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ABSTRACT 
 
Both chronic trauma and shame, as well as the relation between them, are understudied 
phenomena. This is despite particularly high levels of both trauma- and shame-related 
psychopathology in South Africa (Edwards, 2005). I conducted a qualitative study exploring 
experiences of trauma, shame, post-traumatic reactions and coping mechanisms in single 
interviews with 19 South African survivors of chronic trauma (intimate partner violence) 
using narrative analysis. Results from the categorical content analysis indicated that all but 
one participant reported a history of physical violence perpetrated by her intimate partner. 
Sexual and emotional violence were also reported by the majority of the participants. The 
most significant reported mental health outcomes were persistent fear, depression and 
suicidality, dissociation and somatic complaints. Coping mechanisms included religion, 
support from family, counselling and substance misuse. Using smiling as a mask to conceal 
difficult feelings and keeping occupied were cited as the most effective defenses. Shame was 
viewed as a social emotion, and often described as humiliation (and sometimes 
embarrassment), which required the presence of a mocking, hostile audience. This was 
interpreted in socio-cultural terms. Eleven women presented with a split self – the authentic 
self who admitted to a great deal of shame when asked indirectly, and the false self who was 
described in surprisingly positive terms. I analysed this split using categorical content 
analysis and narrative analysis from a social constructivist point of view at individual 
(clinical) level, organisational (micro-cultural) level, and broader cultural level. I used Gee’s 
(1991) categorical form analysis to analyse five long complex shame and trauma narratives 
with the aim of determining if psychic fragmentation presents at linguistic level. I also 
analysed three short, compressed trauma and shame narratives. The structure of the short 
narratives tended to be circular, erratic, disjointed, and interrupted (Scarry, 1985; Simon, 
2008). The three short, compressed trauma narratives were characterised by long pauses or 
silences, hesitations, avoiding eye contact, hunching over, covering the face with clothes, 
whispering, so making the narrative almost inaudible, crying, and defensive leaning in 
towards me, and laughing. These women were exceptions – most women expressed an 
urgency to talk about their experiences in great detail. Although the longer narratives are 
essentially fractured chaos narratives at linguistic level, they contain predominant trauma- 
and shame-related themes that are consistent throughout the narratives and that remain intact 
in spite of the signs of linguistic disruption and fragmentation. They are, in order of 
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narratives, 1) shame/self-blame and deservedness; 2) truth/lies and bearing witness; 3) shame, 
humiliation and dissociation; 4) the concealed, shame-based self, including amnesiac-like 
disorientation of place and time; and 5) patterns of cyclical leave-return reflecting 
perpetrator-instilled abandonment terror, including disorientation of time. I have argued that 
although language, or narrative structure, continues to mimic and reflect narrative content 
(fractured narratives vs fractured selves) – there is also the intriguing possibility of a 
disconnection between form and content; and that thematic coherence or consistency and 
narrative fracturing can co-occur; co-exist. There are a number of clinical features in the 
narratives which are either related to, or comprise diagnostic criteria for chronic trauma 
syndromes such as chronic PTSD and DESNOS, and intersect with shame themes in the 
narratives I analysed. Consequently, I argue that there is a substantial intersection or co-
occurrence between exposure to chronic trauma, and trauma-related clinical symptoms, 
including shame, which emerge from the narratives, which without exception, demonstrate 
significant linguistic fracturing. In conclusion, a number of gaps in the literature were 
identified. Future research should triangulate methods and chronic trauma prevalence and 
longitudinal studies are needed both internationally and locally.  
 Keywords: chronic trauma, shame, psychopathology, narrative analysis 
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OPSOMMING  
 
Sowel kroniese trauma as skaamte, en die verhouding tussen die twee, is tot dusver 
onvoldoende bestudeer – ondanks die besonder algemene voorkoms van trauma- en skaamte-
verwante psigopatologie in Suid-Afrika (Edwards, 2005). Ek het ŉ kwalitatiewe studie 
onderneem en die ervaring van trauma, skaamte, post-traumatiese reaksies en 
oorlewingsmeganismes ondersoek in indiwiduele onderhoude met 19 Suid-Afrikaanse 
oorlewendes van kroniese trauma (geweld in intieme verhoudings). In my ondersoek het ek 
van narratiewe analise gebruik gemaak. Resultate van die kategoriese inhoudsanalise dui aan 
dat ál die vroue in die bestudeerde groep, behalwe een, ‘n geskiedenis van fisieke geweld 
gerapporteer het wat deur haar ‘partner’ gepleeg is. Seksuele en emosionele geweld is ook 
deur die meerderheid van die groep gerapporteer. Die mees betekenisvolle uitkomste in 
verband met psigiese gesondheid was voortdurende angs, depressie, selfmoordneigings, 
dissosiasie en somatiese klagtes. Oorlewingsmeganismes was onder andere godsdiens, 
berading en dwelms. Om ŉ glimlag te gebruik as masker vir die verberging van pynlike 
emosies, en om besig te bly, is genoem as die effektiefste verdedigingsmeganismes. Skaamte 
is gesien as ‘n sosiale emosie, en is dikwels ‘vernedering’ genoem (soms ŉ ‘verleentheid’), 
wat die teenwoordigheid van spottende, vyandige toeskouers impliseer. Skaamte is in die 
studie in sosio-kulturele terme geïnterpreteer. Elf vroue het 'n gesplete self vertoon – die 
outentieke self wat 'n groot hoeveelheid skaamte erken het wanneer hulle indirek daaroor 
uitgevra is, teenoor die valse self wat in verbasend positiewe terme beskryf is. Ek het hierdie 
gesplete self geanaliseer met gebruikmaking van kategoriale inhoudsanalise en ook van 
narratiewe analise uit 'n sosiaal-konstruktiewe perspektief – op 'n indiwiduele (kliniese), 
organisatoriese (mikro-kulturele) en ‘n breër kulturele vlak. Ek het Gee (1991) se kategoriale 
vorm-analise gebruik om vyf lang, komplekse skaamte- en traumanarratiewe te analiseer om 
te bepaal of psigiese fragmentering op 'n linguistiese vlak manifesteer. Ek het ook drie kort, 
gedronge trauma- en skaamtenarratiewe geanaliseer. Die struktuur van die kort narratiewe 
was geneig om sirkulêr, wisselvallig, onsamehangend en onderbroke te wees (Scarry, 1985; 
Simon, 2008). Die drie kort, gedronge traumanarratiewe is gekenmerk deur lang stiltes, 
aarseling, vermyding van oogkontak, vooroor buk, bedekking van die gesig met klere,  
fluistering (sodat die narratief byna onhoorbaar geword het), gehuil, defensiewe oorleun na 
my toe, en gelag. Hierdie drie vroue was uitsonderings – die meeste vroue het 'n dringende 
behoefte laat blyk om in fyn besonderhede oor hulle ervarings te praat. Alhoewel die langer 
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narratiewe op 'n linguistiese vlak wesentlik gefragmenteerde chaos-narratiewe is, bevat hulle 
dominante trauma- en skaamte-temas wat konsekwent deur die verhale aanwesig bly ondanks 
die tekens van linguistiese disrupsie en fragmentering. Hulle is, in die volgorde van die 
narratiewe, 1) skaamte/selfblamering en verdiende loon; 2) waarheid/leuens en getuienis aflê; 
3) skaamte, vernedering en dissosiasie; 4) bedekte, skaamte-gebaseerde self, insluitend die 
amnesieagtige disoriëntering van plek en tyd; en 5) patrone van sikliese vertrek en terugkeer, 
insluitend 'n disoriëntering van plek en tyd – 'n refleksie van die vrees om alleen gelaat te 
word, veroorsaak deur die gewelddadige optrede teen haar. Ek het geredeneer dat, alhoewel 
taal/ narratiewe struktuur geneig is om narratiewe inhoud na te boots en te reflekteer 
(gefragmenteerde narratiewe naas gefragmenteerde self) – is daar ook die interessante 
moontlikheid van 'n diskonneksie tussen vorm en inhoud; en dat tematiese samehang of 
konsekwentheid saam met narratiewe fragmentering kan voorkom. Daar is 'n aantal kliniese 
kenmerke in die narratiewe wat diagnostiese kriteria bevat vir kroniese trauma-sindrome soos 
kroniese PTSD en DESNOS, en wat verband hou met skaamtetemas in die betrokke 
narratiewe. Gevolglik redeneer ek dat daar 'n substansiële oorvleueling of saambestaan is van 
die blootstelling aan kroniese trauma en trauma-verwante kliniese simptome, insluitend 
skaamte. Dit kom na vore in die geanaliseerde narratiewe, wat sonder uitsondering deur 
linguistiese fragmentering gekenmerk word. Ten slotte is ‘n aantal leemtes in die literatuur 
geïdentifiseer. Toekomstige navorsing behoort metodes en algemeen-voorkomende kroniese 
trauma te trianguleer en longitudinale studies, plaaslik en internasionaal, word benodig. 
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2
 that reawakens my rotten shame, I am changed. In the 
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also that we share a common humanity, I am changed. In the face of your soul murder by 
parents [partners
3
] who unleashed their hatred and cruelty upon you, and who even now 
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2
 I interpret this symbolically or metaphorically.  
3
 My insertion. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Trauma and Violence in South Africa 
 
The thread that runs through this thesis is based on the associations between 1) being a 
survivor of trauma – chronic trauma specifically; 2) shame, feelings of “badness”, inferiority, 
defectiveness, being flawed, contaminated and deserving of traumatic events; 3) impaired 
self-esteem; and 4) psychopathology. The analysis focuses on a particular aspect of trauma-
related psychopathology - the split self, or psychic fragmentation (aspects of dissociation), 
which often manifests in language in particular ways.  The associations between aspects 1 – 4 
may seem obvious at first glance, but often remain implicit and unspoken, much like shame 
itself. It is staggering how seldom shame is indexed in texts on trauma, even in contexts like 
South Africa where there are high levels of violence that are likely to evoke shame, like for 
example intimate partner violence (IPV), or sexual abuse. 
The two key features of interest in my study, shame and chronic trauma-related fragmentation 
of self, memory/consciousness or dissociation as outlined later in this paragraph, are 
associated with more inclusive and comprehensive complex trauma syndromes, such as 
Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Disorders of Extreme Stress Not 
Otherwise Specified (DESNOS). This fuelled my interest in the subjective experience of their 
co-occurrence. 
My study is a qualitative study focusing on the associations between exposure to IPV of any 
kind, and experiences of shame. Both chronic trauma and shame, as well as the relation 
between them, are understudied. Despite high levels of both trauma- and shame-related 
psychopathology in South Africa (Edwards, 2005), research in this area remains lacking. This 
is particularly true of process-orientated research (research that focuses on the quality and 
experience of shame) and research which is qualitative in nature as opposed to quantitative 
and outcome focused.  
The reason for my emphasis on trauma is that shame is embedded in trauma. It is often the 
invisible, unspeakable mediator or moderator between exposure to trauma, particularly 
chronic trauma, and psychopathological outcomes. While there is a massive literature on 
trauma, and a separate, considerable literature on shame and its role in psychopathology, what 
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is missing is the association between the two. When shame is mentioned in the context of 
trauma and trauma-related psychopathology, it is often in a transient or co-incidental fashion; 
to date, this association has infrequently been the topic of focused attention, rarely 
internationally, and to my knowledge, never in South Africa.   
I believe the reason for this lack of association is located in the reluctance to engage with 
shame as an outcome of trauma. This is due to the theoretical and emotional complexity 
surrounding this association. Instinctively, one would expect someone who has been 
traumatised to feel hurt, injured, saddened, angered – a range of negative feelings directed 
towards the other, the perpetrator, not bad feelings directed at the self. However, as we will 
discover in subsequent chapters, shame involves the self feeling bad about the self, and 
therefore, intuitively, it does not “fit” with trauma. It seems the wrong way round. As I will 
argue many times in this thesis, shame can function as a defense among people who have 
been abused because it is more bearable to believe that the self is bad, to blame, deserving, 
and so in control, than to accept that the loved perpetrator, whose abuse is random and 
unpredictable, is bad (Fairbairn, 1943; Ferenczi as cited in Orange, 2011). This, at first, is 
counter-intuitive, which is what I believe has kept these literatures separate. I hope to address 
this more fully in the results chapters. 
Finally, I would like to say at the outset that there is some repetition in this thesis. This is 
because it is a complex piece, and repetition was used as a means of assisting the reader in 
navigating his/her way through this dense manuscript, and make links between chapters. The 
repetition is most prominent in the three results chapters (for instance, the choice of analytic 
method and Gee’s framework) due to the complexity of the analytic approach.  
  
Overview of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into five literature review chapters, one methodology chapter, three 
results and preliminary discussion chapters, and one review of findings and conclusion 
chapter. A brief overview of each chapter follows:  
 This opening chapter (Chapter 1) provides a review of exposure to chronic violence, 
self and memory fragmentation (aspects of dissociation) and IPV, with a focus on 
South Africa. This is the first of five chapters reviewing literature relevant to this 
study. 
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 Chapter 2 departs from exposure to violence, and shifts to focus on shame. In this 
chapter I locate myself theoretically, and mainly focus on phenomenology, although I 
select aspects of other theories which also bear relevance to my understanding of 
shame.   
 Chapter 3 is also a theoretical chapter, which focuses on the distinctions between 
shame and related (self-conscious) emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, 
humiliation, and pride. I also describe and compare associated constructs such as 
empathy, sympathy, personal distress, anger, hostility and aggression. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide the reader with a thorough and detailed understanding of 
shame, which, as a complex construct, is not easily defined.  
 Chapter 4 is a short chapter on shame and culture. In this chapter I provide a review 
of shame and culture, focusing particularly on the international literature on cultures of 
honour and shame which have bearing on urban, poverty-stricken, patriarchal South 
African communities. I also review guilt and shame in individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures, and universalist and cultural constructions of shame.  
 Chapter 5 is the final literature review chapter and explores the associations between 
exposure to trauma, shame and a range of psychopathologies. I will review the 
literature on the contributions of emotional, physical and sexual abuse to shame and 
psychopathology; the contributions of parenting and attachment patterns to shame and 
psychopathology; and the consequences of trauma for shame reactions and a range of 
psychopathologies. I focus on psychopathologies such as Complex Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD), depression, anxiety, and dissociation due to their frequent 
association with both trauma and shame. I stress both comorbidity, and the likelihood 
of shame and splitting or psychic fragmentation co-occuring in chronically 
traumatised individuals. The empirical tone of this chapter is at odds with the 
ethnographic nature of my study, but is a function of the kinds of literature on trauma-
related outcomes.  
 In Chapter 6, I outline my method, including a description of my main aim and 
objectives, my research design, and procedure. I describe my interview schedule, and 
describe and defend my approach towards data analysis (narrative analysis, with a 
social constructivist focus), followed by ethical considerations.  
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 Chapter 7 is the first of three results chapters. This chapter is a background chapter 
which begins with a description of my rapport-building with my participants, and then 
presents a mainly descriptive account of the range of psychopathological outcomes 
associated with IPV exposure, based on the categorical content analysis. 
 Chapter 8 is located within phenomenological theory as well as a social constructivist 
approach to narrative analysis, and acts as a theoretical “bridge” between chapter 7 
and chapter 9. It discusses the participants’ divergent descriptions of themselves, 
indicative of a split between the authentic self and the false self; the perpetrator-
defined self and the survivor-defined self, a common post-traumatic response. I 
explore to what extent this split is shame-based, and how it occurs at individual, 
organisational and cultural levels. These results are mostly based on the categorical 
content analysis, and the social constructivist approach to narrative analysis.  
 Chapter 9 presents a categorical form analysis that dovetails with the method used in 
chapter 8. This chapter includes a more complex linguistic analysis of trauma and/or 
shame narratives with the aim of exploring narrative fragmentation (as well as 
compression) at linguistic level, deepening the analysis presented in chapter 8.  
Chapters 8 and 9 also include some substantial preliminary interpretation.  
 Chapter 10 reviews the results, and links them to the theory and the findings 
presented in the earlier literature review chapters. I discuss the limitations to my study, 
and conclude the chapter with recommendations for future research.  
 
The Aim of the Remaining Part of This Chapter 
 
The purpose of this first chapter is to orientate the reader by providing a background or social 
context to the study for the reader. South Africa is a violent country, which increases the 
likelihood and prevalence of exposure to violence and trauma, often on an ongoing basis. 
Although rates of unintentional morbidity and mortality (burns, road traffic or pedestrian 
accidents, poisoning) are unacceptably high in South Africa (Van Niekerk, Suffla, & Seedat, 
2008), my focus will be on intentional violence. In the first part of this chapter, I define 
chronic trauma, as shame has been more consistently associated with chronic trauma than 
acute trauma, and I draw on the work of key international experts on trauma who focus 
significant attention on chronic trauma and associated psychological symptoms, such as 
Herman (1997), Ford and Courtois (2009), and Van der Kolk and colleagues (Van der Kolk, 
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2005; Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995; Van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinazzola, 
2005), as well as a recent South African publication by Kaminer and Eagle (2010) which 
draws together a great deal of the most important (often international) literature in this limited 
field. In the chapters that follow, particularly chapter 2, I rely heavily on H.B. Lewis (1971), 
as it is her seminal phenomenological work on shame that is the lens through which I view 
my data, and on Gilbert’s (1998) evolutionary theory. I am aware of my heavy reliance on 
these scholars, which is due to the lack of alternative solid scholarship in the field. In this 
section I will also refer to some studies on memory/narrative fragmentation and impairment 
due to the centrality of these concepts to my study. Most of the trauma literature focuses on 
acute, single incident trauma, as opposed to chronic trauma, but since my study is on chronic 
trauma, only brief mention will be made of this vast body of literature. Because my 
participants are a group of women who are survivors of IPV, I will include a review of the 
South African literature on IPV in the next part of the chapter. It is, however, important to 
note that the focus of my thesis is not on gender-based violence as such. I am more interested 
in questions concerning chronicity of exposure to trauma and violence. This does not mean 
that gender will be ignored in this thesis. Female gender is a significant risk factor for IPV; it 
is the reason that I have included a rather extensive review of IPV-related studies in this 
introductory chapter. It is also significant that IPV involves exposure to trauma of an 
interpersonal nature, which has been related to the highest probability of increased PTSD 
symptoms (Green et al., 2000). Furthermore, the consequences of gendered vulnerability is 
explored in detail in chapter 8, where women explain how so-called “cultures of honour” – 
particular types of patriarchal cultures - play an important role in their trauma-related 
splitting. But I must emphasise that in terms of recruitment, I selected women who have been 
exposed to IPV primarily because they have, without exception, been exposed to violence on 
an ongoing or chronic basis.  
 
Definitions and Seminal International Works on Chronic Trauma 
 
An influential theorist in the field of trauma, Herman (1997), has argued that among the many 
examples of psychological trauma which have affected public consciousness since the late 
nineteenth century, three are crucial to understanding contemporary views on trauma, and 
each has been associated with particular political movements. The first was hysteria (affiliated 
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with the republican, anticlerical movement of late 19th century France); the second was shell 
shock or combat neurosis (affiliated with post-World War I England and U.S., and post-
Vietnam war); and the third is sexual and domestic violence (affiliated with the feminist 
movement of Western Europe and North America) (Herman, 1997), and its sequelae, which I 
explore in my study
4
. In this chapter, I rely heavily on the work of  Herman (1997), 
consequently, when citing her extensively, I will not provide a reference after each of her 
assertions, only where a reference is needed for the purposes of clarity, such as at the end of a 
paragraph (this I will do in all cases where citing authors extensively). The subject of chronic 
trauma deliberately perpetrated evokes a great deal of controversy. It involves attention to the 
unthinkable and unspeakable, which results in long periods of amnesia, periodically forgotten 
and periodically reclaimed.  
Defining trauma is a challenging task. The English word “trauma” originates from the ancient 
Greek word for “injury” or “wound” (Ford & Courtois, 2009). Trauma may be used to refer to 
the traumatic stressor event, including the person’s experience during the event, and the 
person’s response whether peri-traumatic or post-traumatic (Ford & Courtois, 2009). 
According to Weathers and Keane (as cited in Ford & Courtois, 2009, p. 14):  
Achieving a consensus definition of trauma is essential for progress in the field of 
traumatic stress. However, creating an all-purpose, general definition has proven 
remarkably difficult. Stressors vary along a number of dimensions, including 
magnitude (which itself varies on a number of dimensions, e.g., life threat, threat of 
harm, interpersonal loss…), complexity, frequency, duration, predictability, and 
controllability. At the extremes, i.e., catastrophes versus minor hassles, different 
stressors may seem discrete and qualitatively distinct, but there is a continuum of 
stressor severity and there are no crisp boundaries demarcating ordinary stressors from 
traumatic stressors. Further, perception of an event as stressful depends on subjective 
appraisal, making it difficult to define stressors objectively, and independent of 
personal meaning making. 
Two broad but helpful conceptual perspectives have emerged in the literature addressing 
exposure to violence. The first trend includes research examining the effects of acute 
exposure to violence on intrapsychic processes (simple, single-event trauma, otherwise known 
as Type I trauma) (Pynoos & Eth, 1987; Terr, 1983, 1991). Research within the second 
                                                 
4
 There are other defining political movements as well, such as the Nazi Holocaust, and Stalanism, as well as 
Rwanda, among many others. I am not suggesting that trauma is defined by these movements alone. 
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tradition is distinguishable from the first by its focus on continuous or multiple exposures to 
trauma (complex or chronic trauma, otherwise known as Type II trauma) (Terr, 1991). Green 
et al. (2000) demonstrate that exposure to an acute trauma (Type I trauma) increases the 
likelihood of exposure to further trauma (Type II trauma), and that multiple exposure is 
associated with worse outcomes. Thus, Type I and Type II can also be distinguished by the 
symptoms they evoke. Terr (1991) argues that Type I and II traumas can co-exist, but that 
what differentiates Type II trauma from Type I trauma (apart from chronicity) is the 
prevalence of denial and numbing, self-hypnosis and dissociation, and rage. Furthermore, in 
addition to the extreme fear, helplessness and horror experienced by those exposed to Type I 
trauma, those exposed to Type II trauma experience disruptions in the capacity for 
psychobiological self-regulation and secure attachment (Ford & Courtois, 2009). What is 
important to note in the context of this study, is that chronic (Type II) interpersonal exposure 
has been associated with the highest risk for elevated PTSD symptoms (Green et al., 2000).  
Chronic exposure to traumas including abandonment, betrayal, physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
threats to bodily integrity, coercive practices, emotional abuse, and witnessing violence and 
death, produces patterns of ongoing affective, somatic, behavioural, cognitive, relational and 
representational dysregulation. When experienced in childhood, such trauma exposure can 
lead to changed attributions and expectances, negative self-esteem, distrust, loss of the 
expectation of being protected, continuous fear of future victimisation and serious functional 
impairments in almost every dimension of functioning, including educational, familial, 
relational and vocational domains (Van der Kolk, 2005). 
As I show in chapters 7 and 8, for the women I interviewed, trauma was ordinary, rather than 
extraordinary; it was part of their daily lives. Herman (1997) argues that traumatic events are 
unusual not in that they occur rarely, but that they overwhelm ordinary human adaptations to 
life. They usually involve threats to life or bodily integrity, and/or confrontation with violence 
or death (Herman, 1997). Trauma evokes helplessness and terror. Herman (1997) identifies 
key symptoms of PTSD – hyperarousal, intrusion and constriction. Each of these symptoms is 
exaggerated (in intensity and duration) in survivors of chronic trauma, particularly 
constriction. Hyperarousal includes exaggerated startle reactions, hyperalertness, and 
vigilance for the return of danger, nightmares, and psychosomatic complaints. In intrusion, 
survivors of trauma relive the traumatic event as if it was recurring in the present. Of 
particular relevance to my study is that intrusive memories lack verbal narrative and context. 
Instead, they are remembered in the form of intense, vivid sensations and images. 
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Traumatised individuals may also act on intrusive memories, recreating the traumatic event, 
either in literal or disguised manner, so demonstrating a diminished regard for danger. In 
constriction, the self goes into a state of complete surrender – s/he escapes from an intolerable 
situation by altering his/her state of consciousness. This tendency towards dissociation and 
emotional numbing may occur naturally (through changes in the regulation of endogenous 
opioids) or enhanced by the use of alcohol and other substances. Although constriction is an 
effective defense against overwhelming emotion, powerlessness and helplessness, it can result 
in amnesia, or at the very least, truncated memory, and often leads to a narrowing or 
restriction of life. It also interferes with plans for the future (e.g. a sense of foreshortened 
future), forcing survivors to live in an endless present, the past becoming a split off, 
dissociated fragment, never to be accessed. Intrusion and constriction often oscillate, with an 
emotional instability that may exacerbate the traumatised person’s sense of unpredictability, 
uncontrollability and helplessness. The literature on chronic trauma-related shame emphasises 
rejection and immense loss as important predictors of depression (Mollon, 2002).  However, 
learned helplessness in particular is also a primary contributor to chronic trauma-related 
depression (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). The chronic hyperarousal and intrusive memories of post-
traumatic stress amplify the vegetative symptoms of depression. The constriction also fuses 
with the concentration difficulties associated with depression. The numbing of initiative 
associated with chronic trauma combines with the apathy and helplessness of depression. The 
disruptions in attachment so typical of chronic trauma (as I shall discuss later) merges with 
the isolation of depression. The pervasiveness of depression is perhaps accountable for the 
high suicide rate among survivors of IPV (Herman, 1997).  
As can be seen, a number of symptoms can be evoked as a result of prolonged exposure to 
trauma. One of the main distinctions between PTSD and Complex PTSD is chronicity of 
exposure. Ford and Courtois (2009, p. 13) emphasise that symptoms associated with ongoing 
exposure arise when the stressors are “1) repetitive or prolonged, 2) involve harm or 
abandonment by caregivers or other ostensibly responsible adults, and 3) occur at 
developmentally vulnerable times in the victim’s life, such as early childhood or 
adolescence”. There has been some discussion about whether shame should be included as a 
criterion in a number of trauma-based syndromes in the next edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) framework of the American Psychiatric Association (American 
Psychological Association, 1994). This is true for childhood Complex PTSD, adult Complex 
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PTSD and Disorders of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specific (DESNOS) in the same 
diagnostic system. It is likely to fall under alterations in self-perception.  
Diagnostic criteria for DESNOS include affect and impulse dysregulation, biological 
dysregulation (i.e. somatisation), disruptions in attention or consciousness, distorted 
perceptions of the perpetrator/s, distorted self-perceptions, including profound shame and 
guilt, difficulties in relationships, and problematic systems of meaning or sustaining beliefs 
(Ford & Courtois, 2009). DESNOS is most likely to develop following trauma in early 
childhood and when the trauma involves interpersonal violence or violation (Ford & Courtois, 
2009). Overall, it takes into account the key features of chronic trauma which are dissociation, 
emotion dysregulation, somatic problems, relational or spiritual alienation, impaired self 
development, and disorganised attachment patterns (Ford & Courtois, 2009). This prevents 
the individual from being able to draw upon relationships for support (Ford & Courtois, 
2009). Similarly, Van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinazzola (2005) found that 
survivors of prolonged interpersonal trauma, especially trauma early in life, had difficulties 
with (a) regulation of affect and impulses, (b) memory and attention, (c) self-perception, (d) 
interpersonal relations, (e) somatisation, and (f) systems of meaning. These criteria are not 
captured by the simple PTSD diagnosis. PTSD is an anxiety disorder, while DESNOS 
involves self-regulatory problems that involve deep and persistent difficulties with 
overwhelming emotional distress, dissociation, loss of trust and faith, and chronic 
unexplained somatic complaints (Ford & Courtois, 2009). The co-occurrence of what in the 
DSM system are categorised as Axis I disorders along with PTSD, as well as Axis II disorders 
(i.e. personality disorders) with PTSD often leads to a somewhat confusing array of 
comorbidity combinations that do not cohere as a syndrome (Ford & Courtois, 2009). PTSD 
often involves Axis I disorders that include anxiety (phobias, generalised anxiety, panic, 
obsessions), mood disturbances (major depression, dysthymia, mania) or disruptions in self-
regulation (schizophrenia, dissociative disorders, eating disorders, substance use disorders), 
and with childhood externalising and internalising disorders (Attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder) (Ford & Courtois, 2009). Axis II personality disorders are also supposed to be 
distinct from PTSD, yet BPD (in particular), schizotypal disorder and antisocial personality 
disorders occur frequently comorbidly (Ford & Courtois, 2009). This leads to frequent 
erroneous diagnoses, (often BPD or schizophrenia) (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010) which 
undermines clinical efficiency and the effectiveness of treatments (Ford & Courtois, 2009). 
These authors argue that DESNOS is the closest a clinician can come to an accurate, single 
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complex trauma syndrome for complexly exposed adults. An equivalent syndrome that has 
recently been developed for complexly exposed children is Developmental Trauma Disorder 
(DTD) (Ford & Courtois, 2009). It is interesting to note that disorganised attachments and 
chronic child abuse have been identified as significant risk factors for the development of 
personality disorders, particularly BPD, and dissociative disorders in adulthood (Brown, 
Linehan, Comtois, Murray, & Chapman, 2009). Shame has been identified as a core 
component on this syndrome (Linehan, 1993). 
Of further relevance to my study is the potential for social disconnection that trauma 
represents. Trauma severely impairs the traumatised individual’s capacity for secure 
attachments (Herman, 1997). When the perpetrator is an intimate partner, the traumatised 
individual is extremely vulnerable, because the person who should be the safest, who should 
protect her, is the source of danger. This kind of violence destroys the individual’s 
assumptions of safety, the positive value of the self and the meaningful order of the world. It 
undermines the survivor’s sense of initiative, autonomy and individual competence, returning 
him/her to earlier developmental conflicts (Herman, 1997). Trauma survivors also have 
difficulty in emotional regulation, and may oscillate between uncontrolled rage and total 
intolerance of any form of aggression, a pattern that may alienate others. Similar oscillations 
happen in the regulation of intimacy. Trauma causes individuals both to withdraw from 
intimacy and seek intimate relationships desperately. Because of their particular sensitivities 
in relationships, trauma survivors’ psychological outcomes are severely impaired if they are 
exposed to harsh judgments from others, but simple, easy pronouncements absolving him/her 
of responsibility are also not facilitative of positive outcomes.  
Prolonged or chronic traumatisation has long-term consequences. These experiences tend to 
produce extreme difficulty in trusting others which may result in social isolation and 
withdrawal; alternatively, the intense need for love and acceptance in these survivors may 
result in him/her trusting indiscriminately or becoming very accommodating of others’ needs 
in an attempt to prevent abandonment from them. Both these patterns are typical of 
disorganised attachment styles (Herman, 1997; Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). This increases the 
likelihood that chronically traumatised individuals continue to be emotionally or physically 
abused by others.  
IPV is unique because women are not held in captivity, and physical barriers to escape are 
rare (Herman, 1997). Women are made captive by their economic, social, psychological and 
legal disempowerment, in addition to physical force. Captivity, whether political or domestic, 
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means prolonged contact with the perpetrator, which creates a relationship of coercive 
control. Control is established by the systematic, repetitive perpetration of psychological 
trauma. The two most common techniques include disempowerment and disconnection. In 
addition to inducing constant fear in the survivor, the perpetrator also typically seeks to 
impair the survivor’s sense of autonomy and dignity by scrutinising and controlling her body 
and bodily functions, and by using sexual threats and violations or humiliations. What is so 
compelling in the relationship between perpetrator and survivor is that once the perpetrator 
has achieved bodily control over the survivor, he not only continues to control her through 
fear and humiliation, but by intermittently granting her small indulgences. These rewards bind 
the survivor to the perpetrator: apologies, expressions of love, promises of change, appeals to 
loyalty and compassion, all break down psychological resistance and agency. But total 
domination is dependent on the successful destruction of the survivors’ other relationships. 
This is why perpetrators isolate survivors from emotional support, information or material aid. 
Jealous surveillance is a common form of isolating survivors of IPV. This further binds the 
woman to her captor, enhancing her dependence on him because he is the only human 
connection she has left. As Herman (1997) points out, since women frequently draw pride and 
self-esteem from sustaining their relationships, the perpetrator ensnares the survivor by 
appealing to her core values. In sum, the perpetrator holds the survivor captive, entrenching 
submission and compliance through evoking terror, through intermittent rewards, through 
social isolation and forced dependency. This may render the survivor passive or helpless 
because she has learnt that any initiative she takes may be interpreted as insubordination, and 
punished (Herman, 1997).  
In Herman’s words (1997, p. 69), “from those who bear witness, the survivor seeks not 
absolution but fairness, compassion, and the willingness to share the guilty knowledge of 
what happens to people in extremity”. A community which acknowledges and recognises the 
traumas the women have endured, and tries to take some form of corrective action, Herman 
(1997) argues, facilitate healing. This is important because there may be another layer to 
chronic deliberate trauma and victimisation, which involves the way in which the perpetrator 
may invite bystanders implicitly to collude in the abuse. As Herman (1997) suggests, for the 
perpetrator to be protected from the consequences of his actions, all he requires is a kind of 
passivity from members of society – forgetting, secrecy, silence and denial, a collusion (even 
if passive) with the perpetrator’s attacks on the credibility of the victim. For the victim to 
receive justice, much more is required of bystanders. The victim asks the bystander to believe 
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in and share her pain. This silencing and secrecy (which reproduces and extends the 
asymmetrical power relationship between abuser and victim, but in a more public domain, 
and which protects members of that public from having to face what to them may be horrific 
or unthinkable) has been labelled second injury or betrayal trauma (Ford & Courtois, 2009). It 
may lead to what authors have termed a splitting in the personality, where the individual 
maintains a front or façade of an “apparently normal” personality which is functional and, 
crucially, gives the victim a role in protecting the public from being exposed to the 
unthinkable and unspeakable. This personality in itself may however be isolated, cut off or 
unaware of the trauma, and disconnected from an “emotional” personality that is crippled 
psychosocially by the knowledge of the trauma (Ford & Courtois, 2009, p. 18).  
A great deal of research shows that battered women are strongly, albeit traumatically attached 
to their abusers, a phenomenon which is frequently rooted in histories of disorganised 
attachment patterns with caregivers (Renn, 2012). Renn (2012) argues that in such situations, 
disturbances in attachments are the product of increasing deviations in the caregiver-child 
relationship which make the child’s adaptive functioning less and less likely. If the 
caregiver’s responses to the child generate feelings of fear, shame, and rage, feelings of threat, 
anxiety and insecurity, the child’s anger may become dysfunctional and “split off” – become 
an alien, dissociated part of the self which has implications for adult psychopathology (Renn, 
2012). Renn (2012) suggests that the dominant and controlling behaviour so typical of abusers 
is rooted in acute separation anxiety and fear of abandonment. It is also worth emphasising, in 
the context of intergenerational trauma, that: 
An important motivational factor in the perpetuation of archaic attachment bonds in 
the here-and-now is the desire to recreate a familiar relationship pattern, however 
violent and self-destructive this may be, precisely because it is familiar and thus, in a 
paradoxical way, provides a modicum of felt security. (Renn, 2012, p. 143) 
Repeated traumatic experiences in childhood “train” the brain to be responsive to danger or 
threat at the expense of focusing on learning language, flexible adaptation to change and 
stress, healthy attachments and fostering exploration (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). Thus, the 
neural pathways associated with responding to danger or threat become overdeveloped, and 
those associated with other capacities remain underdeveloped (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). 
Individuals who have been chronically traumatised tend to rigidly perceive the world as 
dangerous, others as untrustworthy and the self as incompetent, non-deserving and worthless 
(Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). 
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Fragmentation of Self and Memory 
 
Fragmentation of self and memory (key features of dissociation) is a key feature of complex 
trauma. Special attention is given to this symptom of chronic trauma because it provides 
background information to the examination of splitting or psychic fragmentation of self and 
memory and its possible co-occurrence with shame in the narratives of the chronically 
traumatised women later in the thesis.  
The complexity and ease with which trauma narratives can be read depends on the peri-
traumatic dissociation of narrators (Zoellner, Alvarez-Conrad, & Foa, 2002). Results of the 
Zoellner et al. (2002) study indicate that trauma narratives constructed by those with high 
peri-traumatic dissociation had higher grade levels and a tendency toward reading ease 
(indices of sophistication of articulation) than the narratives constructed by low dissociators. 
Finding the association with higher grade levels was contrary to expectation, since higher 
grade level has been associated with lower PTSD symptoms (Zoellner et al., 2002). 
Van der Kolk and Fisler (1995) argue that trauma memories in those with PTSD are unique 
because they involve learned conditioning, difficulties in modulating arousal, and shattered 
meaning propositions. These difficulties are characterised by changes in neurobiological 
processes affecting discrimination (manifesting as increased arousal and decreased attention), 
the acquisition of conditioned fear responses to trauma-related triggers, and changed cognitive 
schemata and social fear (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). It is declarative memory (explicit 
memory) which involves conscious awareness of facts or events that is seriously adversely 
affected by lesions of the frontal lobe and of the hippocampus, which have also been 
implicated in the aetiology of PTSD (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Dissociation (a central 
feature of PTSD) interferes with semantic memory and complicates the ability to 
communicate the trauma (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Interestingly, these authors report 
that during the provocation of traumatic memories, there was a reduction in the activation of 
Broca’s area in the brain, the part of the central nervous system implicated in the 
transformation of subjective experience into language. At the same time, the areas in the right 
hemisphere associated with the processing of intense emotions and visual images markedly 
increased in activation (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). This explains why traumatic 
experiences are initially organised without semantic or linguistic representations; traumatic 
memories tend to be experienced as fragments of the sensory components of the event, or as 
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intense emotions, particularly initially (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Participants in this 
study all reported that they initially “remembered” the trauma in the form of somatosensory 
flashback experiences, occurring as visual, olfactory, affective, auditory and kinaesthetic 
modalities (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). One of the unique characteristics of traumatic 
memory is that it is characterised by intense autonomic hyperarousal, and the repetitive, fixed, 
intrusive reliving of traumatic memories when in similar situations (Van der Kolk & Van der 
Hart, 1995). It was only over time that the participants in Van der Kolk and Fisler’s (1995) 
study could construct a narrative that explained what happened to them; once they had 
become more aware and conscious of what the traumatic experience entailed. 
This fragmented quality of traumatic memory is explained by Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 
(1995) as occurring because familiar and expectable experiences are automatically integrated, 
while terrifying or novel experiences may not fit as neatly or easily into existing cognitive 
schemas, and so resist integration. Pre-existing schemas determine to what degree new 
information is integrated (Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). New experiences are 
understood only in the context of prior schemas, which has implications for the association 
between childhood and adult onset abuse (Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). Unintegrated 
memories become subconscious fixed ideas; it is as if chronically traumatised people 
experience arrested personality development at the point of trauma(s), and they are unable to 
change or expand by the addition or assimilation of elements (Van der Kolk, 1994; Van der 
Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). The most extreme form of this is Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID) (Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). The healthy mind creates flexible schemas, and 
constantly searches for new ways of putting experiences together, and for new categories to 
create (Van der Kolk, 1994; Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). In addition, the healthy 
mind is more likely to reflect accurate memories when new ideas and information are 
combined with old knowledge because it is able to create flexible mental schemas (Van der 
Kolk & Van der Hart, 1995). These authors argue that recovery could be encouraged by 
bringing a survivor back to the state in which the traumatic memory was first experienced in 
order to create the condition in which the fragmented, dissociated memory could be integrated 
into present meaning schemas. 
The way in which the trauma is represented in memory affects how trauma narratives are 
articulated. Trauma can lead to either retention or forgetting – in some instances the event is 
remembered vividly and with clarity, in other instances all memory may be lost or absent, so 
totally resisting integration (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). In instances where abuse began 
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early, and was prolonged, the survivor is likely to suffer significant memory loss or amnesia . 
When the survivor also suffers from dissociation, it makes it all the more difficult to construct 
a coherent autobiographical narrative; this is due to disruptions in memory (Van der Kolk & 
Fisler, 1995).   
Many scholars argue that memories of traumatic events are more fragmented and disorganised 
than memories of non-traumatic memories; and that individuals with PTSD have the most 
fragmented and disorganised events (Amir, Stafford, Freshman, & Foa, 1998).These authors 
found that the level of articulation (simplicity/complexity) of rape narratives was inversely 
associated to chronic PTSD, which is consistent with the idea that simpler, less developed 
trauma narratives impede recovery (Amir et al., 1998). Unlike Amir et al. (1998), however, 
Gray and Lombardo (2001) found that differences between PTSD and no PTSD groups on 
writing complexity measures for trauma narratives disappeared when cognitive and writing 
skills were controlled for.  
Contrary to Koss, Figueredo, Bell, Tharan, and Tromp’s (1996) expectations, in a study of 
rape narratives (compared to narratives about other unpleasant and pleasant events), they 
found that these narratives were less clear and vivid, less visually detailed and less likely to 
occur in meaningful order, less well-remembered, less communicated about, less commonly 
recalled either voluntarily or involuntarily, with less sensory components, and including less 
re-experiencing of the physical sensations, emotions, and thoughts that accompanied the 
original trauma. Impaired recall was attributed to the blame and shame surrounding rape, 
which may facilitate cognitive avoidance of the incident (Koss et al., 1996). Other studies 
have also explored cognitive (and emotional) disruptions in processing associated with post-
traumatic symptoms. Newman, Riggs and Roth (1997) found that individuals with PTSD and 
concurrent Complex PTSD experienced more difficulty in adaptively resolving trauma-related 
emotional themes (including shame) than individuals without PTSD and those with PTSD 
who did not have concurrent Complex PTSD. These individuals’ narratives where also 
characterised by a great deal of thematic disruption or fragmentation (Newman et al., 1997). 
Thus, thematic (non-) resolution and disruption were only characteristic of those with the 
most severe post-trauma pathology, which the authors attributed to changes in basic 
cognitive-affective organisation.  
Halligan, Michael, Clark and Ehlers (2003) also examined traumatic memory. These authors 
argued that although survivors may remember some features of the trauma with surprising 
clarity, the overall memory structure is typically confused, and characterised by uncertainty 
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around the sequence of events, with some aspects of the trauma erased from memory. It is 
important to note dissociation, surface-level, data-driven processing (i.e. processing sensory 
impressions and perceptual characteristics) or lack of self-reference processing (i.e. an 
inability to establish a self-referential perspective) during the trauma is associated with 
disorganised trauma memories, and this was particularly evident among current PTSD 
participants and recovered PTSD participants (compared to the no PTSD group). Trauma 
memory disorganisation was one of the factors that predicted chronic PTSD (Halligan et al., 
2003).  
A large body of research on trauma cognition suggests that traumatic memories in individuals 
diagnosed with PTSD should be dominated by sensory impression, perceptual characteristics 
and emotional experience; should lack interconnection and organisation, particularly in 
personal or event time; should lack a self-referential perspective, but where it does occur, be 
pervaded by themes of negative self-evaluation, ineffectiveness, disempowerment and loss of 
agency (all correlates of shame) (O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). In their review of this body of 
literature, the authors demonstrate that there is a predominance of 
sensory/perceptual/emotional language in PTSD trauma narratives, and that there is an 
association between this kind of language and peri-traumatic dissociation and intrusive 
memories. The aspect of trauma narratives which was most severely affected was temporal 
organisation (O’Kearney & Perrot, 2006).  
Sawyer’s (2003) work is also of relevance here. He supports the idea that narrative coherence 
increases across repeated utterances of the story. For him, narrative coherence is the 
conciseness with which the story can be told. Thus, his focus is not on interrelatedness, but on 
precision in narratives (Sawyer, 2003). This increase in precision and conciseness in 
narratives is known as narrative compression
5
, and it is thought to contribute to cognitive 
development (Sawyer, 2003). Whether narrative compression applies to trauma narratives 
remains to be seen. If it can be applied to trauma narratives, it might be used to explain why 
some women had shorter trauma narratives than others – perhaps these women had told their 
story many more times than the women with longer, more complex narratives. This 
proposition, however, is in conflict with the vast majority of research which indicates that 
longer and more complex trauma narratives are characteristic of recovery from trauma, e.g. 
Gray and Lombardo (2001).  
                                                 
5
 The term “compression” is used later in the thesis to refer to some of the narratives examined in the analysis 
chapters, but is not used in the same way as in Sawyer (2003) – in the analysis, it is meant only to point to the 
length of the narrative.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
 
 
In this section we have looked specifically at fragmentation of self and memory as a very 
particular symptom of chronic trauma. In the next section I broaden my focus. Since traumatic 
experiences are always socially located, I turn now to a discussion of trauma and violence in 
South Africa. 
 
Current South African Understandings of the Consequences of Chronic Trauma 
 
Published, systematically collected information about the impact of chronic exposure to 
trauma and violence is lacking (Kaminer, 2010). Most research focuses on “simple” or acute 
trauma, and its clinical consequences, without attention to continuous exposure in high-risk 
contexts such as South Africa, and possible mediators or mechanisms for activating this 
association. We still know very little about the psychological effects of prolonged child 
physical and sexual abuse and IPV. Though this gap in the literature is a problem world-wide, 
there is a special need for research in this area in South Africa, where rates of ongoing abuse 
are high (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). Thus, the psychological consequences of multiple or 
chronic traumatisation still remain unclear – this is both because we lack the necessary data 
and because the clinical picture is complex. These survivors often develop psychological 
symptoms that are not consistent with PTSD or other diagnoses typically associated with 
acute trauma (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). This is because there is no “post” trauma in the lives 
of people who are exposed to continual, ongoing trauma across their lifespan (Kaminer, 
2010). As has been noted, some researchers have noted that the pattern of psychopathology 
accompanying complex trauma involves dysregulation of affect and impulses (ongoing 
distress, self-harming or high-risk behaviour), biological dysregulation (somatisation), 
dysregulation of attention or consciousness (dissociation), alterations in self-perception 
(intense shame and guilt, poor self-esteem, viewing the self as deeply damaged and 
ineffectual), distortions in the perception of the perpetrator (idealisation or constant 
preoccupation with revenge), disturbed relations with others (difficulty in trusting, 
revictimisation and avoidance of sexuality), and alterations in systems of meaning (loss of 
faith and hopelessness) (Benjamin & Crawford-Browne, 2010). This has led to suggestions 
that in the context of chronic and complex trauma, the diagnostic categories of Complex 
PTSD and DESNOS are more appropriate than PTSD (Benjamin & Crawford-Browne, 2010).  
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The psychological consequences of prolonged or chronic traumatisation are thus complex, 
and may differ from classic PTSD symptoms, thus rendering diagnosis difficult. Due to this, 
and the fact that survivors – due to feelings of shame – frequently do not share their traumatic 
experiences, these patients are often diagnosed with a “mixed bag” of different disorders 
(Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). As I have emphasised, without an understanding of the complex 
manifestations of chronic traumatisation, these individuals may repeatedly receive ineffective 
treatment (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). 
Trauma is implicated in the aetiology of most psychological disorders, and internationally, as 
in the South African context, substance abuse, phobias and depression, and particularly 
somatic symptoms are – in addition to PTSD – common responses to trauma (Kaminer & 
Eagle, 2010). Other psychological phenomena associated with chronic trauma include a 
disturbed sense of personal identity, manifest in feelings of fragmentation (e.g. experiencing 
feelings as being foreign, uncontrollable and frightening), detachment, feelings of non-
existence, and alterations in consciousness (such as “blanking out” and not being aware 
afterwards of what s/he said or did while this happened). Echoing international literature, 
Kaminer and Eagle (2010) stress that survivors of chronic trauma may also experience 
feelings of helplessness, powerlessness and passivity, and typically blame themselves rather 
than the perpetrator for the abuse. This is because it is more tolerable to believe that the self is 
bad and deserving of maltreatment than to believe a loved one has chosen to hurt them. These 
feelings give rise to feelings of worthlessness, feelings of being despicable, unlovable, 
contaminated and possibly evil, all of which are accompanied by the experience of shame 
(Kaminer & Eagle, 2010).  
Survivors of chronic trauma may engage in either or both behavioural self-blame (e.g. I was 
not vigilant enough or I didn’t fight back hard enough) and characterological blame (I was 
chosen as a victim because of my character or personal qualities) (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). 
There is some evidence that characterological self-blame occurs more frequently in those who 
have been chronically traumatised, and that it is associated  particularly with depressive 
symptoms and low self-esteem (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010).   
There are a small number of primary studies on chronic trauma in South Africa, but they 
focus on children and adolescents, and/or political violence, which make them inappropriate 
for citing in this study (Barbarin, Richter, & DeWet, 2001; Shields, Nadasen, & Pierce, 2008; 
Suliman et al., 2009; Ward, Flisher, Zissis, Muller, & Lombard, 2001; Williams et al., 2007), 
and thus they are excluded. 
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An exception is a nationally representative study emphasising the co-occurrence of various 
forms of violence, where the authors found that three quarters of South Africans had 
experienced at least one traumatic event during their lifetimes, the most common of which 
was the unexpected death of a loved one (Williams et al., 2007). Other traumas that occurred 
frequently included witnessing trauma, threats to one’s life, criminal victimisation and IPV. In 
this study, exposure to one form of violence put the individual at risk of exposure to other 
forms of violence. As a result, participants experienced high levels of psychological distress, 
which put them at risk for developing clinically relevant disorders (Williams et al., 2007).  
 
To conclude this section, as noted at the outset of the thesis, I will not be reviewing South 
African studies on acute trauma. For the interested reader, there is a huge body of research on 
both the prevalence and consequences of acute violence in South Africa (Barbarin & Richter, 
2001; Bouwer & Stein, 1998; Carey, Stein, Zungu-Dirwayi, & Seedat, 2003; Dawes & Ward, 
2008; Ford & Courtois, 2009; Jewkes, Levin, Mbananga, & Bradshaw, 2002; Kaminer, 
Grimsrud, Myer, Stein, & Williams, 2008; Norman, Matzopoulos, Groenewald, & Bradshaw, 
2007; Schoeman, Carey, & Seedat, 2009; Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005; Van der Merwe & 
Dawes, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). 
 
Gender and Violence in South Africa 
 
Defining violence against women is a complex task – the terms domestic violence, gender-
based violence, and IPV are often used interchangeably, although there are distinctions 
between them. IPV is the most specific of these terms, and describes perpetration of 
psychological, emotional or verbal abuse; social abuse (social isolation); economic abuse; and 
sexual abuse and physical abuse by an intimate partner (Woelz-Stirling, Kelaher, & 
Manderson, 1998). There is general consensus in the literature that interpersonal violence falls 
into two broad categories: predatory and psychopathic violence which is premeditated and 
emotionless, and where the perpetrator has no attachment relationship with the victim; and 
defensive or affective violence, which results in the belief that the individual’s personal safety 
or sense of self are under threat, which is preceded by high levels of emotional arousal (Renn, 
2012). Intimate partner violence occurs on a continuum from shoving on one end to homicide 
on the other (Renn, 2012). In the brief review that follows, I will include studies focusing on 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
 
 
all forms of gender-based violence, not only IPV, due to the limited literature available.  None 
of the literature I accessed included shame as an outcome of IPV. 
According to some estimates, one in two women in South African is exposed to IPV (Vetten, 
2005). This is despite a legal and constitutional human rights framework which seeks to 
promote women’s empowerment and which led to the passing of the progressive Domestic 
Violence Act in 1998 (Vetten, 2005). Critics have pointed out that although the legislative 
environment is considered enabling, many legislative and policy-driven interventions are not 
effectively put into practice (Smythe, Artz, Combrinck, Doolan, & Martin, 2008). To 
effectively address the needs of IPV survivors, there need to be integrated medical and legal 
responses (Smythe et al., 2008). These authors argue that in practice – in primary health care 
settings, at police stations and in the courts, the Domestic Violence Act is having 
“inconsistent and often ineffectual results” (Smythe et al., 2008, p. 155). In a study exploring 
the budget allocation to the Act’s implementation, Vetten (2005) found that daily expenditure 
points to the Act being both under-funded and under-prioritised. Vetten (2005, p. 277) argues 
that “lack of budget and absence of political space demonstrates weak political accountability 
to women”. This may be due to the widespread tolerance of the use of violence against 
women in South Africa, again, despite a progressive legislative and constitutional framework 
(Jewkes, Levin, & Penn-Kekana, 2002).  
In conflict with the findings reported at the beginning of the previous paragraph, a nationally 
representative study found a 19% lifetime prevalence of IPV among female participants, and 
27% of men reported perpetrating IPV in their current or most recent relationship (Gass, 
Stein, Williams, & Seedat, 2010). The mortality rate of women as a result of IPV in South 
Africa is unacceptably high, more than double the rate found in the United States (Abrahams, 
Martin, Mathews, Vetten, & Lombard, 2009). IPV is one of the leading causes of morbidity 
and mortality for South African women (Gass et al., 2010). A recent epidemiological study, 
including a proportionate random sample of 25 mortuaries, found that of the 3 797 female 
homicides in South Africa between 1 January and 31 December 1999, 50.3% were from IPV 
(Abrahams et al., 2009). The mortality rate was 8.8 per 100 000 women, and death from IPV 
was especially prevalent among women aged 14 to 44, and among non-White women 
(Abrahams et al., 2009). Cause of death was most commonly through blunt force injuries, 
sharp injuries and gunshot injuries, whereas strangulation, asphyxiation, burns and drowning 
were less common (Abrahams et al., 2009).  
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Although accurate statistics are difficult to come by, rape and sexual coercion seem to be rife 
in South Africa (Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002). Available data indicate that 240 incidents of 
rape and attempted rape per 100 000 women are reported each year. Age is an important risk 
factor. Representative community-based surveys have shown that those between the ages of 
17 and 48 are particularly vulnerable. In addition, approximately one third of adolescent girls 
were forced into sexual initiation. One point six percent of women reported being coerced 
into having sex before the age of 15, with 3.3% reporting having been sexually touched 
against their will, and 1.1% reporting having been forced to touch a man’s genitals. 
Community-based rape studies indicate that rape is more prevalent in Mpumalanga than other 
provinces. Studies indicate that the incidence of rape homicide is 7.2 per 100 000 or 1.2%. 
Finally, the under-reporting of non-consensual sex (sex agreed upon after blackmail, threats, 
trickery or pleading) occurring within marriages or dating relationships – due to self-blame or 
shame, for instance – is emphasised by these authors (Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002).  
Different types of IPV tend to overlap and co-occur (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, Yoshihama et 
al., 2004). In fact, sexual and physical violence is more likely to occur when economic and 
emotional abuse are also present, suggesting that IPV, as a whole, is part of a broader pattern 
of dominant and controlling behaviour. In a study exploring the prevalence and patterns of 
IPV among women attending antenatal clinics in Soweto, the findings show that 
approximately one third of women reported physical and/or sexual violence from male 
intimate partners. The age of onset for IPV was 12 to 39 years, with a higher incidence from 
late adolescence onwards. Almost 8% of participants reported that the onset of adult sexual 
assault by a non-partner was at its highest before the age of 20 years, with no significant rise 
in cumulative incidence after this age. Eight percent of participants had a history of child 
sexual abuse, and 7% disclosed forced first intercourse at the age of 15 or more years 
(Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, Yoshihama et al, 2004). Child sexual abuse and forced first 
intercourse was significantly associated with higher risk and earlier onset of IPV, and adult 
sexual assault by a non-partner (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, Yoshihama et al., 2004). 
A recent large-scale study found a number of gender differences in exposure to violence and 
PTSD. Firstly, men were exposed to more violence than women (Kaminer et al, 2008). 
Secondly, the pattern of exposure differed between men and women. Men most frequently 
experienced criminal and miscellaneous assaults, followed by childhood physical abuse, 
physical assault that is not domestic, criminal, political or sexual in nature, then politically 
motivated violence, while they were at very low risk for IPV and sexual violence. For women, 
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physical assault by an intimate partner, childhood physical abuse and criminal assaults were 
most prevalent, while sexual violence or experiencing a physical assault that is not domestic, 
criminal, political or sexual in nature is less common, and they are at very low risk of being 
victimised by politically motivated violence. Furthermore, for men, political detention and 
torture were most powerfully associated with a lifetime diagnosis of PTSD, while rape was 
most robustly associated with PTSD in women. At a population level, it was found that 
criminal assault and childhood abuse were related to the most PTSD cases among men, while 
IPV was related to the greatest number of PTSD cases among women (Kaminer et al., 2008).  
Similar findings are reported by Williams et al. (2007). Most South Africans experience 
multiple traumas, and that risk of exposure varies according to particular socio-demographic 
factors, including gender. Women were more likely to be exposed to intimate partner abuse 
and sexual assault and to be affected by traumatic events experienced by those close to them, 
while men were more likely to be exposed to criminal and political violence, threats to life 
and witnessing traumas. In this study, men were more likely to have been exposed to six or 
more traumas, however, the rate of sexual assault among men was low (3.5%) compared to 
the levels among women (5.6%). 
It is important for completeness to mention that although (female) gender is a significant risk 
factor for IPV, and plays an important role in (more severe) reactions to traumatic stress, 
gender-based violence also affects men. Although the rate of sexual abuse of males in 
particular is lower than that of females, in one study this kind of abuse had similar effects on 
male survivors as it has been shown to have on female survivors. In this study, including male 
students from the former University of Natal, South Africa, the author found a significant 
association between contact (sexual intercourse, manual/oral genital contact, or sexual 
touching/kissing) as opposed to no, or non-contact sexual abuse (such as exhibitionism or 
sexual requests) and poor psychological adjustment, including severity of somatisation, 
obsessive-compulsive tendencies, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, 
phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (Collings, 1995). This association 
persisted even after the significant predictive effect of rejecting and abusive parenting on 
psychological adjustment was controlled for (Collings, 1995).  
The causes of trauma may vary from one sample to the other, depending on the particular risk 
factors prevalent in their community. In a more privileged sample of students attending the 
then Pretoria Technikon, the most frequently reported traumatic event was death of a loved 
one, through motor vehicle accidents or suicide (Hoffmann, 2002). Negative changes in life 
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circumstances of quite different kinds was the second most frequently reported trauma, 
including the ending of a love relationship or the divorce of parents. The third most frequently 
reported trauma in this sample was being witness to injury or death, mostly through motor 
vehicle accidents (Hoffmann, 2002). The least reported traumatic event was a natural disaster 
(Hoffmann, 2002). For most trauma categories, the experience of intrusive thoughts was the 
most common symptom (Hoffmann, 2002). 
 
Additional Contributors to IPV 
 
Supporting gender inequality and the normative use of violence in conflict or punishment 
situations have been identified as important contributors to IPV, but there are many others 
(Abrahams, Jewkes, Laubscher, & Hoffman, 2006; Jewkes et al., 2002). Risk factors for 
violence against women in the past ten years, perpetrated by men working in Cape Town 
municipalities, included no post-school training, witnessing parental violence in childhood, 
involvement in physical fights at work and in the community, drug use, alcohol misuse, the 
perception that physically assaulting women is acceptable, frequent conflict, women’s 
problematic alcohol use, conflict about sex or about his infidelity (Abrahams et al., 2006). 
Forty two percent of men in this sample reported physically assaulting a partner in the past ten 
years, with approximately 9% reporting physical assault against a partner in the past year 
(Abrahams et al., 2006). Campbell (2002) similarly found that the characteristics which made 
males more likely to perpetrate IPV included histories of arrest, substance abuse, poor 
education, unemployment, and ex-partner status. It is interesting to note that although some 
research has indicated that there is an association between IPV and lower educational status, 
other research does not demonstrate this association (Seedat, Stein, & Forde, 2005). It seems 
that the relationship between these variables is more complex, and that women with the 
highest and lowest education levels are the most protected from IPV (Seedat, Stein, & Forde, 
2005).  
The role of socio-demographic variables in IPV was also explored by Jewkes et al. (2002). 
Their study showed that IPV was positively related to having no further education, either 
partner financially supporting the home, and living outside the Northern Province. Other 
variables that were positively associated with IPV included drinking alcohol, having another 
partner in the year, having a confidante, his boy child preference (a measure of the male 
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partner’s conservatism), conflict over his drinking, and frequent conflict generally. Somewhat 
surprisingly, partners’ ages, employment, migrant status, financial disparity, cohabitation, 
household possessions, urbanisation, marital status, crowding, communication, his having 
other partners, his education, her attitudes towards violence or her attitudes towards cultural 
norms on women’s role did not associate significantly with IPV (Jewkes et al., 2002).  
Cultural and socio-economic factors impact on the nature of both violence exposure and on 
protective factors against the adverse effects of such exposure. In a study located in three high 
schools in the Northern Province – one of them in a village (Graskop), one in a semi-urban 
area (Mahwelereng), and another in an urban city (Pietersburg), Madu and Peltzer (2000) 
found that four risk factors were responsible for discriminating between instances of child 
sexual abuse and non-abuse, namely, ethnicity not Northern Sotho (other ethnicities including 
Venda, Xitsonga, White, Coloured or Asian), mother being employed and above the level of a 
labourer, stepparent being present during childhood, and frequent violence at home (Madu & 
Peltzer, 2000). Unfortunately, these authors do not provide any explanation for the risk status 
of Northern Sotho ethnicity. In another study, single parenthood was also identified as a risk 
factor for child sexual abuse (Carey, Walker, Roscoe, Seedat, & Stein, 2008). A great deal of 
this risk can be explained by mothers being absent from home and current male partners 
having access to otherwise unsupervised children. Madu and Peltzer (2000) argue that in 
order to protect children from sexual abuse, the “cultural permissiveness of men to commit 
sexual abuse needs to be challenged and replaced with a moral belief which holds men 
responsible for channelling their sexuality within legal and ethical boundaries” (Madu & 
Peltzer, 2000, p. 267). 
The importance of child abuse in the inter-generational cycle of IPV has been emphasised in a 
number of studies. For example, being physically abused in childhood and witnessing 
maternal abuse significantly influenced women’s lifetime experiences of violence (Jewkes et 
al., 2002). Child sexual abuse is associated with heightened risk of both physical and sexual 
partner violence and adult sexual assault by a non-partner (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, 
Yoshihama et al., 2004). Gender has been identified as a risk factor for child sexual abuse 
(Carey et al., 2008). In a sample of children and adolescents drawn from a clinic in 
Stellenbosch emotional and physical abuse were also associated with higher levels of child 
sexual abuse, which once again points to the co-occurrence of different forms of violence 
exposure (Carey et al., 2008). Both depression (33%) and PTSD (63.8%) were the most 
common disorders associated with exposure to child sexual abuse (Carey et al., 2008). 
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Furthermore, this study indicates that having a forced early sexual experience, regardless of 
what age it takes place, increases the risk of later experiencing IPV (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, 
Yoshihama et al., 2004). 
A large number of female students (31% of child sexual abuse survivors) from the then 
University of Natal reported that their sexual abuse was perpetrated by a family member 
(Collings, 1997). This replicates a number of findings which indicate that girls are at greater 
risk of experiencing intra-familial forms of sexual abuse. Sexual abuse was associated with 
more PTSD symptoms, higher levels of sexual conflict, more suicidal feelings and impaired 
self-esteem. It is emphasised that any comprehensive aetiological explanation of child sexual 
abuse also needs to take into account parenting variables such as parenting style (supportive 
or punitive), which can exacerbate or ameliorate the primary trauma (Collings, 1997).   
Other factors, such as a rural setting, also play a role in rates of child sexual abuse. Madu 
(2001) found relatively low levels of child sexual abuse (both for men and women) among 
psychology students at the then University of the North (in the rural Northern Province), and 
attributes these rates to the likely low levels of substance abuse, the physical availability of 
caregivers, and to adherence to cultural values in the area. Findings are inconsistent. Peltzer 
(1999) found that 67% of children in a rural South African community had directly or 
vicariously experienced a traumatic event, including witnessing someone killed or seriously 
injured, violent or very unexpected death or suicide of a loved one, serious accident, sexual 
abuse or rape of a relative or friend, violent crime, child abuse and other life-threatening 
situations. Eight percent of the sample met criteria for PTSD (Peltzer, 1999). 
Wood, Lambert and Jewkes (2008) argue that South Africa’s history of colonialism, 
industrialisation and militarisation has allowed violence of all kinds to thrive. They suggest 
that high levels of violence in post-Apartheid South Africa should be viewed: 
In the context of the redefinition of gender and the liberalization of sexuality entailed 
by democratic transition, which have posed serious challenges to orthodox, mainly 
authoritarian notions of masculinity, leaving many men with a disempowering sense of 
irrelevance in the domestic sphere. (p. 47) 
It is this sense of “irrelevance” which has produced a culture of male disciplinary rights over 
women, where aggression against women became one manner of reclaiming power in a 
society from which men feel largely excluded (Wood et al., 2008). In modern, urban, poverty-
stricken settings where economic power is beyond young men’s reach, the energy and 
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competitiveness that these men may put into attaining and controlling their partners is not 
challenging to grasp (Wood et al., 2008).  
Young men participating in the cited ethnographic study of IPV in the former Transkei report 
that behaviour requiring discipline include when women made “fools” of men through actual 
or suspected infidelities, refusing sexual demands, resisting their partners’ attempts to control 
their behaviour, resisting partners’ attempts to have control over the terms of the relationship 
(like when they meet), and their attempts to thwart their partners’ chances of pursuing a 
sexual relationship with another woman. Controlling women’s behaviour was interpreted as a 
key means of reducing their vulnerability and powerlessness (Wood et al., 2008).  
The principal girlfriend (a queen or 5-60, after the Mercedes-Benz model of car) was invested 
in a great deal emotionally, but was reportedly the most likely to be assaulted (Wood et al., 
2008). Abuse tended to be followed by apologies or “sweet talking”, and many men stated 
that the amount and quality of attention a man gave his partner after an assault “proved” how 
much he cared for her; conversely, lack of care was demonstrated by a lack of tenderness and 
attempts to reconcile after the violent incident (Wood et al., 2008). The oft heard saying that 
“if he beats you, he loves you” demonstrates a link between love and discipline, and suggests 
that women need moral supervision by a partner who cares enough to enforce appropriate 
behaviour, and that assault is a statement of the seriousness of his intentions and is 
constitutive of love (Wood et al., 2008, p. 62). There was an assumption by men and women 
that men simply knew better and were protecting the relationship because they prized it, and 
that such moral discipline is necessary because women can’t think for themselves (Wood et 
al., 2008). Many men seemed to have a hierarchy of assaults, with slapping being condoned, 
while other forms of violence, such as kicking and punching were resorted to only when 
violence escalated or a woman’s transgression was thought to warrant such behaviour (Wood 
et al., 2008). As noted by Wood et al. (2008, p. 54), however, injuries in general, but 
particularly those that disturbed everyday life, were considered “beyond love”.  
In this study, men tended to justify their violence as a result of being a victim of their 
passions; as a victim of caring too much about a relationship. Women on the other hand, were 
resistant to report injuries because of a number of prominent discourses, such as the 
importance of Christian forgiveness and the intolerance towards women expressing anger. 
Wood et al. (2008) further argue that the discourse which constructs women as both strong 
and suffering also contributes to the privileging of male concerns.  
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Health and Psychological Outcomes of Gender-based Violence: Findings from  
South African Research 
 
In keeping with the international literature, individuals’ coping style and perceived social 
support may impact on the development of PTSD. A recent study of police officers 
demonstrated that problem-focused coping (involving interpersonal efforts to solve and 
engage effectively with stressors) and emotion-focused coping (involving the reduction of 
stress through regulation of emotions) and perceived social support predicted PTSD scores, 
with emotion-focused coping and social support playing a protective role (Jones & Kagee, 
2005). Problem-focused coping was positively associated with PTSD symptom severity, 
which was explained by the nature of police work – involving stressors that cannot easily be 
solved. Contrary to expectations, this study shows that gender and extent of service played a 
minimal role in explaining the development of PTSD symptoms (Jones & Kagee, 2005).  
Severity of abuse, previous trauma and partner control and dominance play important roles in 
PTSD developing from exposure to IPV (Campbell, 2002). Women tend to be more 
vulnerable to PTSD, anxiety and depression across cultures, even when the severity of the 
trauma is taken into account (Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005; Suliman et al., 2009). Women are 
twice as likely to develop PTSD as men, the illness lasts about four times longer in women 
than in men, and the quality of life outcomes for women are poorer than they are for men 
(Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005) (although this finding has not been replicated consistently; see 
Carey et al., 2003; Madu & Peltzer, 2000). This is despite evidence that the lifetime 
prevalence of exposure to traumatic stress is higher in men (Carey et al., 2003; Seedat, Stein, 
& Carey, 2005) (although this has been disputed by the findings of Hoffmann, 2002). 
Serotonergic, noradrenergic, neuroendocrine, glutamatergic, GABAergic and opioid systems 
have been identified as playing a role in the altered stress/fear response in women (Seedat, 
Stein, & Carey, 2005). The gender differences in terms of sexual trauma may also account for 
higher levels of PTSD symptomatology in women (Hoffmann, 2002; Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 
2005). However, factors other than trauma type are implicated in the development of PTSD 
symptoms, including, for example, gender differences in perceptions of the traumatic events 
and peri-traumatic dissociation (Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005). There are also gender 
differences in the treatment of PTSD. Recent research has shown that women are more 
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responsive to pharmacotherapy than men, and that PTSD in women can be effectively treated 
with Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI’s), either alone or in combination with 
cognitive behavioural strategies (Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005). Furthermore, antiadrenergic 
agents and preventive cognitive behavioural treatments have been recommended for 
preventing the onset of PTSD (Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005). 
In studies where the rates of PTSD were lower than expected among women survivors of IPV, 
the rate of partial PTSD was high (Seedat, Stein, & Forde, 2005). Although there was no 
significant relationship between the frequency of physical abuse and PTSD in Seedat, Stein, 
and Forde’s (2005) study, there was an association between frequency of beatings and 
intrusive and hyperarousal symptoms, however, not with avoidance or numbing symptoms. In 
addition, IPV was found to be a risk factor for suicide attempts, although PTSD was not 
(Seedat, Stein, & Forde, 2005).  
A recent review shows that there are a number of health consequences to IPV; women who 
have experienced this kind of violence tend to have poor health status, poor quality of life, 
and higher use of health services (Campbell, 2002; Gass et al., 2010). The physical injuries, as 
well as high levels of fear and stress can lead to chronic health problems such as persistent 
pain (particularly back pain and headaches), a suppressed immune system and central nervous 
system symptoms such as fainting and seizures (Campbell, 2002). Assaults such as choking 
and blows to the head that may result in loss of consciousness can lead to serious neurological 
symptoms (Campbell, 2002). Women who have survived IPV have more gastrointestinal 
problems (e.g. loss of appetite and eating disorders) and functional gastrointestinal disorders 
such as irritable bowel syndrome which manifest as a result of stress (Campbell, 2002). 
Cardiac symptoms, including hypertension and chest pain are also more likely in survivors of 
IPV (Campbell, 2002). Other symptoms that have been reported include joint disease, asthma, 
arthritis, sexually transmitted infections, vaginal infections, abdominal pain and shortness of 
breath (Gass et al., 2010; Valente & Jensen, 2000). Abused women also have a higher 
probability of engaging in risk behaviours such as smoking, alcohol and cannabis use and the 
non-medical use of sedatives and analgesics (Gass et al., 2010). Poor health outcomes may be 
exacerbated by alcohol and drug abuse, used as a means of coping with PTSD symptoms, or 
as a means of escaping frightening realities (Campbell, 2002).  
Gynaecological problems are the most consistent, robust and enduring difference between 
battered and non-battered women (Campbell, 2002). Forced sex in particular may lead to 
vaginal, anal and urethral trauma, which in turn leads to increased transmission of micro-
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organisms, accounting for the association between IPV and sexually transmitted diseases and 
HIV (Campbell, 2002). The prevalence of IPV during pregnancy in South Africa is 6.8% 
(Campbell, 2002). This type of abuse is associated with compromised health outcomes during 
pregnancy, including sexually transmitted diseases, urinary-tract infections, substance abuse, 
depression and other mental health difficulties (Campbell, 2002). Evidence also suggests that 
IPV during pregnancy is associated with preterm deliveries, foetal distress, antepartum 
haemorrhage, and pre-enclampsia (Campbell, 2002). It is interesting to note that maternal low 
weight gain, smoking, or both, mediate the relationship between abuse and low birth weight 
(Campbell, 2002).  
The relationship between gender-based violence, relationship power and risk of HIV infection 
among women attending antenatal clinics in Soweto, South Africa, has been explored in a 
recent study (Dunkle et al., 2004a). IPV and high levels of male control in the woman’s 
present relationship were associated with HIV seropositivity. These findings emphasise the 
risks for HIV infection associated with having a violent and controlling male partner. IPV was 
related to a higher likelihood of HIV risk behaviour, including having multiple partners, 
having non-primary partners, taking part in transactional sex, and substance abuse. However, 
these findings did not explain the relationship between IPV and HIV status, suggesting that 
there are other variables which need to be taken into account. Although other factors 
considered in the study, including child sexual assault, forced first intercourse and adult 
sexual assault by a non-partner were related to sexual risk behaviour, they were not 
significantly related to HIV status (Dunkle et al., 2004a).  
In a related study, the authors found that 21% of women attending antenatal clinics in Soweto 
engaged in sex for material gain with a man who was not her primary partner, and these 
women had a significantly higher likelihood of HIV seropositivity (Dunkle et al., 2004b). 
IPV, alcohol or drug misuse, urban residence, ever earning money or living in substandard 
housing were risk factors for transactional sex. Conversely, women who postponed first 
intercourse, were married, or had post-secondary education were significantly less likely to 
engage in transactional sex. These authors speculate that transactional sex may precede 
violence if the woman’s primary male partner finds out that there is a relationship with a non-
primary male, or if a woman refuses to have sex with her transactional partner after receiving 
goods or money. This study shows that South African women commonly engage in 
transactional sex and that it is related to IPV and substance use and a higher likelihood of HIV 
seropositivity. The relationship between IPV and transactional sex, and transactional sex and 
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HIV infection suggests a pathway through which IPV influences HIV risk among women 
(Dunkle et al., 2004b).  
In another study which closely resembles and extends the findings of Jewkes et al. (2002), 
including a large representative sample of women from three South African provinces, 
findings show that IPV was significantly positively associated with violence in participants’ 
childhood, having no further education, consumption of alcohol, having more than one 
partner annually, having a confidant(e), the perpetrator’s boy child preference, conflict over 
his drinking, either partner being responsible for financially maintaining the home, ongoing 
conflict in general, and living outside the Northern Province (Jewkes, Levin, & Penn-Kekana, 
2003). No significant relationships were demonstrated in terms of partners' ages, employment 
or migrant status, financial disparity, living together, household possessions, urbanisation, 
marital status, crowding, communication, his having other partners, his education levels, her 
attitudes towards violence or her perceptions of cultural norms, values and expectations on 
women's roles (Jewkes et al., 2003). The findings emphasise the strong association between 
the status of women in a society and the normative use of violence in attempts to resolve 
conflict or as part of intimidation and the exercise of power (Jewkes et al., 2003). The authors 
also discuss the relationship between violence, gendered disempowerment and the spread of 
HIV, and conclude that the findings from this study suggest the need to investigate critically 
the associations between gender inequalities and HIV prevention in South Africa (Jewkes et 
al., 2003).  
Barriers to disclosure are caused mostly by survivors’ feelings about the abuse, including 
intense shame, denial that the abuse was occurring, the fear of reactions of friends, family or 
medical professions should the abuse be exposed, fear of the consequences to their children, 
fear of losing the perpetrator’s love or financial support, and lack of readiness to change the 
relationship with the abuser. This is particularly true of sexual violence, which in addition to 
fear of retaliation by the perpetrations, is under-reported due to fear of not being believed, 
poor access to the police, and fear of the legal process, including disrespectful treatment by 
police and police corruption (Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002).  
In summary, the brief review of IPV shows that gender-based violence is normative in many 
South African communities, and that IPV-related morbidity and mortality are significant 
concerns in South Africa. A key point emerging from this review is that there is considerable 
overlap between the different forms of gender-based violence more generally and IPV 
specifically. Furthermore, child abuse has been identified as an important risk factor for IPV 
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in adulthood. Although the evidence is inconsistent regarding the relationship between some 
socio-economic and demographic variables and IPV, gender is a well-known risk factor for 
IPV, and women are more susceptible to IPV-related mental health problems such as PTSD 
than men. IPV is associated with poorer physical health outcomes, including risk behaviours 
such as substance misuse, greater reliance on health services, and HIV seropositivity. There 
are a number of barriers to disclosure of abuse, of which shame is one. For this reason, IPV is 
an important public health issue that needs to be addressed not only in the relevant legislation, 
but also by the public health sector.  
 
Coping and Positive Outcomes of Trauma 
 
Coping, support and trauma survival are important areas of study because they can inform 
effective clinical practice. I also had to consider that my participants may have experienced 
some positive outcomes as a result of their experience of trauma. That is why I briefly touch 
on coping and positive outcomes of trauma, focusing mainly on the work of Herman (1997) 
and Kaminer and Eagle (2010). There is a wealth of literature on resilience, which is beyond 
the scope of this chapter (e.g. the extensive work of Michael Rutter). The capacity to cope 
may in part be established by the severity and chronicity of the traumas survivors experience 
(consistent with the “dose-response curve” where less exposure to trauma leads to greater 
coping), but this capacity may also be associated with previous vulnerability and the 
emotional robustness of the individual. Herman (1997) reports that those individuals who 
have high sociability, have an active coping style, and a strong sense of their ability to control 
their destinies, are more resistant to post-traumatic symptoms than others. Self-blame can also 
be viewed as adaptive. It is an attempt to gain some sense of power and control (through 
ownership and responsibility for the traumatic event/s), which may be more tolerable than 
confronting the reality of utter helplessness, although this will be problematised later. Shame 
is a characteristic response to helplessness, the violation of bodily integrity, and the indignity 
in another’s eyes, as is so typical of IPV (Herman, 1997). 
Not all outcomes associated with trauma are negative. A recent study examined the 
associations between post-traumatic growth (positive changes as a result of the trauma, such 
as feelings of strength, becoming closer to family and friends, or greater appreciation of life), 
PTSD symptom severity and post-traumatic depression, and found that for adult assault 
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survivors at six months post-trauma, there was a curvilinear relationship between post-
traumatic growth and PTSD symptom severity and depression, while at thirty-nine weeks 
post-trauma on average the curvilinear association only pertained to PTSD symptom severity 
(Kleim & Ehlers, 2009). In other words, survivors with very low or high growth levels 
reported fewer psychological symptoms than those with moderate growth levels (Kleim & 
Ehlers, 2009). This finding has been replicated (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). Interestingly, 
predictors of post-traumatic growth included shame, fear, peri-traumatic fear, religiousness, 
non-Caucasian ethnicity and ruminative thinking style (Kleim & Ehlers, 2009).  
Other research has identified greater compassion for others, more meaningful relationships 
with others, engaging in altruistic activities to help others, greater appreciation of “little 
things” in life, and feeling emotionally stronger as some of the positive outcomes associated 
with trauma exposure (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). However, it is important to note that post-
traumatic growth depends on a post-traumatic space or phase during which the survivor can 
reflect on his/her traumatic experience/s, and make some kind of sense or meaning of it. In the 
context of chronic or continuous traumatisation, a space for such self-reflection may not be 
available. These survivors may be in situations of continuous danger, and may have to shut 
down emotionally in order to cope, which does not allow for internal reflection (Kaminer & 
Eagle, 2010). In such environments, a preoccupation with survival is likely to dominate 
internal experience.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The issue of psychological sequelae to chronic violence has been under-researched world-
wide. This chapter has provided the reader with an introduction to the issues at stake, and has 
also provided the reader with an overview of the prevalence and nature of violence – chronic 
and IPV specifically – in South Africa, to provide a backdrop to my study. It is important to 
conduct research on chronic violence in South Africa in particular – it is a context which is 
rife with shameful forms of violence exposure. There are many negative psychological 
outcomes associated with exposure to any form of violence, and shame often mediates this 
association, as will be explored further in chapter 5. Yet, there is a virtual absence of studies 
linking shame to chronic trauma. In the next chapter, I turn to shame, and describe my 
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theoretical orientation, and why I believe it is the best perspective from which this complex 
construct can be understood.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Theories on Shame 
If I wish to touch you but you do not wish to be touched, I may feel ashamed. If I wish 
to look at you but you do not wish me to, I may feel ashamed. If I wish you to look at 
me but you do not, I may feel ashamed. If I wish to look at you and at the same time 
wish that you look at me, I can be shamed. If I wish to be close to you but you move 
away, I am ashamed. If I wish to suck or bite your body and you are reluctant, I can 
become ashamed. If I wish to hug you or you hug me or we hug each other and you do 
not reciprocate my wishes, I feel ashamed. If I wish to have sexual intercourse with 
you but you do not, I am ashamed. 
If I wish to hear your voice but you will not speak to me, I can feel shame. If I wish to 
speak to you but you will not listen, I am ashamed. If I would like us to have a 
conversation but you do not wish to converse, I can be ashamed. If I would like to 
share my ideas, aspirations or my values with you but you do not reciprocate, I am 
ashamed. If I wish to talk and you wish to talk at the same time, I can become 
ashamed. If I want to tell you my ideas but you wish to tell me yours, I can become 
ashamed. 
If I want to share my experiences with you but you wish to tell me your philosophy of 
life, I can become ashamed. If I wish to speak of personal feelings but you wish to 
speak about science, I will feel ashamed. If you wish to talk about the past and I wish 
to dream about the future, I can become ashamed. (Tomkins, 1963, p. 192) 
The Proto Germanic, Indo-European, root meaning of the word “shame” is to uncover, or 
expose (Lynd, 1958). Until more recently, shame has been neglected in the psychological 
literature (Karen, 1992). Lately, shame has been the focus of a great deal of attention and 
debate, and has been seen by many scholars as “the master emotion, the unseen regulator of 
our entire affective life” (Karen, 1992, p. 1). It is seen as a regulator because it provides 
feedback on individuals’ social and moral acceptability, and plays an important role in 
guiding behaviour and motivating individuals to adhere to cultural prescriptions and moral 
standards, norms and conventions.  
Shame may be studied in terms of its various component parts, including emotion, cognitions 
and beliefs about the self, behaviour and actions, as a mechanism that has evolved for reasons 
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of adaptation, and its manifestation in interpersonal dynamic interrelationships, but the 
emphasis varies depending on the particular perspective or theoretical understanding in 
question (Gilbert, 1998). Each theory adds a dimension to the understanding of shame, but H. 
B. Lewis’ (1971) influential theoretical work will be foregrounded in this chapter. This is 
because phenomenology emphasises subjectivity and the self as it experiences the world; and 
the importance of reflective attentiveness to the individual’s lived experience, all of which is 
consistent with an ethnographic study such as the one presented in this thesis. This theory also  
informs a great deal of the distinctions between shame and guilt in chapter 3, the majority of 
the empirical studies described in chapter 5, and the results presented in chapter 8 in 
particular. In this chapter, I limit full exploration to phenomenological perspectives on shame, 
with selected aspects of psychoanalytic theory, as well as selected aspects of evolutionary 
theory, each vast theories in and of themselves. I have explained why I am guided by 
phenomenology. I include aspects of psychoanalytic theory because of the relevance of Donna 
Orange and colleagues’ (2008, 1997) work on intersubjectivity and its relevance to any 
qualitative study, and because self-psychology provides explanations for trauma-related 
attachment patterns, psychological cohesion and depletion. I also include the theoretical work 
of the psychoanalytically-orientated Fairbairn (1943) which is central to understanding the 
shame-based, split self. Finally, I include aspects of evolutionary theory because of its 
emphasis on shame as a social emotion (unlike psychoanalysis) and its emphasis on Social 
Attention Holding Power (SAHP), which has implications for those in subordinated, 
disempowered or socially “misattuned” positions, which mirrored the positions that many of 
my participants were in.  
I will also mention other prominent shame theories, like affect theory and cognitive 
attribution theory, but only in passing, since theories such as these do not bear relevance to 
the theoretical basis of my study. My study does not focus on whether shame is innate (affect 
theory) or a developmental accomplishment (cognitive attributional theory).  Clearly, since I 
was working with adult women rather than children, I assumed that they had already attained 
the capacity for experiencing shame, either because it was innately present since infancy or 
because it was achieved through objective self-awareness and self-reflection, core 
requirements of cognitive attributional theory. Only psychological theories on shame will be 
discussed here; sociological theories (from Darwin, Cooley, Durkheim, MacDougall and 
Goffman to name a few) are beyond the scope of this chapter since the focus of this thesis is 
intrapsychic (Scheff, 1988).  
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One of the limitations in the literature is that most of the more prominent theories on shame 
depend heavily on the role of intimate attachment relationships in theorising how shame 
comes about. There is no engagement with the influence of the broader context, where group-
based experiences of discrimination, denigration and disempowerment may also influence the 
development of shame and shame defenses (Kaminer, personal communication, May 24, 
2012). Personal identity and group identity intersect very powerfully (Kaminer, personal 
communication, May 24, 2012). This is a point to which I will return in my discussion and 
conclusion. 
Before reviewing phenomenological theory and other complementary selected sections of 
theories on shame, it is important to consider the following: There is no consensus in the 
theoretical literature whether shame is an innate, universal potential in all humans, or whether 
it is a developmental achievement, or whether it is evoked by certain experiences, such as for 
example, trauma (Karen, 1992). The contention in this thesis is that shame is a universal 
potentiality in all humans, but that for shame to become manifest, the individual must have 
achieved self-consciousness, and experienced triggering events. As such, early infantile 
shame-like responses, as are described in affect theory, for example, and by Gilbert (1998) in 
this chapter, are believed to be primitive, innate, automatically activated precursors to shame, 
which, as a defense against threat of attack or trauma of some kind, are developed and 
elaborated upon to become the full aversive reaction they are in later childhood and 
adulthood, once self-consciousness and triggering events have occurred. In my view, shame 
does not manifest until these two events have occurred.  
There are a number of other vexing questions arising from the theories on shame. One of 
these questions is whether shame can be experienced internally or when alone, or whether it 
can only occur in the presence of an audience. In agreement with phenomenology, I would 
argue that shame can occur in both instances. Shame can, for example, occur when the self 
feels that it has not measured up to, or attained the goals of the idealised object or ideal self, 
thus experiencing shame in isolation (e.g. Self psychology). Equally, shame may be 
experienced at the hands of an actively shaming, humiliating other, in a social context (e.g. 
Evolutionary theory). However, most theories, with which I concur, consider shame a social 
emotion. This brings me to the discussion of the main theory driving my understanding of 
shame: phenomenology. 
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Theories on the Nature and Functions of Shame 
 
Phenomenological Theory 
 
This study is rooted in phenomenological theory, which focuses on the subjective properties 
and structures of experience, although it does draw on selected aspects of other theories, such 
as psychoanalysis and evolutionary theory. H. B. Lewis’ (1971, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c) work is 
based on extensive transcripts of therapeutic interactions between her and her patients. Her 
main thesis, which focused on the role of the self in distinguishing between shame and guilt, 
is further elaborated on in the third chapter. Here, the nature, development and functions of 
shame from a phenomenological point of view are reviewed. 
H. B. Lewis’ phenomenological formulation of shame is guided by three constructs: Freud’s 
construct of the superego; the self; and psychological differentiation (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The 
superego is understood as fulfilling a psychological regulatory function which monitors the 
internal workings of the psyche, and maintains some kind of homeostasis in terms of self-
evaluation. This regulatory process is informed by the personal and moral values of the 
individual. In this monitoring role, the superego regulates human drives which can evoke 
shame, such as the sexual drive, but it also functions as an inhibitor of excessive pride, which 
is the antithesis of shame. Thus, the superego works as a psychological regulatory agency 
which strives to maintain a “balanced” self-evaluation and neutral self-esteem, based on the 
preservation of neutral affective interpersonal relationships (H. B. Lewis, 1971).  
There are four features which are integral to the phenomenon of shame. Firstly, shame 
involves the desire to hide or disappear; to sink through the ground and cease to exist (M. 
Lewis, 1992). Secondly, shame involves intense psychological pain, discomfort and anger. 
Thirdly, shame involves feeling that the self is inadequate, defective and unworthy. Fourthly, 
shame involves the merging of subject and object – this fusion means that the self is unable to 
think clearly and ceases all activity; it is accompanied by the inability to talk and the inability 
to take any action. This final characteristic of shame is one of the main ways in which shame 
can be distinguished from guilt. In M. Lewis’ words:  
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Shame is the complete closure of the self-object circle. However, in guilt, although the 
self is the subject, the object is external to the self. The focus of the self is upon the 
behaviour that caused the interruption, namely the inadequacy to meet certain standards, 
and upon the object who suffers from that failure. Many have used terms like concern or 
regret as synonyms for guilt, suggesting a focus on something external to the self rather 
than on the self itself (M. Lewis, 1992, p. 34).  
What is central to understanding this subject-object fusion is that it is “the social significance 
of the act, the eye of the other that produce[s] the shame” – in other words, shame is elicited 
when the self is able to see the socially inadequate or defective self (subject) from the 
perspective of the disapproving, contemptuous other (object) (M. Lewis, 1992, p. 30). Here, 
to see or perceive, literally means to judge or evaluate (M. Lewis, 1992).  
The notion that shame is characterised by permeable self-boundaries revolves around specific 
conceptions of the self, and psychological differentiation. Because the source of the shame is 
outside the self, the self is able to observe itself from the point of view of the other, causing a 
fusion or merging between the self and the negatively evaluating other (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
Thus, the self is divided in shame reactions – it is being criticised and scorned by the other, 
while it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself. In H. B. Lewis’ (1971) view, this divided 
activity of the self, and the difficulty in separating the self from its negatively evaluating 
surroundings, makes it very difficult for the self to function effectively.  
Another characteristic of shame is that it manifests more readily in individuals who are field 
dependent (those who find it difficult to separate or decontextualise objects from an 
embedding context, such as a hidden figure in a maze of embedding lines, which illustrate 
their relation to significant others [separation or tendency towards enmeshment]), and have 
less differentiated self-concepts and body images (H. B. Lewis, 1971, 1986). Furthermore, 
field dependent perceivers are more influenced by the opinions of others and are more other-
directed in their social relationships (H. B. Lewis, 1971). They also have more positive 
attitudes towards others (social skills), more self-directed hostility, and tend to have poorer 
cognitive restructuring skills (H. B. Lewis, 1986). Finally, they are likely to use the defenses 
of repression and denial, which are cognitively less differentiated defenses (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). In contrast, field independent perceivers tend to isolate affect, rationalise and 
intellectualise, all of which are more differentiated defenses (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, a 
field-dependent type of superego functioning would involve shame, whereas a field-
independent manner of superego functioning would involve guilt (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
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The stimuli which evoke shame are multiple and varied, including, for example, aggressions, 
defeats, disappointments or failures; however, guilt is only evoked by one’s own transgression 
(H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt is more commonly evoked by transgressions of a moral nature, 
while there are both moral and non-moral varieties of shame (although its moral nature is 
often emphasised) (H. B. Lewis, 1971).  
As in evolutionary theory, discussed later in the chapter, in H. B. Lewis’ (1987a) 
phenomenological understanding of shame, shame is the unavoidable response to loss of love; 
the loss of an important social relationship. H. B. Lewis (1987a) argues that shame, the result 
of the loss of the other, is inevitably accompanied by humiliated fury, the purpose of which is 
to protest the loss and demand restitution of the other’s positive feeling towards the self, 
which then leads to feelings of guilt. In order to preserve physical proximity to the love 
object, the self may choose to avoid him/her instead of reacting in aggression towards 
him/her. The self may also repress rageful longings towards the other to protect the social tie.  
What is central to H. B. Lewis’ understanding of shame is that shame is about the whole self; 
the totality, whereas guilt involves the activity of the self, with much less perceptual feedback 
as a result of the self’s activities and experiences. Therefore, shame is a narcissistic reaction to 
the perception that the whole self has been attacked, and is evoked by an inability to live up to 
the ego-ideal (H. B. Lewis, 1971). It deeply affects the individual’s sense of identity. It often 
results in externally directed hostility, or what H. B. Lewis has termed “shame-rage”. Shame-
rage can only occur in the context of an affective relationship between the self and a 
significant, valued other. Hostility expressed towards this other is understood as a means of 
“turning the tables” against the other who has scorned or ridiculed the self, yet because the 
other is loved and admired, guilt about the self’s aggressive wishes or actions is evoked. In 
some cases, the idealised image of the other may be amended, and may become devalued, but 
in this case the loved or admired other is lost. More typically, shame-based rage is turned 
against the self because the self is passive and defective in relation to the idealised other (H. 
B. Lewis, 1971). 
Lynd (1958, p. 50) captures H. B. Lewis’ (1971) assertion of shame’s pervasiveness and 
effect on the whole self by explaining that: 
An experience of shame of the sort I am attempting to describe cannot be modified by 
addition, or wiped out by subtraction, or exorcised by expiation. It is not an isolated 
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act that can be detached from the self. It carries the weight of ‘I cannot have done this. 
But I have done it and I cannot undo it, because this is I’. 
It is this experience that makes shame unspeakable; shame comes with uncodified detail and 
with diffused feeling; there is no readily expressive language of shame – the irrational threat 
implied in shame is abandonment terror, in contrast to the fear in guilt of mutilation (Lynd, 
1958). Implied in this inability to communicate shame is profound loneliness and isolation, 
and may lead to depersonalisation and dehumanisation (Lynd, 1958).  
In H. B. Lewis’ understanding, shame can occur in private or in public; of central importance 
is that the self perceives that it is being negatively evaluated, either in reality or in fantasy (H. 
B. Lewis, 1971). Shame involves a great deal of self-imagery and self-consciousness, and 
involves significant perceptual feedback, particularly autonomic activation, including 
blushing, sweating and accelerated heart rate (H. B. Lewis, 1971). These reactions make 
shame an involuntary, acutely painful experience. Shame has been recognised as an 
involuntary experience that consumes and overwhelms the self, takes the individual off guard, 
caught unawares, for a number of decades (Lynd, 1958). Shame reactions result in what has 
been described as “an implosion of the self”, accompanied by the body curved in on itself, 
head bowed and eyes closed (H. B. Lewis, 1971, p. 37). M. Lewis (1992) similarly argues that 
the phenomenological experience of shame includes not only the wish to die, hide or 
disappear, but leads to the disruption of current behaviour, confusion and loss of speech, and a 
physical shrinking of the body. Consequently, shame is associated with more body awareness 
than guilt, and tends to be experienced as a primitive, irrational reaction in which body 
functions are out of control (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lynd, 1958). Shame has been described as a 
wordless state, characterised instead by the imagery of watching or being observed (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971). Thus, in shame states, there is a split between affect and cognition – with 
limited cognitive activity and a flood of affective (and autonomic) activity (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). Like H. B. Lewis (1971), Lynd (1958) argues that shame is also activated by a sense of 
incongruity and alienation in the social environment, manifest in the discrepancy between the 
reality of what is happening and what is expected to happen (Lynd, 1958). This is 
accompanied by a breakdown in trust (and associated social isolation and estrangement), 
which involves questioning one’s own adequacy or questioning the values of the social 
context which contradict what one has been led to expect (Lynd, 1958).  
H. B. Lewis’ (and M. Lewis’) phenomenological understanding of shame not only focuses on 
the emotional experience of shame, it includes as central feature a sense of heightened 
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consciousness of the self, self-awareness or self-attention, which is where these scholars 
overlap with cognitive attributional theorists. H. B. Lewis (1971) in particular argued that 
shame is located not only in the flood of affectivity and autonomic arousal which 
accompanies it, but also in our thoughts about our selves, and that these thoughts involve the 
real or imagined disapproval of significant others. For these scholars, shame is not only a 
disruption or reduction of positive emotions, but is also a state of exaggerated awareness of 
the self which is considered inadequate (M. Lewis, 1992).  
 
Psychoanalytic and Psychoanalytic-based Understandings of Shame 
 
It is important to note at the outset that, surprisingly, Freud had “no consistent theory of 
shame. Shame received relatively little attention in the Freudian corpus, especially as 
contrasted with anxiety and guilt” (Broucek, 1991, p. 12). Freud’s limited attention to shame 
meant he understood it only as reactive, inhibitory, and prohibitive, opposing the pleasure 
principle and preventing engagement in natural but shameful behaviours, including sexual 
activities such as voyeurism and exhibitionism or activities centred round waste elimination 
(Broucek, 1991). Later psychoanalysts, such as Erik Erikson (1950) (focusing on the eight 
stages of the life cycle, of which one is the battle between autonomy and shame and doubt), 
Piers and Singer (1953) (focusing on the tension between ego and ego ideal), Wurmster 
(1987, 1995) (focusing on extending the classical psychoanalytic tradition of examining 
shame in relation to voyeurism and exhibitionism) and A. P. Morrison (1989) (focusing on 
understanding narcissism from the point of view of tension between ego and ego ideal) did 
however, attend to shame, but none of these theorists produced a full and substantial theory 
on shame, and therefore will not be included in this review in more than a cursory manner 
(Broucek, 1991).  
Miller (1985) identified two subgroups of psychoanalysts who have made some contribution 
to shame, however limited: Freud, Anna Freud, Nunberg and Jacobson in the first group, and 
Knapp, Kohut and H. B. Lewis in the second group. Although there are minor differences 
between the members of the first group, they saw shame, as was identified above, as a 
reaction-formation against sexual exhibitionistic impulses; thus shame was interpreted as an 
emotion in the service of morality. In Freud’s understanding, the self-diminishing, hiding 
nature of shame is a defense against engaging in morally forbidden exhibitionistic excitement 
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(Miller, 1985). Indulging in this forbidden act was believed to produce guilt or fears of 
castration (Miller, 1985). The second group also have some minor disagreements among 
them, but generally understand shame as a defense against sexual exhibitionistic excitement 
and feelings of grandiosity and omnipotence (thus, an emotion designed to curb arousal), but 
they did not see it as a moral emotion (Miller, 1985). They emphasise the ego-disruptive 
impact of overstimulation and the need for a mechanism to subdue highly stimulated states, 
producing psychic homeostasis (Miller, 1985). One of the limitations of these scholars’ work 
is their narrow and exclusive focus on issues such as psychosexual phases and the genital-
exhibitionistic conflict. Miller (1985) painstakingly analyses data from ten interviewees about 
their experiences of shame from a psychoanalytic point of view, but comes to the same 
conclusion. Although prominent scholars have argued that sexual exhibitionistic impulses and 
genital inferiority (female sexuality as compared to the penile norm) are (always) the major 
sources of shame, Miller’s (1985) data shows that these conditions may not in fact precede 
shame in every instance.  
One useful contribution made by psychoanalysis, which ties in well with self-psychology 
discussed below, is the role of shame in the Oedipus Complex. Shame is typically linked to 
the struggles of the anal phase towards autonomy and self-control, as well as sexual 
developments associated with the Oedipus Complex (Nathanson, 1987b). According to Freud, 
the superego develops as a result of the identification process which occurs during the 
Oedipus conflict – through the identification with the parents, and the resolution of the 
conflict between the child’s love and admiration for them, and his fear of castration due to his 
sexual and aggressive fantasies and desires (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The Oedipus Complex 
involves shame over desiring the rejecting parent (Nathanson, 1987b). Rejection from this 
parent results in a reduction in interest and excitement (and consequently, desire), which 
Nathanson (1987b) argues is one of the earliest manifestations of shame proper. Through 
identification with the parents the child internalises their values, in the absence of which, the 
child develops no moral code (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Identification takes place in two, related 
ways. The first route involves the incorporation of the castration threat. The second route of 
identification is through the imitation of an admired or beloved parent figure, which involves 
the incorporation of an ego-ideal or positive model for the child’s behaviour (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). This route involves the threat of loss of love or positive regard from the ego-ideal, and 
the associated loss of self-esteem (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The differences in routes of 
identification regulate whether shame or guilt will be evoked in a particular child. 
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Identification with the threatening parent and internalisation of that threat leads to guilt (over 
perceived transgression), whereas identification with the ego-ideal evokes pride and triumph, 
and failure to live up to this internalised image results in shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971).  
I would like to pause for a moment to consider a recent shift in psychoanalysis which has 
been developed by Orange (2008) and Orange, Atwood and Stolorow (1997). Their 
thoughtful and thorough scrutiny of psychoanalytic theory and practice examines the possible 
sources of shame in the therapeutic relationship. This is relevant to my examination of the 
unfolding of the relationship between me and the participants, and to my exploration of self-
reflexivity in the final chapter. Unlike Miller (1985) and other “purist” psychoanalytic 
colleagues’ exclusive focus on sexual exhibitionistic impulses and genital inferiority as the 
(only) source of shame, Orange and colleagues broaden their focus to examine the 
intersubjective or relational origins of shame. Orange (2008) describes the therapeutic 
interchange as inherently shameful:  clients often have a stigmatised or shameful status; the 
client risks exposing painful vulnerabilities and/or personal limitations which may be 
experienced as shameful; emotional life itself, with all its pain and woundedness, is often rife 
with shame; and finally, society sets the analyst up to be the expert who knows the client 
better than s/he knows herself, so creating a power differential which is disempowering and 
shaming (Orange, 2008). Orange et al. (1997) argue that transference and countertransference 
create an intersubjective system of mutual influence – neutral analysts, pure, objective 
interpretations, and uncontaminated transferences are considered mythological and cannot and 
do not exist in this kind of system (Orange et al., 1997). While remaining loyal to yet critical 
about psychoanalysis as a whole, Orange et al. (1997) bring the analyst into the therapeutic 
dialogue, and emphasise the role played by his/her subjective world (which is typically 
defended against, denied, not reflected on), which may facilitate or impede the analytic 
outcome. This kind of work humanises psychoanalysis, and makes it compatible with more 
contemporary theoretical work which focuses on the construction of social relations.   
Finally, before considering self-psychology below, I would like to emphasise the theoretical 
postulations of Fairbairn (1943). Feelings of “badness” constitute a common defense among 
people who have been abused. Abuse survivors identify with and internalise intolerably bad 
objects and carry the burden of “badness” and shame because it is more tolerable to believe 
that the self is bad, and so in control, than to accept that the loved perpetrator, whose abuse is 
random and unpredictable, is bad. According to Fairbairn (1943, p. 67), internalisation is an 
attempt to control these bad objects who have wielded power over them in the external world; 
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however, “these objects retain their prestige for power over him [the survivor] in the inner 
world. In a word, s/he is ‘possessed’ by them, as if by evil spirits”. Fairbairn (1943) argues 
that the ego seeks relationships with these internal objects; and that repression is primarily 
directed against these internalised objects. Once internalised and repressed, these objects are 
both unsatisfying and frustrating, and tempting and alluring; retaining both contradictory 
qualities simultaneously. This causes a great deal of ambivalence. The individual deals with 
this in the following way: 1) by splitting the individual into two objects, one good and one 
bad; 2) by internalising the bad object in an attempt to control it; 3) by splitting the 
internalised bad object in turn into two objects, a) the exciting or needed object, and b) the 
rejecting object; 4) by repressing both these objects and using aggression in the process; and 
5) by using further aggressing in splitting off from his/her central ego and repressing two 
subsidiary egos (the libidinal ego and the saboteur ego, so challenging Freud’s tripartite 
structure of the psyche) which remain attached to these internalised objects. This gives rise to 
the multiplicity of ego (identity) which we associate with trauma-related dissociation. It is 
also important to note that this attachment to bad internalised objects is additionally a means 
of avoiding being objectless and abandoned. This is why individuals who have been abused 
tend to cling to painful experiences because it enables them to continue relating to 
relationships with bad internal objects (Fairbairn, 1943). 
 
Self-psychology  
 
The inclusion of self-psychology is due to the important role it plays in attachment patterns, 
including trauma-related attachment patterns: the need for mirroring and merging – involving 
the regulation of emotional distance/intimacy, as well as explaining the cohesion and 
depletion of self.  
As I have noted, shame scholars have postulated the existence of two types of shame, one 
internal (intrapsychic), and one external (A. P. Morrison, 1987). In the case of the former, 
negative or punitive affect is imposed by the superego for the self’s failure to live up to some 
ideal; in the case of the latter, it is the self’s failure to achieve an external, reality-derived goal 
(A. P. Morrison, 1987). In internal shame, self-criticism and self-persecution is determined by 
imaginary audiences which have been created on the basis of experiences with others (Gilbert, 
2007). Self-psychologists such as Kohut argue that the experience of shame is entirely 
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internal, and as such, may develop in isolation (A. P. Morrison, 1987). Not all theorists agree 
that shame can be experienced entirely internally, like for example, Gilbert (1998), but that 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Originally, the selfobject (experienced as an extension of the self) exists as a significant and 
valued person to whom the self is attached and not clearly differentiated from; this selfobject 
is then internalised as the idealised parental imago (A. P. Morrison, 1987). In order for a 
cohesive self to develop, the self needs to attain its ideals through the responsiveness of the 
idealised parental imago (A. P. Morrison, 1987). Experiences with the selfobject promote 
development and cohesion of the self through processes such as mirroring, idealising and 
merging (Brown, 2004).  
Central to Kohut’s theory is the construct of the bipolar self, which refers to the two chances 
there are for the self to achieve cohesion: firstly, the empathic mirroring of the exhibitionistic 
grandiose self, usually by the mother, and secondly, the presence of an empathic, idealised 
selfobject later on, usually the father, who accepts the child’s identification, idealisation and 
desire for merger (A. P. Morrison, 1989). For Kohut, a selfobject which is unresponsive to the 
self’s need for mirroring and idealised merger contributes to a vulnerability towards shame. In 
his understanding, as is evident, shame is neither interpersonal nor social. Instead, it is a 
manifestation of weaknesses or deficiencies in the self with regards to the ideal self (A. P. 
Morrison, 1987). Specifically, shame was seen as the consequence of overwhelming, 
unmirrored grandiosity and selfobject unresponsiveness. Even the need for the selfobject can 
bring about shame, particularly in environments where the selfobject continually fails the self 
(A. P. Morrison, 1989). 
Although Kohut explicitly rejected the notion of linear development, there is an implied 
developmental progression from:  
1) Investment in the grandiose self, to 2) movement outward, in an object-seeking 
direction, toward investment in the idealized parental imago, to 3) firming of the 
idealized parental imago and its internalization (with the formation of psychic 
structure) through idealization of the superego and resultant establishment of ideals 
(A. P. Morrison, 1989, p. 70). 
So, there is a developmental progression from primary narcissism (reflected in the mirroring 
of the grandiose self) towards the self’s increasing affiliation with objects (merging and 
idealisation) (A. P. Morrison, 1987). Affiliation in the form of merging, and later 
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identification refers to selfobject experiences that facilitate a sense of belonging (Brown, 
2004). If the parental imago is unresponsive to the self’s needs for mirroring, idealisation or 
merging, it leads to the experience of shame, which is associated with fears of rejection and 
abandonment (A. P. Morrison, 1987, 1989). Due to his/her unrealised needs, such a child may 
have a predisposition to low self-esteem, and lack of self-acceptance, which also accompany 
experiences of shame (A. P. Morrison, 1987).  
Kohut described the consequence of the selfobject’s failure to mirror and affirm age-
appropriate exhibitionistic needs as fragmentation and disintegration, the opposite of cohesion 
(A. P. Morrison, 1989). Psychological depletion, on the other hand, is understood as a 
response to the absence of the needed, wished-for, omnipotent and idealised selfobject (A. P. 
Morrison, 1989). Specifically, it is noted that (A.P. Morrison, 1989, p. 74), 
“depletion/enfeeblement anxiety reflects threatened absence of the early, longed-for 
configurational objects – the idealized selfobject – leading to feelings of emptiness, 
depression and shame.” Such a self does not have realizable ideals and is weighed down by 
exaggerated and unattainable ideals and goals (A. P. Morrison, 1989). It is worth emphasising 
that A. P. Morrison (1989) argued that shame is more characteristic of self-depletion than 
fragmentation.  
If the selfobject fosters adequate validation, nurturance, protection and belonging, a mature 
sense of self develops; one which is characterised by cohesion (maintaining a stable 
connection with the self during times of emotional upheaval), continuity (the ability to 
maintain a consistent sense of self over time), colour (the capacity for appropriate affect 
regulation), and agency (the ability to maintain an independent sense of initiative) (Brown, 
2004). If any of these aspects is missing, an immature sense of self emerges (Brown, 2004). 
The immature sense of self is one which is characterised by either fragmentation, as one finds 
in psychotic and borderline conditions, or depletion, as in neurotic individuals, which is 
accompanied by a need for merging with an idealised selfobject, and associated feelings of 
failure and emptiness, as well as vulnerability toward shame (A. P. Morrison, 1987). For an 
immature self, the (infantile) need to merge with another, associated with complete 
identification and internalisation of the idealised other, continues to be the foremost selfobject 
experience in adulthood (Brown, 2004). Often, romantic partners in adulthood function as 
attachment figures or selfobjects, which allow for the immature self to recreate and relive 
relationships from the past in an effort to get selfobject needs met (Brown, 2004). Where 
merger experiences are searched for in adult selfobjects, particularly intimate partners, an 
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inability to endure any separation or difference between oneself and one’s partner is likely to 
develop, which could lead to shame-rage spirals as are seen in domestic violence situations 
(Brown, 2004).  
When trauma occurs, individual development may be arrested, and narcissistic vulnerability, 
associated with marked grandiosity manifest as unrealistic, idealistic expectations of self, may 
develop (Brown, 2004). This is thought to be accompanied by impaired affect regulation. 
These conditions result in an all-consuming sense of shame at the failure to achieve set goals, 
ideals and expectations, and a yearning for connection with the idealised parent (Brown, 
2004).  
 
Evolutionary Theory 
 
I will briefly outline some of the core tenets of evolutionary theory, because it is such an 
important theory in terms of external shame, and external shame is likely to emerge in non-
Western participants such as those I interviewed (Goldberg, 1991). One of the key debates in 
shame theory is whether the underpinning psychobiological mechanisms of shame are of 
recent origin and associated with self-consciousness and self-awareness, or whether shame is 
the result of elaboration of phylogenetically older mechanisms (Gilbert, 1998). It is Gilbert’s 
(1998) belief that shame is the result of the latter, which is based on the contention that 
evolution does not create new designs but adapts existing designs, so ensuring evolutionary 
continuity.  
A core tenet of evolutionary theory is that human beings are social animals who are motivated 
to engage in behaviours which promote survival and reproduction. According to evolutionary 
theorists, shame is an interpersonal phenomenon, and can therefore be understood as 
originally fulfilling the function of ensuring and enhancing social cohesion, by promoting 
conformity to the group, which is associated with the development of skills and competencies 
that are essential for the continuation of both the individual and group/species (Izard, 1977; 
Will, 1987). Shame is elicited in situations where there is a defect in cooperative 
relationships, failures in competition for prestige, when non-conformity occurs, as well as in 
situations where an individual is subordinated (Fessler, 2004). The key threats to survival and 
reproduction are exclusion and intrusion (Gilbert, 2007). There are a great number of 
evolutionary pressures which motivate the need to create positive feelings about the self in 
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others – including those we have primary, early attachments with, to co-operative, 
emotionally supportive and sexual relationships in adulthood (Gilbert, 2007). Being securely 
attached in these relationships involves positive feelings and feelings of safety, while loss of 
attachment constitutes a threat (Gilbert, 2007). Caring, supportive and affiliative relationships, 
and being loved, valued and respected by others (and knowing that one is) deactivates threat 
systems, provides important resources for coping with challenges, and facilitates 
physiological changes that promote health and well-being (Gilbert, 2007). Shame is an 
emotion that alerts individuals (through threat-processing systems which signal loss of safety) 
when love, acceptance and positive regard from others has been lost, or are in the process of 
being lost (Gilbert, 2007).  
In order to avoid shame, and to ensure ongoing SAHP (Social Attention Holding Power), 
individuals may rely on attractiveness or aggression (Gilbert, 1998). Aggression signals are 
designed to stimulate fear/submission brain areas in others, while attractiveness strategies are 
designed to stimulate the reward/approach areas of others’ brains (Gilbert, 1998). Human 
shame is typically not focused on being physically attacked or injured, but rather on having 
SAHP damaged in some way. In modern societies, SAHP is associated with prestige rather 
than with dominance (Fessler, 2004). Loss of SAHP signals has a dysregulating effect on 
humans, possibly at least partly because SAHP has serotonin regulating properties (Gilbert, 
1998).  
Shame is a “two-edged sword” (Gilbert, 1998, p. 114). It can both help limit or avoid 
breaches in social attractiveness or SAHP, and it may even evoke forgiveness and 
reconciliation, but at the same time, if the shame system is overly sensitive and leads to 
disproportionate or excessive displays of submission, it can lead to rejection by others, 
because such displays are seen as unattractive. In this context it is pertinent to note that 
unfavourable social comparisons (along a continuum of “inferior-superior” and “same-
different”) are highly correlated with shame (Gilbert, 1998). In order to maintain SAHP 
(which is dependent on social success that involves behaviours like sexual partnering) the 
individual must learn to engage in displays that evoke sympathy and reconciliation, rather 
than those that demonstrate excessive submission, which is illustrative of weakness or 
vulnerability. 
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Interpersonal misattunement has been identified as an important elicitor of shame by 
evolutionary theorists (Gilbert, 1998). This occurs when two or more individuals are not 
affectively matched in their roles towards one another (e.g. when a person’s sexual advances 
are not reciprocated, or an infant is not comforted by a mother’s nurturance). Misattunement 
with others may be responded to in a range of ways, including polite requests for adapting or 
changing behaviour to overt attacks and rejection, depending on the intensity and duration of 
the misattunements. The person in question may also respond in a range of ways, exhibiting 
confusion, anxiety, anger or shame. The relative social rank of the individuals involved will 
determine who must attune to whom, with the subordinate typically having to attune to the 
dominant partner. If the lower rank individual does not display compliance and deference, 
more serious attempts at making him/her realise the error of his/her ways are embarked upon, 
like for instance ostracism and social exclusion. Gilbert (1998) argues that rank and status in 
social roles can be domain specific, and include being valued as a sexual mate, as a close 
personal ally, as a carer, as a group or team member, as a status seeker, or, in some cultures, 
as a care seeker (care seeking is shamed in Western cultures which value self-sufficiency). 
The term “regulation” is useful in the context of the discussions about misattunement of roles. 
It refers to a physiological and psychological state where systems are functioning optimally, 
in perfect balance, and can be compared to the state described by the medical term, 
“homeostasis” (Gilbert, 1998). In a regulated state, “one feels well, has the energy and 
confidence to do what one wants to do, thinks clearly, feels in control of one’s own thoughts 
and feelings, and is asymptomatic” (Gilbert, 1998, p. 106). In contrast, the term 
“dysregulation” refers to physiological and psychological states which are atypical and 
symptomatic, and which compromise capacities to concentrate and act effectively. 
Dysregulation and defense system activation is likely to occur when social signals indicate 
that there is role misattunement. Shame is a form of dysregulation which alerts individuals to 
the need for some defensive, reparative, or retaliatory actions. It is also associated with 
psychopathology in those vulnerable to mental disorders. This may in part be further 
determined by the role that social signals such as deference and respect, and associated social 
status, play in contributing to the regulation of serotonin (including levels in the blood and 
sensitivity) (Gilbert, 1998).  
Based on the primacy of the social dimension in evolutionary theory, Gilbert (2007) has 
proposed a biopsychosocial model for shame, seen below in Figure 2.1. It includes all the 
contributions to shame, from biological to psychological and social perspectives. 
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Figure 2.1. An evolutionary and biopsychosocial model for shame (Gilbert, 2007, p. 301). 
In this model, the importance of generating positive feelings in the minds of others for group 
belonging and cohesion is clear. As humans develop the cognitive competencies necessary to 
experience shame, they are able to understand that shame signals that the self is unattractive 
to the other, and this activates threat systems. These cognitive capacities also determine our 
experience of the social context for shame that arise from local, historical, cultural and 
ecological conditions – how different contexts vary in terms of how they socialise and 
construct shame (Gilbert, 2007). This, in turn, has influences on personal experiences of child 
rearing practices which may inhibit or enhance shame reactions. The wider social domains of 
peers may also be accepting or rejecting and bullying. In these broader social contexts, 
individuals may also experience prejudice and discrimination, which lead to stigmatisation. 
Innate motives for attachment and group belonging; 
Needs to stimulate positive affect in the minds of others; 
Unfolding cognitive competencies for self-evaluation 
Socio-cultural contexts relating to economic opportunities, group conflicts, political structure, 
cultural rules for honor/shame/pride; 
Personal experiences of shaming – stigma 
Family: criticism, high expressed emotion, negative labelling, abuse 
Social group: Bullying, discrimination, prejudice, stigma 
External shame: 
Devalued by other 
Excluded 
Avoided 
Criticized 
Internalized shame: 
Self-devaluation 
Internal attribution 
Depressed/Anxious 
Humiliation: 
Devaluation of other 
External attribution 
Unjust – 
revenge/anger 
Reflected stigma (to family and others) 
Rejection by community 
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Gilbert (2007) argues that at the centre of his model is external shame – how the self believes 
it exists in the minds of others (which may or may not interact with internal shame). High 
levels of external shame exist when individuals believe that because of certain characteristics 
they will not be able to create positive or acceptable images of the self in the eyes of the other. 
External shame, however, may also be associated with humiliation, which is associated with 
desires for revenge and aggression towards the other who has humiliated the undeserving self. 
In this model, the core source of shame is the experience of lack of social safeness; a sense of 
heightened social threat and uncertain sense of social positioning. Finally, in cultures where 
shame and honour systems are closely linked to the behaviours of other group members, the 
self may experience reflected shame or honour or conversely, the other may experience the 
reflected shame of the self (Gilbert, 2007).    
In summary, Gilbert argues that evolution has resulted in a range of biosocial goals and 
strategies (e.g. finding a sexual mate, caring for offspring) which enhance the likelihood of 
survival and reproduction of the species. Social signals are humans’ most significant source of 
information, showing us whether our search for these evolutionary goals has been successful 
or not (Gilbert, 1998). These social signals are crucial in the maintenance of internal 
regulation and in indicating how attuned individuals are to their social roles. Shame signals 
misattunement, which leads to physiological dysregulation and indicates the need for 
defensive, reparative or retaliatory action. Shame activates the need to hide from view what is 
considered worthy of rejection, attack or ostracism (Gilbert, 1998). It may also be 
accompanied by depression or anxiety associated with the perception that there has been a 
reduction or diminishment in social status, respect and social attractiveness. The implications 
of external shame, including diminished social status, respect and SAHP with respect to this 
study will be explored in the results and discussion chapters.  
 
Affect Theory 
 
I will not be discussing Tomkins’ (1987) affect theory at any length. It is a biologically driven 
theory, not a social or phenomenological one, and focuses on the presence of inherent shame-
like reactions present from infancy, something which is in stark opposition to what I am 
proposing. I am proposing that trauma produces shame, and make no claims about whether or 
not it is an inborn emotion present in the absence of a traumatic trigger.  
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Briefly, Tomkins (1987) argues that there are seven innate affects that are present at birth and 
which share a common characteristic – each is motivated by a specific pattern of neural 
activity and accompanied by a particular facial display. They will be described in the next 
paragraph. Before describing them, it is worth noting that Tomkins postulates that each of the 
seven affects (located in specific parts of the brain) is triggered by information carried 
through the neural pathways, and that the intensity of neural firings activates the affect in 
question. Any decrease in density of neural firing activates the affect of enjoyment; such 
reduction is responsible for producing laughter (Tomkins, 1987). Laughter has previously 
been found to dispel both shame and hostility (H. B. Lewis, 1987a). Conversely, fairly 
constant levels of stimuli at relatively uncomfortable levels activate distress, while higher 
levels of stimulation at a more uncomfortable level activate affects such as fear, startle 
reactions, anger and rage (Kaufman, 1993; Tomkins, 1987). For Tomkins (1987), affects are 
displayed primarily on the face. It is particularly the eyes which are responsible for 
communicating affect. Tomkins (1963) argues that they are the organs of expression, 
communication, contagion, escalation and control of affects.  
The positive affects include interest-excitement, which is accompanied by the eyes down and 
the stare fixed on tracking or following an object; the second is enjoyment-joy, accompanied 
by the smiling response (Tomkins, 1987). The third innate affect is surprise-startle, with the 
eyebrows raised and eyes blinking (Tomkins, 1987). The negative innate affects include 
distress-anguish, accompanied by the crying response; anger-rage, accompanied by a frown, 
clenched jaw and red face; next, fear-terror, with the eyes held open or in a fixed stare, or 
looking away from the source of fear; and finally, shame-humiliation, with the eyes and head 
lowered (Tomkins, 1987). These affects are known as “drive auxiliaries” (Tomkins, 1987). 
These innate affects are not related to drives, unlike the innate affects of dissmell 
(accompanied by the raising of the top lip and nose in response to a unpleasant odour) and 
disgust (accompanied by the spitting out or vomiting out of the mouth or nostrils something 
noxious which has been ingested) which are related to the drive, hunger (Tomkins, 1987). 
Like disgust, which is an auxiliary to hunger, shame is an auxiliary to the affects interest-
excitement and enjoyment-joy (Tomkins, 1987). Thus, shame emerges only when there is 
interest involved; it sensitises us to a number of behaviours that have either brought shame 
upon ourselves, or upon others (Zembylas, 2008). 
Tomkins does not consider shame from the perspective of violating social norms, but instead 
sees it as being elicited as a means of “blocking desire”; an automatic mechanism for 
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interrupting pleasurable sensations (M. Lewis, 2003, p. 1184). Thus, in his understanding, an 
event which elicits shame is one that leads to a reduction in interest, and causes 
disengagement (Mills, 2005). In other words, frustration involves the blocking of interest or 
excitement, and it is that frustration that leads to shame (Lee, 1999).  
Tomkins’ theory has been widely criticised, with scholars arguing that shame is more likely to 
be evoked in situations where there is a loss of positive affect associated with the devaluation 
of self specifically. For Tomkins, shame is the product of automatically activated, mechanistic 
inhibitory mechanisms, while for M. Lewis and H. B. Lewis, shame is the result of a 
conscious or self-conscious attribution or process (M. Lewis, 1992). The focus of the self is 
on the whole self’s failure or inadequacy, and the evaluation of that failure evokes shame, 
rather than an automatic elicitor (M. Lewis, 1992). In addition, unlike Tomkins, both H. B. 
Lewis and M. Lewis, as well as Gilbert (1998), considered next, view shame as a social 
emotion, one whose main function is to restore threatened affectional bonds (H. B. Lewis, 
1986).  
 
Cognitive Attributional Theory 
 
Cognitive attributional theory will not be foregrounded in this thesis since developmental 
concerns are not a focus of my study. The primary difference between evolutionary theory 
and cognitive attributional theory on shame is that in evolutionary theory, shame is not 
considered to be a self-conscious emotion. Instead, shame is considered to be dependent on 
more primitive psychological mechanisms that evolved to ensure that animals are responsive 
to social threat and take the necessary defensive actions. In contrast, cognitive attributional 
theory focuses not on the innate nature of shame, but rather on the learnt capacity, through the 
ability to reflect and evaluate both the self and the environment, to experience shame. 
According to cognitive attributional theory, there are three prerequisites to the shame 
experience: 1) the capacity to reflect upon the self; 2) the acquisition of culturally prescribed 
standards, conventions, rules and goals (transmitted through socialisation from an early age - 
these standards will differ from society to society, and across different time periods, as well as 
across individuals, in terms of age or gender, for instance); and 3) the internalisation of 
standards and the ability to anticipate others’ reactions to one’s capacity to meet these 
standards (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993; Mills, 2005).  
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The individual evaluates the success or failure of his/her thoughts, feelings and/or actions in 
relation to these standards. Individuals’ evaluation of success or failure with regard to 
standards may be accurate or idiosyncratic (standards are either too high or too low) (M. 
Lewis, 1992, 1993). Moreover, some individuals may tend to internalise blame, while others 
are prone to externalising blame for violations or transgressions. Shame is elicited when the 
self negatively evaluates the whole or total self (global attributions), while guilt is elicited 
when the self negatively evaluates specific actions (specific attributions) (M. Lewis, 1992, 
1993)
6
. The violation of standards which are integral to the definition of self tend to evoke 
shame (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993).  
Emotions can be divided into two groups – those which are self-referential and those which 
are not. Broucek (1991) and M. Lewis (1992) believe that shame, because it requires 
introspection, is not a primary but a secondary (self-referential) emotion. The experience of 
shame requires objective self-awareness – this is awareness in which the self focuses attention 
on the self; where we become the “objects of our own consciousness” - one that emerges only 
once we have a capacity for abstract knowledge (M. Lewis, 1992, p. 42). Abstract knowledge 
refers to the developing capacity to generate representations that are not restricted to the 
realistic, the capacity to categorise or classify objects and people, the ability to think about 
both past and future events, and the ability to fuse and reconcile discrepant events (M. Lewis, 
1992). So, self-reflection is not something that is present at birth; it is learnt and develops 
over time once a capacity for abstract knowledge has developed, one that is dependent on the 
acquisition of sensorimotor affective knowledge (initially involving evolutionarily adaptive 
reflexes, which develop into behavioural patterns that demonstrate the infant is engaging with 
his/her object and social environment), and representational knowledge (involving the 
development of active memory) (M. Lewis, 1992). Objective self-awareness emerges after 
subjective self-awareness, which involves attention directed outwards, towards external 
objects, rather than inwards, as is the case in objective self-awareness (M. Lewis, 1992). 
Thus, objective self-awareness develops only if the objective self becomes differentiated from 
the subjective self, and this depends on three conditions: there must be someone with a 
different point of view from the child; the two different points of view must involve the same 
object; and the child must be aware of the two different opinions simultaneously (M. Lewis, 
1992). The conflict between the child’s action or behaviour, and that of others, leads to the 
                                                 
6
 Women, as opposed to men, tend to make global attributions for failure, and specific attributions for success, 
while younger children, as opposed to older ones, tend to make global, rather than specific attributions (M. 
Lewis, 1992). 
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objectification of his/her thoughts, feelings and behaviours, which is central to the 
development of objective self-awareness (M. Lewis, 1992).  
According to M. Lewis (1992, 1993), certain cognitions need to be in place before self-
conscious emotions
7
 emerge. The self-conscious evaluative emotions are thought to develop 
in a predictable sequence, starting with the presence of primary emotions, including joy, fear, 
anger, sadness, disgust and surprise (emotions that involve simple or limited cognitive 
processes). As the child matures, at around the age of two-and-a-half to three years, s/he 
achieves the cognitive capacity of knowing him/herself, having developed objective self-
awareness. Once this is in place, the exposed emotions, consisting of embarrassment (non-
evaluative type), empathy and envy can emerge (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993). These emotions are 
not evaluative, as the self-conscious emotions are – they are not based on correct or incorrect, 
or appropriate or inappropriate thoughts, feelings or behaviours (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993). 
Instead, they are associated with feeling the self being exposed to others (M. Lewis, 1992, 
1993). Next, the child develops the cognitive capacity for owning social standards, rules and 
goals (which cannot occur without objective self-awareness), and begins to understand his/her 
own behaviour in relation to these standards (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993). This capacity needs to 
have developed in order for the self-conscious evaluative emotions, which involve the 
evaluation of thoughts, feelings and actions as correct or incorrect, appropriate or 
inappropriate, to develop (M. Lewis, 1992). These emotions include embarrassment 
(evaluative type), pride, shame and guilt (emotions that require complex cognitive processes) 
(M. Lewis, 1992, 1993). Although there is some debate around the timing of the emergence of 
evaluative self-conscious emotions, particularly whether the development of shame precedes 
the development of guilt or vice versa, it appears that these two self-conscious emotions 
emerge more or less simultaneously (M. Lewis, 1992). Like H. B. Lewis and Gilbert, those 
studying self-conscious emotion from a cognitive attributional point of view tend to perceive 
shame as a social emotion.  
Below, I distinguish between shame, guilt, pride, embarrassment and humiliation
8
, and in 
doing so, rely heavily on the work of June Tangney and her colleagues, which is primarily 
based on the earlier theoretical understandings put forth by H. B. Lewis’ phenomenological 
                                                 
7
 The term “self-conscious emotion” is a cognitive attributional term. Its use in this thesis does not point towards 
an investment in this theory. The term is simply used to usefully group a range of related emotions.  
8
 Envy will not be discussed here due to the lack of research on this emotion in relation to shame; however, it is 
acknowledged that both are associated with a sense of inferiority, dependency, powerlessness and rage at the 
object of shame/envy (Berke, 1987). In addition, both involve comparison between self and other (although 
shame may involve a shaming internal figure). Furthermore, both involve the defenses of concealment, denial, 
magical self-defense, appeasement, and aggressive counter-attack (Berke, 1987).  
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theory (particularly her distinctions between shame and guilt). I will also describe and 
compare associated constructs such as empathy, sympathy, personal distress, anger, hostility 
and aggression
9
.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The primary function of shame is to interrupt any activity that violates internal or external 
standards, norms or rules. These standards will differ from society to society, across groups 
and individuals in societies and across various time periods, but are all derived from the 
information acquired during the acculturation process in a particular society.  
In this chapter I have located the study in phenomenological terms. I have also indicated why 
affect and cognitive attributional theories are not relevant to my study, due to their 
developmental focus (and my study was conducted with adults, who had already developed 
the capacity for shame). I retained specific elements of other psychological shame theories 
that have relevance for my study, including intersubjectivity in dialogic work; trauma-related 
splitting and attachment patterns, particularly the need for mirroring and merging – including 
the regulation of emotional distance/intimacy, as well as the cohesion and depletion of self 
(self psychology) and SAHP (evolutionary theory).  
As can be seen from the theories reviewed in this chapter, shame is a highly contested, multi-
dimensional construct which is difficult to capture in a single theory. It is generally seen as a 
negative, pathological emotion. Not all scholars support this position. Bradshaw (2005) 
distinguishes between toxic and healthy shame, and believes that healthy shame is important 
because it puts us in touch with the limits of our abilities and motivates us to seek new 
information and learn new skills. It also reminds us that we often require help, and that we 
need to be in loving and caring relationships with others. Relatedly, healthy shame facilitates 
the ability to experience intimacy. It is at the core of humility and modesty. This is also 
touched on in chapter 4 on shame and culture. This is starkly contrasted with toxic shame, 
which is the experience of the self as being wholly, fundamentally flawed and characterised 
by crippling self-contempt (Bradshaw, 2005).  
                                                 
9
 Although not discussed further here, it is important to note that social anxiety, shyness and shame have been 
identified as closely related constructs (Gilbert, 1998). Shyness, social anxiety and shame are all associated with 
fear of negative interpersonal evaluation in real or imagined social settings, specific physiological symptoms, 
self-consciousness, generalized tension and inhibition (Gilbert, 1998). 
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In agreement with Gilbert (1998), I maintain that shame is based on primitive psychological 
mechanisms which have adaptive functions that have evolved over time to enable animals and 
humans to defend against social threats. However, in excess, shame is toxic, and has 
extremely detrimental effects on psychological functioning (Bradshaw, 2005). 
In the following chapter we turn to the factors which distinguish shame from related 
emotions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretically and Clinically Relevant Distinctions Between Shame 
and Related Emotions 
 
Shame is a complex construct, which is not easily defined. Although this thesis is only based 
on shame, not theoretically and empirically related emotions, I compare shame to these 
emotions instead of trying, and inevitably failing, to define shame in a single sentence or 
paragraph. Therefore, elucidating shame through comparison to other related constructs was 
chosen as a more appropriate approach to understanding the construct than attempting to 
provide a single, all-encompassing definition of shame. Consequently, the function of this 
chapter is to define shame through its relation to a number of other related emotions. Many of 
these emotions are closely related, and overlap, but I also focus on the important distinctions 
amongst them. It is important to understand both the commonalities and the distinctions 
between shame and these associated emotions in order to understand shame in all its 
complexities. The understanding of shame and other related emotions will be based on 
psychoanalytic, phenomenological, cognitive and empirical approaches, most of which were 
described in the previous chapter. I begin the chapter with a brief description and comparison 
of shame and other self-conscious emotions (defined below), and then go into greater depth in 
terms of the similarities and differences between shame and related constructs. 
Before beginning the theoretical review, it is important to make a distinction between shame 
and stigma. In M. Lewis’ (1998, p. 126) understanding, shame can be defined as “an intense 
negative emotion having to do with the self in relation to standards, responsibility, and such 
attributions as global self failure” (an internal experience), whereas stigma is a “public mark” 
or violation (an external experience), something that is noticeable to others and involves a 
“spoiled identity”. Thus, the stigmatised person is publically marked by his/her deviation 
from the norm in appearance or in behaviour (M. Lewis, 1998; Nussbaum, 2004). However, 
there is a great deal of overlap between these two constructs. Significantly, shame may 
precede and/or follow stigmatisation. Nussbaum (2004) argues that individuals project aspects 
of themselves of which they feel ashamed or out of control, and wish to conceal, onto 
vulnerable groups, thus stigmatising them. Shame is also one of the core emotional 
consequences of stigmatisation (M. Lewis, 1998). For example, individuals who manifest 
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psychotic behaviour often describe the sense of estrangement from others, alienation, a sense 
of isolation and social failure, as well as the awareness of belonging to a feared or unwanted 
group, which are all characterised by substantial despair and shame (Will, 1987). 
Furthermore, the degree to which the stigmatised person is blamed for his/her deviation is 
associated with the degree of shame experienced (M. Lewis, 1998). A related construct, is 
stigma consciousness. It refers to an individual’s expectation that s/he will be prejudiced 
against or discriminated against on the basis of dispositional or situationally induced 
differences (Mosley & Rosenberg, 2007). Stigma consciousness does not only refer to an 
individual’s awareness that s/he has a stereotyped status; instead, it refers to the individual’s 
focus on his/her stereotyped status (Mosley & Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
Shame and Guilt 
 
From the earliest writings on shame, scholars have suggested that the desire to hide or to 
disappear is a key feature of the experience of shame. In fact, Schneider (1987, p. 199) argues 
that “at its core, shame is intimately linked to the human need to cover that which is 
exposed”, a characteristic which is quite clear in the Proto-Germanic, Indo-European root 
*(s)kem-; *(s)kam-, which means “to cover”, and gives us the English word shame. Yontef 
(1996) argues that the difficulty with the hiding associated with shame is that it isolates the 
individual, and without interaction and feedback from others, no growth is able to take place. 
However, hiding may be inevitable because shame comes with such extreme pain, discomfort, 
and anger, which is what distinguishes shame from shyness or embarrassment (M. Lewis, 
1992).  
Early scholars emphasised the overlap between self-conscious emotions, and mistakenly 
conflated shame with a range of related constructs, including, among others, discouragement, 
self-consciousness, embarrassment, shyness and guilt (Kaufman, 1993). These emotions have 
a core affect in common, but there are marked differences in their activators, targets and 
reducers (Kaufman, 1993). Shame and guilt in particular have been a challenge to disentangle 
in some of the literature (Mollon, 2002). The confusion between shame and guilt in particular 
can be traced mainly to the belief that both shame and guilt are social emotions – affects that 
arise when there is a threat to significant social bonds (Gilbert, 1998; H. B. Lewis, 1986; Will, 
1987). Although both shame and guilt develop in interpersonal contexts, shame is evoked 
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when a person fears the loss or ruptures of an attachment to a valued or admired other (Will, 
1987). This fear functions to encourage compliance with cultural or group prescriptions, 
norms, standards and values (Will, 1987).  
As we saw in the previous chapter, it is H. B. Lewis who first developed the distinctions 
between guilt and shame, discussed below. H. B. Lewis (1971) and later, M. Lewis (1992),  
Nussbaum (2004) and Mollon (2002), differentiate between shame and guilt on the basis of 
specific and global attributions – in shame, global attributions involve the negative evaluation 
of the total self, while in guilt, the individual’s attributions focus on the particular actions of 
the self. Thus, researchers such as Dearing, Stuewig and Tangney (2005) have shown that 
shame-proneness (a tendency or readiness to experience certain kinds of emotions and engage 
in certain types of behaviours, such as feeling bad and self-conscious about the whole self; 
and having more severe negative emotions and behaviours activated in potentially shameful 
situations), relates to a variety of problems and pathologies, whereas guilt-proneness, which 
involves the tendency to feel bad about a particular behaviour or incident, is more likely to be 
adaptive. Because the self is not debilitated by guilt, and because guilt involves focusing on 
specific and controllable behaviours, it is more likely to be accompanied by reparative action, 
hence the demonstrated association between guilt and prosocial feelings and behaviour 
(Lazarus, 1991; H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991). When guilt occurs, the individual 
focuses on fixing or “undoing” the failure, or preventing its re-occurrence (M. Lewis, 1992; 
Nussbaum, 2004). In the words of Kingston (as cited in Goldberg, 1991, p. 54):  
Unlike the guilty act for which one can make confession, expiation, penance, or 
reparation, the shameful act requires an alteration of the person. The person thinks ‘I 
can not have done this. But I have done it, and I can not undo it because it is I.’  
Gilbert (1998) has made a distinction between internal (the self’s negative evaluation of the 
self) and external (others’ negative evaluation of the self) shame. He argues that although the 
two are often correlated, shame can either be entirely internal or entirely external; however, 
the core aspect of both types of shame is the experience of the self as “unattractive social 
agent” 10(Gilbert, 1998, p. 22). By contrast, H. B. Lewis (1971) argues that shame includes the 
vicarious experience of another’s negative evaluation of the self (which involves a great deal 
of visual and verbal imaging of the self from the other’s perspective), hence, for shame to 
occur, there needs to be a relationship between the self and an admired or valued other. Guilt 
                                                 
10
 This is defined as the closeness to the undesired self as opposed to distance from the idealized self (Gilbert, 
1998). 
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is also understood as a vicarious experience, however, it is the experience of having done (or 
not done) something that harmed, injured or caused another suffering (H. B. Lewis, 1987a). 
As such, H. B. Lewis argues that shame can be interpreted as the experience of losing self-
esteem in both the self and/or others’ eyes as a result of perceived failure, while guilt is the 
experience of injuring others which requires corrective action.  
Other important distinctions between shame and guilt besides in focus (self vs. a specific 
incident) is the experienced emotion (worthlessness and powerlessness vs. tension, remorse 
and regret); the effect on the individual’s conception of self (global impairment vs. 
unimpaired self), and the reactions (a desire to hide, escape or strike back with hostility, 
scorn, contempt and ridicule vs. a regret, remorse, concern and a desire to confess, apologise 
or repair) (Crowe, 2004; Lazarus, 1991; H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Steuwig, & Mashek, 
2007). Seligman and Teasdale (as cited in Tangney & Dearing, 2002) distinguish between 
locus (internal vs. external), globality (global vs. specific) and stability (stable vs. unstable). 
Guilt and shame are both internal attributions, but they differ in terms of globality and 
stability – with shame being more likely to involve global and stable attributions (See Table 
3.1 for a summary of the differences between shame and guilt at the end of the section). In 
addition, causal controllability impacts on guilt and shame, with internal, controllable causes 
for personal failure leading to feelings of guilt (for example, lack effort in an achievement 
task), and internal, uncontrollable causes for personal failure leading to shame (for example, 
lack of ability in an achievement task (Weiner, 1986). It is also worth noting that shame 
results in a reduction in achievement striving, while guilt is associated with renewed 
motivation (Weiner, 1986). 
It is worth briefly noting however, that largely on the basis of criticisms of the commonly 
used measure known as the Test for Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA), Ferguson, Brugman, 
White and Eyre (2007) have argued that shame and guilt cannot be distinguished on the basis 
of perceived controllability. In addition, they question whether shame is inevitably associated 
with poor adaptation, and guilt with healthy adaptation. In fact, they suggest that it is the 
combined tendency toward guilt and shame that characterises sophisticated moral self-
regulation. They also question the focus in existing research on emphasising the importance 
of guilt and detracting from the importance of shame. On the basis of this, these authors 
demonstrate that withdrawal/avoidance/self-criticism so typical of shame is not a warranted 
reaction to minor or isolated transgressions. However, when expressed as a response to 
repeated transgression, the pattern of submissive-appeasement displays of shame is used to 
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elicit sympathetic understanding from others (Ferguson et al., 2007).  This finding has not 
been consistently replicated.    
Shame is an involuntary affective state that may arise in response to events or circumstances 
for which the individual cannot be held responsible, and over which the individual has little 
control (Goldberg, 1991; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Because of its irrational nature, the self is not 
open to rational solutions when shamed (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt tends to involve more 
cognitive activity than shame, such as preoccupation with wrongdoing, and rationalisation 
(Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt involves negative feelings, but with or without the 
painful affect – particularly the heightened or acute self-consciousness characterising shame – 
and the accompanying autonomic (e.g. blushing, tears, increased heart rate) reactions (Izard, 
1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). It involves less emotional disorganisation, more rational ideation 
and tendency to make amends; the self is much more able, less helpless than in the case of 
shame (H. B. Lewis, 1986). Shame is understood as a wordless, primitive and irrational 
emotion which is associated with excessive uncontrollable autonomic reactions, which may 
be experienced as a flood of sensations (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Blushing ironically 
heightens the visibility of the face, the primary site for communicating affect, at a time when 
the blushing individual desires to be inconspicuous, so compounding helplessness and shame 
(Tomkins, 1963). Other mental and physical indicators of shame include mentally blanking, 
numbness, becoming very still or quiet, and hanging of the head (Yontef, 1996). 
As is clear, because of the heightened self-awareness that accompanies shame, it involves 
greater body awareness and activity (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). In shame reactions, the 
body “implodes”, with head bowed, eyes closed and body curled in itself, to make the 
individual as small and as inconspicuous as possible (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). This is 
understood by evolutionary theorists as a form of appeasement (Gilbert, 1998). The hanging 
head and the averted eyes cause an immediate reduction in facial visibility, which is why 
shame has previously been referred to as “loss of face” (Kaufman, 1993, p. 20). Facial 
defenses against shame include a frozen face and the “anti-affect” head-back look which 
involves a facial display opposite to the shame response with head and chin up (Kaufman, 
1993, p. 20). Retzinger (1987, p. 171) argues that the external bodily manifestations of shame 
include: 1) the hand covering all or certain parts of the face; 2) turning in, biting, or licking 
the lips, or biting the tongue; 3) gaze avoidance, eyes lowered or glancing; 4) blushing; 5) 
forehead wrinkled vertically or diagonally; and 6) false smiling and masking behaviours. 
Nonverbal markers of shame also include shame phrases (e.g. It was sore, it hurt; I am 
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nothing; I am dirty), repetitious speech, and fragmented speech (Retzinger, 1987). Behaviours 
involved in the shame response include these physiological reactions, behaviours that are 
activated to cope with or conceal shame (e.g. secondary reactions to shame such as fear or 
anger), behaviours triggered to avoid being shamed or to avoid shame being discovered (e.g. 
social withdrawal, secrecy, competitiveness, addictions, unrelenting high standards or 
perfectionism), and behaviours used to repair or compensate for shame (e.g. 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, public demonstrations of shame to ensure reconciliation 
and forgiveness) (Gilbert, 1998).  
When the guilt reaction includes affect, it may vary considerably in intensity, while in shame 
the negative emotion is typically intense (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, shame is an intense 
negative state which results in an interruption of current behaviour, confusion in thought, and 
speechlessness (M. Lewis, 1992). Often, the shamed individual finds it difficult to identify the 
exact cause of his/her uneasiness, which is why it is so difficult to find the words to 
communicate the painful experience of shame (Goldberg, 1991). One of the reasons for these 
difficulties in speech is because “normal” or universal shame experiences occur prior to 
language development (before the hypothalamus and hippocampus of the brain are fully 
developed), in infancy, and thus the experience becomes internalised in terms of imagery 
rather than language (Goldberg, 1991).  
Recent empirical work has begun to study the psychobiological markers of shame, and have 
found that shame reactions are associated with increased proinflammatory cytokine activity 
(leading to the suppression of the immune system) and increases in cortisol levels, potentially 
leading to autoimmune and inflammatory disturbances (Mills, 2005; Tangney et al., 2007). In 
addition, Tangney et al. (2007) found increased cardiovascular reactivity and risk factors for 
hypertension in shame reactions. The same biological reactions were not evident in guilt 
experiences.   
Another key difference between guilt and shame is that in shame, self-other boundaries are 
much more permeable – the individual is able to take the perspective of both the self, and 
vicariously experience that of the other (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971)
11
. This duality or 
doubleness of experience is the basis for what Freud called the “internal theatre” of the self 
(H. B. Lewis, 1987c, p. 107). Furthermore, shamed individuals frequently experience others 
behaving towards them as they treat themselves unconsciously (Yontef, 1996). Soft self-other 
boundaries also have implications for the contagiousness of shame – shamed people tend to 
                                                 
11
 This differs from empathy, which requires not only perspective-taking, but also affective matching. 
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evoke shame in others (Goldberg, 1991). Guilt on the other hand, is more contained and is 
localised within the self (i.e. not involving seeing the self from the perspective of others) (H. 
B. Lewis, 1971).   
A related issue is the different roles played by shame and guilt in terms of boundaries 
protecting the self. Wurmser (1995, p. 62) argues that each person is surrounded by an inner 
and an outer limit or boundary; the inner limit is the boundary around the person’s intimate 
areas and protects his/her privacy, while the outer limit is the boundary of “power expansion”, 
which, if crossed, violates the other’s integrity, power, and social prestige. Guilt ensures that 
the outer boundary of another is not infringed, while shame ensures that there is no 
infringement of the inner boundary (Wurmser, 1995).   
There are important differences in how the other is perceived in shame and guilt reactions. In 
shame reactions, the other is the source of scorn, contempt or ridicule; is seen as intact, 
powerful and active; as abandoning; and focal in awareness (H. B. Lewis, 1986). In guilt, the 
other is seen as injured, suffering or hurt; dependent; and the other is only present in thoughts 
related to guilt, not as a pervasive focus (H. B. Lewis, 1986).  
At its core, shame involves feelings of banishment, ostracism and abandonment, while guilt 
involves awareness of engaging in a specific act which is in violation of a standard of conduct 
(Yontef, 1996). For example, shame involves fears of abandonment when caregivers 
withdraw from the child, withholding love, when they are contemptuous or disgusted with the 
child, and when they threaten to leave the child, all of which communicate rejection 
(Kaufman, 1993). Caregivers, siblings and peers can also evoke shame and abandonment 
fears through communicating that the child is a source of shame or embarrassment to them, by 
disparaging, by blaming, humiliating, and having performance expectations (Kaufman, 1993).  
Abandonment is of key importance in shame experiences. Perceptions of exposing the self’s 
weakness, defectiveness and dirtiness (the core ingredients of the shame experience) are 
centred around fears of evoking rejection, contempt and abandonment from others (Wurmser, 
1995). That is why the subject of shame is internalised or hidden, while the object(s) (those 
perceiving another’s shame) need to be displaced or “neutralized” (Wurmser, 1995, p. 59). 
Wurmser (1995) argues that the primary aim of shame is to stimulate hiding behaviours, 
whose function it is to prevent abandonment. This pertains to both levels of shame, namely, 
the activity of being exposed, and the content of what is being exposed (Wurmser, 1995).  
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From a Gestalt point of view, shame is the “experience of negative evaluative and emotional 
reactions to one’s own being”, whereas guilt is the experience of violating a standard of 
conduct (Yontef, 1996, p. 353). Shame involves both thought and affect, and includes feeling 
inadequate, incompetent, weak, defective, stupid, disgusting, repugnant, loathsome, 
untouchable, unwanted, a bother or a nuisance, not “enough”, as unentitled and unworthy of 
belonging, respect, love, and comfort, and includes the experience of being uncomfortably 
seen by significant others, exposed, naked and vulnerable to contempt. According to Yontef 
(1996), there are three types of shame: situational, group and existential. Situational shame is 
a response to a situation in which particular failures, weaknesses or inappropriate behaviour 
are exposed (Yontef, 1996). Existential shame is broader than situational shame, and involves 
the negative evaluation of the essence of the individual; his/her entirety (Yontef, 1996). 
Group shame refers to shame that is the result of belonging to a particular stigmatised social 
grouping. Existential shame, in particular, develops in shaming environments, which result in 
the child turning against the part of the self that needs love and nurturance from (shaming) 
significant figures in his/her life; blaming him/herself for these needs, rather than the 
environment which should foster them. Because it feels unfathomable to the child that his/her 
parents are “bad”, s/he feels shame for being “needy” or “weak”. From a Gestalt point of 
view, shame is the introjected message (a toxic message absorbed – “swallowed whole”, 
unintegrated, from the environment) from significant others such as parents, that s/he is never 
enough to deserve love from them (Yontef, 1996).  
It is worth briefly noting that what kind of event evokes either guilt or shame is also at least 
partly dependent on the nature and temperament, as well as socialisation experiences of the 
individual. Although there are very few prototypic situations for eliciting shame (or guilt), M. 
Lewis (1992) suggests that love withdrawal, which implies the rejection or abandonment of 
the whole self, is one such situation.  
It has long been held that shame may be evoked by moral or non-moral transgressions, and 
from relatively trivial events, to serious moral wrongdoings (H. B. Lewis, 1971). It may be 
evoked for irrational or illogical reasons, and commonly involves disappointment, defeat or 
frustration, usually as a result of perceived or actual abandonment, which tends to be linked to 
past experiences (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lazarus, 1991). H. B. Lewis (1971) argues that guilt, in 
contrast, is evoked by the acceptance or acknowledgement of moral contravention. More 
recent empirical work, however, indicates that shame and guilt are not distinct in terms of the 
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types of transgressions or failures that evoke them. According to Tangney (2003), there is a 
great deal of overlap in the kinds of occurrences that evoke shame and guilt.  
Findings, however, are inconsistent. Ferguson, Stegge and Damhuis (1991) found that guilt 
was evoked for pre-adolescents when moral violations occurred, whereas shame resulted from 
both moral transgressions and social blunders. Guilt was associated with approach-avoidance 
conflict in terms of the victim, self-criticism, remorse, desire to make amends, and fear of 
punishment for both 7 – 9 year-olds and 10 – 12 year-olds, whereas shame was associated 
with embarrassment, blushing, ridicule and wish to escape among 7 – 9 year-olds and 10 – 12 
year-olds when shame was characterised as involving feelings of stupidity, being unable to do 
things the right way, and being unable to look at others (Ferguson et al., 1991).  
There is an enduring belief that shame is a more “public” emotion (experienced in the 
presence of others) than guilt, which is viewed as a more “private” experience (experienced 
when alone) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A large body of research, however, calls this 
distinction into question, demonstrating that shame and guilt do not in fact differ on this 
dimension (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). Shame may involve internally 
focused, private self-consciousness, or externally focused public self-consciousness about the 
self (Gilbert, 1998). Shame and guilt are both likely to be experienced while in the presence 
of others; and solitary shame experiences have been found to be as frequent as solitary guilt 
experiences (Tangney, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007). Both shame and guilt are elicited by 
social situations, whether imagined or real, although shame is associated with more intense 
feelings of exposure (Tangney et al., 2007). Unlike guilt, shame is also characterised by a 
tendency towards self-criticism, unfavorable social comparison (on dimensions of inferior-
superior and same-different) and dependency (Gilbert, 1998). However, the major distinction 
between shame and guilt remains the differential role played by the self.  
The belief that guilt is adaptive, and shame maladaptive, is not universally held. Kaufman 
(1993) argues that shame is not necessarily debilitating; that its effects depend on its 
frequency, intensity, duration and consequences. Dost and Yagmurlu (2008) suggest that any 
emotion can be both adaptive and maladaptive, depending on the function of the emotion, its 
context and circumstances (including culture). Researchers supporting this contention suggest 
that guilt is a multi-dimensional construct, which comprises some adaptive dimensions, and 
some maladaptive dimensions (Dost & Yagmurlu, 2008). The maladaptive dimensions of 
guilt can be seen in studies where guilt has been associated with depression, somatisation, 
obsessive-compulsiveness, psychoticism, paranoid ideation, anxiety and anger (Dost & 
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Yagmurlu, 2008). Guilt has also been associated with negative perfectionism (Dost & 
Yagmurlu, 2008). Furthermore, there are different types of guilt, like for example, chronic 
guilt (continuous guilt feelings without concrete cause) and predispositional guilt (guilt 
feelings that are evoked by specific incidents) (Dost & Yagmurlu, 2008). Research indicates 
that chronic guilt, but not predispositional guilt, is associated with poor outcomes, including 
depression, somatic complains, obsessive-compulsive tendencies and paranoid and anxious 
symptoms (Dost & Yagmurlu, 2008). Scholars in the past (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971, 
1987a, 1987b, 1987c) have theoretically associated guilt with thought disorders – particularly 
obsessive ideation and paranoia. Guilt is transformed into paranoia through the projection of 
hostility outwards (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). Finally, it is important to note that under certain 
circumstances, shame may also be constructive. For instance, in societies which are 
characterised by the promotion of human dignity and equality, individuals may uphold 
particular values, such as the inclusion of all human beings in a community, and the 
associated notions of interdependence and mutual responsibility (Nussbaum, 2004). Not 
upholding such values may lead people in such societies to feel shame, a kind of shame that is 
distinguished from more primitive varieties, which are typically associated with rage and 
revenge or retribution fantasies, by its essentially anti-narcissistic character (Nussbaum, 
2004).    
It is interesting to note that, similar to Freud, in the early writings of Piers and Singer (1953), 
guilt was considered more pathological than shame. Although their assertion that guilt is 
typically accompanied by restitution (sacrifice, atonement) concurs with the later writings of 
other scholars, they argue that shame-driven individuals are more likely to reach their 
potentialities, to mature and progress in healthy ways (due to healthier primary and secondary 
identifications), than those who are guilt-driven and who tend to regress or stagnate, as well 
as experience feelings of resentment, frustration and rage (Piers & Singer, 1953). However, as 
will be seen, some of the more recent empirical work calls this assumption into question. 
Recent studies have demonstrated that shame-free guilt mostly does not contribute to 
psychological symptoms (Tangney et al., 2007). In fact, greater guilt has been associated with 
higher ideal and real self-image, educational achievements, fewer learning difficulties, and 
less acting-out behaviour (Bybee & Zigler, 1991). In contrast, shame is associated with a host 
of interpersonal problems such as retaliation or withdrawing, hiding, and wishing to escape 
(Tangney, 1991). Shame-proneness is negatively associated with self-esteem, stability of the 
self, and positively related with self-consciousness, fear of negative evaluation, and splitting 
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(Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). Conversely, shame-free guilt is positively related to 
self-esteem, stability of self, and is unrelated to self-consciousness, fear of negative 
evaluation and splitting (Tangney et al., 1995). In addition, in shame, but not guilt reactions, 
individuals may experience a range of secondary defenses and catastrophic reactions, which 
prevent the individual from feeling shame, but which cause significant distress (Goldberg, 
1991). In Goldberg’s (1991) view, these “explosive” responses temporarily overwhelm the 
individual’s sense of being insignificant, debased, abject and disregarded. Another way in 
which individuals counter feelings of shame is by putting on a front of arrogance, self-
glorification, aggressiveness and pseudo-masculinity (Goldberg, 1991).  
Tangney, Mashek and Stuewig (2005) assert that guilt becomes maladaptive or problematic 
only when it becomes enmeshed with shame, and it is the shame aspect of the fused construct 
that facilitates pathological outcomes. The kind of maladaptive or fused shame-guilt proposed 
by Tangney et al. (2005) is characterised by chronic self-blame and obsessive pre-occupation 
with wrongdoings (Tangney, 2003). Alternatively, another recent study speculated that there 
are two types of guilt – one constructive and restorative, the other destructive and 
maladaptive, and that shame remains a distinct affective construct (Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, 
Felton & Ciesla, 2008). Problematic guilt may emerge when individuals develop a magnified 
or distorted sense of responsibility for events that were not within their control and/or in 
which they had no particular involvement, such as in the case of survivor guilt (Tangney et 
al., 2007).  
It is worth pausing for a moment to focus on shame exclusively and to consider that these 
psychopathologies develop both in individuals who have a temperamental vulnerability to 
shame-proneness and in those who experience high levels of shame-promotive experiences 
(Mills, 2005). Children who are disposed to high levels of anxiety more readily attribute 
transgressions or wrongdoings to internal traits than those who experience lower levels of 
anxiety (Mills, 2005). In addition, it has been shown that individuals who are prone to more 
self-focused attention are less able to create barriers to protect themselves from negative 
internal stimuli, and are at increased risk for developing a disposition towards shame (Mills, 
2005).  
As I have noted, unlike guilt, shame results in complete helplessness. In guilt reactions, the 
individual has the option of changing his/her behaviour; repairing the negative consequences 
of his/her behaviour; extending an apology; as well as resolving to behave differently in the 
future (Tangney et al., 2007). By contrast, the self is much more incapacitated and powerless 
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in the case of shame responses (Tangney et al., 2007), which is possibly one of the reasons it 
bears a strong relationship to psychopathology, for example, depression.  
The research findings on a related construct, self-blame, and its relationship to anger (as 
distinguished from verbal and physical aggression and hostility) have not been consistent. 
Gilbert and Miles (2000) found that self-blame rather than blame of others was associated 
with anger; and that self-blame was also positively related to hostility, whereas blaming 
others was related to fewer hostile attitudes. Self-blame can also paralyse the self into 
passivity, and contribute to feelings of being overwhelmed and being unable to control one’s 
life (Goldberg, 1991). 
Shame is often understood as the dissonance or disjuncture produced in the self-concept as a 
result of thoughts, feelings and actions which are inconsistent with who one believes one is, 
or ought to be (Stone, 1992). Thus, shame is associated with discrepancies between the actual 
self (attributes that the individual or others believe s/he actually possesses), the ideal self 
(attributes the individual or others would like him/her to possess), and the ought self (the 
attributes the individual or others believe s/he should possess) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
Unlike the theory proposes, self-discrepancies of all kinds are related to shame (Tangney, 
Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). Tangney and her colleagues also found that both 
anxiety and depression were associated with all types of self-discrepancies, and that unlike the 
theory states, affective states (dejection and agitation) were not differentially related to these 
self-discrepancies. 
In psychoanalytic terms, these discrepancies are described as the inability to live up to the 
ego-ideal; the inability to live up to an idealised image, an image which to the internal eye is 
searingly deficient (Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; Wurmser, 1995). Alternatively, shame can be 
described as a discrepancy between expectancy and realisation (Wurmster, 1987). According 
to Piers and Singer (1953), in shame, there is a discrepancy between the ego and ego ideal 
whilst guilt is the tension generated when the barrier erected by the superego is transgressed 
by id impulses. This diverges from Freud’s sexual understanding of shame, where shame is 
understood as a reaction formation against exhibitionism in particular (in Freud’s writings, 
shame is usually described in the context of drives and impulses that require restriction, 
including sexual impulses, as well as aggression and toileting practices) (Freud, 1986). 
Specifically, Freud held that shame, disgust, pity and the societal structures of morality and 
authority inhibit sexual instincts (Freud, 1986). For Piers and Singer (1953), unlike guilt, 
shame is generated by a goal not being reached (one which is held by the ego-ideal). Thus, 
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shame is accompanied by a sense of failure, while guilt is the anxiety associated with 
transgression, made evident by the workings of the superego (Piers & Singer, 1953). Another 
distinction, in psychoanalytic terms, between shame and guilt, is that the unconscious, 
irrational threat associated with shame is that of contempt, ostracism and ultimately, 
abandonment, while in guilt it is mutilation (castration) (Piers & Singer, 1953). Although 
these two constructs are clearly differentiated, even in early writings, these authors found in 
their clinical practice that they tend to co-occur in that one can lead to the other, and that one 
may conceal the other (Piers & Singer, 1953). For example, guilt can follow shame when 
feelings of weakness, passivity and helplessness, as is characteristic of shame, lead to feelings 
of anger and retribution towards the injuring other, resulting in feelings of guilt (Mollon, 
2002).  
Although also from a psychoanalytic perspective, H. B. Lewis (1971) argues that in shame, it 
is not the discrepancy between the ego and the ego-ideal that determines failure and 
abandonment terror, but the perception that one has failed in the eyes of an imagined or real 
idealised other, who is perceived as punitive and rejecting. Thus, in H. B. Lewis’ (1971) view, 
shame can be experienced only in the context of an emotional relationship with another 
person who is valued.  
Prior to concluding this section, it is worth briefly pausing to consider a very different theory, 
posited by Elison (2005). He argues that shame is an affect, a basic emotion, evolved through 
social selection and caused by perceived devaluation, whereas guilt is considered a socio-legal 
condition, an objective description, which may be associated with any affect through 
socialisation and scripting. So, shame is considered a single construct (an affect) while guilt 
involves multiple affective-cognitive hybrids (an affect combined with cognitive awareness of 
being guilty). What is interesting here is that Elison (2005) defines shame differently from 
some of the other scholars whose work I have reviewed. Specifically, he believes that 
although self-evaluation and standard violation are related to shame, shame is caused by a 
social antecedent – devaluation – where such devaluation refers to all occasions or events 
where social status or acceptance by others has been lost, reduced, or is less than desired. It is 
this devaluation, irrespective of standard violations, that produces shame; while it is the focus 
on the responsibility for negative consequences to others following the guilty action that 
produces the affective-cognitive hybrids of guilt. Thus, violation is integral to the definition 
and understanding of guilt (Elison, 2005). 
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Elison (2005) criticises the methodology of previous studies (the questionable validity of the 
instruments used), including those conducted by Tangney and her colleagues, on the basis of 
which distinctions between shame and guilt have been made. He argues that shame and guilt 
are often associated (that shame is the primary emotion involved in guilt affective-cognitive 
hybrids); specifically, that shame is commonly reported when feelings of guilt are reported, 
although the reverse is not true. This overlap is why people often cannot distinguish between 
the two constructs. In addition to shame, anger, fear, sadness and joy are seen as pure affects. 
Affective-cognitive hybrids include embarrassment, humiliation, shame-guilt (subordinates of 
shame), fear-guilt (subordinate of fear), sad-guilt (subordinate of sadness), anger-guilt 
(subordinate of anger), and joy-guilt (subordinate of joy). The pure nature of the shame affect, 
in contrast to the multitude of affects and cognitions association with guilt is why shame is 
often considered more painful. The multiple and varied responses to guilt, the greater 
complexity of guilt, and the greater cognitive content of guilt are also explained by the 
number of affective-cognitive hybrids. The presence of the sadness/remorse hybrid further 
explains why guilt, but not shame, is often associated with attempts at reparation. 
Elison (2005) understands shame in evolutionary terms – as signalling submission and 
acceptance of norms in the face of aggression or perceived devaluation or loss of 
attractiveness by others. Behaviours associated with shame include hiding through retreat or 
making the body smaller (e.g. slumped shoulders); it also brings confusion, which 
disorganises behaviour and makes it difficult for the individual to continue engaging in the 
sanctioned action. Further evidence of the evolutionary origins of shame and other affects are 
their having modular neural bases, rapid onset, automatic appraisal and uncontrolled or 
involuntary occurrence (Elison, 2005).  
To conclude this section, I summarise the similarities and differences between shame and 
guilt, including post-traumatic shame and guilt, in table form, see Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 
Key Similarities and Differences between Shame and Guilt 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Features shared by shame and guilt: 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Both fall into the class of “moral” emotions – emotions that keep us “on the straight and 
narrow”; 
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___________________________________________________________________________
Both are “self-conscious”, self-referential emotions; 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Both are negatively charged emotions
12
; 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Both involve internal attributions of one sort or another; 
___________________________________________________________________________
Both are typically experienced in interpersonal contexts; 
___________________________________________________________________________
The negative events that give rise to shame and guilt are highly similar (frequently involving 
moral failures or transgressions). 
 
 
Key dimensions on which shame and guilt differ: 
    Shame    Guilt 
  
                                                 
12
 It is worth noting that some authors such as Bradshaw (2005) and Zembylas (2008) have emphasized the 
positive potential of shame, including facilitating humility, encouraging awareness of our need for others and 
facilitating intimacy, as well as enabling emotional connectivity and reconciliation in groups who are historically 
opposed.  
Focus of evaluation Global self: “I did that 
horrible thing” 
Specific behaviour: “I did 
that horrible thing” 
Stimulus Disappointment, defeat, or 
moral transgression 
Deficiency of self 
Involuntary: self unable 
Encounter with “other” or 
within the self 
Moral transgression 
 
Event; thing for which the 
self is responsible 
Within the self 
Conscious content Painful emotion 
Autonomic responses: 
rage, blushing, tears 
Identity thoughts; “internal 
theatre” 
Affect may or may not be 
present 
 
No identity thoughts 
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(Drawn from H. B. Lewis, 1987c, p. 113 and Tangney, & Dearing, 2002, p. 25) 
To complement the discussion by Tangney and Dearing (2002) above, I will draw on the 
work of Wilson, Drozdek and Turkovic (2006), who focus on the distinction between post-
traumatic shame and guilt specifically. According to these authors, post-traumatic shame and 
guilt can be compared across eight domains of psychosocial functioning (see Table 3.2). 
  
Table 3.1 continued   
Position of self in field Self passive 
Self focal in awareness 
Self-imaging and 
consciousness; multiple 
functions of self 
Vicarious experience of 
the other’s negative view 
of self 
Self active 
Self absorbed in action or 
thought 
Self intact, functioning 
silently 
 
Pity; concern for welfare 
Nature and discharge of 
hostility 
Humiliated fury 
Discharge blocked by guilt 
and/or love of “other” 
Righteous indignation 
Discharge on self and 
other 
Degree of distress Generally more painful 
than guilt 
Generally less painful than 
shame 
Phenomenological 
experience 
Shrinking, feeling small, 
feeling worthless, 
powerless 
Tension, remorse, regret 
Operation of “self” Self “split” into observing 
and observed “selves” 
Unified self intact 
Impact on “self” Self impaired by global 
devaluation 
Self unimpaired by global 
devaluation 
Concern vis-à-vis the 
“other” 
Concern with others’ 
evaluation of self 
Concern with one’s effect 
on others 
Counterfactual processes Mentally undoing some 
aspect of the self 
Mentally undoing some 
aspect of behaviour 
Motivational features Desire to hide, escape, or 
strike back. 
Desire to confess, 
apologise or repair. 
Characteristic symptoms Depression; and affect 
disorders 
Obsessional; paranoid; 
“thought disorders” 
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Table 3.2 
Key Dimensions on which Post-Traumatic Shame and Guilt Differ 
Psychological dimension Post-traumatic shame Post-traumatic guilt 
Self-attribution processes Focus on self-evaluation, 
loss of self-worth, moral 
virtue, self-esteem, sense 
of failure 
Focus on evaluation of 
actions, self-recrimination 
over behaviour rather than 
self as object of appraisal 
Emotional states Humiliation, 
powerlessness, 
helplessness, sadness, 
anger and rage 
State-dependent guilt, 
remorse, regret, 
apologetic, embarrassment 
Action appraisal I did something to cause it; 
therefore I am shameful or 
bad 
I failed to act properly or 
acted badly; my actions 
were wrong but I am a 
good person 
Impact on personal 
identity 
“Loss of face”, loss of 
self-continuity and self-
sameness, ego 
fragmentation, self-
dissolution 
No “loss of face”, no loss 
of identity, no 
fragmentation of self 
Suicidality High potential; suicide as 
self-obliteration 
Low potential; defense: 
rationalization of guilt 
Defensiveness Repression, avoidance, 
suppression, denial 
Denial, rationalization, 
minimization, undoing, 
counterphobic 
Post-traumatic stress 
disorder proneness 
High Variable 
Dimensions of self-
structure negatively 
affected 
All (e.g. decreased sense 
of continuity, coherence 
connection, vitality, 
autonomy, energy) 
Part (e.g. vitality, 
connection) 
(Wilson et al., 2006, p. 124) 
Post-traumatic shame and guilt are considered important, multi-dimensional features of 
simple and Complex PTSD (Wilson et al., 2006). Dimensions of post-traumatic shame are 
described as including: 
- loss of self-worth, virtue, self-esteem, wholeness, goodness and moral 
integrity; 
- loss of sense of self-continuity in upholding culturally defined values, norms, 
and respected patterns of behaviour;  
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- feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, inadequacy, failure, humiliation and 
smallness;  
- perception of shame in the eyes of others (condemnation and failure);  
- suicidality in fantasy or action (self-obliteration, desire for escape, isolation, 
withdrawal, self-imposed exile, and alienation);  
- self-consciousness over disappointing others, letting down kinship, family, 
friends, fellow survivors, etc.; devalued self-appraisal (“loss of moral 
goodness”); and 
- loss of self-respect within culturally defined roles, status and expectations 
(Wilson et al., 2006, p. 125).  
By contrast, dimensions of post-traumatic guilt include: 
- self-recrimination for failed personal enactments;  
- survivor guilt over surviving perils of trauma; 
- death guilt over being alive when others died or were injured;  
- bystander guilt for failure to help others in need;  
- personal guilt for acts of transgressions with negative consequences for others;  
- situational guilt for acting contrary to personal values under coercive 
processes; and  
- moral guilt for failed enactments inconsistent with personal ethics and moral 
responsibility (Wilson et al., 2006, p. 125).  
It is clear from these descriptions that post-traumatic guilt is less severe, powerful and 
detrimental in its effects on psychological functioning than post-traumatic shame (Wilson et 
al., 2006).  
Next we turn to the similarities and differences between shame and embarrassment. 
 
Shame and Embarrassment 
 
Early seminal works by scholars such as H. B. Lewis, (1971) and Izard (1977) used the terms 
shame, shyness and embarrassment interchangeably. This is because they share a number of 
features, such as feelings of self-consciousness, exposure or fear of exposure, feelings of 
incompetence, stress, and inappropriate behaviour (Goldberg, 1991). However, M. Lewis 
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(1992, p. 79) has defined shyness as a biological predisposition including a “sheepishness, 
bashfulness, a feeling of uneasiness or psychological discomfort in social situations”, a state 
which originates owing to the oscillation between fear and interest or avoidance and 
approach, and one which is elicited by experiences of novelty and conspicuousness. Shyness 
is a mood, not an emotion like embarrassment, and is not associated with self-evaluation in 
relation to standards, rules and goals, whereas embarrassment may be self-evaluative or not 
(M. Lewis, 1992, 1993; Miller, 2007). The type of embarrassment which is associated purely 
with exposure can be termed self-consciousness, while the other, self-evaluative type of 
embarrassment has been termed mild shame, and is based on global failures in relation to 
standards, rules and goals which are less central to the self than they would be in shame 
reactions (M. Lewis, 1992, 1993). The latter type of embarrassment has been so termed 
because it contains the same self-evaluative essence that shame does, but is a less powerful, 
averse emotion, and is associated with quite different physiological responses (M. Lewis, 
1992). Shame has been described as a “darker, angrier and more intense emotion” than 
embarrassment (Miller, 2007, p. 246). It is important to note that despite the misleading 
terminology, embarrassment and shame remain quite distinct emotions.  
Further theoretical and empirical distinctions have been made between embarrassment, guilt 
and shame in the more recent literature (Tangney et al., 2005; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Hill-Barlow, 1996). Tangney, Miller et al. (1996) and Tangney et al. (2005) have 
demonstrated that shame, guilt, and embarrassment are not simply different terms for a single 
emotion, but differ in terms of physiological reactions, subjective experience, attributions and 
appraisals, perceptions and concerns around audience, and motivation for future behaviour. 
Embarrassment specifically was found to be quite different from shame and guilt, and the 
distinctions among the three constructs could not only be explained by intensity of emotion 
(Tangney, Miller et al., 1996). Although shame and guilt were rated as more powerful, 
distressing emotions than embarrassment, they were also associated with a greater sense of 
moral wrongdoing than embarrassment (Tangney, Miller et al., 1996). Shamed or guilty 
participants felt greater responsibility, regret and remorse than they would have felt if 
embarrassed (Tangney, Miller et al., 1996). In addition, they felt more enraged and repulsed 
with themselves and believed that others also felt anger towards them (Tangney, Miller et al., 
1996). In contrast, embarrassment emerged as a result of more inconsequential and amusing 
events (where the individual has been absentminded or clumsy for instance), and participants 
indicated that it occurred more suddenly and with a greater deal of surprise (Tangney, Miller 
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et al., 1996). However, as in shame reactions, embarrassment was associated with involuntary 
physiological changes, and with a significant sense of exposure and conspicuousness 
(Tangney, Miller et al., 1996; Tangney et al., 2007). Physiological changes unique to 
embarrassment include increased systolic and diastolic blood pressure, and increased heart 
rate in the first minute of the experience of embarrassment (after which the heart rate drops), 
and blushing (Miller, 2007). The most important function of blushing is that it sends out an 
easily recognizable signal to others that the individual is both aware of his/her predicament, 
and regrets it (Miller, 2007). 
There is some overlap between the nonverbal behaviours accompanying embarrassment and 
those that accompany shame, like for instance the averted gaze (Miller, 2007). Other 
nonverbal behaviours which are unique to embarrassment include (initially) compressed lips 
or lips pulled down at the corners; when attempting to stifle a smile but fail, embarrassed 
individuals generally break into an abashed, sheepish grin which they may cover up with one 
hand; restlessly shifting their position; gesturing broadly; and if attempting to speak, may 
stammer or stutter (Miller, 2007). 
Many scholars believe that embarrassment is caused when implicit social rules, norms, 
conventions and scripts are disrupted, or when an individual is negatively evaluated by 
another (Tangney, 2003). What is crucial to embarrassment, is that it only occurs when others 
are present, while shame can arguably be experienced both in the company of others (external 
shame) or when alone (internal shame) (Miller, 2007; Nussbaum, 2004). When embarrassed, 
individuals tend to behave in compensatory, conciliatory ways to win social approval and 
(re)inclusion – the primary function of embarrassment is to interrupt misbehaviour and 
produce behaviour that remedies the situation (Miller, 2007; Tangney, 2003). Embarrassed 
individuals tend to apologise for their behaviour and engage in action that repairs any damage 
or inconvenience caused by the embarrassing situation, and in cases where no harm was done, 
embarrassed individuals tend to use humour (Miller, 2007). Less often, they ignore or make 
no mention of the embarrassment and continue as if nothing has happened (Miller, 2007). 
Only in approximately one tenth of cases does the embarrassed person flee the situation, a 
behaviour which compounds negative impressions of him/her (Miller, 2007). An even more 
rare response is anger or aggression, which is only evoked when someone else has 
intentionally caused the embarrassment (Miller, 2007).  
A key difference between embarrassment and shame is that although both are accompanied by 
the urge to hide or conceal, embarrassment is not characterised by the self-blame that is 
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associated with shame (Tantam, 1998). Another key difference between embarrassment and 
shame is that embarrassment results from relatively trivial social faux pas and transgressions, 
while shame tends to result from more serious and moral transgressions, or questions of 
honour (Tangney, 2003). In Miller’s (2007, p. 246) words, embarrassment occurs when 
someone “violates a norm of deportment, civility, self-control, or gracefulness by making a 
mental error, behaving clumsily, or losing control of their possessions”. Interestingly, though, 
Miller (2007) argues that overall, embarrassment is a positive or desirable response to social 
misdemeanours, because onlookers generally respond to another’s embarrassment with 
sympathy and support; they tend towards more favourable evaluations than if the 
embarrassing situation had not taken place. However, exaggerated embarrassment or 
embarrassment in the absence of an embarrassing predicament does not evoke positive 
responses from others, it makes the embarrassed individual look inept or overly anxious 
(Miller, 2007). 
People differ in terms of their capacity to be embarrassed – this is determined by the extent to 
which an individual pays attention to cues that give away what others are thinking of him/her, 
and the fear that others’ evaluations will be negative and involve rejection (Miller, 2007). 
Tangney (2003) argues that embarrassment is not caused by a lack of social skills, but rather 
by a greater sensitivity towards, and high levels of concern for, social rules and standards 
(Tangney, 2003). Those vulnerable to experiencing embarrassment are thus at higher risk of 
being influenced by peer pressure, and tend to have higher levels of neuroticism, negative 
affect, self-consciousness and fear of judgment from others (Tangney et al., 2007). 
 
Shame and Pride 
 
Pride and shame occur on an axis, and psychoanalytically, the manifestation of the emotion is 
determined by the distance between the actual self and the ego ideal (Nathanson, 1987a). 
Pride has received the least empirical attention of all the self-conscious emotions (Hart & 
Matsuba, 2007; Tangney, 2003). The purpose of pride is to enhance individuals’ sense of self-
worth and through this process to encourage and facilitate future conforming behaviours 
(Tangney, 2003). Current theoretical work suggests that pride can be an important motivator 
of sustained altruistic behaviour (through having such behaviour supported and reinforced by 
the social judgments of other people) (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). These authors argue that pride 
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motivates prosocial behaviour by helping individuals improve the image of the self that other 
people see and evaluate (the image improvement hypothesis), or by helping individuals feel 
better about themselves (the positive state improvement hypothesis). These theoretical 
arguments are largely confirmed by a recent empirical study which identified pride as a 
significant predictor of volunteering (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). This study also shows that pride 
is associated with individuals’ perceived control over their volunteering work, and on whether 
others perceive their work as meeting particular internal standards (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). 
Some authors have argued that the primary purpose of pride is to promote good feelings and 
thoughts about the self, based on acting in accordance with internalised standards that 
enhance social status, which in turn, leads to high self-esteem (Tracy & Robins, 2007).  
However, certain types of pride can also be maladaptive, such as when prideful individuals 
distort and invent situations which enhance and inflate the self, which can lead to significant 
interpersonal problems (Tangney, 2003). False pride, which is a response to chronic feelings 
of inadequacy, is one of the more pathological forms of pride (Nathanson, 1987a). 
Furthermore, similar to the distinction made between guilt and shame, where shame involves 
negative appraisal of the whole self, and guilt involves negative appraisal of a particular 
behaviour, pride can be divided into “alpha pride” (positive evaluation of the whole self) and 
“beta pride” (positive evaluation of a particular behaviour) (Tangney et al., 2007). M. Lewis 
(1992; 2003) and Tracy and Robins (2007) have drawn a distinction between hubris 
(pridefulness) and pride. These scholars argue that hubris occurs when the person makes a 
global attribution as a consequence of success (“alpha pride”), while pride occurs when a 
person makes a specific attribution (“beta pride”). Positive events which have internal, 
unstable causes promote pride, while positive events with internal and stable causes promote 
hubris (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Hubris is seen as the counterpoint to shame (M. Lewis, 2003). 
According to M. Lewis (1992, p. 78) hubris is problematic because 1) it is a short-lived and 
addictive emotion; 2) it is not related to specific action and consequently requires changing 
patterns of goal setting or changes in the evaluation of what constitutes success; and 3) it 
interferes with interpersonal relationships because of its “contemptuous and insolent nature”. 
Hubris has been associated with narcissism, which undermines and reduces the likelihood of 
prosocial behaviour; instead, it is associated with aggression and hostility, particularly when 
perceptions of the self are threatened (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). In addition, it has been 
negatively associated with self-esteem and positively associated with shame-proneness, while 
pride is positively associated with self-esteem and negatively associated with shame-
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 
 
 
 
proneness (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Finally, pride has been positively related to the socially 
desirable and adaptive traits of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional 
stability, while hubris has been negatively associated with agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (Tracy & Robins, 2007). These findings demonstrate that pride is an 
adaptive, achievement-orientated and prosocial self-conscious emotion, which facilitates the 
development of a sound self-esteem, while hubris is associated with arrogance, narcissistic 
grandiosity and superiority, which in part are defenses against a deep sense of shame (Tracy 
& Robins, 2007). It is interesting to note that pride and hubris cannot be distinguished by the 
nature of the events that evoke them; it is the way in which the event is evaluated that 
determines how it is experienced (Tracy & Robins, 2007).  
Shame and pride are characteristically seen as opposites (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). While 
the antecedents of shame include a flawed or unacceptable action, statement or characteristic 
of an individual, the antecedents of pride are virtue or successful or desirable action, 
statement or characteristic of an individual (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Similarly, responses 
to shame and pride are divergent, including hiding, escaping, a sense of shrinking, and 
feelings of worthlessness in the case of the former, and displaying, engaging, a sense of 
growing large and feeling worthwhile in the latter (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; M. Lewis, 
1992). Furthermore, an individual experiencing shame is likely to disguise or deny the 
presence of a negatively evaluated action, statement or characteristic, or to blame other 
individuals or events for it, while in pride, the individual tends to draw attention to the 
positively evaluated action, statement or characteristic and take credit for it (Fischer & 
Tangney, 1995). By the age of three years, children have developed the capacity to experience 
pride, but it is not until age four that children can recognise pride in others; however, full 
understanding of pride does not emerge until children have reached the age of nine or ten 
years (Tracy & Robins, 2007). 
Pride is associated with showing dominance/superiority; believing in the importance of the 
standards one has upheld; maintaining good feelings about oneself; believing that others will 
think one is good; inclinations to show or tell others about one’s achievement; the self as 
agent; moderately tense voice, flushed face and high heart rate (Barrett, 1995). Other non-
verbal behaviours typical of pride include the head tilted slightly back, upper body in 
expanded posture, arms akimbo with hands on hips (or up in the air), and a small smile (Tracy 
& Robins, 2007). Shame, in contrast, involves distancing oneself from the evaluating agent; 
communicating oneself as small, including showing deference/submission; a goal of 
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maintaining others’ respect and affection and preserving positive self-regard; beliefs that the 
self is “bad”; beliefs that others think one is “bad”; feeling exposed; withdrawal and 
avoidance of others; belief that the self is helpless; and lax, “thin” voice, and low heart rate 
(Barrett, 1995).  
It is interesting to observe that abusive parenting experiences impact on young children’s 
capacity to feel pride. Differences in levels of pride were found in the maltreated vs. non-
maltreated preschoolers when completing assigned tasks (Alessandri & Lewis, 1996). 
Specifically, children of maltreating mothers showed less pride at accomplishment of tasks, 
and more shame at unsuccessful completion of tasks than non-maltreated controls (Alessandri 
& Lewis, 1996). 
 
Shame and Humiliation 
 
Humiliation can be defined as an intense and unpleasant emotion involving a lowering of 
estimation in the eyes of others; a loss of esteem, social status or dignity (Elison & Harter, 
2007; Miller, 1985). Gilbert (1998) argues that humiliation is similar to shame in that it is 
experienced when an individual is subordinated; put in a debased or powerless position by 
someone more powerful. The most common causes of humiliation include 1) being harassed, 
teased, ridiculed, and debased; 2) public behaviours or accidents that go against social norms; 
and 3) incompetence or mistakes seen by others (Elison & Harter, 2007). What is crucial is 
the role played by the audience in that they mock or laugh at the victim (Elison & Harter, 
2007). Humiliation therefore usually occurs at the hands of another, and in most cases, there 
is a broader audience that observes the humiliating event; a contemptuous and hostile 
audience is a key predictor of humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007). Critically, in humiliation 
the victim is seen as undeserving; the event tends to be viewed as an unprovoked attack 
(Elison & Harter, 2007). In other words, there is no acceptance that the negative judgment 
from another is justified (as in shame), and no re-evaluation of the self takes place; instead, 
the individual may feel motivated to make the other give up or take back his/her negative 
judgment (Tantam, 1998). The intensity of the emotion will depend on the sise of audience, 
the importance of the audience (loved ones or friends vs. strangers), whether the audience is 
hostile vs. friendly or sympathetic, whether the victim acknowledges or recognises the 
characteristic which is being devalued, and the magnitude of the devaluation (Elison & 
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Harter, 2007). However, generally, the intensity of humiliation is somewhere between the 
intensity of guilt and shame (Elison & Harter, 2007).  
Humiliation overlaps a great deal with shame; they tend to co-occur (Elison & Harter, 
2007)
13
. There is very little literature on the differences between these two constructs, but that 
which does exist emphasises the position of the self in relation to a real or imagined other (H. 
B. Lewis, 1971). Unlike shame, humiliation does not involve the negative evaluation of the 
self by the self: instead it involves a focus on the other as bad; external rather than internal 
attribution for negative events; a sense of injustice and unfairness; and a strong desire for 
revenge and retaliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilbert, 1998).  
Other emotional correlates include embarrassment and anger, and in the longer term, sadness 
and depression (Elison & Harter, 2007; Miller 1985). Violence against self and others has 
been identified as a key behavioural correlate of the experience of humiliation (Elison & 
Harter, 2007). A study conducted by these authors demonstrates that peer humiliation, in the 
presence of low parental support, leads to depressive and aggressive responses, including both 
homicidal and suicidal ideation (Elison & Harter, 2007). Humiliation acted as a necessary 
mediator between bullying and mocking and anger, violent ideation and suicidal ideation 
(Elison & Harter, 2007). In this study, violent ideators had higher levels of both internalising 
and externalising symptoms, and scored significantly lower on peer likeability, physical 
appearance and scholastic competence, as well as peer support (Elison & Harter, 2007). 
Interestingly, humiliation was self-esteem congruent – those with low self-esteem were more 
likely to experience humiliation in situations that could potentially humiliate than those with 
healthier self-esteems (Elison & Harter, 2007).  
 
Shame, Sympathy, Empathy and Personal Distress 
 
Empathy is a multi-dimensional construct that involves both cognitive and affective 
components (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Specifically, it involves the cognitive ability to take 
another person’s perspective; the cognitive ability to precisely identify another’s emotional 
experience; and an affective ability to feel an array of emotions and “match” them to the 
other’s affective experience (Fechbach as cited in Tangney & Dearing, 2002). By contrast, 
                                                 
13
 Another related construct is indignity, which is about being in control of oneself, although it does not involve 
the self-blame that characterizes shame (Gilbert, 1998). 
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sympathy is the feeling of concern for someone else’s situation or the emotional state of 
another person, but does not involve the affective matching that takes place with empathy 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007).  
Another related emotion is personal distress, which is a self-oriented rather than an other-
oriented emotional experience (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Unlike empathy or sympathy, in 
personal distress the focus is on the feelings and thoughts of the self, and as such, it is not 
related to altruism and prosocial behaviours, which is often the case with the former two 
constructs (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A great deal of research has shown that empathy, but 
not personal distress, motivates altruistic, helping behaviour, and that it facilitates warm, close 
interpersonal relationships and inhibits antisocial behaviour and aggression (Tangney, 2003).   
The self-focus of shame makes it a narcissistic emotion (Gilbert, 1998). It has been 
demonstrated repeatedly that shame, low empathy and high self-preoccupation tend to co-
occur (Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). In shame 
reactions, the individual is typically more concerned about others’ evaluation of the self, 
while in guilt, the individual is more concerned about the self’s effect on others (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). Research indicates that the shame-prone person is unlikely to have an 
empathic disposition, and that shame is more likely to be related to poor interpersonal 
relationships (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). By contrast, the guilt-prone 
individual is much more likely to display an ability to shift perspectives and empathic concern 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
The relationships between empathy, shame, guilt and interpersonal conflicts have been 
explored in depth by Leith and Baumeister (1998). Firstly, the authors found that shame was 
associated with personal distress, and guilt was associated with perspective-taking, the 
cognitive component of empathy. In their second and third studies, they found that guilt 
feelings were associated with perspective-taking, which was associated with better 
relationship outcomes (lower levels of interpersonal conflict), whereas shame had no, or a 
negative, effect on relationship outcomes (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Thus, guilt feelings are 
helpful in interpersonal contexts, because guilt-prone people react to conflicts by taking into 
account the consequences of his/her actions, and by taking the perspective of the other, 
whereas shame appears to be counter-productive (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Yang, Yang, & 
Chiou, 2010). Shame seems to be connected mainly to the affective features of empathy, 
including personal distress, which is unlikely to facilitate improvement in relationships or 
interactions (Leith & Baumeister, 1998).  
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In an exploration of the interrelationships between guilt-proneness, shame-proneness, 
personal distress and empathic responsiveness across three samples of young adults, 
proneness to shame was related to impaired empathic responsiveness, while guilt-proneness 
was related to enhanced other-oriented empathy (Tangney, 1991). The self-focus that 
accompanies shame means that shame-prone individuals’ focus tends to move away from a 
distressed other, back to the injured self (Tangney, 1991). Therefore, as would be expected, 
personal distress was positively related to shame and negatively associated with guilt 
(Tangney, 1991).  
Tangney (1991) explains the associations between shame, guilt and empathy in the following 
ways. Firstly, she asserts that guilt-prone individuals, through their enhanced capacity for 
empathic responsiveness, are more able to notice when they have wronged another. Secondly, 
the lack of self-focus also means that the guilt-prone individual is more likely to notice the 
distressed other, and is so more likely to respond empathically. Thirdly, the capacity for 
empathy and guilt comes from what Tangney (1991, p. 605) terms “psychological 
differentiation or cognitive complexity”. Contrary to guilt or empathy, there is no clear 
distinction between self and behaviour in the shame experience – shame-proneness is 
accompanied by a global, undifferentiated approach. Tangney (1991) asserts that this lack of 
distinction is also reflected in the blurring of boundaries between self and other. The lack of 
distinction between self and other and between behaviour and self results in the shame-prone 
individual having difficulty in maintaining other-oriented empathic responsiveness (which 
relies on the knowledge that the self is distinct from other), and a tendency to lapse into 
personal distress reactions (Tangney, 1991).  
In a recent study, Joireman (2004) examined the relationships between self-rumination and 
self-reflection and shame, guilt, empathy and personal distress. In this study, self-rumination 
is defined as “recurrent thinking or ruminations about the self prompted by threats, losses, or 
injustices to the self”, while self-reflection was described as an “intellective category of self 
attentiveness characterised by reflection on the self motivated not by distress about the self 
but by epistemic curiosity, that is, pleasurable, intrinsic interest in abstract or philosophical 
thinking” (Joireman, 2004, p. 227). It was hypothesised that proneness to shame would be 
positively associated with the more maladaptive self-rumination, and that both would have 
positive relationships with personal distress. By contrast, it was predicted that proneness to 
guilt would be positively associated with the more adaptive self-reflection, and both would be 
positively related to perspective-taking and empathy (Joireman, 2004). The findings of the 
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study largely confirmed these hypotheses: shame-prone individuals experienced more 
personal distress, while guilt-prone individuals experienced more perspective-taking, and 
these relationships were mediated by self-rumination and self-reflection respectively 
(Joireman, 2004). These results, however, also demonstrated that self-rumination was 
associated with higher levels of shame, suggesting that shame and self-rumination are part of 
a reciprocal cycle that inhibits perspective-taking and empathic concern.   
Externalisation is typically negatively associated with empathy: a number of studies have 
pointed to the role of empathy in inhibiting aggression and other antisocial behaviours 
(Tangney et al., 2007). It seems that amidst a personal distress reaction, the shame-prone 
individual is less likely to take responsibility for the aversive situation and resort to blaming 
others to reduce his/her own pain (Tangney, 1991). This tendency to externalise blame further 
tends to impair empathic responsiveness (Tangney, 1991). This, however, has not been 
replicated consistently.  
 
Shame, Anger, Aggression and Hostility
14
 
 
In shame reactions, the person may withdraw and hide, but s/he may also respond in rage 
(Mollon, 2002). There are a number of differences between anger and rage. In anger, the 
reason for the emotion feels justified, whereas in rage, it does not, and the spiral described 
below, ensues (M. Lewis, 1992). Injury to the self is acknowledged in anger, but denied in 
rage, and pushed from consciousness (M. Lewis, 1992). Therefore, although anger is not 
displaced, rage is. In addition, whereas anger is focused on a real cause, rage is a generalised 
response, one which has many more negative consequences (M. Lewis, 1992). Consequently, 
anger is a more restricted, contained and focused response whereas rage is not; anger has a 
particular object, while rage is diffused both in terms of its object and its occurrence (M. 
Lewis, 1992). 
Before examining the empirical evidence of the associations between shame, anger, 
aggression and hostility, it is worth briefly considering theoretical contributions to the 
understanding of shame and anger. One useful formulation is Retzinger’s (1991) model for 
understanding shame-related anger. The basic premise of this model is that shame is a social 
                                                 
14
 Nathanson (1992) maintains that common defenses against shame may include attacking the other, attacking 
the self, or withdrawal or avoidance.  
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emotion; one which ensures survival through the preservation of significant relationships. 
Underlying this model is the tension between togetherness and separateness; the capacity to 
regulate social distance. This ability to regulate distance is dependent on differentiation, 
which refers to individuals who have a solid, cohesive sense of self, and who are able to move 
freely and flexibly between togetherness and separateness with limited or no distress or 
emotional reactivity. However, those individuals characterised by low levels of differentiation 
have low levels of cohesion, and have much more permeable self-other boundaries. These 
individuals feel incomplete without a significant other, and find it difficult to move between 
states of togetherness and separateness; they tend to feel engulfed when emotionally close to 
another, and alienated and isolated if distant from the other. High levels of emotional 
reactivity and resultant intolerance of emotion is common, as well as ineffective 
communication characterised by blaming, distracting and avoiding. The interpersonal system 
in cases such as these is narrow, unyielding and inflexible (Retzinger, 1991).  
In Retzinger’s (1991) model, the most important pre-requisites for the evocation of shame are 
that: 1) the social bond (including the attachment system and the capacity to differentiate 
emotionally from another) is threatened, and this threat typically involves disrespect; 2) 
shame is the product of a disruption in the bonding system; 3) when shame is not 
acknowledged, the self feels alienated and isolated, and the other is perceived as the source of 
attack; and 4) anger is then evoked, amplifying threat to self and social bond as a means of 
protesting or resisting against the threat. When the bond is not considered, anger is a way of 
“saving one’s own face” (Retzinger, 1991, p. 56). Shame and anger frequently co-occur, and 
have previously been shown to alternate rapidly in facial response sequences (Retzinger, 
1991).  
In this model, there are three types of shame-related anger response styles. Firstly, in secure 
attachments, when conflict arises, partners in conflict tend to be responsive to the shame or 
hurt in each other, and the threatened bond remains intact (Retzinger, 1991). Partners are able 
to retain feelings of pride in these situations, and it leads to mutual cooperation and 
connectedness. Secondly, in situations where there are weaker bonds, partners may not be 
responsive to one another, and they start to feel disconnected from each other, and become 
ashamed. However, if shame, hurt or the state of the bond is acknowledged (through apology, 
a feeling statement or taking responsibility for part of the conflict), and mutual respect is 
demonstrated (there is no further shaming), the system can readjust, and the conflict can be 
experienced as constructive, leading to greater cooperation and connectedness. Conflict of this 
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kind is functional, and results in reparation of the bond and feelings of attunement. It is 
constructive because it can lead to change and increased cohesion. However, in the third 
instance, in partnerships which are reactive and where there is insufficient differentiation, 
escalation occurs when shame is not acknowledged, in a manner which is experienced as 
disrespectful, and anger is evoked. Key in these situations is that shame is evoked but not 
acknowledged. In these situations, each partner feels injured and attacked by the other, and 
responds with a more vehement attack on the other (using, blame, disgust, contempt or 
withdrawal). Neither party acknowledges his/her injury of the other or responsibility in the 
conflict; neither sees anything but the unjustness of the other party’s behaviour. So this loop 
continues, with each partner blaming the other for the conflict without considering his/her 
own role in the interaction. This kind of conflict is destructive, and erodes rather than restores 
social bond, and is often the kind of escalating conflict which leads to emotional and physical 
violence (Retzinger, 1991).  
The third response style outlined by Retzinger (1991) has a great deal in common with what 
H. B. Lewis (1971, 1986) called “shame-rage” or “humiliated fury”. Shamed individuals tend 
to either withdraw and escape the shame-inducing situation, or shift the blame onto others, an 
effective strategy, but only in the short term (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995). H. B. Lewis (1971) 
argues that shame-rage, which usually involves the breaking of social bonds or the inability to 
control attachment objects (in other words, a reaction against separation from a significant 
other), cannot be directed outwards indefinitely; the shamed individual begins to feel guilt or 
shame at his/her “inappropriate” or “unjust” anger, and then it is turned inwards once again. 
In other words, the rage itself becomes a source of shame (or guilt) (H. B. Lewis, 1986, 
1987a; M. Lewis, 1992). As such, a sequence or circular pattern emerges, where the 
individual experiences shame-rage, which is followed by shame or guilt about his/her anger, 
which is then turned inwards and results in further shame-rage (H. B. Lewis, 1987a). Thus, 
shame-based rage or humiliated fury is anger which is turned back against the self, both 
because the self is characteristically passive with regards to his/her position relative to the 
other and because the self values the other (H. B. Lewis, 1971, 1986). This shame-rage-
shame-rage spiral is important in understanding a range of interpersonal conflicts (M. Lewis, 
1992). It is suppressed, humiliated fury, due to the accompanying feelings of unjustness and 
inappropriateness, which contributes to depression (H. B. Lewis, 1986). The differences 
between “normal” rage and shame-rage are presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 
Normal Rage and Shame-Rage 
Normal rage Shame-rage 
1) Simple bodily response 1) A process (shame and rage alternation) 
2) The rage feels justified 2) One feels powerless 
3) The injury is recognised 3) The injury is denied 
4) It remains conscious 4) It is pushed from awareness 
5) It may easily be resolved 5) A circular feeling trap 
6) Rage is not displaced 6) The rage is displaced 
7) It is focused on the actual cause 7) The rage becomes generalized 
8) An individual phenomenon 8) A social phenomenon 
9) Few negative results 9) Negative results 
(Retzinger, 1987, p. 157) 
Turning to the empirical evidence for these theoretical postulations, a classic study on the 
relationship between shame, rage and laughter was conducted by Retzinger in 1987. In an 
analysis of video footage of individuals expressing shame and rage, Retzinger (1987) was 
able to differentiate the sample into two groups – the laughter and non-laughter groups. In the 
laughter group, permission had been given to participants to express rage, which led to shame 
being reduced and laughter occurring. After laughter had occurred, the amount of rage 
displayed in the facial expressions of participants was significantly reduced (marking the 
disappearance of asymptotic anger), and shame levels were normalised, suggesting a break in 
the shame-rage spiral. In contrast, in the non-laughter group the shame-rage spiral continued 
with very little change – throughout the interview, both emotions stayed at approximately the 
same levels, although the duration and frequency of the emotions suggested a movement 
towards asymptotic shame and the generation of new anger (Retzinger, 1987). 
As can be seen, shame and anger or rage tend to interact, with one emotion acting as a defense 
against the other (Miller, 1985). These emotions alternate, and play different roles in different 
contexts (Miller, 1985). For example, sometimes, anger or rage develops in response to being 
shamed (due to intolerable feelings of exposure) (Kaufman, 1992), and may be turned against 
the self, but shame also sometimes constitutes a judgmental emotion against unacceptable 
anger or rage: thus shame may relieve anger or rage; shame may be emphasised to de-
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emphasise anger or rage; and shame may flourish when anger or rage is inhibited (Miller, 
1985).  
According to Mills (2005), rage is a response to intense wounding of the self due to repeated 
shaming experiences. The shame-rage which develops results in aggression targeting the 
individual who induces shame, or it is shifted onto less threatening targets. Either way, over 
time, this shame-rage cycle begins to foster a hostile interpersonal style, which is 
characterised by distrust of others, hostile attributions, and hostile solutions to interpersonal 
problems (Mills, 2005).  
In contrast to shamed individuals’ humiliated rage, guilty individuals feel righteous 
indignation directed against the self’s actions or inactions (H. B. Lewis, 1986; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). Unlike humiliated rage, righteous indignation is diffused by amending the 
transgression which evoked it (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Those feeling guilt therefore tend 
to be more likely than shamed individuals to take responsibility for their actions through 
righting transgressions or wrongdoings (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Because both rage and anger are potent, authoritative emotions, they counter some of the 
helplessness and paralysis of shame, giving the individual back their sense of power and 
agency (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Attacks on others, and putting others down, helps to 
(defensively) repair a shattered sense of self-worth (Kinston, 1987; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 
1995). The anger response is facilitated by two factors: imagining a disapproving other, and 
an impaired capacity for empathy, which is likely to facilitate externalisation of blame 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt, by contrast, appears to be associated 
with other-oriented empathy which prevents anger and aggression (Tangney et al., 2007). In 
addition, guilt-prone individuals are less likely to imagine critical and disapproving others, 
and so tend not to retaliate against the “observing others” with anger (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).  
Although anger is generally assumed to be a negative emotion, there can also be positive 
outcomes associated with it. Tangney and Dearing (2002) propose three types of non-
aggressive anger management strategies: 1) adaptive behaviours (e.g. non-hostile discussion 
with the target of anger), 2) escapist/diffusing responses (e.g. minimising the importance of 
the event), and 3) cognitive reappraisals (e.g. reinterpreting the motives or actions of the 
target). As noted previously, it is interesting that shame-prone individuals are not only prone 
to more anger, but to less constructive responses to anger, compared to guilt-prone 
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individuals. Shame-proneness was associated with malevolent intentions towards the target, 
and engaging in direct verbal, physical and symbolic aggression, displaced aggression, self-
directed aggression and anger held in (a ruminative, unexpressed anger) (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).  
In a study on the relationship of shame and guilt to constructive and destructive responses to 
anger through the lifespan, the authors found that shame and guilt had quite distinct 
relationships to anger (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). 
Shame-prone individuals experienced more anger than those less shame-prone, and this 
shame-proneness was associated with much less constructive responses to anger, including 
malevolent intentions and a greater likelihood of involvement in direct, indirect and displaced 
expressions of anger (Tangney et al., 1996). In addition, shame-proneness was associated with 
more ruminative, unexpressed anger, self-directed hostility and a tendency to withdraw from 
anger-related situations (Tangney et al., 1996). Thus, shame-prone individuals tend to react in 
one of two destructive ways to anger-inducing situations – either passive withdrawal or active 
aggression – both of which are maladaptive responses which are unlikely to resolve the 
situation (Tangney et al., 1996). By contrast, guilt-prone children, adolescents and adults were 
more likely to adopt constructive behaviours, including non-hostile conversations with the 
target of their anger and direct, reparative action (Tangney et al., 1996). In addition, guilt-
proneness was associated with constructive re-evaluations of the target’s and the self’s role in 
the situation (Tangney et al., 1996). These findings are supported by earlier work by Tangney, 
Wagner, Fletcher and Gramzow (1992), which demonstrated an inverse relationship between 
guilt and externalisation of blame, anger, hostility and resentment, and a positive relationship 
between shame-proneness and anger arousal, suspiciousness, resentment, irritability, blaming 
others for negative occurrences and indirect expressions of hostility.  
Shame-proneness has demonstrated an association with anger arousal and externalising 
attributions for one’s own behaviour in men who assault their partners (Dutton, Van Ginkel, 
& Starzomski, 1995). In this study, memories of shaming by parents were significantly related 
to abusiveness, anger, trauma symptoms, and BPD in adult perpetrators of physical violence . 
The authors propose a two-step model where shaming develops the abusive-prone personality, 
which is a necessary but not sufficient antecedent of abusive behaviour. Modeling of the 
abusive behaviour is the required second developmental step, pointing to a pattern of 
transgenerational shaming and abusiveness (Dutton et al., 1995).  
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In a review of the literature, however, Stuewig and Tangney (2007) remind the reader that 
existing studies do not always find a strong and reliable relationship between shame and overt 
aggression (it is likely that there would be a stronger relationship between shame and covert 
or internalised aggression); but that guilt-proneness has been consistently and robustly 
associated with the inhibition of aggression. In terms of criminal behaviour, the picture is still 
unclear. Guilt seems to have a distinct inhibitory function in relation to criminal behaviour, 
but the findings with regards to shame have been inconsistent and context-dependent, which 
may be due to sampling variability across studies or due to the influence of as yet 
undiscovered variables (Stuewig & Tangney, 2007).  
Not all studies make clear distinctions between the constructs of anger, rage, aggression or 
hostility. This is reflected in the imprecision of measurement tools that, for example, tend to 
confound verbal and physical aggression, anger and hostility (Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, 
Harty, & McCloskey, 2010). Anger is an affective state, while aggression is a behavioural 
response to anger – one of many possible responses (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A recent, 
more methodologically sophisticated study, which differentiates between these constructs, 
came to five conclusions drawn from data across four (diverse) samples. These conclusions 
are: that there is no direct relationship between shame and aggression; that there is no direct 
relationship between shame and impaired other-oriented empathy; that there is an indirect 
relationship between shame and physical as well as verbal aggression through externalisation 
of blame; that guilt is directly related to low levels of aggression; and finally, that there is an 
inverse, indirect relationship between guilt and aggression through both (low levels of) 
externalisation of blame and (high levels of) empathy (Stuewig et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
path to (lower) aggression through (greater) empathy is unique to guilt (Stuewig et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, the kinds of situations that evoke anger are different for shame-prone and guilt-
prone individuals – shame-free guilt is far more likely to arise from reality-based violations 
than for shame-prone individuals (Tangney et al., 1996). There was also remarkable stability 
from middle childhood to adulthood in these findings – in the association between shame-
proneness and a defensive, retaliative and destructive response to anger, and between shame-
free guilt and constructive anger-management strategies and outcomes (Tangney et al., 1996).  
It is worth noting in conclusion that most of the studies on shame and anger or aggression are 
correlational, and thus, the precise nature of the relationship between these constructs and 
their directionality cannot be determined (Keltner & Harker, 1998).   
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Summary of Key Points 
 
 Crucial differences between shame and guilt are in focus (self vs. a specific incident); 
their experienced feeling (worthlessness and powerlessness vs. tension, remorse and 
regret); their effects on the individual’s sense of self (global impairment vs. 
unimpaired self), and their reactions (a desire to hide, escape or strike back with 
hostility, scorn, contempt and ridicule vs. a regret, remorse, concern and a desire to 
confess, apologise or repair) (Crowe, 2004; Lazarus, 1991; H. B. Lewis, 1971; 
Tangney et al., 2007). Seligman and Teasdale (as cited in Tangney & Dearing, 2002) 
also distinguish between locus (internal vs. external), globality (global vs. specific) 
and stability (stable vs. unstable), with shame characterised by internality, globality 
and stability. Shame-proneness relates to a variety of problems and pathologies 
(possibly through its association with helplessness and self-blame), whereas guilt-
proneness, which involves the tendency to feel bad about a particular behaviour or 
incident, is more likely to be adaptive (Dearing et al., 2005). Because the self is not 
debilitated with guilt, and because it involves focusing on specific and controllable 
behaviours, it is more likely to be accompanied by reparative action, hence the 
demonstrated association between guilt and prosocial feelings and behaviour (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971; Lazarus, 1991; Tangney, 1991). Another key difference between guilt 
and shame is that in shame, self-other boundaries are much more permeable – the 
individual is able to take the perspective of both the self, and vicariously experience 
that of the other (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt on the other hand, is more 
contained and is localised within the self (i.e. not involving seeing the self from 
others’ perspective) (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Furthermore, when guilt includes affect, it 
may vary considerably in intensity, while in shame the negative emotion is typically 
intense (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, shame is an intense negative state which results in 
the interruption of current behaviour, confusion in thought, and speechlessness (M. 
Lewis, 1992). Shame is an involuntary affective state (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Guilt also 
tends to involve more cognitive activity than shame, such as preoccupation with 
wrongdoing, and rationalisation (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Because of its 
irrational nature, the self is not open to rational solutions when shamed (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). Guilt involves negative feelings, but with or without the painful affect - 
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particularly the heightened or acute self-consciousness characterising shame - and the 
accompanying autonomic (e.g. blushing, tears, increased heart rate) reactions (Izard, 
1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Thus, shame is understood as a wordless, primitive and 
irrational emotion which is associated with excessive involuntary autonomic reactions, 
which may be experienced as a flood of sensations (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
Because of the heightened self-awareness that accompanies shame, it involves greater 
body awareness and activity (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). In shame reactions, the 
body “implodes”, with head bowed, eyes closed and body curled in itself, to make the 
individual as small and as inconspicuous as possible (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
 Shamed or guilty participants feel greater responsibility, regret and remorse than they 
would have felt if embarrassed (Tangney et al., 1996). In addition, shamed individuals 
are more likely to feel angry and disgusted with themselves, and to believe that others 
also feel anger towards them, than embarrassed individuals (Tangney et al., 1996). 
Embarrassment may be self-evaluative or not. Shame has been described as a “darker, 
angrier and more intense emotion” than embarrassment (Miller, 2007, p. 246). 
Embarrassment arises from more inconsequential and amusing events or trivial faux 
pas (where the individual has been absentminded or clumsy for instance), and it 
occurs more suddenly and with greater feelings of surprise (Tangney et al., 1996). 
However, as in shame reactions, embarrassment is associated with physiological 
changes, and with a significant sense of exposure and conspicuousness (Tangney et 
al., 1996; Tangney et al., 2007).   
 Shame and pride are characteristically seen as opposites (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). 
While the antecedents of shame include a flawed or unacceptable action, statement or 
characteristic of an individual, the antecedents of pride are virtue or successful or 
desirable action, statement or characteristic of an individual (Fischer & Tangney, 
1995). Similarly, responses to shame and pride are divergent, including hiding, 
escaping, a sense of shrinking, and feelings of worthlessness in the case of the former, 
and displaying, engaging, a sense of growing large and feeling worthwhile in the latter 
(Fischer & Tangney, 1995; M. Lewis, 1992). Pride is associated with distancing 
oneself from those who are believed to be evaluating us; showing 
dominance/superiority; believing in the importance of the standards one has upheld; 
maintaining good feelings about oneself; believing that others will think one is good; 
inclinations to show or tell others about one’s achievement; the self as agent; 
moderately tense voice, flushed face and high heart rate (Barrett, 1995). Current 
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theoretical and empirical work suggests that pride can be an important motivator of 
sustained altruistic behaviour (through having such behaviour supported and 
reinforced by the social judgments of other people) (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). Pride 
motivates prosocial behaviour by helping individuals improve the image of the self 
that other people see and evaluate (the image improvement hypothesis), or by helping 
individuals feel better about themselves (the positive state improvement hypothesis) 
(Hart & Matsuba, 2007). Similar to the distinction made between guilt and shame, 
where shame involves negative appraisal of the whole self, and guilt involves negative 
appraisal of a particular behaviour, pride can be divided into “alpha pride” (positive 
evaluation of the whole self) and “beta pride” (positive evaluation of a particular 
behaviour) (Tangney et al., 2007). M. Lewis (1992, 2003) has similarly drawn a 
distinction between hubris (pridefulness) and pride. Unlike pride, hubris is associated 
with narcissism, and through this association, with lower levels of prosocial behaviour 
and higher levels of violence, hostility and aggression (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). 
 Humiliation can be defined as an intense and unpleasant emotion involving lowering 
in the eyes of others; and loss of esteem, social status or dignity (Elison & Harter, 
2007). The presence of a mocking audience is central to this experience (Elison & 
Harter, 2007). Gilbert (1998) argues that humiliation is similar to shame in that it is 
experienced when an individual is subordinated; put in a debased or powerless 
position by someone more powerful. Unlike shame, however, it does not involve the 
negative evaluation of the self by the self. Instead it involves a focus on the other as 
bad; external rather than internal attribution for negative events; a sense of injustice 
and unfairness; and a strong desire for revenge (Gilbert, 1998). It has been associated 
with violence, both against the self, and others (Elison & Harter, 2007).  
 Research indicates that the shame-prone person is unlikely to have an empathic 
disposition. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that shame, low empathy, high self-
preoccupation and high personal distress tend to co-occur (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995; 
Tangney et al., 2007). The self-focus of shame makes it a narcissistic emotion 
(Gilbert, 1998). This means that shame is more likely to be related to poor 
interpersonal relationships (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). By 
contrast, the guilt-prone individual is much more likely to display an ability to shift 
perspectives and empathic concern, which translates into prosocial behaviour 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
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 Rage is a response to intense injury to the self, due to repeated shaming experiences 
(Mills, 2005). The shame-rage which develops results in aggression targeting the 
individual who induces shame, or it is displaced onto safer targets (Mills, 2005). 
Either way, over time, this shame-rage cycle begins to foster a hostile interpersonal 
style, which is characterised by distrust of others, hostile attributions, and hostile 
solutions to interpersonal problems (Mills, 2005). The kinds of situations that evoke 
anger are different for shame-prone and guilt-prone individuals – shame-free guilt is 
far more likely to arise from reality-based violations than for shame-prone individuals 
(Tangney et al., 1996). Because anger is a potent, authoritative emotion, it counters 
some of the helplessness and paralysis of shame, giving the individual back their sense 
of power and agency (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Attacks on others, and putting 
others down, helps to (defensively) repair a shattered sense of self-worth (Lindsay-
Hartz et al., 1995). The anger response is facilitated by two factors: imagining a 
disapproving other, and an impaired capacity for empathy, which is likely to facilitate 
externalisation of blame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). There is 
also remarkable stability from middle childhood to adulthood in the association 
between shame-proneness and a defensive, retaliative and destructive response to 
anger, and between shame-free guilt and constructive anger-management strategies 
and outcomes (Tangney et al., 1996). 
In conclusion, shame is an uncontrolled, tremendously painful and incapacitating self-focused 
emotion that has a profoundly negative effect on individual psychological outcomes and on 
interpersonal functioning (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Tangney (2003) suggests that non-
shame-prone, high ego-strength individuals with a solid sense of self may be able to utilise 
shame constructively (to modify behaviour in positive ways). However, for the vast majority 
of individuals who are experiencing shame, it is a debilitating, ego-threatening experience, 
which makes constructive outcomes extremely unlikely (Tangney, 2003). Although shame 
and guilt are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, recent research on shame and 
guilt demonstrates that they are theoretically and empirically distinct, albeit related, concepts. 
In distinguishing between shame and guilt, it is useful to focus on the role of the self – in 
guilt, the self negatively evaluates specific behaviours, while in shame, the entire self is 
perceived as diminished, defective or fundamentally flawed, as failing to meet standards, as 
inferior or worthless in comparison to others (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Miller, 1985; Tangney, 
1991). Therefore, shame is a more global, undifferentiated and consequently painful and 
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challenging experience than guilt, in which the whole self, not just a particular behaviour, is 
perceived or evaluated as negative (Tangney, 1991). As noted by Lindsay-Hartz, Rivera and 
Mascolo (1995, p. 295), “when guilty we feel ‘as if’ we are bad”, while with shame, this “as 
if” condition falls away, and we become the “anti-ideal”. Shame is often attended by a sense 
of “shrinking” and feeling “small” and feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991, p. 599). Guilt-prone individuals do not feel the 
same powerlessness, and tend to view the self as flexible and malleable; amenable to change 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Most scholars agree that all self-conscious emotions, including shame, guilt, embarrassment 
and pride, are fundamentally affects of self-regulation (Tangney, 2003). According to Izard 
(1977) and Tangney (2003), these emotions provide feedback on individuals’ social and 
moral acceptability, and play an important role in guiding behaviour (particularly sexual 
behaviour), motivating individuals to adhere to cultural prescriptions and moral standards, 
norms and conventions. As noted by M. Lewis (1992), self-conscious emotions are designed 
to interrupt any behaviour that disrupts either internally or externally derived norms, 
standards or rules. Although scholars coming from a phenomenological point of view believe 
that shame can be experienced internally and externally, a number of authors argue that self-
conscious emotions, including shame, are inherently social emotions.  
Shame is associated with withdrawing, hiding, and wishing to escape (Lazarus, 1991; Miller, 
1985; Tangney, 1991). It is associated with retaliation, internalisation and externalisation of 
blame, and increases in anger and hostility, as well as high levels of personal distress. Shame 
has been implicated in the aetiology of a range of trauma-related mood and personality 
disorders (Harder, 1995; A. P. Morrison & Gilbert, 2001; Tangney et al., 2007).  Owing to the 
self-focus of shame, shame-prone individuals also tend to have impaired empathic capacity, 
which is a key pre-requisite for prosocial behaviour, hence the association between shame and 
antisocial behaviour and disorders of conduct (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
In the next chapter, we briefly look at the role of culture in shame.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Shame and Culture 
 
A diverse context such as South Africa will include a range of different cultures which will 
differently conceptualise, express and respond to different emotions, including shame. There 
was more than one cultural group among my participants, and consequently, I expected 
different cultural understandings of shame, perhaps even different shame-related 
psychological outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the likely 
culture-bound ways in which shame is expressed in South Africa. In order to do this I review 
the literature on culture and shame, specifically considering the research on cultures of honour 
and shame, which I will justify below (paired because, in my interpretation, they are 
responses to one another), guilt and shame (paired because of their culturally relevant 
similarities and differences) as they manifest in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, and 
universalist and cultural constructions of shame.  
 
Cultures of Honour 
 
There is an acute lack of literature on shame and culture in South Africa, so what follows is 
extrapolated from the international literature. I have begun this literature review with a very 
specific focus, because of its relevance to many South African cultural contexts.  The other 
debates which I cover, as described above - guilt and shame (paired because of their culturally 
relevant similarities and differences) as they manifest in individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures, and universalist and cultural constructions of shame, are part of a wider discussion 
about shame within culturally oriented psychological theory.  
The specific focus on cultures of honour is particularly relevant to my study, because it affects 
the kinds of communities my participants came from - urban (and violent) poverty contexts, 
which are characterised by the oppressive patriarchal values that are so rife in South Africa 
(see for example, Hearn & Morrell, 2012; Shefer, Ratele, Strebel, Shabalala, & Buikema, 
2007). Cultures of honour are cultures in which male strength and power are highly valued 
and in which men are prepared to kill to defend their status as honourable men (Cohen, 
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Vandello & Rantilla, 1998). Because of widespread poverty, status is also important in these 
communities, and deference must be paid to those occupying a higher social rung (Cohen et 
al., 1998). These views are collectively held (Cohen et al., 1998). The more cohesive the 
community, the more culturally sanctioned violence may be; in such cultures, social 
organisation is a risk factor (Cohen et al., 1998). Cultures of honour develop where people 
have only themselves to rely on for protection (Cohen et al., 1998). Cohen et al. (1998, p. 
277) argue that lack of law enforcement and lack of order construct the conditions necessary 
for a culture of honour to come about; that cultures of honour and associated cults of 
manhood develop in places where “living is hard”. In such cultures, as in many South African 
communities, wrongs are not only things done to the individual’s physical person, but also to 
the individual’s reputation (or those close to him, particularly females for whom men are 
deemed responsible) (Cohen et al., 1998).  
Using the example of the U.S. South and West, Cohen et al. (1998) show that regions 
dominated by cultures of honour are the most violent regions when it comes to honour-related 
infractions (violence due to lack of respect or deference to honour-based values and belief 
systems); however, the rates of felony-related violence are comparable to other areas of the 
country (Cohen et al., 1998). Honour-related violence is, in these regions, part of what it 
means to be a “real” man (Cohen et al., 1998). What makes the readiness for responding 
aggressively to affronts so powerful is that these views are collectively held – when the 
conflict escalates, both individuals are aware that the other may be thinking of violence as a 
means to save face (Cohen et al., 1998). In these societies, collective representations, such as 
laws, policies, media, and institutions may further amplify the beliefs and principles of 
cultures of honour (Cohen et al., 1998). One paradox remains: despite high levels of honour-
related violence, cultures of honour emphasise politeness, congeniality and generosity; 
perhaps because since an individual cannot escape conflict without losing face, the best thing 
to do is to avoid conflict before it starts (Cohen et al., 1998). This kind of deference is 
described in evolutionary theory (Gilbert, 1998). A characteristic way of interacting in 
cultures of honour is to engage in initial politeness and suppress anger, which is inevitably 
followed by a sudden explosion of anger and aggression once a certain line has been crossed 
(Cohen et al., 1998) – as noted by Carter (as cited in Cohen et al., 1998, p. 271), “the 
southerner is proverbially gentle in manner. It has been said that until he is angered enough to 
kill you, he will treat you politely”.  
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What is particularly relevant to South African urban poverty contexts is the emergence of 
cultures of honour as in American inner cities. Anderson (as cited in Cohen et al., 1998, p. 
275) has written that: 
The code of the streets is actually a cultural adaptation to a profound lack of faith in 
the police and the judicial system…the street code emerges where the influence of the 
police ends and the personal responsibility for one’s safety is felt to begin.  
It is argued that the harsher the environment and the scarcer the resources, the more likely it is 
that honour-related definitions of manhood are emphasised as desirable (Cohen et al., 1998). 
In such places – because they are threatened – the 3 P’s of manhood are considered especially 
important: protecting, providing and procreating (Cohen et al., 1998). In these societies, 
honour is a virtue and an ideal in the same way that dignity is for those who do not belong to 
cultures of honour (Cohen et al., 1998).   
I would argue that cultures of honour are a reaction to shame. Cultures of honour develop in 
poverty-stricken communities where men do not have access to material status, for instance, 
and have to create other means to counter feelings of disempowerment and humiliation. 
Investment in patriarchal values which emphasise male power, strength and dominance 
functions to subjugate and disempower other groups, such as women, so bolstering men to a 
higher social position while simultaneously dissipating their defensive shame. I would argue 
that at a cultural level, this may be one explanation why IPV is so prevalent in South Africa. 
 
Is Shame Universal or Culturally (Linguistically) Constructed? 
 
The social functions of emotion can be categorised at four levels – evolutionary (universalist) 
approaches are more likely to pay attention to the individual or the dyad as the unit of 
analysis, while social constructivist approaches tend to focus on the group or culture as the 
unit of analysis (Goetz & Keltner, 2007). At the individual level of analysis, emotion-related 
changes in experience, cognition and physiology are considered; at the dyadic level of 
analysis, researchers focus on the communication of emotion through facial, vocal and 
postural means; at the group level of analysis, how emotions facilitate groups of individuals to 
meet shared goals is the focus; while at the cultural level of analysis, attention is paid to the 
shaping of emotion through historical factors, and the entrenchment of emotion in cultural 
institutions, practices, norms and discourse (Goetz & Keltner, 2007). Thus emotions, 
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including shame, fulfil different functions at each of these levels – they determine and orient 
the individual, they regulate dyadic interactions, they influence group identities and values, 
and transfer cultural practices, identities and ideologies (Goetz & Keltner, 2007).  
There is limited research on cross-cultural differences in shame, but in the literature that does 
exist, there are two major debates. Firstly, scholars disagree on whether shame is universal or 
culturally constructed, and secondly, they disagree on whether individualistic societies are so-
called guilt cultures and collectivistic societies are so-called shame cultures. In other words, 
the debate is centred around whether individualistic cultures are characterised by people 
predominantly feeling guilt, and collective societies are characterised by people 
predominantly experiencing shame (as these constructs have been defined in the previous 
chapter) (the latter debate will be returned to later in the chapter). Universalism views 
emotions as the outcome of phylogenetic development that has particular specialised, adaptive 
functions in humans (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006). Relativism involves seeing emotions 
as social and cultural constructions (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006). Recent research 
provides evidence for the presence of a form of universalism; one which is tempered by the 
recognition that there may be cultural differences in the manifestation of different emotional 
processes (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006).  
Proponents of the universalist approach argue that all self-conscious emotions, including 
shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride, are fundamentally affects of self-regulation, which 
serve this key function in all contexts (Tangney, 2003). According to Izard (1977) and 
Tangney (2003), these emotions provide feedback on individuals’ social and moral 
acceptability, and play an important role in guiding behaviour, motivating individuals to 
adhere to cultural prescriptions and moral standards, norms and conventions. These moral 
standards, norms and conventions may differ in terms of their context, nature and expression, 
however, these scholars maintain that the antecedents and mechanisms underlying the 
evocation of shame (when standards are transgressed, when the failure is attributed to the self, 
and when the focus is on the self instead of action) remains the same (M. Lewis, 1992; 
Tomkins, 1963).  
Most scholars who support the universalist approach emphasise that both shame and guilt are 
social emotions – affects that arise when there is a threat to significant social bonds (Will, 
1987). Shame develops in interpersonal contexts, where a person fears the loss or rupture of 
an attachment to a valued or admired other (Will, 1987). As noted by M. Lewis (1992), self-
conscious emotions are designed to interrupt any action that violates either internally or 
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externally derived norms, standards or rules. Thus, shame functions to inhibit transgression 
against culturally-specific standards, and encourage conformity to particular norms and 
ideologies, which ensures continued membership to social groups. 
Fessler (2007) argues that shame is a bipartite emotion including an ancestral part that is 
shared with nonhuman primates, and a derived or socially constructed component that is 
unique to humans. The two differ in that the former is cognitively simpler, focuses only on 
social rank and does not involve concerns around conformity to cultural standards for 
behaviour (Fessler, 2007). Edelstein and Shaver (2007) also broadly agree, although their 
focus is on language. They argue that there is no indication in the limited group of lexical 
studies on shame that different cultures, or people speaking different languages, have 
significantly different understandings or experiences of shame, although it is acknowledged 
that certain emotions, like shame, may occur with greater frequency in one culture than 
another, may be more focused on and conceptualised in greater detail, may be valued more 
highly, and may be captured in language with greater precision.  
From an evolutionary perspective, self-conscious emotions are universal, and are associated 
with social status/hierarchy, co-operation and reciprocity across cultures. However, 
anthropological studies indicate that self-conscious emotions vary in their lexical 
representation, the degree to which they are valued, the (un)pleasantness of the experience, 
the nature of elicitors and the degree of associated moralisation
15
 (Goetz & Keltner, 2007). 
Research demonstrates that self-conscious emotions involve displays that are universal across 
cultures, particularly appeasement gestures recognised as shame and embarrassment, but there 
also seem to be culture-specific displays and behaviours (Goetz & Keltner, 2007). A social-
functional approach to self-conscious emotions suggests that there is both universality and 
variation across cultures, and that the evolutionary and cultural forces that evoke self-
conscious emotions should be considered complementary rather than opposing. In their 
words: 
Through display and feeling rules, through moralization and valuation of the self-
conscious emotions, culture has created profound variation in emotion processes that 
are, at their core, universal. Research shows that self-conscious emotion concepts exist 
in virtually all languages, have similar appraisal profiles across cultures, and may have 
cross-culturally recognizable facial displays. However, self-conscious emotions serve 
                                                 
15
 Goetz and Keltner (2007) suggest that research evidence points to collectivistic cultures being more 
moralising.  
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to help the individual act according to group norms, and these group norms vary 
greatly across cultures. These norms result in variation in the specific events that tend 
to elicit self-conscious emotions, in the elaborate concepts around particular self-
conscious emotions, and in the functional value and normative beliefs associated with 
self-conscious emotions. (Goetz & Keltner, 2007, p. 154) 
Contrary to many other (individualistic) leaders in the field of shame, Greenwald and Harder 
(1998) argue that shame is adaptive if it is not excessive or chronic. They argue that shame, 
irrespective of culture, places a major role in promoting genetic fitness through behavioural 
regulation in the domains of group identity, social bonding, and competitive mating success. 
Taking an evolutionary (universalist) approach, all humans are hardwired to experience 
shame and guilt by natural selection, however, it is conceded that the triggers and the manner 
in which these feelings are expressed may vary according to culture (Greenwald & Harder, 
1998). The purpose of shame from this perspective is a signal to the individual to change 
his/her behaviour in such a way that it ameliorates the damage to one’s status and reputation, 
and to prevent social rejection, greater shame and anxiety (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).  
These authors suggest that there are four types of shame which are related to separate domains 
of human functioning, and which are important for fitness: conformity, prosocial behaviour, 
sex and status/competition (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). The purpose of conformity shame is 
to identify members of a group, and so, it regulates behaviours related to dress, language, 
food consumption, rituals etc. (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). If these conventions are not 
adhered to, individuals may be marginalised or ostracised, which impedes or challenges 
fitness (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Humans are unique in that they not only value and 
adhere to cultural standards, they also enforce them by punishing those who deviate from 
them (Fessler, 2007). Cultures vary in terms of the importance attached to conformity, and it 
is suggested that conformity shame is more likely to be prominent in collectivist (as opposed 
to individualist) societies (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).   
Although some research in individualistic cultures has found an association between shame 
and antisocial behaviour (e.g. Tangney & Dearing, 2002), research in other contexts has 
found that prosocial behaviour may be enforced by fear of shame, encouraging altruistic and 
cooperative behaviour (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Humans are able to assess other’s 
emotional states and knowledge with very little effort (something which is not possible for 
nonhuman primates), which is why humans habitually engage in mutual watching behaviour – 
this underlies all cooperative endeavours (Fessler, 2007). In deciding on a partner for a 
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cooperative endeavour, humans are motivated to observe whether another person is able to 
behave appropriately in a range of culturally-specific activities, so giving him or her 
information with regards to whether his/her potential partner has the cultural knowledge 
relevant to any given cooperative endeavour, and whether s/he is motivated to comply with 
cultural standards in a manner that allows for co-ordination (Fessler, 2007). The more serious 
the violation of cultural standards is, and the more it harms an individual’s prized reputation 
as co-operator, the more severe and aversive the shame reaction will be (Fessler, 2007). 
Furthermore, the more people who are aware of the rule violation, the more serious the 
experience of shame will be (Fessler, 2007). Fessler (2007) also argues that shame will also 
be more intense if those who witness it are from the individual’s social group – if they are 
similar to the individual – and if a prominent figure condemns the rule violation.  
To return to Greenwald and Harder’s (1998) types of shame, it is worth noting that while 
there are some universal values in relation to sexual behaviour (e.g. around incest), sexual 
values and the circumstances that evoke sexual shame are remarkably varied. Some status 
hierarchies may well be associated with attractiveness to potential mating partners, while 
other status hierarchies function to elevate the individual’s position in other ways, so 
increasing his/her access to resources and alliances. It is important to note that these status 
hierarchies tend to overlap, so those who have achieved high status in one area are likely to 
have high status in other hierarchies as well (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).  
The form and expression of shame can be fairly consistent according to culture, although the 
elicitors of all these types of shame differ. It is important to consider individual differences, 
like for example, the types of shame individuals are most sensitive to, and how intensely they 
experience the emotion (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). There are consequences to the 
particular sensitivities a person may have - for example, those who are especially sensitive to 
conformity shame may experience a strong sense of group membership, but simultaneously 
are also likely to experience diminished freedom to follow their own desires, a great deal of 
worry about whether their behaviour is socially appropriate, and vulnerability to excessive 
worry about minor infractions of social regulations (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). 
Shweder (2003, p. 1115) argues that the abstract idea of shame is universal, and can be 
defined as “the deeply felt and highly motivating experience of the fear of being judged 
defective”. However, the local manifestation of shame will vary, as will be apparent from 
culturally specific situational determinants, self-appraisal features, somatic phenomenology, 
affective phenomenology, social appraisal, self-management and communication (Shweder, 
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2003). For example, among Oriya Brahmans, lajya may be translated into shame, shy, modest, 
embarrassed or bashful, and is associated with downcast eyes, a veiled face, and physical 
withdrawal from the situation, a set of words which among modern Anglo-Americans is 
associated with meekness, timidity, mousiness, sheepishness, shrinking, self-deprecation, 
weakness, humiliation and degradedness (Shweder, 2003). In Oriya Brahman culture, 
however, lajya is associated with being “unpretentious, unobtrusive, reserved, self-restrained, 
humble, proper, civilized, self-effacing, not brazen, decent, elegant, delicate, undefiled, 
unsullied, powerful, virtuous, good” – in fact, the ego or self of the person with lajya is 
thought to be mature and elevated, enhanced by an advanced sense of propriety, knowledge 
and compliance with societal roles and rules, adherence to social order, awareness of virtues 
and responsibilities of sacrifice and self-control, and sensitivity to preserving the honour of 
others (Shweder, 2003, p. 1125). 
Edelstein and Shaver (2007) argue that there are both substantial universalities and cross-
cultural differences in linguistic categorisation of emotion, which points to a core, common 
set of emotions that are given a particular shape and flavour by specific cultural influences. It 
is interesting to note that in some lexical studies of shame, the concept is often categorised 
within the “sadness” domain, and other times within the “fear/anxiety” domain (Edelstein & 
Shaver, 2007). Its particular categorisation depends on whether shame occurs before the 
individual engages in a transgression (in which case it would resemble or overlap with 
anxiety, apprehension or fear), or whether s/he experiences shame after committing a 
shameful act (in which case it would be similar to regret, remorse, and more broadly, sadness) 
(Edelstein & Shaver, 2007).  
From a cultural constructivist point of view, there are significant cultural differences in the 
meaning, antecedents, experience of shame and associated action tendencies (Li, Wang, & 
Fischer, 2004). It has been argued that affect, cognition and behaviour are determined by 
historical, cultural and political factors (Shi-xu, 2009). Shi-xu (2009) suggests that cultural 
values are central to cultural emotions, and that 1) cultural affective experience is dynamic 
and changeable; 2) cultural affective experience is a product of historical contexts; and 3) 
cultural affective experience is embedded in history (Shi-xu, 2009). In order to understand 
cultural affective experience we need to pay attention to the historical circumstances in which 
such emotions occur, as well as acknowledge that no feeling, thought or action exists 
independently of comparable or parallel emotions in different cultures (Shi-xu, 2009). In stark 
contrast to individualist understandings of shame, people in Orissa, India, experience shame 
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as a healthy emotion, and one which is an effective antidote to rage (Menon & Schweder, 
1994). In China, for example, shame is “not a mere emotion, but also a moral and virtuous 
sensibility to be pursued” (Li et al., 2004, p. 769). In addition, in Spain, shame is more closely 
associated with family and masculine honour and female sexuality than in the Netherlands 
(Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & 
Fischer, 2002).  
From this perspective, it is important to note that in different cultures, shame may be 
differently conceptualised, experienced and expressed (Bedford, 2004; Bedford & Hwang, 
2003). This is because of different perspectives on morality and identity (Bedford & Hwang, 
2003). In Western individualism, the focus is on the individual self, on rights and freedom of 
choice, where morality is objectively determined, and guilt is often the mechanism for social 
control (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). In contrast, the Confucian relationalism characteristic of 
China, for example, focuses on the relational self, obligation to the relational other, and 
subjective (relational) morality, and the mechanism for social control tends to be shame 
(Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Bedford (2004) identifies four types of shame among the Chinese, 
known as diu lian (loss of face), can kui (the shame that results from failing to achieve one’s 
best or ideal state, usually associated with carrying out a positive duty), xiu kui (involves the 
discovery of something negative in the self that has harmed another) and xiu chi (a general 
type of shame that involves feeling inadequate as a person) (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). All of 
these types of shame involve exposure, inadequacy or feeling deficient in some way, and 
concern with identity, but they are different in terms of their intensity (e.g. can kui is the least 
intense feeling and xui chi is the strongest), function (e.g. the function of diu lian is to 
maintain an individual’s reputation; the function of can kui is to motivate the individual to 
strive towards his/her ideal self; and xiu kui and xiu chi function to prevent the individual 
from engaging in inappropriate social action and to protect social harmony) and the nature of 
transgression (e.g. in one’s own eyes or in others’ eyes) (Bedford, 2004). In each case, the 
aspect of the identity which is threatened varies – with diu lian it is the public identity; with 
can kui it is destruction of personal ideals; xui kui is caused by threats to the private identity; 
while xui chi is both public and private (Bedford & Hwang, 2003).  
As a result, Bedford and Hwang (2003) suggest that the emotional experience of shame may 
be different in different cultures, because of the way it is conceptualised and expressed in 
language. Not all languages discriminate so clearly between different dimensions of shame 
and shame and other self-conscious emotions. Some have argued that languages in which 
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concepts are highly elaborated, and which are more discriminating are likely to belong to 
cultures which are more sensitive to shame (e.g. Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Some scholars 
have suggested that because of the highly elaborated nature of the concept of shame in 
Chinese language, it might be worthwhile for Chinese researchers to work with Western, 
English-speaking researchers to achieve a more discriminating and precise conceptualisation 
of shame (Edelstein & Shaver, 2007). However, the theory that more elaborate and 
discriminating language necessarily points to a greater knowledge or understanding of shame 
is not consistently supported – for example, the Japanese word haji does not distinguish 
between embarrassment and shame (Lebra, 1983), and this is despite the fact that Japan is 
traditionally viewed as a “shame culture”. Not distinguishing between shame and other self-
conscious emotions in language does not mean that the constructs are not viewed separately. 
For example, the Raramuri Indians in Mexico only have one word for shame and guilt but the 
authors show that these individuals nonetheless differentiate between these constructs, much 
like cultures which use two words for shame and guilt (although the expression of these 
emotions is somewhat different to expressions documented in Western cultural samples) 
(Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006).  
In a similar vein, Heider’s (1991) study of three cultures in Indonesia demonstrated highly 
differentiated features or dimensions of shame which are not evident in English-speaking 
cultures. However, Indonesia has not consistently proven more shame-orientated (Li et al., 
2004). In a study of the organisation of emotion words in English, Italian, Chinese and 
Indonesian, only the Chinese produced an additional emotion family for shame (Shaver, 
Murray & Fraley, 2001; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). The Chinese have more consistently 
been found to emphasise shame (Li et al., 2004). In their study of Chinese shame concepts Li 
et al. (2004) found that at the highest abstract level (superordinate) participants distinguished 
between shame state, self-focus (shame that focuses on the self) and reactions to shame, 
other-focus (consequences of and reactions to shame directed at others). The former contained 
three additional meanings (at basic level), including fear of losing face, the experience of 
already having lost face, and guilt; while the latter contained a further three meanings, 
including disgrace, shamelessness and embarrassment (Li et al., 2004). The second 
superordinate category (shame, other-focus) was considered particularly interesting, because 
it pointed to the high level of involvement and engagement of the group in each member’s 
emotional life in Chinese culture compared to Western cultures (Li et al., 2004).   
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In a cross-cultural comparison of shame in Bengkulu (Indonesia) and California, Fessler 
(2004) found that 1) based on the frequency of the use of the term shame, shame was more 
prevalent in Bengkulu; and 2) comparisons of naturally occurring shame events in Bengkulu 
with reports of shame in California showed that shame is associated with guilt in California, 
and with shyness and subordinance events in Bengkulu; and 3) in a synonym task guilt was 
again more prominent in California and subordinance in Bengkulu. It is interesting to note 
that in this study, Westerners from individualistic cultures were more likely to conflate, merge 
or equate shame and guilt than non-Westerners from collectivistic societies (Fessler, 2004). 
This has been suggested by a number of authors, who draw attention to the close clustering 
and merging of self-conscious emotions among English-speakers, even those who were 
college educated (Edelstein & Shaver, 2007). However, it has not been consistently 
replicated: in Li et al.’s (2004) study, Chinese participants blurred the distinctions between 
shame and guilt.  
Japanese people have been identified as particularly sensitive to exposure (a culturally 
rewarded or even prescribed attitude), with any kind of real or imagined exposure leading to 
haji (Lebra, 1983). The avoidance of haji comes with a great deal of pressure for 
perfectionism around the display of the self (Lebra, 1983). This sensitivity to exposure and 
pressure for perfectionism in display leads to anthropophobia (morbid fear of interpersonal 
contact) which is so characteristic of the Japanese (Lebra, 1983). Lebra (1983) argues that 
there is a great deal of cultural importance attached to the rules of formal display, which is 
particularly evident in rituals such as the tea ceremony – against the backdrop of haji, it is 
understandable that the Japanese find such ritualistic, rule-bound self-presentation as is 
demonstrated in the tea ceremony, calming, therapeutic, and tranquility-inducing.  However, 
this drive towards formally flawless display inhibits self-expression, and consequently, 
Japanese people need to create occasions which allow for free, personal self-disclosure 
(Lebra, 1983). It is interesting to note that the formality and perfectionism so characteristic of 
Japanese social life is reserved for public or “on-stage” social performances, while when “off 
stage”, in the realm of the private, Japanese have been known to be uncharacteristically 
informal and display apparent shamelessness (Lebra, 1983). In Lebra’s words (1983, p. 199), 
“It appears that the rhythm of the Japanese life represents cycles of alternation between on-
stage inhibition and off-stage shamelessness or underexposure and overexposure.” The 
opposite extremes, in Lebra’s (1983) view, are an intrinsic part of the shame complex in 
Japanese culture. Despite the ubiquitousness of shame in Japanese culture, Lebra (1983) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
 
 
argues that guilt is more firmly entrenched in the Japanese moral system. Shame and guilt 
tend to be conflated, with shame exacerbating guilt reactions (Lebra, 1983). The shyness, 
exposure-avoidance, fear of eye-to-eye contact, and the culturally sanctioned self-denigration 
and humility in Japanese culture, then, should be reinterpreted and understood as the 
individual’s attempt at thoughtfulness and avoiding hurting or offending others, in other 
words, pointing to the extreme other-oriented nature of the Japanese form of guilt (Lebra, 
1983).  
 
Guilt and Shame in Collectivistic and Individualistic Cultures 
 
The stark categorical distinction between Western cultures as wholly individualistic and non-
Western cultures as wholly collectivistic has been criticised, from as early as the 1950’s 
(Ausubel, 1955) – with authors claiming that the definition of any emotion needs to be 
general and flexible enough to encompass different culture-bound expressions thereof. 
Evidence against the simplistic categorisation of cultures into individualistic or collectivistic, 
or guilt or shame cultures, is that even in “we-self” cultures, there remains an “I-self” which 
can be shamed if standards, rules or goals are transgressed, for example, among Oriya 
Indians, a woman is “polluted” during her menstrual cycle and may not be touched (M. 
Lewis, 1992). Similarly, for Hindus there are a number of personal sins, such as being reborn, 
being born a woman, or having a lingering death (M. Lewis, 1992).  
Having said this, however, there are discernible differences between collectivistic and 
individualistic cultures. The cultural values of independence, autonomy and equality are 
fostered in Western, individualistic or “I-cultures”, while the cultural values of conformity, 
interdependence, group solidarity and hierarchical authority are supported in non-Western, 
collectivistic or “we-cultures” (Li et al., 2004). The distinction between individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures is made on the basis of whether sanctions applied to normative 
behaviour are internal or external (Goldberg, 1991). If a particular context depends on the 
criticism, ridicule and ostracisation of others to ensure moral behaviour, it is shame oriented; 
alternatively, if a culture relies on an internalised conscience for adherence to moral 
behaviour, it is a guilt culture (Goldberg, 1991). A number of authors have made 
generalisations about the differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. For 
example, Kaufman (1993) argues that in Western cultures, compared to African or Asian 
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cultures, shame is centred around competition for success, being independent and self-
sufficient, and being popular and conforming (Kaufman, 1993). Additional sources of shame 
in adulthood in Western culture identified by Kaufman (1993) are any situations in which the 
individual is powerless (reminiscent of his/her original helplessness in infancy), failed in 
vocation, failed in relationships, or has aged (great emphasis is placed on youthfulness).  
M. Lewis (1992) maintains that I-cultures are focused on striving towards personal freedom, 
and have become more shame-driven and narcissistic (M. Lewis, 1992). This in part is caused 
by the achievement orientation of Western cultures; from infancy, children are encouraged to 
engage in academic, social and athletic competition, and are shamed when they fail to be as 
competent as others (Goldberg, 1991). Simultaneously, in such cultures, the influence of 
religious institutions has radically diminished over time, and consequently, there are fewer 
opportunities for absorbing shame (M. Lewis, 1992).  In the past, religious institutions, 
whether guilt-oriented (e.g. in Judaism and Protestantism which focus on rewards for specific 
good deeds and punishment of specific transgressions in this life) or shame-oriented (e.g. 
Catholicism and fundamentalist Christian religions, which focus more on original sin and 
global forgiveness, in the hereafter for instance), played a central role in absorbing shame and 
forgiveness of sin (M. Lewis, 1992).  
M. Lewis (1992) argues that in individualistic cultures, shame is present when the self 
violates central standards and accepts blame for failure; the focus remains on the self rather 
than reparation.  However, the violation of group standards rather than the individual remains 
more shaming in collectivistic cultures (M. Lewis, 1992). In fact, Li et al. (2004) suggest that 
in China, individuals almost always belong to a closely knit group on which their honour and 
shame are reflected, which is why a network of people share an interest in each member’s 
achievements and disappointments. So when, broadly speaking, individuals in collectivistic 
cultures fail, they not only lose face themselves, but also shame all who belong to the group 
(Li et al., 2004).  
The distinction between shame and guilt may be less relevant in collectivistic cultures (Wong 
& Tsai, 2007). A number of studies have demonstrated that the differences between shame 
and guilt are far less pronounced in collectivistic cultures, and they are seldom considered 
entirely separate constructs (Wong & Tsai, 2007). On the few occasions when a distinction 
between shame and guilt has been drawn in collectivistic cultures, the underlying foundation 
of this distinction is different to most individualistic contexts (Wong & Tsai, 2007). For 
example, because Confucianism is the dominant philosophical framework in many East Asian 
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contexts, a tradition that is more focused on situations and relations, in Chinese culture guilt is 
experienced when an absolute standard is breached, while shame is experienced when a 
situation-specific standard is breached (Wong & Tsai, 2007).  
Many scholars argue that the distinctions between shame and guilt are culturally constructed. 
Specifically, Wong and Tsai (2007) argue that the distinctions between shame and guilt vary 
cross-culturally, but also that the valuation, elicitors and behavioural consequences of these 
emotions vary according to individualistic or collectivistic culture. Of relevance here is the 
cultural construction of the self – in individualistic cultures, the self is considered bounded, 
separate from others, and independent, including stable personal attributes, whereas in 
collectivistic contexts the self is viewed as interdependent, including mutable and changeable 
personal characteristics, and consequently, external influences are as significant as internal 
influences (Wong & Tsai, 2007). The interdependent self is considered contextually and 
situationally dependent, and thus, changes in the self are both standard and common (Wong & 
Tsai, 2007). These changes in the self in collectivistic cultures – including feeling bad about 
the self - are normative and valued as a means of constantly improving the self (Wong & Tsai, 
2007). This relates to the valuation of shame in collectivistic cultures – negatively valuating 
the self, which is typically associated with shame, is not traditionally seen as damaging to 
psychological well-being (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Instead, feeling negative about oneself is 
viewed as potentially informative and as motivating positive psychological change (Wong & 
Tsai, 2007). Consequently, shame is valued more in collectivistic contexts, and may very well 
play an important role in everyday life (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In individualistic cultures, 
however, shame is understood as an involuntary, very painful and incapacitating self-focused 
emotion that has a profoundly negative effect on individual outcomes and on interpersonal 
behaviour (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
The elicitors of shame and guilt also vary according to culture. Because of the different 
construal of the self in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, those transgressing in 
individualistic contexts themselves feel the consequences of their wrongdoing (it is the 
individual who transgressed who feels the shame), while these consequences may be induced 
by others’ behaviour in collectivistic contexts (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In terms of behavioural 
consequences, unlike individualistic cultures, which traditionally view shame as a negative 
emotion because of its psychological, social and physical consequences, in collectivistic 
cultures, shame may have positive and adaptive consequences (Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
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It has been shown that the expressions of traumatic memory, and associated experiences, 
including shame, differ across individual and collectivist societies (Elsass, 2001). Elsass 
(2001) found that in collectivist Peruvian villages, individuals did not respond to violence 
with standard DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. Participants mentioned “evil and bad thoughts”, “a 
burning head”, or having “cried the eyes out”, and suggested that their “souls are putrefied 
and destroyed by all dead persons”, or “we are as in a dream without thoughts” (Elsass, 2001, 
p. 309). A few participants described further difficulties that are not reflected in the diagnostic 
criteria of PTSD such as “insufferable homesickness” and “gnawing shame” (Elsass, 2001, p. 
309). Peruvian participants also did not believe that traumatic memory needs to be treated 
with psychological interventions (Elsass, 2001). Instead, most psychosocial work is dedicated 
to strengthening the construction of local communities (Elsass, 2001). By contrast, people in 
the more individualistic villages in Colombia tend to be preoccupied with guilt and shame, 
and psychosocial work takes the form of individual psychological interventions, which are 
widely used and accepted (Elsass, 2001).  
Another study found that shame mediated the relationship between personality (introversion, 
extroversion, neuroticism and psychoticism) and social anxiety among Chinese university 
students, whereas no such relationship could be found among American students, for whom 
there were direct relationships between personality and shame, and personality and social 
anxiety (Zhong et al., 2008). Contrary to previous findings, however, in this study the authors 
found that the American sample had higher shame and lower social anxiety scores than the 
Chinese sample, a difference that was attributed to Americans’ tendency to be more open 
about expressing their private feelings (Zhong et al., 2008).  
Fischer et al. (1999) found important distinctions between collectivistic honour-related 
cultures (Spain) and individualistic cultures (Dutch). In their study, they found that honour-
related values were more important in Spain, while values associated with individualism were 
more important in the Netherlands (Fischer et al., 1999). In a second, related study, the 
authors explored whether differences in values would be reflected in cultural 
conceptualisations of pride, shame and anger. As hypothesised, they found that there were 
more dissimilarities than similarities between how participants from the two different cultures 
described pride and shame episodes, compared to their descriptions of anger (which is not a 
self-conscious emotion). Results indicate that Spanish participants referred more to others and 
their relationships with them than Dutch participants, who were more self-focused (Fischer et 
al., 1999). Furthermore, Spanish participants mentioned negative feelings and consequences 
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to pride more often than their Dutch counterparts (Fischer et al., 1999). In addition, for 
Spanish respondents, shame was more likely to be associated with situations where their 
honour was publicly affected (Fischer et al., 1999).  
A number of studies which have found differences in shame and guilt between individualistic 
and collectivistic societies have produced results which were unexpected. For example, in a 
recent study, guilt, not shame, was the most prevalent emotion in narratives generated by 
Japanese young people (Thonney, Kanachi, Sasaki, & Hatayama, 2006). In a study comparing 
Indian and Italian undergraduates’ shame and guilt responses and shame and guilt proneness, 
results showed firstly, that shame and guilt are indeed separate constructs; and that secondly, 
Indian participants responded more intensely to shame while Italian participants reacted more 
intensely to guilt; and thirdly, and somewhat unexpectedly, that Indian respondents were 
prone to both more shame and guilt (Anolli & Pascucci, 2005). In a comparison between 
Chinese (collectivistic) and American (individualistic) students’ shame reactions, the authors 
found that there were significant differences in levels of shame across imaginary scenarios, 
but in an unexpected direction – that US students had higher shame scores than their Chinese 
counterparts on the majority of scenarios (Tang, Wan, Qian, Gao, & Zhang, 2008). However, 
in both groups, intensity of shame decreased with social distance between the self and a 
related other (mother, partner, best friend and classmate) (Tang et al., 2008).  
A comparison between German (individualistic) and Kurdish and Lebanese (collectivistic) 
individuals in reactions to violation of normative standards also revealed surprising results 
(Bierbrauer, 1992). The author found that individuals in the collectivistic group not only had 
higher shame scores, they also had higher guilt scores (however, their shame scores remained 
higher than their guilt scores). This unexpected finding was explained by the religion of 
participants – despite their collectivistic orientation, the Kurdish and Lebanese participants 
endorsed a monotheistic religious orientation (Islam, which, like Christianity, includes a 
personal God that is the highest form of authority, who regulates transgressions from 
normative standards by inducing feelings of guilt), which is associated with higher levels of 
guilt. Furthermore, although there were distinct differences between the individualistic and 
collectivistic cultural groups in terms of their belief in the legitimacy of tradition and religious 
norms (the collectivistic group endorsing these beliefs more), there was no difference between 
the groups in terms of perceived legitimacy of state laws. This result suggests that religion 
and tradition – as opposed to the Western reliance on state laws - may potentially play an 
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important role in regulating individual and social behaviour in some cultures (Bierbrauer, 
1992).  
Finally, in closing this section on individualistic and collectivistic cultures, it is worth 
reiterating that in some (usually collectivistic) contexts, shame may be positive and pride 
negative. For example, in their review of the literature, Goetz and Keltner (2007) describe that 
in Bedouin culture, the word hasham has positive connotations, and includes not only the 
concept shame, but also embarrassment, humility and modesty, and may even be experienced 
as a pleasurable sensation. Eid and Diener (2001) demonstrate that in individualistic cultures 
such as the U.S. and Australia, pride was considered positive, both acceptable and desirable, 
while in collectivistic cultures such as China and Taiwan participants were indifferent to, or 
had a negative orientation towards pride. In addition, guilt was considered highly undesirable 
in all participating countries (U.S., Australia, Taiwan and China), except for China (Eid & 
Diener, 2001). Furthermore, Wallbott and Scherer (1995) found, in their comparison of shame 
experiences across 37 countries, that shame had a much less negative impact on self-esteem 
and on relationships in collectivistic cultures, and was also associated with behaviours such as 
smiling and laughing, indicating pleasure.   
In summary, it is clear from the number of studies that have produced unexpected findings, 
that there is no such thing as a pure shame culture, or pure guilt culture (corresponding with 
pure collectivistic and individualistic societies). Hong (2004) argues against such 
dichotomous thinking, suggesting a more nuanced approach that recognises diversity and 
complexity, and includes culturally sensitive methodologies and measurement tools. It is also 
important to note that societies are not static, but are continually changing. As an example of 
this, Lee (1999) describes the transition in Korean culture from a face-saving culture to a 
modern culture. The most important value in the face-saving culture was the safeguarding of 
honour in the family. However, influenced by Western culture, modern Korean culture has 
begun to value personal competence, particularly material prosperity (Lee, 1999). 
Consequently, the major source of shame has changed from damage to the honour of the 
family in the face-saving culture to personal incompetence in modern Korean culture (Lee, 
1999). It is likely that in a dynamic society such as South Africa, similar changes are 
happening. It is also highly likely that cultures of honour and shame permeate South African 
culture(s). Because of the established connections between shame and mental health, these 
changing conceptions of shame need to be captured and understood to ascertain their impact 
on the mental health of survivors of chronic trauma. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Associations Between Trauma, Shame and Psychopathology 
 
Research on the associations between chronic trauma, shame and psychopathology is limited. 
This is despite the fact that individuals who have experienced multiple traumatic events, 
particularly if the traumas are interpersonal in nature, have higher levels of post-traumatic 
symptoms (which I will argue includes shame) than those who have been exposed to a single 
traumatic event (Green et al., 2000). The literature that does exist falls into two categories: the 
generally more dated theoretical literature on shame from a variety of perspectives, which 
tends to be based on single cases (which were discussed in chapter 2); and the more recent 
empirical literature, which includes large samples, and has a broader focus, linking shame to a 
full range of psychological difficulties. Thus, although the proposed study is qualitative in 
orientation, the literature reviewed in this chapter includes mostly medium to large-scale 
quantitative studies, so conclusions are drawn on the basis of data rather than clinical 
experience. Where this is not the case, attention will be drawn to it, as it has implications for 
the kinds of generalisations that can be made on the basis of findings. In some instances, 
theoretical work will be referred to, in which case, the reader’s attention will once again be 
drawn to it.  
The tone of this chapter is somewhat in conflict with an ethnographic study. This is because 
of the nature of the material I am reviewing. And since this chapter is the heart of my 
literature review, including all my main themes, it is critical that this literature is reviewed.  
Due to the frequent association of shame to high-risk psychological outcomes, and a lack of 
research on the possible positive functions of shame, the following review also emphasises 
psychopathology. This reflects the focus of the vast majority of available research
16
. 
However, it is worth noting that Mollon (2002) has recognised that shame also has adaptive 
functions. He argues that in evolutionary terms, shame protects a person from engaging in 
behaviour which is in conflict with (prosocial; advantageous) group norms and result in social 
exclusion, and thus the support and protection of the community and society.  
                                                 
16
 As will be seen in later chapters, this deficit will be addressed during the field work component of the current 
study, when participants will be given an opportunity to resist or challenge dominant biomedical discourses 
which tend to locate pathology within the individual. Participants will be encouraged to give voice to shameful, 
silenced and stigmatized experiences in a manner which generates alternative knowledges and meaning 
structures which will be used to inform future research. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I have foregrounded certain forms of trauma-related psychopathologies, 
because they are more common than others. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to cover all 
shame and trauma-related outcomes. Firstly, due to the overlap between child abuse and 
chronic trauma including IPV (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, Yoshihama et al., 2004) I focus on 1) 
the contributions of emotional, physical and sexual abuse to shame and psychopathology, and 
2) the contributions of parenting and attachment patterns to shame and psychopathology. 
Then I turn to the consequences of trauma for shame reactions and selected 
psychopathologies. This is with the knowledge that chronic trauma often results in a 
complicated comorbid picture, which does not cohere into a simple, unified syndrome. As can 
be seen in the third section below, psychic splitting and fragmentation (aspects of 
dissociation) as a post-traumatic response frequently co-occurs with shame, which are both 
central to Complex PTSD (and DESNOS). 
 
Trauma, Shame and Psychopathology 
 
Shame has been associated with a range of psychopathological outcomes, including 
depression, anxiety, eating disorders, Complex PTSD, and personality disorders such as BPD 
and narcissism, as well as to disorders of conduct, dissociative disorders and substance misuse 
(N. K. Morrison, 1987; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney et al., 2007). As I 
have noted, reviewing all the literature on shame and psychopathology is beyond the scope of 
this review. Instead, the review will focus on the associations between shame and specific 
forms of trauma-related psychopathology.  
 
1. Causes and Correlates: The Contributions of Emotional, Physical and Sexual Abuse 
to Shame and Psychopathology 
 
Gilbert (1998) points out that trauma is both a categorical and dimensional construct, which 
implies that although certain social interactions do not constitute abuse, they may still be 
damaging for the child’s developing personality or sense of self. In this chapter, I engage with 
trauma as a categorical concept (e.g. a child was sexually abused or not), as well as a 
dimensional one (e.g. occasional role reversal between child and primary caregiver [low on 
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the continuum], or the frequent or escalating experience of failed identification between infant 
and primary caregiver [higher on the continuum]).  
Child abuse of various kinds has been implicated in the development of a shame-prone 
interpersonal style in a number of studies (Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995). In fact, some authors 
have named physical and sexual abuse shame-based syndromes, based on their clinical work 
(Kaufman, 1992). Individuals who have been abused tend to experience a great deal of shame 
because of feeling unvalued and worthless as a person (Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995).  
One of the ways in which those who have been shamed through abuse counter their feelings 
of helplessness is to become abusers themselves (Goldberg, 1991). Based on his clinical 
experience, Kaufman (1993) argues that scenes of both physical and sexual abuse often 
compel re-enactment, but that they are recast – the previously abused individual is now in the 
role of the abuser, thus reversing roles. Goldberg (1991) estimates that one third to one half of 
those who have been physically abused become abusers themselves, as a means of taking 
back the power and potency which was taken from them during their own abuse. Oliver 
(1993) replicated this estimation in a study that included original research and a compilation 
of 60 studies, which were recent at the time, predominantly from the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The results indicate that one-third of child survivors of abuse grow up to 
engage in severely impaired, neglectful, or abusive rearing as caregivers (Oliver, 1993). One-
third do not engage in abusive caregiving (Oliver 1993). The remaining one-third was classed 
as vulnerable to the effects of social stress on the likelihood of becoming abusive caregivers 
(Oliver, 1993). Kaufman and Zigler (1987) came up with similar estimates (approximately 
30% of caregivers with a history of abuse perpetrate abuse against their offspring), but they 
emphasise the obvious point that the majority of maltreated children (two thirds) do not 
become abusive caregivers, and that there are a range of mediating factors that influence 
transmission.  
Emotional abuse, as opposed to physical abuse, has been found to be a particularly important 
contributor to feelings of shame, as well as overt and covert hostility, and both unexpressed 
and expressed anger in a sample of 107 male and 101 female undergraduate psychology 
students (Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995). However, guilt, overall, was unrelated to abusiveness, 
anger or hostility. This was attributed to the fact that the individual’s self-concept is a core 
component in both the experience of shame (but not guilt) and emotional abusiveness – in this 
kind of abusiveness the individual’s basic sense of self is being undermined, criticised or 
belittled. In other words, emotional abuse involves the negative evaluation of who one “is” 
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(shame), rather than what one “does” (guilt). The lack of relationship between physical abuse 
and shame is more complex, and could involve the perception that physical abuse is the 
rightful punishment for actual or imagined transgressions; that exposure to physical 
abusiveness is dominated by emotions other than shame; or that these findings may be a 
function of the sample characteristics (low levels of exposure to abusiveness) or choice of 
measures (Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995).  
Shame has been found to mediate the association between exposure to psychological abuse by 
a romantic partner and PTSD symptomatology (Street & Arias, 2001). Interestingly, once 
again, psychological abuse (in the absence of physical abuse), not physical abuse, was 
associated with shame-proneness, and shame-proneness was a significant predictor of PTSD 
(Street & Arias, 2001). Emotional abuse has been repeatedly isolated as an important 
predictor of pathological outcomes, not only in the case of PTSD, but also in depression 
(Cloitre et al., 2009; Webb, Heisler, Call, Chickering, & Colburn, 2007). For example, 
psychological maltreatment, whether open, direct hostility, neglect or social isolation, was 
found to be associated with shame-proneness (not guilt) and depression in a sample of 280 
participants from a public community college and a private university (Webb et al., 2007).   
Shame has also been found to account partially for the relationship between severe child 
sexual abuse and severity of depression in a sample of 105 psychiatric patients aged fifty 
years and over diagnosed with depression (Gamble et al., 2006). Specifically, a dimension of 
neuroticism known as self-consciousness (characterised by feelings of shame and 
embarrassment) mediated the association between severe child sexual abuse and severity of 
depressive symptoms (Gamble et al., 2006). 
Emotional abuse and emotional neglect were found, in a recent study, to predict both anxiety 
and depression in a sample of 301 college students, and this association was mediated by 
schemas of shame (feeling that the whole self is defective and unworthy), vulnerability to 
harm (the belief that one is unable to prevent disasters and that disasters may occur at any 
time) and self-sacrifice (exaggerated focus on the needs, feelings and reactions of others, 
frequently at the cost of the individual’s own needs) (O’Dougherty Wright, Crawford, & 
Castillo, 2009). In addition, emotional neglect was related to dissociation, and this 
relationship was once again mediated by schemas of shame and susceptibility to harm 
(O’Dougherty Wright et al., 2009). The relationship of these schemas to dissociation was 
explained by the authors as a result of resorting to hiding or escaping during a shame reaction; 
insulating oneself against this painful emotion.  
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A study including 373 psychology undergraduate students examining the impact of childhood 
psychological abuse and shame-proneness on adult outcomes found significant gender 
differences (Harper & Arias, 2004). Specifically, shame-proneness was a moderator of child 
psychological maltreatment and depressive symptoms in women, and for child psychological 
abuse and anger in men. Thus, for women, those who reacted with high levels of distress to 
child psychological abuse experience an increase in shame and are more likely to develop 
internalised symptoms. Contrary to women, men exhibited less shame-proneness and more 
anger, which is consistent with the proposition that in by-passed shame (an avoided or denied 
shame), externalising emotions such as anger are used to suppress the painful shame response 
(Harper & Arias, 2004).  
Child sexual abuse has repeatedly been implicated in a range of pathological outcomes, and 
shame and guilt have been identified as particularly common post-traumatic reactions 
(Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1996; Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 2002; Ginzburg et al., 2009; Uji, 
Shikai, Shono, & Kitamura, 2007). Factors which increase shame in survivors of sexual abuse 
include the offender blaming the survivor, sexual abuse by a parent or familial member 
(betrayal by a trusted person), more serious forms of sexual contact (which involve 
penetration and force), playing an active part in the abuse (complicity in a socially stigmatised 
and forbidden relationship), and being discovered as opposed to purposeful telling (Feiring et 
al., 1996). However, the most important variable in determining shame remains the cognitive 
evaluation of the event (internal, stable, global attributions for negative events) and the 
individual’s (pessimistic) attributional style (Feiring et al., 1996).  
Feiring, Taska and Chen (2002) conducted a study including 80 children and 50 adolescents 
who were seen within eight weeks of discovery of the abuse and one year later. Participants 
were asked to describe why they believed the abuse happened, rate the extent to which 
internal and external attributions for the abuse event applied to them, and complete measures 
of general attribution style for everyday events, shame for the abuse, and symptoms of 
depression, PTSD, and self-esteem. The authors found that shame was a key mediator in the 
association between sexual abuse-specific internal attributions (self-blame) and PTSD. 
Abuse-specific internal attributions were related to higher levels of psychopathology, 
including PTSD symptoms and internalising behaviour problems, such as depression. In 
another study, Feiring et al. (1996) presented a theoretical and testable model that specifies 
psychological processes related to stigmatisation in child and adolescent survivors of sexual 
abuse. The model proposes that sexual abuse leads to shame through the mediation of 
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cognitive attributions about the abuse, and shame, in turn, leads to poor psychological 
adjustment. Three factors, social support, gender, and developmental period are proposed to 
moderate the proposed stigmatisation process. These findings were largely replicated by Uji 
et al. (2007), who tested Feiring et al.’s (2002) model on a Japanese sample of 172 women 
with negative sexual experiences. Shame directly predicted PTSD, and mediated the 
associations between internal attribution and PTSD (Uji et al., 2007). This relationship was 
significant even though the reported sexual abuse was relatively mild (Uji et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, the closer the survivor of sexual abuse was to the perpetrator emotionally, the 
greater her shame (Uji et al., 2007).   
In a study of 25 female survivors of sexual assault, a history of previous sexual victimisation, 
physical consequences (sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, pelvic pain), self-blame, 
concealing the assault and being assaulted by a known attacker were all significantly related 
to characterological and body shame (Vidal & Petrak, 2007). These findings emphasise the 
importance of early and repeated sexual victimisation in the development of shame.  
A recent study involving 195 survivors of childhood sexual abuse examined the moderating 
effect of hardiness on shame associated with childhood sexual abuse. In this study, hardiness, 
defined as “the learned ability to cope with a wide variety of stressful situations or events by 
creating a successful coping strategy”, was expected to decrease along with increases in 
shame in those who have experienced childhood sexual abuse (Feinauer, Hilton, & Callahan, 
2003, p. 68). Results confirmed a potent negative relationship between internalised shame and 
hardiness. In addition, hardiness moderated the negative effect of internalised shame and 
severity of abuse on relationship intimacy. The authors argue that in clinical practice 
therapists should bear in mind that traumatic sexual abuse experiences inhibit children’s 
capacity to gain mastery over themselves and their environments; they undermine their sense 
of competence; and they deprive them of the opportunity to learn positive ways of coping 
with their situations. However, many women do develop some hardiness skills despite their 
experiences, do not internalise shame and manage to create meaningful intimate relationships 
(Feinauer et al., 2003).  
Shame and anger have been linked to self-harming in a sample of 89 offender women with a 
history of child sexual abuse (Milligan & Andrews, 2005). Bodily shame in particular (as 
opposed to characterological or behavioural shame) was isolated as an important direct 
determinant of self-harming (Milligan & Andrews, 2005). In this study, bodily shame also 
partially mediated the association between childhood sexual abuse and self-harming (Milligan 
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& Andrews, 2005). Bodily shame has also been shown to play an important role in mediating 
the association between childhood physical and sexual abuse and bulimia in a community 
sample of 69 teenagers and young women (Andrews, 1997). 
Social support is hypothesised to moderate the impact of shame and adjustment in individuals 
who have experienced sexual abuse (Feiring et al., 1996). Furthermore, developmental period 
also plays a role. Some research has found that adolescents have poorer psychological 
adjustment than children in the aftermath of sexual abuse (Feiring et al., 2002), while other 
scholars argue that pre-pubescent children are the most vulnerable to poor outcomes (Feiring 
et al., 1996).  
 
2. Causes and Correlates: The Contribution of Parenting and Attachment Patterns to 
Shame and Psychopathology 
 
According to the theoretical work of Mills (2005), the trauma of rejection by the primary 
attachment figure, as well as insecure attachment (characterised by a caregiver who is 
consistently emotionally inaccessible and does not promote affect regulation in the infant) has 
long-term implications for the individual’s mental health (Mills, 2005). In Miller’s (1985) 
theoretical work, she argues that ideally, there needs to be a bond of affection, protectiveness, 
and appreciation for the child, and the caregiver should encourage the child to experience 
intimacy and identification with the caregiver, and facilitate him or her to live up to realistic 
expectations. This protects the child’s self-esteem and self-confidence (Miller, 1985). Actual 
or perceived sibling favouritism has been identified as a risk factor for a shame-prone 
emotional style (Mills, 2005). In her review of the developmental literature, Mills (2005) 
identifies parental overcontrol, through treating the child as weak and incapable, and through 
fostering a perception of uncontrollability and inefficacy in the child, as a contributor to 
shame-proneness (Mills, 2005). Certain types of family environments also contribute to 
dispositional shame. In Mills’ (2003) empirical study, authoritarian parenting by both parents 
when the child was aged three years, for example, predicted shame in these children at five 
years. 
Theoretical work by Patterson, DeBaryshe and Ramsey (1989) and Mills (2005) suggests that 
coercive interaction cycles, in which child and caregiver continually attack and counter-attack 
each other, may in part be determined by shame-rage. Mills (2005) argues that caregivers with 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
 
 
 
poor self-esteem may tend to feel vulnerable in difficult caregiving situations, and so inclined 
to respond harshly or coercively to the child in an attempt to regain control or power over the 
situation. Although there is no empirical support for this conjecture, Mills (2005) proposes 
that such parents may be vulnerable to feeling shame in situations where they feel a sense of 
low power, and they counter these feelings with interactions characterised by rage and 
hostility. In such family environments, it is also likely that hurtful caregiver messages will be 
communicated, including shaming messages, which are likely to engender a disposition 
towards shame (Mills, 2005). In addition, in families where children’s failures are frequently 
attributed to their inner traits (global, stable, internal attributions), and successes to external 
events, they may develop a depressogenic, helpless and pessimistic emotional style that 
contributes to shame-proneness (Mills, 2005). Excessive praise may also elicit shame, 
particularly if it conveys either low expectations of capability or unreasonably high 
expectations, or when it implies that the child’s value or worth is dependent on performance 
(Mills, 2005). According to Mills (2005), it undermines motivation, may facilitate a sense of 
contingent self-worth and helplessness, and evoke self-consciousness which can disrupt 
performance.  
On the basis of his clinical experience, M. Lewis (1998) argues that children may also 
experience shame when being disciplined for failing to meet accepted standards, rules and 
goals. Problematic disciplinary styles include those which involve high levels of blame, where 
there is a great deal of anger, contempt and disgust, and punitive attitudes are upheld (M. 
Lewis, 1998). Facial expressions of disgust and contempt, which are used to humiliate or 
shame the child out of the behaviour s/he is engaging in, tends to communicate a rejection or 
dismissal of the whole self (communicating the message “you are disgusting/contemptible”), 
and so results in internal, global attributions, which produce shame (M. Lewis, 1992). 
Optimal disciplinary strategies (such as reasoning with the child about the cause of his/her 
problem), which do not contribute to a shame disposition, are those in which only mild 
negative affect is elicited that is short in duration due to effective interactive repair (M. Lewis, 
1992; Mills, 2005). Those disciplinary techniques which involve power assertion and which 
are intensely negative not only contribute to the development of shame, but force children’s 
attention away from the content of the message, and thus render them incapable of reparation 
(M. Lewis, 1992).  
A recent large eight-year longitudinal study (n = 363 time 1; n = 286 time 2; n = 297 time 3) 
illuminated the relationships between harsh parenting, sexual abuse and exposure to domestic 
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violence in childhood and parental rejection and parental warmth during adolescence 
(Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005). These variables, in turn, were then expected to have 
associations with shame- and guilt-proneness, which was hypothesised to predict depression 
and delinquency in late adolescence. Results of the path models developed indicate that harsh 
parenting in childhood related to shame-proneness in adolescence, and that this association 
was mediated by parental rejection and lack of warmth in adolescence. Those young people 
who had cold, rejecting parents were more shame-prone and less guilt-prone than other youth. 
In addition, shame-proneness was related to higher levels of depression, and guilt-proneness 
was associated with lower levels of delinquency in late adolescence, a relationship that was 
attributed to the role played by heightened empathy in guilt-prone individuals. It is interesting 
that exposure to sexual abuse and domestic violence did not relate to shame- or guilt-
proneness in adolescents. Stuewig and McCloskey (2005) speculate that perhaps it is because 
psychological maltreatment (implied in parental rejection and lack of warmth) plays a more 
significant role in the development of a shame-prone emotional style than other forms of 
abuse. 
Poor parental bonding has also been associated with shame. Specifically, in Lutwak and 
Ferrari’s (1997) study involving 264 women and 140 men (young adults), shame was 
associated with memories of parents being demanding, over-controlling and non-nurturing 
during childhood. In addition, in this study, fear of negative social evaluation, social anxiety 
and interpersonal avoidance were identified as significant predictors of shame in young 
adulthood (Lutwak & Ferrari, 1997). 
In Bradshaw’s (2005) theoretical formulations, he argues that shame within families is often 
intergenerational because it remains unconscious. The internalisation of shame as an identity 
involves at least three processes: 1) identification with unreliable and shame-based models 
which is the source of “carried” shame from one generation to another; 2) the trauma of 
abandonment, which severs the “interpersonal bridge” (Kaufman, 1993, p. 33) and the 
binding of feelings, needs and drives with shame; and 3) the interconnection of memory 
imprints, which forms collages of shame. Thus, one of the most significant determinants of 
shame is abandonment (Bradshaw, 2005). This may take the form of the actual physical 
absence of the caregiver, through emotional abandonment and narcissistic deprivation by the 
caregiver (which often leads to role reversal between caregiver and child), through the 
creation of a fantasy bond (enmeshment), abandonment through the neglect of developmental 
dependency needs, or abandonment through abuse (Bradshaw, 2005). These processes all lead 
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to disorganised attachment styles, which persist from childhood to adulthood (Fonagy, 2011; 
Steele, 2011). 
On the basis of Mills’ (2005) theoretical review of the developmental literature on the role of 
families in the lives of children, she argues that families’ socialisation of emotions is 
important in the development of shame. In particular, children of caregivers who face and 
validate emotions (as opposed to ignoring or denying them) in themselves and their children, 
and view their child’s negative emotions as an opportunity for learning how to label emotions 
and tackle and solve the problems that arise from them, are less likely to develop a disposition 
to shame. She argues that it has repeatedly been demonstrated in the recent literature that 
discussion of emotions plays an important role in developing emotional awareness and affect 
regulation (Mills, 2005).  
Based on M. Lewis’ clinical experience, and Mills’ (2005) theoretical work, these authors 
postulate that shaming family environments, which include those in which caregivers 
themselves are prone to shame and children chronically experience “empathic shame” and 
model self-blaming attributions, may facilitate the development of a disposition to shame (M. 
Lewis, 1992; Mills, 2005). M. Lewis’ (1992) clinical work suggests that early trauma, such as 
parental depression, addictions, or conflict tend to produce more empathic behaviour in 
children because of the child’s attempts to help his/her parents – s/he typically blames 
him/herself globally for failure, which leads to shame. He also suggests that in general, 
individuals who tend to make internal attributions also tend to be more shame-prone (M. 
Lewis, 1992). Thus, any family environment which encourages internal, global attributions 
for failure, are likely to foster a shame-prone emotional style (M. Lewis, 1992). This has been 
shown in Mills, Arbeau, Lall and De Jaeger’s (2010) empirical study, in which child shame 
responding, parental shaming, and child temperamental inhibition were assessed at time 1 (n 
= 225, aged 3-4 years), shame responding was reassessed at time 2 (n = 199, aged 5-7 years), 
and shame-proneness was assessed at time 3 (n = 162, aged 7-9 years). Results indicated that 
higher mother shaming, and associated promotion of internal, global negative self-
attributions, predicted increased shame in low inhibition girls between pre-school and school-
going age, and high inhibition boys at the same age (although father shaming only contributed 
to boys’ shame in preschool). Interestingly, there are also notable gender differences in 
parents’ socialisation practices. This may be why some studies have found that girls show 
more shame than boys (Mills et al., 2010). 
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Parentification (the reversal of parent and child roles which occurs because the parent’s own 
needs for acceptance, nurturance and support were not met during childhood) also plays a role 
in the development of shame. Parentified children develop a false self in response to 
unreasonable parental demands and conditional love, and become split off from their true 
needs, values and wishes, and begin to value themselves only for their abilities to be intuitive 
and meet others’ needs (Wells & Jones, 2000). On the basis of a large-scale study involving 
197 undergraduate students, Wells and Jones (2000) found that parentification demands a 
premature identification with the parental expectations and needs, at the expense of the 
development of the child's own strengths and talents, tending to leave the child feeling 
ashamed of the true or authentic self's unrewarded strivings. In this study, parentification was 
related to shame-proneness, but not guilt-proneness, supporting the notion that parentification 
involves the internalisation of unreasonable parental expectations which is accompanied by 
shame about the “real” or true self (Wells & Jones, 2000). 
Finally, it is important to consider the theoretical work by N. K. Morrison. Although the role 
played by biological factors in schizophrenia is significant, the trauma of early rejection by 
parents has been associated with the pervasive experience of shame that is characteristic of 
schizophrenia (N. K. Morrison, 1987). These individuals are excessively prone to shame; a 
reaction that is traced back to repeated shame experiences perpetrated by important parental 
figures. Early rejection is thought to facilitate repeated rejections in later life, which leads to 
individuals with schizophrenia avoiding social interaction and affectionate feelings. It is the 
habitual nature of early shaming that is considered most damaging. People with schizophrenia 
are prone to emotional engulfment, which is attributed to extreme sensitivity to interpersonal 
interactions. Individuals with schizophrenia also tend to be particularly sensitive to fears of 
exposure. They typically fail to achieve psychological differentiation and integration – this 
failure at integration in particular leads to the feeling that aspects of the individual’s character 
or personality are unacceptable, and s/he tends to feel intense shame about them. These 
aspects of the self are often projected onto others. Paradoxically, individuals with 
schizophrenia also tend to experience an exaggerated sense of responsibility, and tend to see 
themselves as to blame for situations which are not objectively their fault, which leads to 
intense feelings of shame (N. K. Morrison, 1987).  
It is interesting to note that people with schizophrenia may either have a paranoid or schizoid 
personality organisation (N. K. Morrison, 1987). Schizoid individuals are aloof, often 
unaware of their emotions, avoidant of interpersonal interaction, and frequently engage in 
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fantasy, particularly fantasies of omnipotence which can be understood as an escape from 
experience of shame. It is argued that they desire attachments, but tend towards detachment as 
a defense against extreme sensitivity to shame. Unlike paranoid individuals, the schizoid 
person takes on the experience of shame (and personal responsibility for it) without question. 
In paranoia the individual reacts to shame as if it is a premeditated assault on the integrity of 
the self, and consequently s/he feels indignant, righteous anger. It is relevant to draw attention 
to the split typically experienced in the shame reaction (the vicarious experience of the 
shaming other, and the [shamed] experience of the self) that makes the paranoid individual’s 
frequent belief that others are watching him/her, and that others are attempting to control 
him/her by putting thoughts in his/her head, more understandable (N. K. Morrison, 1987). 
 
3. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame and Complex PTSD 
 
It is a great pity that there are no studies on chronic trauma, shame and DESNOS. This seems 
to be an incomprehensible gap in the literature. However, in the absence of this literature, the 
relationship between shame and Complex PTSD needs to be foregrounded. Individuals rarely 
only experience one traumatic event; it is much more likely that a traumatised individual 
would have experienced several episodes of traumatic exposure (Cloitre et al., 2009; Herman, 
1997; Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). One of the most common outcomes of repeated exposure is 
Complex PTSD, which involves impaired self-regulatory capacities (hyperarousal and 
hypervigilance or emotional numbing), problems with anger and aggression, dissociative 
symptoms, and avoidant behaviours (Cloitre et al., 2009). Cloitre et al. (2009) conducted a 
study examining the relationship between accumulated exposure to different types of 
traumatic events and total number of different types of symptoms (symptom complexity) in 
an adult clinical sample (n = 582) and a child clinical sample (n = 152). The results of Cloitre 
et al.’s (2009) study suggests that lifetime cumulative exposure to maltreatment and trauma 
can lead to both increased complexity and severity of symptoms – affecting multiple affective 
and interpersonal domains of functioning (Cloitre et al., 2009). One of the affective 
dimensions of functioning which is influenced by trauma exposure is shame. In fact, shame 
has been identified as a significant predictor of Complex PTSD independent of fear, 
helplessness, and horror, and is a determinant of impaired recovery among childhood abuse 
survivors who experience adult-onset trauma (Cloitre et al., 2009). It is viewed by these 
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authors as the “core” emotion resulting from trauma. Other features associated with 
prolonged trauma are loss and grief – of all the positive events and experiences the survivor 
was entitled to (Cloitre et al., 2009). 
Wenzel, Griengl, Stompe, Mirzaei and Kieffer (2000) conducted a study focusing on 
psychiatric impairment in survivors of torture presenting to an out-patient department for 
psychiatry. A DSM-III-R-based psychiatric interview, including the general assessment of 
functioning scale, an open list of symptoms and the Vienna diagnostic criteria for depression 
were used to evaluate psychological functioning (Wenzel et al., 2000). The most frequent 
current diagnosis in 44 patients assessed over three years was PTSD (n = 40), but criteria for a 
present diagnosis of other disorders were met in 34 patients, even years after torture, mainly 
depression or dysthymia (n = 26) (Wenzel et al., 2000). Criteria for functional psychosis were 
fulfilled in four patients (Wenzel et al., 2000). However, these authors emphasise that the 
majority of their sample reported symptoms that fall outside of the DSM-III-R criteria for 
PTSD, mostly, and notably, feelings of shame and guilt, excessive rumination and existential 
fears, which are typically associated with Complex PTSD (Wenzel et al., 2000). Another 
more recent study involving 598 college students from North Texas also found that feelings of 
shame, guilt, disgust and sadness were more frequently reported than fear in those with 
chronic PTSD symptomatology (Hathaway, Boals, & Banks, 2010).  
In Ebert and Dyck’s (2004) theoretical work, which has important clinical implications, 
“mental death” has been associated with Complex PTSD. This concept is defined as the 
destruction of an individual’s identity, including the loss of perceptions of consistency and 
continuity of self, which is frequently reported in the torture literature. Survivors of torture 
frequently fit the anticipated diagnostic criteria for Complex PTSD, characterised, among 
other symptoms, by existential dilemmas, guilt, shame (for having survived events that caused 
the death of others; their “shameful” maltreatment; as well as their unwanted participation in 
atrocities, often to protect the self; or their inaction during the traumas), distrust, attachment 
problems, damage to beliefs about safety and justice, and somatisation. This results in 
enduring personality changes, changes in fundamental beliefs and assumptions, and the ability 
to interact with, and attach to others (Ebert & Dyck, 2004).  
Ebert and Dyck (2004) argue that torture situations, like other multiple, severe, prolonged 
interpersonal traumas, are characterised by the individual being caught in an extremely 
aversive situation which is of human construction rather than as an outcome of natural causes; 
the harm done to the individual is intentional; and dehumanising means are used to 
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deconstruct the victim’s identity, including good guy/bad guy and impossible choice 
techniques. These techniques affect the extent to which the individual feels able to anticipate 
and control situations and their outcomes, and to depend on past life experiences to 
effectively guide behaviours (previous knowledge and new beliefs are irreconcilable) (Ebert 
& Dyck, 2004). These factors are associated with high levels of anxiety and distress, as well 
as learned helplessness, which is associated with shame (Ebert & Dyck, 2004). It is the total 
subjugation that comes with torture that diminishes self-respect, which evokes shame 
(Shapiro, 2003).  
Features of Complex PTSD according to the American Psychiatric Association include:  
Impaired affect regulation, dissociative symptoms, somatic complaints, feelings of 
ineffectiveness, shame, despair or hopelessness, feeling permanently damaged, a loss 
of previously sustained beliefs, hostility, social withdrawal, feeling constantly 
threatened, impaired relationships with others, and change from the individual’s 
previous personality characteristics. (American Psychiatric Association, as cited in 
Ebert & Dyck, 2004) 
A new category was introduced in the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases), 
called enduring personality change after catastrophic experience, which captures the essence 
of mental death, while the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV have not included criteria which 
adequately distinguish the symptoms associated with complex trauma from those that 
characterise individuals who have experienced acute trauma (Complex PTSD is seen as a 
syndrome based on PTSD, only with a few additional features, rather than two qualitatively 
different syndromes) (Ebert & Dyck, 2004). An important feature of a chronic post-trauma 
syndrome includes changed functioning across five dimensions: safety, justice, attachment, 
identity role, and existential meaning; and the individual has to adapt to compromised 
comprehensibility, manageability and meaningfulness of actions (Ebert & Dyck, 2004).  
 
4. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame and PTSD 
 
PTSD is likely to occur as a result of acute trauma, however it is included here because it is 
often comorbid with other disorders when a chronic-trauma related diagnosis of Complex 
PTSD (or DESNOS) has not been made (Ford & Courtois, 2009). It is also included because 
more recent research acknowledges the co-occurrence of PTSD and shame, which is a 
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function of a lack of awareness of more appropriate chronic-trauma related diagnoses which 
acknowledge shame as a central feature of the diagnosed syndrome.  
Three assumptions about the self and world are destroyed by traumatic events: that the self is 
invulnerable; that the world is ordered, understandable and meaningful; and that the self is 
positive and autonomous (Ebert & Dyck, 2004). When these core assumptions are broken 
down through trauma, the basis for the individual’s sense of control is undermined, and s/he 
loses the belief in his/her ability to comprehend and predict events. As such, the individual 
has to adapt to the experience of alienation, which is a correlate of shame, destruction of 
identity, altered relationships, and existing in an uncontrollable, unpredictable world (Ebert & 
Dyck, 2004).  
Lee, Scragg and Turner (2001) present a clinical model of shame-based and guilt-based 
PTSD. In this model, there are two pathways to the development of shame-based PTSD – one 
is through schema congruence, and the other is through schema incongruence. For schema 
congruence to occur, the shame evoked by the meaning of the traumatic event (feelings of 
loss of status, social attractiveness and a sense of the self being attacked) must “match” or be 
congruent with underlying “shame schemas”. These “shame schemas” are determined by 
previous experience (of family, community, culture, etc.). Thus, the process the individual 
goes through on the schema congruence path involves dormant beliefs about the self (as 
devalued) being reactivated by the traumatic event. This reactivation influences the receipt of 
information as well as thinking processes. Consequently, the individual continually evaluates 
the traumatic event from the perspective of maladaptive schemas, making the experience of 
shame pervasive. This pervasive experience of shame results in shame-charged intrusions 
(flashbacks, intrusive thoughts) which in turn contribute to withdrawal, avoidance and 
concealment (Lee et al., 2001).   
The second pathway proposed by these authors is the schema incongruence pathway. In this 
pathway, there is a mismatch between pre-existing schemas and the experience and 
interpretation of the meaning of the traumatic event (Lee et al., 2001). It is argued that when 
the meaning of the traumatic event does not match a deeper negative evaluation about the self, 
humiliation frequently occurs (instead of shame) (Lee et al., 2001). Humiliation differs from 
shame in that when humiliated, the individual feels it is the perpetrator who is bad, not the 
self, and there is likely to be a great deal of rumination, replay and revenge fantasies (D. 
Morrison & Gilbert, 2001; Lee et al., 2001). However, the self remains robust and unimpaired 
(Lee et al., 2001). So, in the schema incongruent pathway, dominant feelings and behaviours 
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include anger and aggression, whilst in the schema congruent pathway, the pervasive feelings 
are of shame and defeat, and the resultant behaviour avoidant (of triggers or exposing the 
defective self) (Lee et al., 2001). 
Maladaptive schemas have demonstrated a significant relationship with PTSD symptoms, 
dissociation and suicide risk in 137 chronically traumatised individuals seeking outpatient 
psychiatric treatment (Dutra, Callhan, Forman, Mendelsohn, & Herman, 2008). In Dutra et 
al.’s study, maladaptive schemas are defined as:  
Extremely stable and enduring themes, comprised of memories, emotions, cognitions, 
and bodily sensations, regarding oneself and one’s relationship with others, that 
develop during childhood and are elaborated upon throughout the individual’s 
lifetime, and that are dysfunctional to a significant degree. (Young et al. as cited in 
Dutra et al., 2008, p. 71) 
This study shows that the maladaptive schemas of emotional deprivation, abandonment, 
mistrust/abuse, social isolation/alienation, defectiveness/shame, failure, subjugation of needs, 
self-sacrifice, emotional inhibition and unrelenting standards were associated with PTSD 
symptoms. Furthermore, the strongest correlations were found between the maladaptive 
schemas of social isolation, alienation, shame and defectiveness and dissociation (Dutra et al., 
2008). Finally, a number of maladaptive schemas, including social isolation, alienation, 
failure, shame and defectiveness, had a relationship with suicidal ideation and the existence of 
a suicide plan (Dutra et al., 2008).  
Shame has been shown in another study to relate to rumination more than to intrusive 
memories in a sample of 31 patients diagnosed with PTSD referred for cognitive behavioural 
therapy to specialist services; a finding which has significant implications for the 
effectiveness of traditional psychotherapeutic interventions (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, 
Ruths, & Clark, 2007). In this study, intrusive memories were described as predominantly 
sensory experiences of mostly short duration, while rumination was described as a thought 
process, which is typically longer in duration, has more pathological consequences, and is 
more difficult to treat (Speckens et al., 2007). 
A recent study on the relationship between shame- and guilt-proneness and PTSD in 107 
prisoner of war veterans has indicated that shame-proneness is positively related to PTSD 
symptom severity, whereas guilt-proneness is unrelated to PTSD symptom severity (Leskela, 
Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002). These authors question whether shame-proneness is a risk factor 
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that pre-exists the trauma, or whether it is, in fact, a post-traumatic reaction. Although most 
research points to shame as a post-traumatic reaction, further longitudinal research needs to be 
conducted.  
Another study with 47 hospitalised US Vietnam war veterans has demonstrated that veterans 
who were diagnosed with PTSD scored significantly higher on internalised shame, alienation, 
inferiority and depression (than participants in the comparison groups diagnosed with 
depression and substance abuse), and found a marked overlap between shame and self-
esteem, suggesting that shame might be the emotional experience underlying self-esteem 
(Wong & Cook, 1992). Shame memories (assessed through autobiographical narratives) have 
been shown to predict both depression and PTSD, while guilt predicted neither condition in a 
sample of 140 young people in the Boston area (119 were students) (Robinaugh & McNally, 
2010). Centrality of the shameful event to the participant predicted the severity of depression 
and PTSD symptoms (Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). This study demonstrated that when 
memories charged with a great deal of negative emotion are remembered as congruent with 
the self (viewed from a field perspective), central to one’s life story (high centrality), and 
related to global appraisals of the self (high levels of shame and low levels of guilt), these 
memories are linked to greater distress (Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). 
 
5. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame and Dissociation  
 
One of the most pathological aspects of complex post-traumatic shame is its relationship with 
dissociation, which is central to this study. Dissociation is understood as involving four 
distinct, but inter-related phenomena: the sensory and emotional fragmentation of experience; 
depersonalisation and derealisation at the moment of the trauma; ongoing depersonalisation in 
everyday life; and containing the traumatic memories within distinct ego-states (Van der Kolk 
& Fisler, 1995).  
A great number of studies have demonstrated an association between trauma and dissociation 
(Van der Kolk et al., 1996). However, there are far fewer texts which take into account the 
central role of shame in the aetiology of dissociation, particularly DID. PTSD and 
dissociation are strongly associated, and a study conducted in the 1990’s showed that PTSD 
was not only associated with dissociation, but also with affect regulation, somatisation and 
permanent personality changes, suggesting the inadequacy of this diagnosis as it stands for 
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survivors of chronic trauma (Van der Kolk, 1994). Dissociation is often selected as a defense 
because it assists in avoiding the profound and debilitating negative self-evaluation that 
accompanies trauma-related shame (Talbot, Talbot, & Tu, 2004).  
Findings from a recent study show that greater shame-proneness (a propensity to experience 
shame across a range of situations) was related to elevated levels of dissociation, particularly 
in women who had experienced early sexual trauma (n = 99; the sample included hospitalised 
women who had, and who had not been sexually abused) (Talbot et al., 2004). In another 
study, lifetime shame (in a two-wave study, wave 1: n = 81; study 2: n = 21) and dissociation 
have been shown to cause disconnection in interpersonal relationships among chronically 
traumatised individuals, with dissociation having the most disruptive impact (Dorahy, 2010). 
Another study including the completed self-report measures of 103 Australian students found 
that proneness to shame contributed significantly to dissociative tendencies, although guilt 
and age also played significant roles, however, the role of trauma was not taken into account 
(Irwin, 1998). This is despite the fact that dissociation has been theorised as a key feature of 
the so-called trauma induced “shame syndrome”, along with severe and consistent 
depersonalisation, eating disturbances, depression and thought disturbances such as 
concretisation and over-generalisation (Wurmser, 1995). 
According to the experts in the field, on the basis of their research and clinical experience, in 
cases of extreme dissociation, as occurs when an individual has been exposed to severe and 
prolonged sexual abuse (usually of a ritual nature) in early childhood, DID may develop (M. 
Lewis, 1992; Putnam, 1989; Ross, 1997). Severe and prolonged trauma is likely to lead to the 
splitting of self (M. Lewis, 1992). M. Lewis (1992) argues that sexual abuse produces shame, 
which can become so powerful and debilitating that it needs to be transformed and/or 
avoided. It is during this shame-avoidance process that dissociation occurs (M. Lewis, 1992). 
It is only under conditions of both severely traumatic and prolonged shame that such an 
extreme form of dissociation, and an accompanying fragmentation of self, occurs (M. Lewis, 
1992; Nathanson, 1992; Putnam, 1989).  
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6. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame and BPD 
 
It is important to emphasise that PTSD may be accompanied by other psychopathologies, 
which increases symptom severity. Comorbid PSTD particularly aggravates the symptoms, 
course of illness and social functioning of individuals diagnosed with BPD (Rusch et al., 
2007). Interestingly, results of a recent study indicate that self-reported guilt-proneness and 
general psychopathology, but not shame-proneness or trait anxiety, were significantly higher 
in women with BPD and PTSD than in women with BPD alone. Contrary to expectations, 
self-reported shame, anxiety and anger were not significantly associated with comorbid PTSD 
(Rusch et al., 2007).   
BPD, however, has been associated with shame in a number of other studies (Brown, 
Linehan, Comtois, Murray, & Chapman, 2009; Chan, Hess, Whelton, & Yong, 2005). It is 
possible that this association is mediated by the experience of trauma. On the basis of his 
clinically relevant theoretical work, Kaufman (1993) argues that borderline pathology only 
develops in individuals who have experienced trauma-related damage to their self-esteem, and 
narcissistic injury. In addition, he suggests that borderline tendencies are associated with an 
amplified, or exaggerated, need for fusion or merging, borne out of the trauma of inadequate 
identification in infancy. Others – also on the basis of clinical experience and theoretical 
principles – argue that shame is caused by the trauma of fusion with a shame-filled primary 
caregiver, which leads to devastating polarised fears that being loved will lead to engulfment 
and obliteration, and being unloved (because of being shameful and “bad”) will inevitably 
lead to abandonment (Fisher, 1985). It is interesting to note that some scholars argue that the 
diagnosis of BPD should be amended to include the crucial contribution of past trauma and 
shame, emphasising the diagnosis’ lack of stability, and its similarity to Complex PTSD 
(Crowe, 2004).  
In Chan et al.’s (2005) study, 36 women with BPD were compared with 49 university women 
to investigate possible reasons for differences in the BPD women’s ability to function 
effectively. Participants with BPD had experienced significantly higher levels of trauma, 
internalised shame and psychiatric symptoms than those included in the non-clinical 
comparison group. It was demonstrated that the experience of trauma and internalised shame 
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were positively associated; the greater the level of trauma, the greater the experience of 
internalised shame (Chan et al., 2005).  
Higher levels of non-verbal shame (lowering head and avoiding eye contact) have 
additionally been found to predict a higher likelihood of future self-inflicted injuries, as well 
as shorter time to the next incidence of self-inflicted injury in women with BPD who were 
enrolled in a clinical trial (N = 77) (Brown et al., 2009). Furthermore, in this study, self-
reported shame and assessor ratings of shame were related to future self-inflicted injuries, 
although not after controlling for other negative emotions, such as fear (Brown et al., 2009).   
 
7. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame, Depression and Anxiety 
 
Both depression and anxiety are common responses to the experience of trauma, are often 
comorbid with PTSD, and have repeatedly been associated with shame reactions. Depression 
in particular has been associated with shame from the earliest theoretical and clinical writings 
on shame, and is associated with blaming the whole self or character for perceived failings or 
deficiencies (H. B. Lewis, 1986). In particular, depression often emerges as a product of 
humiliated fury being “turned back upon the self” (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). H. B. Lewis (1986, 
p. 334) and Mollon (2002) maintain that depressives tend to self-denigrate, however, this self-
denigration is unconsciously meant for a significant other whose love s/he has lost (hostility 
towards the self is directed outwards, then through shame re-directed inwards), thus locating 
depression in the “lost social tie”. As we have seen, many scholars believe that shame is a key 
social emotion, designed to alert us to threats to significant social bonds. The destruction of 
these bonds seems to be integral to depression (H. B. Lewis, 1986). Rejection leads to shame, 
which in turn is associated with rage, self-hatred, falling self-esteem and further shame – a 
relentless spiral (Mollon, 2002). These individuals are aware that their deteriorating mental 
state makes them socially unattractive which leads to additional shame (Mollon, 2002). The 
deliberate self-destructiveness manifested by some depressive clients is an attempt at 
preventing feelings of helplessness and shame in response to rejection (Mollon, 2002).  
Based on her clinical experience, H. B. Lewis (1987b) suggests that women are more likely to 
experience depression (a view supported by epidemiological evidence – see for example 
Tomlinson, Swartz, Kruger, & Gureje, 2007), and it has been argued that this is because of 
their greater sociability and lesser aggression, and their greater tendency to feel shame. This is 
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reversed in pre-pubertal children – boys are more likely to experience depression until they 
reach puberty (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). Learned helplessness, low self-esteem, as well as field 
dependence, all of which are well-known associates of shame, have been associated with 
depression repeatedly (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). In addition, the tendency to make internal, stable, 
global attributions for failure, as is the case with shame, has a strong relationship to 
depression (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). 
In a recent two-wave longitudinal study including 221 non-referred adolescents, shame, guilt, 
behavioural blame and characterological blame were associated with making internal 
attributions about negative events (Tilghman-Osborne et al., 2008). Characterological blame, 
shame-proneness and state shame were more strongly related to depressive cognitions 
(attributing negative events to stable and global causes, inferring that negative events will 
have serious negative consequences and a tendency to perceive oneself as fundamentally 
flawed) and symptoms than were behavioural blame and guilt. Longitudinal analyses 
demonstrated that depressive symptoms predicted later shame-proneness, state shame and 
characterological blame. In addition, these authors’ results support the convergence of shame 
and characterological blame into a single underlying construct. This suggests that the 
cognitions associated with shame are comparable with those that characterise 
characterological blame. Interestingly, the loading of the two different measures of guilt in 
this study onto separate factors suggests that there are two types of guilt, one positive and 
restorative, and the other damaging and maladaptive (Tilghman-Osborne et al., 2008).  
The distinction between characterological and behavioural self-blame has been previously 
made in relation to shame (Andrews & Brewin, 1990). The former is associated with shame, 
and considered the most pathological because it is associated with feelings of responsibility, 
personal deservedness and attributions to a non-modifiable source (one’s character) in 
situations where abuse has taken place. In a study conducted by Andrews and Brewin (1990), 
women (n = 407) who were experiencing marital violence, and who had also experienced 
either physical or sexual abuse in childhood, were most likely to report characterological self-
blame, and were more likely than other woman survivors of domestic violence to suffer from 
persistent depression. As previously noted, characterological self-blame is also associated 
with learned helplessness (a well-established correlate of depression), which has been 
identified as closely associated with shame, although whether it is a precursor or an integral 
part of shame is yet to be established. Shame, characterological self-blame, and learned 
helplessness often co-occur with feelings of powerlessness, betrayal, and 
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subordination/submissiveness or inferiority in survivors of child sexual and physical abuse. 
There is evidence that defeat and subordinate status are associated with particular biochemical 
changes that evoke depressive states. Thus, experiences of either physical or sexual abuse 
which are accompanied by subordinate status may be associated with depression through 
feelings of submission and shame. It is important to note that the negative self-perceptions 
that accompany depression may be as a result of the guilt and hatred experienced by the 
perpetrator, which is introjected by the innocent child (Andrews & Brewin, 1990).  
Andrews (1998) has made assertions based on reviewed research and theoretical work on 
symptoms of depression in those who had experienced childhood physical and sexual abuse 
and those who had not. Reviewed findings indicate that the women who had experienced 
childhood abuse differed on two dimensions: feelings of pathological guilt, and suicidal plans 
and actions (with guilt more strongly related to physical abuse) (Andrews, 1998). Pathological 
guilt involves high levels of self-blame, and the anticipation and deservedness of retribution 
and punishment from others (Andrews, 1998), distinguishing it from shame, which involves 
the anticipation of others’ rejection, scorn and abandonment (Andrews, 1998). However, 
overall, Andrews (1998) concludes that abusive experiences from early childhood contribute 
to a tendency to feel both shame and pathological guilt in adulthood, and that shame may play 
a mediating role in the association between early abuse and depression in particular.  
Although there are a multitude of studies on the relationships between shame and anxiety, 
there are very few studies which focus specifically on the inter-relationships between trauma, 
shame and anxiety. The findings of one of the studies that could be found indicated not only 
that those veterans with PTSD were more likely to have social phobias than those without 
PTSD, but that the post-trauma environment (e.g. an adverse home environment) and war-
related shame were more important in determining social anxiety disorder than pre-military 
anxiety or the seriousness or severity of exposure to combat in 41 Vietnam war veterans 
(Orsillo, Heimberg, Juster, & Garrett, 1996). This suggests that shame may play a key role in 
the relationship between PTSD and social anxiety disorder (Collimore, Carleton, Hofmann, & 
Asmundson, 2010).  
Although no further empirical studies could be found linking trauma, shame and anxiety, 
theoretical (psychoanalytic) work done by Wurmser (1995) suggests that two of the three 
types of shame identified (shame anxiety and shame as a preventive attitude) are linked to 
trauma. In fact, he argues that these types of shame are always determined by the anticipation 
or experience of a traumatic situation. His definition of “trauma” in this instance is the 
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helplessness of being unloved; the sense of being unlovable (expressed through rejection and 
abandonment). In this theoretical work, the typical sequence to shame is through exposure of 
the (shameful) self, contempt from others, the revealing of essential unlovability, and 
corrective efforts aimed at ameliorating the situation. This trauma unfolds in the structural 
components of shame, consisting of the self’s failure to meet expectations (the ego ideal), the 
self’s judgment of the self in relation to the ego ideal, comparison of expectations for the self 
against judged aspects (self-evaluation), criticism (originally from a significant other, but later 
introjected, becoming the self-critical part of the superego), and punishment from an external 
censor (in the form of contempt) (Wurmser, 1995).  
Despite the lack of empirical research, theoretical and clinical work suggests that shame and 
anxiety and particular types of traumas are related in important ways. Fear of shame is a 
powerful motivator for anxiety; individuals with generalised anxiety disorder tend to dread 
finding themselves in situations where they may be depreciated, ridiculed, rejected, or feel out 
of control, and situations which are conducive to shame (Emery, 1985). In Gilbert’s (1998, p. 
6) words, social anxiety in particular arises from fear of exposure and “the prospect or 
presence of interpersonal evaluation in real or imagined social settings”. Social anxiety, 
shame and depression have previously been linked to feeling inferior and to submissive 
behaviour (Gilbert, 2000). Interestingly, a recent study also demonstrated that individuals (n = 
79 with first episode psychosis) with high social anxiety scores were more likely to feel 
shame attached to a diagnosis of psychosis (feeling that the diagnosis made them socially 
marginalised, stigmatised) than a low social anxiety comparison group (Birchwood et al., 
2006). Beck (1985) theorises that much of the anxiety around shame-filled situations is 
around the wish to avoid the trauma of being negatively evaluated, potentially rejected, and 
having one’s public image depreciated, or occupying a position of low social status.  
 
8. The Aftermath of Trauma: Shame, the Body and Eating Disorders  
 
I include a discussion on eating disorders in this chapter because of the overlap between child 
abuse and its association with eating disorders, and chronic trauma later in life (Dunkle, 
Jewkes, Brown, Yoshihama et al., 2004), as well as the complex comorbidity associated with 
trauma-related eating disorders.  
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Based on their clinical work, some scholars have theorised that the majority of Western 
women experience a difference between their actual self and their internalised ideal body 
weight (Silberstein, Striegel-Moore, & Rodlin, 1987). It is this discrepancy that leads to 
shame (Fodor, 1996; Silberstein et al., 1987). This kind of shame affects Western women 
disproportionately because current societal standards equate thinness with feminine beauty, 
and because of the constant traumatising scrutiny of women’s bodies by both men and women 
(Silberstein et al., 1987). Women measure themselves against this societal standard, and 
inevitably they fail to measure up to this ideal, leading to the pervasive experience of shame 
(Silberstein et al., 1987). Fodor (1996) argues that self-objectification and body shame is 
common in Western women as a result of introjected societal messages. A vast number of 
women are chronic dieters, attempting to counter this shame, but any failure to implement the 
diet as directed, or to lose weight, may exacerbate feelings of inadequacy and shame 
(Silberstein et al., 1987). Furthermore, the effect of shortcomings in one area on the 
individual’s self-esteem is determined by the importance of that area in the person’s self-
definition (Silberstein et al., 1987). Given the emphasis by society on attractiveness, a large 
number of women view weight as important, and consequently it is likely that there is a 
positive relationship between this construct and poor self-esteem (Silberstein et al., 1987). 
However, it is not only shaming cultural expectations that create poor body images and eating 
disorders, but also the experience of (often) intra-familial trauma.  
Trauma increases the likelihood of developing an eating disorder (Corstorphine, Waller, 
Lawson, & Ganis, 2007). Child sexual abuse in particular, but also physical abuse and 
neglect, have all been implicated in the aetiology of eating disorders (Brewerton, 2007; 
Corstorphorpine et al., 2007; Kong & Bernstein, 2009; Meltzer-Brody et al., 2011; Sansone & 
Sansone, 2007; Tobin, 1995; Vanderlinden, Vandereycken, Van Dyck, & Vertommen, 1993). 
Bulimia nervosa has been associated with more extensive exposure to trauma, more severe 
depression and sexual and physical abuse than women with anorexia nervosa (Meltzer Brody 
et al., 2011). In one study, depression fully mediated the association between some forms of 
childhood trauma and eating psychopathology (Kong & Bernstein, 2009). There is also 
complex comorbidity to take into account: for example, there appears to be inter-relationships 
between trauma, BPD and eating disorders (Sansone & Sansone, 2007), as well as between 
eating disorders and PTSD (Brewerton, 2007), impulsive disorders (Corstorphorpine et al., 
2007), and dissociative disorders (Tobin, 1995; Vanderlinden et al., 1993). Those with eating 
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disorders are also more likely to have suffered controlling mothers who devalued their fathers 
(Mollon, 2002).  
Central to eating disorders is the issue of control. Survivors of trauma have typically suffered 
a great deal of loss of control at the hands of the perpetrator(s) and often experience persistent 
feelings of helplessness. As a result, some survivors seek to control at least one basic and 
fundamental aspect of their lives, their food intake, their basic means of survival, as a means 
of countering that helplessness and the feelings of loss of control associated with the 
traumatic experience(s) (and the terror that accompanies it/them). It is possible that such 
attempts at control may be unconscious attempts to “fix” or undo the trauma of the past, when 
the survivor had no control. Depriving the self of food, a basic requirement for living, 
dramatically and explicitly expresses self-hatred. In later chapters, I will discuss how feeling 
“bad” about the self is a means of reclaiming control from the perpetrator(s) or bad object(s) 
(Fairbairn, 1943; Ferenczi as cited in Orange, 2011).   
In cases of sexual abuse, the perpetrator’s relationship to the survivor may be an important 
factor in determining psychological functioning in the aftermath of the trauma(s). A 
nonclinical sample of female undergraduates (n = 214) completed standardised measures of 
experiences of sexual abuse, internalised shame, and bulimic psychopathology to test this 
assumption (Miller & Waller, 2002). The results of Miller and Waller’s (2002) study show 
that shame accounts entirely for the association between intra-familial sexual abuse and 
bulimic attitudes, whereas it only partially accounts for the link between sexual abuse from 
any adult and bulimic attitudes.  
Based on his clinical experience, Kaufman (1993) argues that shame about eating, which 
leads to eating in secret, constitutes a displacement of shame away from the self. Similar to 
addictions, the eating patterns associated with bulimia in particular are a substitute for shame-
bound interpersonal needs, specifically, the trauma of having emotional needs unmet, a means 
of “filling up” the internal emptiness and placating intense longing (Kaufman, 1992). Binging 
may also serve the function of anaesthetising feelings, or for some, may be an aggressive 
outlet, and for others, an expression of self-hatred (Silberstein et al., 1987). Similarly, purging 
may constitute an expression of anger or a release of tension in general (Silberstein et al., 
1987). Purging may either be experienced as reinforcing (leading to feelings of thinness and 
control) or punishing (for the transgression of a binge) (Silberstein et al., 1987). Kaufman 
(1992) explains the purge part of the binge-purge cycle as a product of affect magnification, 
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which accelerates shame, bringing it to peak intensity before the purging, after which it is 
released – a process that usually stimulates feelings of relief and cleansing.  
As can be seen, interpersonal trauma and shame play an important part in the aetiology of 
binge eating. Sanftner and Crowther (1998) conducted a study including a sample of 78 
female university students, 37 who binge and 41 who do not binge, and demonstrated that 
women who binge eat experience higher levels of both state shame and guilt, greater 
fluctuations in social and performance self-esteem, and lower positive affect (defined as 
pleasurable engagement and high energy) than controls. Contrary to expectations, state self-
esteem and positive affect increased significantly before binging episodes, but could be 
explained when considering the comforting, self-nurturant function of binging (Sanftner & 
Crowther, 1998). 
Although the following two studies do not address trauma, they demonstrate that shame is 
associated with body image and that it has also been associated with particular 
psychopathologies. A recent study found connections between trait self-objectification and 
maladaptive eating attitudes and depressive symptoms (Choma, Shove, Busseri, Sadava, & 
Hosker, 2009). Undergraduate women from southern Ontario, Canada (Sample 1, n = 104; 
Sample 2, n = 314) completed measures of depression, disordered eating attitudes, subjective 
well-being, and body-image coping (Choma et al., 2009). Trait self-objectification was 
associated with lower subjective well-being, suggesting that this trait extends beyond 
depressive symptoms and body-related distress to women’s global life evaluations, including 
her emotional reactions to, and satisfaction with her life (Choma et al., 2009). In addition, 
body shame significantly predicted depression, disordered eating attitudes and subjective 
well-being (Choma et al., 2009). Furthermore, the results of this study support a mediational 
model, where trait self-objectification predicted greater body shame, which was related to an 
increase in the use of appearance fixing (changing physical appearance) and avoidance coping 
(avoiding body image-related information) rather than using a more adaptive rational 
acceptance strategy (Choma et al., 2009). In particular, body shame and appearance fixing 
coping fully mediated the association between trait self-objectification and disordered eating 
attitudes, while appearance fixing coping partially mediated the association between body 
shame and disordered eating attitudes (Choma et al., 2009). In contrast, body shame and 
avoidance coping completely mediated the association between trait self-objectification and 
depression, while avoidance coping partially mediated the association between body shame 
and depression (Choma et al., 2009). The authors argue that appearance fixing involves active 
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attempts at controlling and changing one’s appearance, including for example extreme 
exercise and plastic surgery, to combat distressing feelings about the body, all of which is 
characteristic of disordered eating attitudes. Some of the behaviours characteristic of 
avoidance, such as withdrawal, is also characteristic of depression, and represents an escape 
from the cause of distress or trauma, rather than actively searching for a resolution to the 
disturbing feelings (Choma et al., 2009). In Silberstein et al.’s (1987) clinically relevant 
theorising, they emphasise that other research also points to the relationship between eating 
disorders and depression – specifically, it is argued that the high levels of shame experienced 
by individuals with eating disorders contribute to depressive symptoms.  
Self-objectification has been associated with poor outcomes in another study (Tiggemann & 
Boundy, 2008). Participants were 96 female undergraduate students who completed 
questionnaire measures and cognitive tasks in a 2 (a subtle objectifying environment versus a 
standard environment) × 2 (an appearance compliment versus no comment) × 2 (high versus 
low trait self-objectification) design. Results indicate that for women scoring high on trait 
self-objectification, an objectifying physical environment (including mirrors, scales and 
fashion magazines) increased state self-objectification, and a compliment on appearance 
(focusing attention on the body) significantly enhanced body shame (Tiggemann & Boundy, 
2008).   
Patterns of parental care and protection have demonstrated direct and indirect relationships 
with bulimic attitudes through shame-proneness and internalised shame (defined as 
perceptions about the self resulting from prolonged exposure to shameful situations) (Murray, 
Waller, & Legg, 2000). The participants in this study were 139 nonclinical undergraduate 
women (Murray et al., 2000). Each completed measures of perceived family function, shame-
proneness, internalised shame, and bulimic psychopathology. Specifically, results indicate 
that perceptions of low paternal protection led to internalised shame, while perceiving one’s 
father as overprotective led to greater internalised shame if the participant was already shame-
prone. In the family care and protection-shame-bulimia model presented in this study, shame-
proneness acts as a moderator, while internalised shame mediates the association between 
paternal overprotection and bulimic attitudes (Murray et al., 2000). The authors argue that the 
mechanism which activates internalised shame is the belief that one is either someone who 
needs to be firmly controlled, or someone not worthy of paternal attention. 
Bodily shame has been demonstrated as having an association with childhood abuse and also 
has a relationship to chronic or recurrent depression in adulthood (Andrews, 1995). 
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Furthermore, bodily shame has also been shown to mediate the relationship between early 
abuse and depression in adulthood (Andrews, 1995). These findings are based on a study 
conducted by Andrews (1995) on the role of bodily shame as a mediator between sexual or 
physical abuse and depression in a community sample of 101 women who had been followed 
for eight years. Findings from another study reported in Andrews (1998) indicate that both 
bodily shame and characterological shame are related to early abusive experiences.  
Finally, in a recent study on childhood experiences of being bullied and teased and eating 
disorders, 92 eating-disordered women completed measures of social anxiety, shame, eating 
pathology and childhood experiences of being bullied and teased about their appearance (by 
peers and family) (Sweetingham & Waller, 2008). Being teased by peers about appearance, 
and being verbally bullied by family members demonstrated a negative association with body 
satisfaction in adulthood (Sweetingham & Waller, 2008). In addition, results indicate that 
social anxiety and bodily, characterological and behavioural shame were related to body 
satisfaction. However, in this study, a composite of bodily, characterological and behavioural 
shame, and not social anxiety, was a perfect mediator between teasing about appearance by 
peers and body dissatisfaction (Sweetingham & Waller, 2008). 
 
9. The Aftermath of Trauma: Excluded Syndromes and Symptoms, Including Trauma-
related Shame and Narcissism, Externalising Disorders, Psychosis and Substance Abuse 
 
There are very few empirical studies on the relationship between trauma, shame and 
narcissism. However, there is a vast amount of theoretical work on the association between 
shame and narcissism, which bears little relevance to the focus of my research. The interested 
reader can refer to the largely theoretical work of Besser & Priel (2009); Broucek (1991); 
Kaufman (1993); Kinston (1987); H. B. Lewis (1987c); M. Lewis (1992); A. P. Morrison, 
1989; Schimmenti, 2012;  Thomaes, Bushman, Stegge, & Olthof, 2008; and Wurmser (1987). 
I have not included any literature on externalising disorders (e.g. Conduct Disorder) as they 
typically affect children and adolescents, and my participants were adults. I have also not 
reviewed any material on trauma-related psychosis other than the theory I discussed earlier by 
N. K. Morrison in relation to parenting and attachment (schizophrenia). This is due to the 
paucity of literature on chronic trauma, shame and psychotic disorders which suggests that 
this and other psychopathologies are a much rarer occurrence than the post-traumatic 
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responses I have reviewed above, and so do not warrant further consideration. This is, 
however, with the knowledge that trauma-related dissociative disorders are frequently 
misdiagnosed as schizophrenia, and that schizophrenia, (and on occasion, schizotypal and 
antisocial personality disorders) are often comorbidly associated with PTSD. Finally, I 
consider substance abuse a secondary symptom of the syndromes discussed in this chapter – a 
means to numb the pain associated with trauma-related syndromes – and thus I do not 
dedicate a separate section to this phenomenon.  
 
Summary of Key Points 
 
 Emotional abuse has been isolated repeatedly as an important predictor of shame-
related pathological outcomes, especially PTSD, anxiety and depression (Cloitre et al., 
2009; Street & Arias, 2001; Webb et al., 2007).  
 Child sexual abuse has been implicated repeatedly in a range of shame-related 
pathological outcomes through its association with negative cognitive evaluation of 
the abuse event(s) and a pessimistic attributional style (Feiring et al., 1996, 2002). 
 The trauma of rejection by the primary attachment figure, as well as disorganised and 
insecure attachment, and actual or perceived sibling favouritism have been identified 
as risk factors for a shame-prone emotional style (Mills, 2005). Certain types of family 
environments also contribute to dispositional shame, like for example parental over-
control or coercive interactional styles (Mills, 2005).  
 Individuals rarely experience only one traumatic event. One of the most common 
outcomes of repeated exposure is Complex PTSD (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). This 
disorder involves multiple affective and interpersonal domains in functioning, 
including among other symptoms, impaired self-regulatory capacities, anger and 
aggression, dissociative symptoms and avoidant behaviours (Cloitre et al., 2009; 
Kaminer & Eagle, 2010) 
 PTSD is generally understood as an anxiety disorder in which fear is the most 
dominant emotion (Lee et al., 2001). Similarly, anxiety is a central emotion in shame 
(Gilbert, 1998). Shame and guilt play prominent roles in the development and 
maintenance of the disorder (Lee et al., 2001).  When a person has experienced 
chronic trauma s/he may be diagnosed with PTSD and one or more other 
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psychopathologies because of the complex comorbid picture created by chronic 
trauma.  
 BPD is often comorbid with PSTD, and has been associated with shame in a number 
of studies (Brown et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2005). Some research shows that it is likely 
that this association is mediated by the experience of trauma. The pattern of research 
work suggests that there are strong relationships between various forms of shame, 
trauma and borderline psychopathology.   
 Both depression and anxiety are common responses to the experience of trauma, often 
accompany a diagnosis of PTSD, and have repeatedly been associated with shame 
reactions. Learned helplessness, the tendency to make internal, stable global 
attributions for failure, low self-esteem, as well as field dependence, are all well-
known correlates of shame, and are associated with depression (H. B. Lewis, 1987b). 
Very few studies focus specifically on the inter-relationships between trauma, shame 
and anxiety.  
 One of the most pathological aspects of post-traumatic shame is its relationship with 
dissociation (Talbot et al., 2004). Severe and prolonged trauma is likely to lead to the 
splitting of self (M. Lewis, 1992). M. Lewis (1992) argues that sexual abuse produces 
shame, which can become so powerful and debilitating that it needs to be transformed 
and/or avoided. It is during this shame-avoidance process that dissociation occurs (M. 
Lewis, 1992).  
 There are very few empirical studies on the relationship between trauma, shame and 
narcissism. However, there is a vast amount of theoretical work explaining this 
association.  
 Shame has been implicated in the aetiology of a range of eating disorders, including 
binge eating and bulimia (Sanftner & Crowther, 1998). Child abuse, particularly 
sexual abuse, plays an important role in the development of these disorders (Miller & 
Waller, 2002). Regaining control of a central part of livelihood (countering the 
helplessness associated with trauma) is an important motivator for eating disorders. 
 Externalising disorders, substance misuse and psychotic disorders are not discussed in 
the review for a range of reasons specific to each syndrome.  
  
In the past five chapters, we have looked at violence and trauma in South Africa, theories on 
shame, the differences between shame and other self-conscious or related emotions, shame 
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and culture, and the associations between shame, trauma and selected psychopathologies. In 
the chapter that follows, the methodology of the study presented in this thesis is described.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Method 
 
Overall Aim 
 
To explore experiences of chronic trauma, shame, and specific post-traumatic reactions in 
South African survivors of IPV. 
 
Objectives 
 
1) To conduct a categorical content analysis of women’s experiences of chronic trauma, 
shame and related constructs (post-traumatic reactions and coping mechanisms) where 
they emerge as prominent themes in the data.  
2) To examine the theme of the split self from a phenomenological perspective, and 
explore how it manifests on individual, organisational and cultural levels. I analyse the 
split self at an organisational level by using an informal form of narrative analysis 
from a social constructivist point of view.   
3) To conduct a formal linguistic (categorical form) analysis of both long and complex 
and short, compressed trauma narratives with the aim of exploring whether psychic 
fragmentation manifests at linguistic level. 
 
My theoretical positioning, and how I plan to achieve my aims and objectives through 
employing the social constructivist strand of narrative analysis, and how it complements a 
phenomenological interpretation of the data, is discussed under the heading “Theoretical 
Positioning” below.  
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Research Design 
 
Procedure and Research Participants 
 
The participants were drawn from the Saartjie Baartman Centre for Women and Children in 
Manenberg, Cape Town. The Centre is a 24-hour emergency shelter for women and children 
who are survivors of IPV. Services include short and medium term residential care, childcare 
services, counselling, mental health support, legal and economic empowerment services, 
research into gender-based violence, job skills training, and legal advice. The ethos of the 
Centre is important in the context of my study. The vision and the mission of the Centre is 
advocacy and human rights orientated and promotes a strong message of personal 
empowerment and agency. In some of the feedback given by women who have been resident 
at the shelter shown in the Centre’s website, empowerment and new-found strength were 
emphasised, e.g. “I really found myself and became strong. I feel I can fight the world”, and 
“During the course of my stay you motivated me to better myself by sending me on valuable 
courses, which has empower[ed] me as an individual. You gave me new vision and made me 
realise that I can make my own dreams come true”. As will be demonstrated in the results and 
discussion chapters, this discourse or ethos had important implications for the construction of 
self and identity in my participants.  
The director of the Centre was approached during the beginning of 2011, and permission to 
conduct the interviews was granted during this initial meeting, after I had described my 
research proposal. It was agreed that I would use a convenience sampling strategy, and invite 
all women resident at the Saartjie Baartman Centre to participate in my study. Field work 
began in August 2011. The first two months of field work involved doing voluntary work 
twice a week at the Centre to build rapport with the resident women (which I will elaborate on 
in chapter 7). I organised with the manager of the shelter to meet with all the women in the 
shelter on four occasions to explain my research and request their participation in my study. 
Four recruitment sessions were held, each lasting no more than fifteen minutes. All resident 
women attended the recruitment sessions. During these sessions, the women were informed 
about the nature and purposes of the research: that I was conducting a study about experiences 
of trauma, how people felt about it, how people felt about themselves, and how they coped. I 
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asked whether any women were interested, and in three out of four sessions, all women 
agreed to participate. I provided all information both in Afrikaans and English. The women 
who did not agree to participate did not give reasons for their refusal.  
Inclusion criteria included being over 18 years of age (since the emotional and behavioural 
manifestations of trauma differ for adults and children/adolescents), and exposure to more 
than one violent event, including emotional, physical and sexual trauma. Interviews 
commenced in October 2011, and were completed in December 2011. Twenty interviews 
were conducted; however, one was lost due to poor recording quality, leaving a total of 19 
completed interviews. Twelve participants were Coloured, while seven were Black. The 
youngest participant was 22 years old, and the oldest participant was 54 years old. The 
participants included eight Afrikaans participants, while the rest were English-speaking. The 
participants did not speak any other languages (see table 1 below).  
 
Table 6.1 
Demographics   
   
Demographics 
Ethnicity Language 
Age range 
Black Coloured Afrikaans English 
7 12 8 11 22-54 
          
 
There was a wide range in the length of interviews. The shortest interview was 25 minutes 
long, while the longest interview was an hour-and-a-half. Most lasted approximately an hour. 
The longest interview’s word count was 11658 words, while the shortest interview had a word 
count of 2257. Most interviews had a word count of between 5830 and 11443. Although 
follow-up interviews were offered to all interviewees for debriefing purposes, and I offered to 
speak to their counsellors if they wished, only one interviewee requested that I speak to her 
counsellor. Although some women expressed a need for a second interview, none of the 
women followed up with me. I believe it would have been re-traumatising for some of the 
women to engage in a second interview. I understood their reluctance as a product of the 
material which emerged in the interviews which was both traumatic and shameful. As I 
discuss later at length, women were reluctant to engage with me after the interview, but not 
after encountering me in a casual and less intimate context during rapport-building, which is 
significant. I believe this is due to the surprising degree of disclosure of extremely personal, 
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highly shaming material during the interviews.  I strongly believe that it is the shame 
associated with the urgency to disclose intimate, traumatic material that caused a shame-filled 
avoidance of me, which resulted in no follow-up interviews. It cannot be co-incidental that 
not one of the interviewees requested a follow-up interview, and that each time I encountered 
a participant post-interview, she displayed typical bodily indicators of shame, particularly 
gaze avoidance and turning the head to face downwards. This has implications for 
controversial issues such as re-traumatisation of the interviewee and the co-construction of 
pain, which I will discuss in the final chapter.  
 
Data Collection Instrument 
 
A semi-structured interview schedule consisting of eighteen questions was developed, 
providing a flexible guide for questioning. The questions focused on traumatic experiences, 
post-traumatic reactions and change, shame, and support and coping mechanisms, and is 
included as Appendix A. 
I chose semi-structured interviews as my data analytic method because I was interested in 
capturing participants’ subjective experiences and constructions of themselves, consistent 
with a phenomenological approach. I felt that a one-on-one approach to collecting data of 
such a personal, sensitive nature would be less threatening for participants than focus groups 
for instance, and I believed I would gain richer data if the participant felt safe. Narrative 
analysis is suited to exploring individuals’ experiences phenomenologically – to examine how 
the subjective self manifests itself in language.  
The interview schedule consisted mostly of open-ended questions, which is suited to the 
chosen analytic approach, narrative analysis. Compared to closed-ended questions, open-
ended questions encourage greater disclosure by participants, and are more likely to facilitate 
disclosure in narrative form. However, a number of closed-ended questions eliciting 
information about emotional and psychological phenomena were included in the second half 
of the interview. In designing my interview schedule in this way I followed the suggestions of 
a study which recommended starting the interview with open-ended questions that allow the 
interviewee to relate her experiences freely, becoming more structured towards the end of the 
interview (Carlson, 1997). 
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The interview schedule was translated from English to Afrikaans by a senior member of staff 
at the Afrikaans Department, University of Cape Town. I am bilingual, so no interpreter was 
necessary during the interview process. The design of the interview schedule was informed by 
recent research (Spangaro, Zwi, & Poulos, 2011). Their study shows that women who have 
been exposed to IPV disclose abuse only when they feel safe, when asked by a trusted or 
trustworthy person (a perception I attempted through rapport building before I conducted the 
interviews, which involved doing volunteer work at the Centre), when they are directly asked, 
and when they are given a choice as to the level and extent of their disclosure. The safety 
dimension was divided into safety from the abuser, which the Centre could ensure, safety 
from shame (I actively tried to assume a non-judgmental and accepting attitude during the 
interviews), and safety from institutional control (like for example statutory child protection 
agencies) (Spangaro et al., 2011). It is possible that women may have perceived me as 
affiliated with management, which could have led to withholding certain information, for 
example around child abuse or substance misuse. I attempted to ask women questions as 
directly and as unambiguously as possible and I also told women at the outset only to share 
what they felt comfortable sharing.  Because shame is so often an unconscious and 
unarticulated response to trauma, I also looked for the emotional and behavioural indicators of 
shame, as well as bypassed shame, emerging during the interviews.   
The interviews were transcribed by an experienced bilingual transcriber recommended by my 
supervisor, and extensive notes were taken after each interview to record important or 
noteworthy aspects of the interview. 
 
Using a Narrative Approach: Theory and Analysis 
 
 The stories we tell about our lives are not necessarily those lives as they were lived, 
but these stories become our experience of those lives (Frank, 1995, p. 22). 
It struck him that when one is overburdened and dreams of simplifying one’s life…the 
law one longs for is nothing other than that of narrative order, the simple order that 
enables one to say: ‘First this happened, and then that happened…’. Lucky the man 
who can say ‘when’, ‘before’ and ‘after’! Terrible things may have happened to him, 
he may have writhed in pain, but as soon as he can tell what happened in 
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chronological order he feels as contented as if the sun were warming his belly (Etlin as 
cited in Ochs & Capps, 2001, p. 45). 
Narrative analysis will be used to analyse the data. Narratives are distinguished from other 
textual modes such as description or argumentation; the essence of narrative is that something 
happens, that something changes as time progresses (Kleres, 2010). There is no single 
definition of narrative research, and there is no single way to do narrative research (Riessman, 
2008). Elliott (2005) argues that all definitions of narrative research illustrate one or more of 
the following: An interest in people’s lived experience and appreciation of the temporal 
nature of that experience; a desire to empower research participants and allow them to 
contribute to determining what are the most salient themes in an area of research; an interest 
in process and change over time; an interest in the self and representations of the self; and an 
awareness that the researcher him- or herself is also a narrator.  
For the purposes of this study, narratives can be defined as deeply situated and contextual 
accounts of events that happen over time (temporality; Bruner, 1991), which involve specific 
events, episodes or experiences as their reference point (emplotment
17
 and particularity; 
Bruner, 1991; Squire, 2005). As such, narratives can be described as “talk, organized around 
consequential events” (Riessman, 1993, p. 3). In many autobiographical narratives, the plot is 
organised around a turning point at which the protagonist experiences a transformation of 
identity (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Narrators may hyperpersonalise a cultural template, fully 
identifying with the collective, or s/he may hypopersonalise a cultural template, feeling 
uncomfortable in identifying with a social group or its worldview (Ochs & Capps, 2001). 
Many of my participants demonstrated a heightened sense of identification with the 
community of IPV survivors.  
Narratives contain some or all of the following discourse components: description, 
chronology, evaluation and explanation (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Narrative analysis has to do 
with how narrators interpret their experience – in personal narratives “it is precisely because 
of their subjectivity – their rootedness in time, place and personal experience, in their 
perspective-ridden character – that we value them” (Personal Narratives Group in Riessman, 
1993, p. 5). Narrative analysis focuses on how people construct their self-accounts through 
drawing on a range of societal genres (Burck, 2005).  
                                                 
17 Plots have been described by a number of scholars as a combination of temporality (sequencing or succession) 
and causality because the plot links prior decisions, choices or events to subsequent happenings (Elliott, 2005).  
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People are natural storytellers; stories provide coherence and continuity to individuals’ 
experience, and play a central role in communication with others (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, 
& Zilber, 1998). Despite the universality of story-telling, some experiences are initially too 
difficult to speak about (Riessman, 1993). In trauma narratives, there is a constant tension 
between the yearning for coherence of life experience, and for authenticity (Ochs & Capps, 
2001). In such cases, the task of the researcher is two-fold: firstly, to guide the narrator in 
making sense of her experiences through casting it in narrative form; and secondly, to bear 
witness to the event(s) in question (Riessman, 1993). As Dinesan (cited in Riessman, 1993, p. 
4) put it, “all sorrows can be borne if we can put it into a story”. However, there remains a 
tension between the need to authentically share personal experiences and express them in a 
way that aligns with, and is familiar and acceptable to, others (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Despite 
this, developing a story is particularly important in trauma narratives, as it represents an 
attempt to create some form of unity and coherence from fractured, disordered or chaotic 
experience (Riessman, 1993). As such, narratives can be understood as “meaning-making 
structures” which researchers must preserve in their analyses, so demonstrating respect for the 
narrator’s subjective interpretations (Riessman, 1993, p. 4). For this reason, it is very 
important that researchers do not suppress narratives by asking standardised questions. 
Without such interruption, interviewees are free to organise their replies in long, personally 
meaningful stories (Riessman, 1993). Emotion is a key component of trauma narratives. 
Emotions are inextricably interlinked with the meaning dimension of texts to the extent that 
the distinction between cognition and emotion appears false – they are not separate, isolated 
and autonomous phenomena, they are both dimensions of human experience (Kleres, 2010).  
Developing coherent narratives enhances psychological well-being (Ochs & Capps, 2001). 
Because of how traumatic experiences are remembered, trauma survivors struggle to piece 
together traumatic events into a meaningful sequence – because of flashbacks of remembered 
sights, sounds, smells and other sensations, and because trauma often defies language, 
survivors have trouble articulating their experiences (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Trauma 
overwhelms the capacity to organise the traumatic event/s, and so survivors have great 
difficulty conceptualising them, and integrating them with other memories to link narrative 
episodes to form a lengthy narrative sequence (Ochs & Capps, 2001). This is not the same as 
the occasional ebb back and forth between time zones characterising some personal narratives 
– a kind of elasticity and flexibility characterising most oral narratives. In trauma narratives 
the non-linearity is far more distinctive and dramatic.  
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There is no single narrative method, no standard approach or list of procedures which is 
understood as representing the method of narrative analysis; in fact, in Elliott’s words (2005, 
p. 36), there is a “state of near anarchy in the field.” Similarly, Chase (2011, p. 430) asserts 
that narrative analysis is a “field in the making”. It may involve the use of multiple sources of 
data (e.g. interviews, letters, films, ethnography, self-portraits, diaries, maps etc.) which 
emphasises that every view is partial and incomplete, and that narrative environments are 
multiple and layered (Chase, 2011). The challenge with narrative research is that it offers no 
rules about the materials or modes of exploration, nor does it offer information about the best 
level at which to study narratives (Squire, Andrews, & Tamboukou, 2008). It also does not 
tell the researcher whether s/he should aim for objectivity or involvement, or whether to 
analyse narratives in terms of their particularity or generality; and what epistemological 
significance should be brought to bear on stories (Squire et al., 2008). Thus there is a wide 
array of perspectives on how to conduct narrative analysis, which may range from micro-level 
analysis of single segments or a focus on the entire narrative or large sections of it (Kleres, 
2010). 
 
Theoretical Positioning 
 
In a thesis which is somewhat theoretically eclectic, it is important to state explicitly my 
theoretical positionings, which I believe are complementary. As I have stated elsewhere, 
phenomenology, with its focus on subjective experience and consciousness, is compatible 
with narrative analysis’ interest in the subjective construction of self through stories. 
Phenomenology’s intrapsychic, individual approach is complemented by narrative analysis 
from a social constructivist point of view’s assertion that the self as socially determined and 
determining, multiple, incoherent and fragmented. It is clear how each of these theories shed 
light on my research aims and objectives in their complementary ways; aims which centre 
around the lived experience of the splitting of the self (multiplicity) and associated memory 
and language fragmentation, and the possible presence of trauma-related shame.  
The multiplicity characterising narrative research is due not only to its divergent beginnings, 
but also to the multitude of theoretical perspectives which are relevant to it (Squire et al., 
2008). For example, current perspectives locate narrative analysis in humanist terms, which 
conceives a singular unified subject, while social constructivist interpretations promote the 
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concept of the self and narrative as multiple, socially constructed and constructing, and also 
reinterpretable (Squire et al., 2008). Scholars have argued for some time over unity versus 
multiplicity of identity (McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich, 2006). Life stories can be 
understood as functioning to create a coherent life; a synthesis; one which would otherwise be 
fragmented and scattered – in McAdams et al.’s (2006, p. 5) words, “life stories, therefore, 
may be seen as bringing different aspects of the self together into a unifying and purpose-
giving whole”.  Life story construction is considered an “interpretive process of self-making 
that operates to produce coherence through the formation of meaningful connections between 
past experiences and the self” (Pals, 2006, p. 177). The idea that there is some kind of 
integrated identity reflected in a unified, coherent story provides the individual with a 
comforting sense of sameness and continuity (Raggatt, 2006).  
I believe this unified, coherent story and self is an illusion. Other researchers, much more 
convincingly in my view, have argued that life stories articulate multiple, conflicting, 
contradictory parts of the self, and that any given person will have many different selves, each 
with their own distinctive voice (McAdams et al., 2006). They believe that a singular and 
integrated life story or narrative identity does not exist; instead there is a dialogical self based 
on the assumption that there are multiple I positions which may “agree, disagree, understand, 
misunderstand, oppose, contradict, question and even ridicule the I in another position” 
(Hermans as cited in Halbertal & Koren, 2006, p. 41). These various positionalities often 
reflect multiple agendas (Maynes, Pierce, & Laslett, 2008). A middle ground is probably most 
appropriate: personalities and life stories are characterised by some stability, but also by 
change, development and growth (McAdams et al., 2006). Pals (2006) argues that this growth 
takes place through the acknowledgement of the emotional impact of a negative experience; 
actively analysing the impact and meaning of the negative event, and achieving a resolved 
ending which promotes transformation of the negative to the positive.  
The meaning of narrative and narrative analysis has changed significantly over time 
(Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). This change is characterised by a movement away from 
classical structuralism and “its adamant positivistic claims, reductionistic formalist 
explanations, reliance on generative causal mechanisms, and not least, an inaccessible 
idiosyncratic vocabulary, its jargon of technical ‘scientificity’” towards what has been 
variously dubbed “the interpretive turn”, “discursive turn”, “cultural turn” and “post-
structuralist turn” (Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001, p. 4, 9). It is this “turn” in which I locate 
myself theoretically.  
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From a constructivist paradigm, one which I believe is complementary to phenomenology, the 
narratives we construct cannot be separated from our experiences of our lives - narratives 
inform and determine our lived experience, just as these lives determine the way we construct 
the stories or narratives of our lives (although some scholars disagree, and understand 
narratives as subjective accounts of varying degrees of historical accuracy, see Craib, 2009 
and Wengraf, 2009
18
). Subjective experience and emotions are deeply embedded in our 
narratives and are acquired through stories; narratives are the antecedents of our subjective 
emotional experiences (Kleres, 2010). So too, narrative and identity cannot be separated – 
narrative is constitutive of self and identity, and the way we subjectively perceive ourselves 
shapes the stories we tell (Chase, 2011). Narratives are used to make claims about our 
experience of ourselves and our identities (Bamberg, 2004). Like mine, a few psychological 
studies incorporating narrative analysis focus on whether individuals’ subjective identity 
constructions through narration indicate the self’s unity, multiplicity or both; how the self and 
society work together to determine individuals’ lived experience of constructing narrative 
identity; and how individuals’ narratives display (and can be experienced as demonstrating) 
stability, growth, or both in their identities (Chase, 2011).  
In constructivist, post-modernist terms, individuals cannot be seen to have a fixed identity that 
is: 
…ontologically prior to their position in the social world. Identity is not to be found 
inside a person (like a kernel within a nut shell) but rather it is relational and inheres in 
the interactions a person has with others (Elliott, 2005, p. 124). 
The self of autobiographical narratives does not necessarily precede its constitution in 
narrative (Charon, 2006). Furthermore, the way in which the past and the present are 
constructed in narratives, constructs the future (Charon, 2006). The self, and language, is 
relationally, socially constructed; it is an interactional achievement (Gergen, 1994). For 
theorists like Foucault and Derrida, the self is multiple and continually under construction and 
does not contain any fixed characteristics (Elliott, 2005). Identity is not seen as some kind of 
“static essence”, but instead as a “dynamic accomplishment” (Elliott, 2005, p. 130). In other 
words, there is no essential, pre-existing self or life that is independent of the process of 
constructing it (Bruner, 2001). The audience for whom the narrative is being performed or 
produced is pertinent here. Freeman (2001) argues that each person has a repertoire of 
                                                 
18
 It is important to note that some scholars have argued that the denial of the existence of any subjectivity 
outside of discourse or narrative constitutes “discourse determinism” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2009, p. 136). 
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autobiographies which are suited to different cultural settings and different target audiences; 
that there is no singularity of self or story, but instead, remarkable multiplicity. Ochs and 
Capps (2001) add that although memory affects how events are narrated, narrative practices in 
turn affect how experiences are later encoded, retained and revised in memory. Thus, identity 
is malleable, and is changed as we narratively reflect on our experiences – as such, 
autobiographical memory informs and is guided by narrative. Both are changeable, mutable 
and constantly subject to reformulation (Ochs & Capps, 2001).  
From a constructivist, post-modernist point of view, the belief that there is a story “out there” 
waiting to be discovered, prior to the narrative process and removed from its analytical 
construction, is known as the ontological fallacy (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). An associated 
illusion is the “metalinguistic illusion” (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001, p. 48), which arises when 
philosophers and linguists examine words and sentences, or propositions and meanings, 
which it is argued are all imposed (theoretical) categories. These “metalinguistic shadows” 
have taken on a “stable, real existence…have materialized into real beings” (Brockmeier & 
Harré, 2001, p. 48). This criticism can be directed at certain structural methods of narrative 
analysis. A related fallacy, the representation fallacy, concerns the error of assuming that 
there is one human reality to which all narratives must conform (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). 
From these authors’ perspective, narratives are constitutive of a highly variable and fleeting 
human reality (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001).  
 
Types and Modes of Narrative Analysis 
 
There are a number of different modes of narrative analysis (Phoenix, 2008). Some emphasise 
temporal ordering and emplotment, some emphasise themes, some focus on episodes and 
drama, and still others on narratives as an interactional or co-accomplishment (Phoenix, 
2008). The researcher may categorise the narrative using a typology or genre borrowed from 
literature, for example, comedy or tragedy or satire, or may focus on the direction of the plot – 
whether it is progressive, regressive or stable (Elliott, 2005). Because I will be focusing on 
oral narratives, however, I will not be discussing the work of scholars such as Propp and 
Barthes who focus on the structural aspects of literary texts here. Instead, my analysis will 
focus on the breakdown of temporal ordering or plots, which also applies to oral narratives. 
According to Toolan (2001, p. 6, p. 8) a narrative is a “perceived sequence of non-randomly 
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connected events”, which includes “foregrounded individuals”, and “crisis resolution 
progression”, and if there is not non-random connection, it does not constitute a narrative. I do 
not concur with this rather extreme view, and still consider fragmented narratives as 
recognizable stories. In my analysis I will also consider the narrative as an interactional or co-
accomplishment. Analyses have tended to shift from the first wave of narrative analysis which 
focused on narrative as text, to the second wave of narrative analysis that focuses on the study 
of narrative-in-context (Phoenix, 2008). My analysis will incorporate aspects of both waves of 
analysis – including a structural/linguistic analysis of sections of text, and the identification of 
themes and discourses which are context-dependent.   
Contemporary approaches to narrative analysis emphasise the connection between the 
individual and the social or cultural and historical collectivity (Maynes et al., 2008). These 
authors call for narrative researchers to focus on the links between the individual and social 
realms of experience – on how individual life stories are embedded in historical and social 
relationships and structures and articulated in culturally specific forms (Maynes et al., 2008). 
From these authors’ perspective, stories can be seen as reflections of lived experiences over 
time in specific social, cultural, and historical settings (Maynes et al., 2008).  This is 
something I will discuss in chapter 8. This does not necessarily exclude the possibility for 
human agency. Maynes et al. (2008) argue in favour of locating individual motivations, 
feelings and meanings in a broader social and historical context and as changing and 
developing over time. They see the subject as constructed through social relationships, 
embodied in individuals with both histories and psyches, growing and changing over time 
(Maynes et al., 2008). In Maynes et al.’s (2008, p. 67) words, “individuals are shaped by their 
contexts but never reducible to them”. This will be further explored in participants’ master 
gendered narratives and counter narratives. 
Researchers may be interested in the content of the narrative (the “what” of the narrative), 
while others will focus on the structure or form of the narrative; how the content is conveyed 
and how the narrative is put together (Elliott, 2005). Some may be interested in the 
performance of narratives, the interactional and institutional settings in which narratives are 
produced and received (Elliott, 2005). What these researchers look for is what the functions of 
the narrative are, what the narrative does through the use of rhetoric, particularly with regards 
the target audience (Freeman, 2001). Some researchers attempt a holistic analysis which 
preserves the narrative in its entirety, while others extract short sections of text, and place 
them in categories for analysis (Elliott, 2005). I will use short sections of text for my 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
 
 
linguistic and categorical analysis and will be paying attention to the interactional and 
institutional contexts which determine language (the social construction of language and self, 
see Gergen, 1994). 
As noted, narrative researchers are interested both in the form or structure and content of the 
stories they analyse (Lieblich et al., 1998). Some authors argue that analysis of form is 
preferable because it provides greater depth of information on the narrator’s identity, and that 
the form of the story is often more difficult to manipulate or influence than the content 
(Lieblich et al., 1998). In a similar vein, Hollway and Jefferson (2009) suggest looking for 
unconscious material in the text, which may be illustrated at a structural level. Riessman 
(1993) recommends starting with an analysis of form or structure; focusing on how the 
narrative is organised, and then moving on to focus on content. I agree that both form and 
content are important aspects to examine, but in no particular order.  
Narrative analysis has also not been untouched by positivism. According to the positivistic 
Labov (as cited in Riessman, 1993; Toolan, 2001), fully formed narratives include six 
common structural elements: an abstract (summary of the substance of the narrative), 
orientation (time, place, situation, participants), complicating action (sequence of events), 
evaluation (significance and meaning of the action, attitude of the narrator), resolution (what 
finally happened), and coda (returns the perspective to the present). Another influential theory 
for analysing narratives was developed by Burke (as cited in Riessman, 1993), who identified 
five common dramatic structural elements: act (what was done), scene (when or where it was 
done), agent (who did it), how s/he did it (agency), and why (purpose). Labov is an important 
theorist in narrative research, although his work has been widely criticised in recent years due 
to “the interpretive turn”, “discursive turn”, “cultural turn” and “post-structuralist turn”. 
Labovian analysis is event-centred as well as text-centred, meaning that it tends not to take 
context into account (Patterson, 2008). Labov’s approach assumes that there is an objective 
reality, and that what is being portrayed is the what of narrated experience; there is limited 
acknowledgement that the individual may be reconstructing the past for the purposes of the 
current interaction (Patterson, 2008). The danger of Labov’s model is that it assumes that a 
“good” narrative is one that will neatly fit with the model, and that those which do not fit 
neatly have somehow been told by less competent narrators (Patterson, 2008). Using Labov’s 
model may involve treating a narrative as if it has an orderly structure and reducing it to one 
type of text just so that it can fit with a particular paradigmatic model (Patterson, 2008). 
Another danger of this approach is that some types of (unfitting) data may be lost (Patterson, 
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2008). A third danger is that according to Labov, the definition of a minimal narrative is a 
neat “sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered”, which would render the 
majority of stories as non-narratives (Patterson, 2008, p. 33). In Patterson’s (2008, p. 32) 
words:  
Focusing solely on chronologically ordered past tense clauses, analysing them in 
isolation from the rest of the transcript, and taking no account of the context in which 
the narrative was produced, can only produce an overly simplistic, reductive analysis 
and interpretation. 
Elliott (2005) furthermore argues that narratives do not follow a strict sequence of event 
clauses, and that interviews typically include a range of different narratives leading to 
difficulties in finding the boundaries between them. She notes that Labov’s structural model 
may be more appropriate for analysing short sections of narratives, rather than examining the 
narrative more holistically. Labov’s event-centricity does not fit my phenomenological, 
experiential data and approach. As noted by Patterson (2008), using alternative approaches 
allows for more comprehensive analyses, which take into account the complexity and subtlety 
of the narration of experience. A final reason for not using Labov’s approach in my analysis is 
cited in Toolan (2001 p. 144), who describes how Labov argues that “crisis” oral narratives of 
personal experience are “invariably recounted chronologically”, and that he has no interest in 
the complexity of temporal reordering, which runs counter to my clinical and research 
knowledge (e.g. the fragmentation and the loss of chronology that accompanies trauma).  
Nonetheless, Squire (2005) includes Labov, along with Ricoeur and cultural understandings 
of narratives as important ways of interpreting certain types of stories. All three of these 
methods of analysis have their strengths and drawbacks. Ricoeur’s work is relevant to 
narrative analysis in many ways, although it is most suited to literary texts, both historical 
writings and fiction (Simms, 2003). Ricoeur’s work is centred around time, and how both the 
subject and the narrative are bound by the inevitable movement through time (Simms, 2003). 
As such, emplotment is central in Ricoeur’s work. For him, the plot “integrates into one 
whole and complete story multiple and scattered events” (Ricoeur cited in Simms, 2003). 
Thus, a sequence develops, which is established by causal relationships between events 
(Simms, 2003). Two features of narratives are important to Ricoeur: firstly, mimesis, which 
refers to the representation of human reality; and secondly, the type of reality which narrative 
is mimetic of is human action (Simms, 2003). Accordingly, Ricoeur proposes that key aspects 
of narrative are Mimesis (1), Mimesis (2) and Mimesis (3) (Simms, 2003). These refer 
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respectively to the preconfiguration, configuration (emplotment) and refiguration of the text 
(Simms, 2003). Preconfiguration refers to prior knowledge or expectations that we bring to 
the narrative; configuration refers ordering of events into a plot (implying a temporal and 
causal sequence), and reconfiguration refers to the revised understanding of the real world we 
have as a result of engaging with the narrative (Simms, 2003). Although there are important 
differences between the autobiographical nature of the narratives I collected and historical 
texts, there is also a significant overlap between these texts. Of particular interest is the 
concept of configuration, specifically the breakdown of expected story or plot lines.  
Ricoeur stresses that the term ‘identity’ can be understood on the one hand as exactly the 
same, equivalent or identical (idem), or identity can refer a sense of identity that has 
permanence through time without sameness through time (ipse) (Elliott, 2005). Narrative 
psychology fits with ipse as it presents a means of understanding individuals as living through 
time; a person with a past, present and future “made whole by the coherence of the narrative 
plot with a beginning, middle, and end.” (in the absence of trauma) (Elliott, 2005, p. 125). 
This kind of understanding of identity avoids the extremes of both essentialist and 
constructivist approaches to the self (Elliott, 2005).  
Three key features of narratives, which have relevance for my study, are that they incorporate 
chronology (or lack thereof), that they are meaningful, and that they are social in the sense 
that they are determined by, and produced for a specific audience (Elliott, 2005). These 
features are not separable and are associated in complex ways (Elliott, 2005). Although 
causality has not been determined as a universal and necessary dimension of narratives, the 
audience is likely to infer causal links between events (Elliott, 2005). In the fragmented 
narratives I examine in chapter 9, there is a breakdown in chronology or sequence, and 
meaning is lost in a number of the narratives. However, as some of the participants’ narratives 
show, I interpret and extrapolate meaning from their narratives, and conclude that their stories 
are deeply reflective and constitutive of their social realities.  
As has been noted, a key feature of narrative psychology is that it includes the concepts of 
time and sequence – for any individual to make sense of something that has happened, the 
sequence of events is crucial, and thus, there is a close connection between time and identity 
(Crossley, 2000). Alternative temporalities have also been identified, including unconscious 
as well as lived realities (Squire et al., 2008). Narrative researchers interested in temporal 
gaps and reinterpretations may focus on conscious or unconscious state, social, historical or 
spatial succession and change (Squire et al., 2008).  
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Central principles of narrative enquiry include emplotment, character, scene, place, time and 
point-of-view (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). The purpose of narrative analysis is to identify 
patterns, narrative threads, tensions and themes within and across individual experience in 
their particular social setting (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). The tension here is being able to 
honour the participants’ experience, while trying to create a generalizable theory (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 2000). No set of stories is homogenous; there will always be variation even when 
the topic is the same (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). My focus is on the breakdown of 
emplotment and on fractured points-of-view. 
Some scholars have distinguished between narratives that are focused on particular past 
events, and those that are focused on emotional experience – in the latter case, stories may 
involve many hours of life histories, include general or imagined phenomena, events that 
occurred in the interviewee’s life, or things they have simply heard about (Squire et al., 2008). 
This kind of narrative may also include varying types of media. A third type of narrative has 
also been identified. This type is co-constructed, for example in conversations or email 
exchanges (Squire et al. 2008). The narratives produced by my participants reflected an 
interest in both past events and emotional experience, and were at least partly a product of our 
joint construction (although perhaps less so than during less formal conversations). 
Storytelling is seen as taking place in a sequential, collaborative and interactional 
environment (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Any conversation is a collaborative endeavour 
between researcher and participant, and analysis might focus on how stories are 
collaboratively told (emphasising analytic insights and techniques), or focus on what is 
accomplished through collaborative story telling (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). This brings up 
the problem of authorship (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). Narratives are constructed co-
operatively, and every story is multi-voiced, its meaning determined by the numerous uses in 
previous contexts (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). It has been called the “dialogical principle” of 
discourse “emphasising its inherent interindividuality: every word, expression, utterance or 
narrative bear the traces of all subjects, possible and real, who ever used or will use this word, 
expression, utterance, or narrative” (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001, p. 46). Narratives are also 
performative in the context of the collaborative relationship, to varying degrees (Toolan, 
2001). The narratives of the women I interviewed were highly performative, including most 
of the criteria developed by Wolfson, including: direct speech, asides, repetition, expressive 
sounds, sound effects, motions and gestures, conversational historic present, alternating with 
narrative past tense (Toolan, 2001). 
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Linkage refers to the manner in which experiences are linked to other items in particular 
ways; in essence, the process of meaning making (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The meaning 
of stories may change as the particulars of the story are linked together in different ways for 
different audiences (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). As noted, stories may be performative, and 
always involve consideration of the audience (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Specifically, 
performative particulars may include not only audiences, but also roles, purposes, modes of 
expression and emphases, which reflexively influence stories over and above their texts 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). It is important to remain cognizant that stories are performed for 
particular audiences and that different kinds of situations call for different kinds of stories 
(McAdams et al., 2006). Different societies also privilege particular types of stories and 
storytellers; history and culture influence how people narrate their lives (McAdams et al., 
2006). 
A relevant concept, which is not limited to literary texts, is intertextuality, which means that 
texts or interactional accounts draw their meanings from other texts or accounts, “in an 
ongoing interplay of readings and interpretations” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, p. 186). 
Narratives need not be in written form to be intertextually shaped; all forms of accounts can 
be influenced and related to prior narratives, both written and unwritten (Gubrium & Holstein, 
2009). These authors refer to narratives as “nodes within networks”, where any narrative 
could share the empirical stage with other narratives (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, p. 187). 
Decisions and narratives or accounts made in one set of circumstances thus consider prior 
decisions, accounts and actions from other settings, for instance organisational histories – 
decisions and accounts are therefore “both retrospectively and prospectively composed” 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, p. 187). The importance of understanding intertextuality in 
narrative analysis is for the researcher to pay attention to the influence of other narratives and 
other narrative environments, in making sense of present accounts (Gubrium & Holstein, 
2009). As Gubrium and Holstein (2009, p. 197) argue, “Meaning is constructed at the 
confluence of sites of narrative production and the work of situated storytellers, listeners and 
readers. Accordingly, it would be analytically naïve to think of personal accounts or records 
as merely ‘their own stories”.  Once again, as I found, women’s narratives were influenced by 
previous narratives which were embedded in local discourse and context, which is explored in 
chapter 8.  
Conversational narratives can be evaluated according to five dimensions (Ochs & Capps, 
2001). 1) Tellership refers to the level and nature of involvement of conversational partners in 
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the recollection of a narrative. Conversational participants such as researchers facilitate the 
nature of quality of narrative construction by vocal and non-verbal displays of attention. 2) 
Tellability refers to the extent to which narratives describe remarkable, interesting or 
unexpected events, and describe them in a rhetorically effective manner. 3) Embeddedness 
refers to the extent to which a narrative is embedded in the surrounding discourse and social 
context – it describes whether a narrative is relatively self-contained, an entity in itself, 
separate from earlier, current or subsequent discourse, and is associated with turn-taking 
organisation, thematic content and rhetorical structuring. For example, embedded narratives 
vary in the length of turns, are thematically relevant to a topic being discussed or a social 
activity. They make a point, make comparisons, support an argument or focus on a central 
concern. Rhetorically, embedded narratives assume discourse features of the surrounding 
discourse. These narratives are often embedded in prayers, explanations, and disagreement 
(Ochs & Capps, 2001). The narratives I will be analysing reflect the features of the 
surrounding discourse. 4) Another dimension structuring personal narratives is linearity. This 
concerns the extent to which the narrative orders events in a single, closed, temporal and 
causal path. Many of the narratives I analysed did not display linearity. Non-linear narratives 
open the text to multiple truths and perspectives, and remind the listener or reader that 
particular life experiences resist simple, neat and tidy interpretive frameworks. In non-linear 
narratives, the plot structure breaks down, and the ordering, logic and meaning of experienced 
events are irregular and ambiguous. 5) Finally, personal narratives present perspectives on 
events – thus, a core dimension of personal narratives is the moral stance assumed by the 
teller. Personal narratives in the field of trauma usually contain a recollection of a social 
violation, and involves taking a moral stance in order to clarify, reinforce, or revise what the 
teller believes and values. Much like the narratives I analysed, women affirmed their own 
moral stance (as survivors) in opposition to rival moral perspectives (patriarchal beliefs in the 
legitimacy of the subjugation of women). However, where there is moral uncertainty, or a 
lack of firm belief in the justification of the teller’s moral stance, it may become 
indeterminate and unstable, and the teller’s moral stance may unravel as the telling proceeds 
(Ochs & Capps, 2001). Narrative competence is usually viewed as the capacity to describe a 
narrative by oneself (one active teller), in a rhetorically effective manner (high tellability), 
which is fairly self-contained (not embedded), with a coherent beginning, middle and end 
(linearity), and a consistent moral stance (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Obviously, these criteria 
cannot be applied to evaluate the typical trauma narrative. 
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Reflexivity 
 
It is recommended that all narrative inquirers remain intensely conscious of their own 
responses to the lived experiences of others (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Clandinin and 
Connelly (2000) emphasise the need for wakefulness – a quality characterising inquiries that 
necessitate ongoing reflection. As noted by Clandinin and Connelly (2000, p. 46): 
We all, novice and experienced researchers alike, come to inquiry with views, 
attitudes, and ways of thinking about inquiry. These histories, these personal narratives 
of inquiry, may coincide with or cross a boundary to varying degrees with the actual 
inquiries that we undertake. 
Dialogic listening to three voices is required when working with narratives: the voice of the 
narrator; the theoretical framework which provides the concepts and tools for interpreting; 
and a reflexive monitoring of the reading and interpreting of materials - a self-awareness of 
the decision process of drawing conclusions from the text (Lieblich et al., 1998). As such, I 
pay particular attention to self-reflexivity in the next chapter. Reflexivity is essential in 
narrative analysis. This refers to the researcher’s awareness of his/her identity in the research 
process (Elliott, 2005). It does not simply involve providing personal information about the 
researcher, but rather involves providing an analytic account of how his/her personal and 
professional history and his/her theoretical orientation has lead him/her to approach the data 
in a specific way (Elliott, 2005). The researcher needs to engage in the significance and 
implications of his/her position and how it relates to the research (Elliott, 2005). As noted by 
Elliott (2005, p. 154):  
Once we become aware that when the subjects of our research provide us with 
narratives, they are not merely reporting their experiences but rather are engaged in an 
activity that makes sense of those experiences, we are obliged to admit that our own 
research narratives are also constructed.  
Where reflexivity becomes challenging is when researchers admit to the intuitive nature of 
much of the analysis that is invested in the hermeneutic perspective – some might question 
whether it is possible to document this intuitive process; to be fully reflexive about this part of 
research and so making it transparent and open to others’ scrutiny (Elliott, 2005).  
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There is relatively little literature on reflexivity in the analysis and writing up of data 
(compared to the collection of data) (Elliott, 2005). However, Van Maanen (as cited in Elliott, 
2005) identifies three types of writers: the realist writer, the confessional writer and the 
impressionist writer. The impressionist writer is closest to what we understand by a narrative 
approach to analysis and writing up. Unlike the realist or confessional tale, the impressionist 
tale does not focus exclusively on the researcher (confessional) or respondent (realist), but 
instead focuses on the doing of fieldwork – and aims to draw the reader in and encourage 
his/her participation through providing a vibrant account filled with concrete details (Elliott, 
2005). This gives the write up an open-ended character, and leaves it feeling unfinished, so 
that with each re-telling or re-reading the individual is given the opportunity to make new 
interpretations and learn more from the data (Elliott, 2005). The impressionist writer does not 
situate the researcher as central character, but instead occupies the space of one of the key 
protagonists alongside his/her respondents (Elliott, 2005).  
Two types of reflexivity, self-control (or disengagement) and self-exploration, are relevant to 
narrative psychology (Crossley, 2000). In Crossley’s (2000, p. 20) words:  
‘Self-exploration’ constitutes a total contrast to that involved in ‘disengagement’. 
Rather than standing back from our bodies, thoughts, feelings and desires, 
‘objectifying’ them in the pursuit of self control, the stand of ‘self-exploration’ 
encourages us to explore these dimensions in order to establish our identity; we have 
to ‘search for ourselves’.  
Clandinin and Connelly (2000, p. 61) eloquently emphasise the importance of recognising our 
own role in the work that we do with others: 
As inquirers we, too, are part of the parade. We have helped make the world in which 
we find ourselves. We are not merely objective inquirers, people on the high road, 
who study a world lesser in quality than our moral temperament would have it, people 
who study a world we did not help create. On the contrary, we are complicit in the 
world we study. Being in this world, we need to remake ourselves as well as offer up 
research understandings that could lead to a better world.  
What this quote indicates is that as narrative inquirers, we work not only with our participants 
but also with ourselves; our own experiences and lived and told narratives which unfold in 
our interactions (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Clandinin and Connelly (2000) stress the 
importance of the researcher’s own experience; his or her own livings, telling, retellings, and 
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relivings. Consequently, the starting point for any narrative analysis is the researcher’s own 
autobiography. One of the most important things narrative inquirers do is to place themselves 
“in the midst”, which involves writing one’s own stories (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 
100).  
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) believe that narrative inquiry boundaries are permeable, that 
they expand and contract, with researchers’ personal and professional lives flowing across the 
boundaries into the research setting, with the participants’ lives and experiences flowing the 
other way. Some feel that if researchers do not become fully involved in the inquiry, they can 
never fully understand the lives of others, whereas others feel that becoming fully involved 
leads to a loss of objectivity (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Clandinin and Connelly (2000) 
suggest that narrative inquirers must experience this tension, because all narrative analysis is 
relational. The inquirer needs to be aware of a great deal of things at once: the details of place 
or situation, the nuanced distortions in time, and the complicated shifts between personal and 
social observations and their relations (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). How experiences are 
conveyed and how and what is said in what circumstances is very important (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2009). They argue that inquirers must become fully involved, “fall in love” with 
their participants, yet they must also have the ability to take a step back and recognise their 
own stories or narratives at work in the inquiry, the stories of the participants, as well as the 
broader social landscape in which we all exist (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 81).  
It is important to note that heard experiences and stories get modified in retelling and reliving 
them – consequently, critics of narrative analysis frequently speak of “co-optation of voice”, 
suggesting that researchers run the risk of drowning out participants’ voices, or speaking on 
their behalf, so losing participants’ voices (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 75). This is 
closely tied to the notion of signature – too strong or lively a signature runs the risk of 
obscuring the field and participants, and too weak a signature runs the risk of speaking only 
from the perspective of the participant (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). There will always be a 
tension between voice, signature, and audience, just like there will always be tension between 
the experiences of the researcher and the participant, and the broader social context that 
surrounds what is being addressed in the inquiry (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Narratives 
operate both within society and are about society (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). They also 
reflect inner life (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). In other words, stories have personal and social 
purposes and consequences, which shape their accounts (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). 
Gubrium and Holstein (2009, p. 16) argue that “stories are not just conveyed, but they are 
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given shape in the course of social interaction. How things are put or unfold is as important as 
what is said and in what circumstances”. In this context it is easy to see why researchers need 
to pay attention to the fact that there may be preferred tellings of stories in particular 
circumstances (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009).  
In reality, what should happen in narrative inquiries is that there is a progressive mingling of 
voices, a boundary crossing where there is a combination of researchers’ and participants’ 
narratives of experience (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). This is what Gubrium and Holstein 
(2009) call the interactional terrain, whereas the situational terrain is about meaning-making 
preferences; local understandings and expectations for how a story should be constructed and 
its preferred results. Participants and researchers actively take part in discursive exchanges 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, p. 42). They stress that: 
Narratives emerge in context - interactionally, situationally, and organisationally. In 
practice, narrators are the architects and builders of their stories, but they accomplish 
their craft interacting with other storytellers and listeners. The narrative process - from 
start to finish – yields an ever-emergent, pliant product that should be treated as 
something more dynamic than a more or less accurate, waiting-to-be-told text. 
Analysis needs to orient to the interactions and circumstances of narrative production 
as well as to the story that is produced. In practice, narratives are social to the core. 
Researchers also need to be alert to how power and control may influence narrative 
collaboration (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Inequalities in status and power between the 
interviewer and interviewee can complicate the research process (Maynes et al., 2008). 
Although in my interviews participants could be described as the main storytellers, my input 
cannot be discounted. I had considerable power in the interview situation. The questions I 
asked determined the stories that were told; I activated the stories, and my prompts served to 
encourage women to elaborate on aspects of their stories that I felt were interesting or 
noteworthy.  
McLean and Thorne (2006) argue that in thinking about how life stories are constructed, 
listeners play a very important role, as their responses determine whether the speaker’s story 
is suppressed, revised or solidified. These authors emphasise that the listener and the context 
in which the story is told are central to which kinds of meanings are produced. It is important 
to note that I was considered as staff at the Centre, and that because of this women might have 
felt that there was a power differential between us, and although it was not so intended, they 
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may have felt that they were compelled to answer my questions. In this sense, I did hold some 
control over narrative construction. However unintentionally, I believe that the stories that 
emerged were at least partly a product of how I was viewed (as a member of the Centre staff), 
and that because of that, in some instances accounts which would be preferred by the Centre, 
were put forward. The issue of status is relevant here too. Gubrium and Holstein (2009) 
question the narrative agency of people who have low social status (such as a severely 
cognitively impaired young girl and people with Alzheimer’s Disease). The women I 
interviewed occupied a similarly subjugated position, and consequently, in some instances, 
they were reluctant to admitting to shame, with all its associations not only of self-blame, but 
also of vulnerability and disempowerment.  
The audience collaborates in storytelling by taking on roles that influence the final 
remembering in some way (Pasupathi, 2006). The roles available to both speaker and listener 
are historically and culturally bound, and they reflect the nature and structure of society and 
the identity options they allow (Cohler & Hammack, 2006). It cannot be denied that I entered 
the field as a privileged White woman, and all the women I interviewed were of lower socio-
economic status and were Black or Coloured. These demographic differences are likely to 
influence the roles we played in relation to each other, and what the women felt comfortable 
disclosing to me (how much filtering or editing took place).  
What most narrative researchers need to come to terms with is that they need to be ready to 
engage with “surprisingly abbreviated accounts, convoluted storying, remarkably repetitive 
narratives, and the less-than-unified commentaries that commonly inhabit this terrain – all of 
which have good practical reasons for taking the forms they do” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, 
p. 38). It is the researcher’s responsibility to explore how external factors may affect the 
narrative, what conditions may make narrative emerge, flourish and thrive, and which achieve 
the opposite – this is closely related to the nature of cultural or organisational resources and 
preferences, which influence the interactional production or avoidance of particular narratives 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). This is particularly relevant for the construction of counter-
narratives, which resist master or hegemonic narratives (Andrews, 2004). 
As noted by Gubrium and Holstein (2009, p. 174), “Organizations establish general 
parameters for how narratives may be produced and who is authorized to produce them. They 
establish the foundation for what might pass in their purview as recognizable, legitimate 
accounts”. These authors stress how the “big stories” of organisations or agencies (socio-
cultural aspects) affect how the “little stories” (individuals’ stories) are articulated. 
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Researchers should pay attention to individual accounts and listen carefully to how they 
reflect organisational principles and groundings (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Simultaneously, 
it is important to take heed of individual variations in talk and interactions (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2009). Organisations influence and shape, but do not determine, locally and 
individually articulated narratives (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The importance of local and 
wider societal contexts cannot be emphasised enough in the construction of personal 
narratives (Phoenix, 2008). It may be worth examining, as Phoenix (2008) does, how 
canonical narratives around wider societal issues such as sexism are interwoven in personal 
narratives.  
 
Discourses, Narratives, and Counter-narratives 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the distinctions between discourses and 
narratives. Narratives are considered a subtype of discourses (which is defined as a 
framework, articulated in language, for understanding things, people, events and 
relationships) (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; Day Sclater, 2009). Within narrative enquiry, 
individuals are considered embodiments of lived stories; as living individual lives which are 
influenced by social and cultural narratives (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Self-making and 
life-making is highly dependent on the constraints and opportunities presented by the cultural 
or social system in which it is conducted (Bruner, 2001). Specifically, Brockmeier and Harré 
(2001) argue that stories are always told according to certain cultural conventions. In fact, 
narratives can be understood as a condensed set of rules and instructions, which capture what 
is coherent and plausible in any culture (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001). Thus, a narrative should 
consist of “a sequence of events over time, structured comprehensibly in terms of cultural 
canonicality, it must also contain something that endows it with exceptionality” (Bruner, 
2001, p. 29). What makes a story interesting is the violation of canonical expectancy, but in a 
way that is culturally acceptable (Bruner, 2001). Bruner (2001) argues that narrative “turning 
points” are crucial to attempts to individualise a life, to resist automatic, folk-psychological or 
cultural canonicality, and it is what makes the ordinary and expectable, idiosyncratic and 
agentive. Thus, narratives are not culturally deterministic, individuals are active agents who 
accept, negotiate, challenge or resist the positionings that are offered to them by dominant or 
master narratives and discourses (Bradbury & Day Sclater, 2009). This brings me to counter-
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narratives. Counter-narratives are by definition agentive and emancipatory. I shall try to 
demonstrate that the women I interviewed constructed counter-narratives which violated 
canonical or cultural master narratives and discourses but in a way that was culturally 
comprehensible (consistent with the predominant discourse or ethos of the Centre). 
It is the researcher’s responsibility to provide an analysis of narratives which makes 
transparent what has gone without saying, and to make linkages between specific narratives 
and underlying social conditions (Elliott, 2005). The researcher’s main task is to identify 
taken-for-granted or hegemonic cultural processes which are embedded in social practice 
within personal narratives. However, s/he needs to do so ethically and bear in mind that the 
way in which s/he interprets and analyses the narratives produced may also influence the 
interviewee (Elliott, 2005). In Smythe and Murray’s words (as cited in Elliott, 2005, p. 141):  
The problem is that, once the researcher’s account is taken as the authoritative 
interpretation of an individual’s experience, the individual’s own understanding of 
their experience inevitably is compromised. Narrative research in this way can become 
intrusive and subtly damaging, even when participants respond positively to the 
researcher’s account. 
 
Evaluating Narratives 
 
It is important to consider how the quality of narrative analyses is evaluated. Generalizability 
is determined on the basis of trustworthiness or plausibility (Emerson & Frosh, 2009). The 
trustworthiness of narrative research can be evaluated through its persuasiveness, its 
correspondence (with interviewees’ interpretation of their stories), its coherence, and its 
pragmatic use (the extent to which it becomes the basis for other researchers’ work) 
(Riessman, 1993). It has been emphasised that a persuasive analysis includes a detailed 
presentation of narrators’ stories (Maynes et al., 2008). Emerson and Frosh (2009) argue, 
however, that narrative continuity or coherence has been too central in the process of 
demonstrating trustworthiness, particularly when considering the fractured accounts of trauma 
survivors, as I will be doing. Narrative research does not require replicability as a criterion in 
its evaluation. Instead, the quality of the research is dependent on the researcher’s personal 
wisdom, skill and integrity (Lieblich et al., 1998). This does not imply absolute freedom of 
interpretation, but instead, requires self-awareness and self-discipline in the continuous 
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examination of the text against interpretation (Lieblich et al., 1998). The analyst is expected 
to make his/her interpretation and logic apparent through honesty, transparency and clarity 
(Maynes et al., 2008).  
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) describe a good narrative as having explanatory, invitational 
quality, as being authentic, and as being adequate and plausible. Narrative analysis should 
also be self-reflective, particularly in relation to co-construction; it should be cognizant of the 
interplay between individual self-construction and social, historical and cultural context; and 
it should be transparent about the approach to interpretation (Maynes et al., 2008).  
There has been some debate about the internal validity of narrative interviews. Emerson and 
Frosh (2009) argue that the validity of narrative research is assessed by the extent to which 
the primary text is displayed, the analytic categories are specified in terms of discernible 
features of the texts, and theoretical interpretations are focused on these structures. Some 
argue that the kinds of interviews described by Clandinin and Connelly (2000) are more likely 
to produce accurate, truthful or trustworthy data than structured interviews that limit the 
interviewee to a standardised list of questions (Elliott, 2005). Others argue that narratives are 
never an objective reflection of reality, but rather a subjective interpretation, thus, they are 
concerned that narratives may always obscure a clear description of the aspects of life that are 
narrated (Elliott, 2005). In fact, in Elliott’s (2005, p. 24) words:  
Narratives do not transparently reflect experience, rather they give meaning to it. … In 
order to provide the details of life experience in the form of a story, individuals are 
forced to reflect on those experiences, to select the salient aspects, and order them into 
a coherent whole. 
In thinking about internal validity, and whether the interviewee is telling the “truth”, it is 
important to consider what questions are being focused on in the research, and what kinds of 
information the researcher is hoping to glean from the interview (Elliott, 2005). It is worth 
distinguishing between historical and narrative truth here. The former involves the belief that 
factual information can be discovered and articulated, while the latter emphasises the role that 
stories play in creating meaning about the self and others (Maynes et al., 2008). Maynes et al. 
(2008, p. 148) state that “any rendition of the past has to be seen in the context of its motives 
in the present (i.e. at the time of telling), its symbolic power, and its contextual framing”.  
In terms of external validity, many researchers opt for either depth or breadth (Elliott, 2005). 
Qualitative research, in Elliott’s (2005, p. 26) view might require a “common sense” view of 
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generalizability in that the reader is allowed to decide for him or herself how far the evidence 
that has been gathered in a particular study can be transferred and offer information about the 
same research area in similar settings. 
The most persuasive analyses acknowledge and take advantage of the most influential, cogent 
and specific features of personal narratives as evidence (Maynes et al., 2008). These kinds of 
studies make appropriate generalisations, including sociological generalisation (narratives that 
reflect a specific social position or social process), ethnographic generalisation (narratives that 
illuminate culture, including transactions, conventions, mythologies, meanings and 
motivations) and historical generalisation (narratives help to explain historical events or 
processes). Analyses should be transparent in describing the research process. They should 
provide enough narrative detail to facilitate the audience’s understanding and buy-in. The best 
analyses acknowledge that narrative research involves a great deal of uncertainty, and that 
“truths” which emerge are complex, contingent and subject to revision and reinterpretation. 
Narrative analyses may be based on a single, detailed narrative, or on a group of narratives 
that are interconnected in some way. A group of narratives may be selected because they shed 
light on the research question, or serve particular methodological purposes (Maynes et al., 
2008). 
Friedman (1993) examines spatialisation as a strategy for reading narratives. Specifically, she 
identifies horizontal and vertical narrative co-ordinates. Although this applies mainly to 
written narratives, it can also usefully be applied to oral narratives. The horizontal narrative 
involves the sequence of events, the setting, character, action, initiating problem, progression 
and closure. It is the horizontal movement or linearity of the plot from beginning, middle to 
end. The vertical axis of the narrative does not exist at the level of the sequential plot; unlike 
the horizontal narrative which has a single textual surface, the vertical narrative has layers of 
superimposed surfaces, much like the human psyche. Simplistically, the horizontal narrative 
can be equated with consciousness, and the vertical narrative with the unconscious. Although 
interconnected, three strands of the vertical narrative can be usefully separated for analysis: 
the literary; the historical; and the psychic. The literary and historical strands have to do with 
intertextuality, but here the focus is on the psyche. Friedman (1993) argues that reading the 
vertical narrative involves the realisation that the text, as linguistic entity, mimics the 
structure of the psyche, particularly the multi-layered unconscious. In some of the narrative 
analysis I will conduct, I will examine the vertical axis which demonstrates how language 
mimics psychic processes, for example, fragmentation.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
 
 
 
 
The Use of Narrative Analysis in this Study 
 
A constructivist take on narrative analysis will be used in the proposed study for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the approach to understanding the analytic outcomes of the data is focused on 
subjective experience and personal interpretations; how the self and experience are 
constructed through stories, which is consistent with narrative analysis coming from a social 
constructivist point of view (Bruner, 1994; Widdershoven, 1993). Secondly, this type of 
narrative analysis is particularly suited to the exploration of disruptions in expected story- or 
plot-lines, as occurs with trauma (Burck, 2005; for an eloquent example of narrative analysis 
of a case of sexual abuse, see Crossley, 2000). Furthermore, the act of narrating experience 
may restore order and coherence to the frequently disordered and fragmented experience of 
traumatised individuals. Ochs and Capps (2001) argue that traumatic recollections will remain 
fragmented until they are heard in a supportive environment and are co-narrated into a 
coherent sequence of events and responses. This may be particularly helpful for narrators who 
split off the emotion associated with the setting and events being narrated – this is often 
associated with trauma-related discontinuities in an individual’s identity, memory and 
consciousness, such as appears in those with disorganised attachment experiences in 
childhood, dissociative personality disorders, and post-traumatic stress (Ochs & Capps, 2001).  
This study will explore how trauma leads to narrative breakdown, which in turn, often leads 
to a revision of personal beliefs and values. Crossley (2000) argues that such narrative 
disruption occurs when one element in a chain of events, people, plans, aims, objectives, 
values and beliefs disappears or is damaged irreparably. In such situations, we literally “lose 
the plot”, and temporal sequences which were meaningful before the moment of rupture 
(consisting of a beginning which informs the middle, which informs the end of the narrative) 
are experienced as “the senseless progression of one thing after another” (Crossley, 200, p. 
56). The disconnection and disorientation associated with this “mere sequence” (lack of 
meaningful temporal order or structure) is described by Carr (as cited in Crossley, 2000, p. 
57) as: 
The dark and looming outer limit of experience, the chaos which stands opposed to 
order…this is a threat which is, admittedly, in varying degrees, permanently present at 
the periphery of our consciousness, the very threat and possibility of madness.   
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I will analyse examples of narrative disruption or breakdown using Gee’s (1991) linguistic 
approach to narrative, which, unlike Labov’s approach, is more suited to lengthier oral 
narratives. This analysis is not meant to be an exercise in formalism, in which the structure 
and content of texts are analysed apart from their social, cultural, political and intertextual 
contexts. Gee (1991) argues that all discourse genres are socially situated and constituted, and 
that interpretive reading should take into account wider social contexts, including organising 
discourses and canonical narratives, in addition to the spoken linguistic co-construction of 
texts. In this manner, Gee (1991) largely avoids being criticised for performing the error of 
metalinguistic illusion, where language is viewed as a pre-existing, mechanical structure 
divorced from its social and cultural roots. Gee’s (1991) method of analysis is particularly 
sensitive to narrative and linguistic disruption, and so seemed most appropriate for the 
detailed examination of the text as it fragments and loses coherence as a result of its traumatic 
content. Although Wengraf’s (2004) biographic-interpretive method of analysing narrative 
life-stories, including centrally a comparison of stories of lives as lived with stories as told, 
seems intuitively a sensible approach to analysing my data, I selected Gee’s (1991) method 
because firstly, unlike Wengraf (2004), I was not able to verify the “truth” or “factual” nature 
of interviewees’ accounts (by accessing supplementary data), making a comparison between 
narratives of lives as lived with stories as told impossible. Secondly, Gee’s (1991) method can 
be applied to short and specific sections of narrative, whereas Wengraf’s (2004) method is 
better suited to lengthy biographical narratives. Thirdly, Wengraf’s (2004) method is overly 
technical and cumbersome to execute. Finally, an important focal area of Wengraf’s (2004) 
method is the generation of multiple hypotheses (counter-hypotheses and tangential 
hypotheses) at each turning point in the narrative, which was not a focus in my work. My 
focus was on proving or disproving the existence of narrative fragmentation, as a metaphor 
for psychic fragmentation.  
The narratives I have collected will be divided into Parts, Strophes, Stanzas and Main lines. 
“Idea units” are the smallest component of narratives. Each Main line is made up of one or 
more than one idea units (indicated with a slash or / in the narratives that follow). Each idea 
unit contains a piece of new information which is called the focus, and it has a unitary 
intonation contour consisting of one pitch disruption (the pitch glide) (Gee, 1991). Thus, the 
focus of the idea unit is determined by the pitch glide, which is the change in the pitch of the 
voice, including falling, rising, rising-and-falling, or falling-and-rising in relation to the base 
pitch level of the sentence (Gee, 1991). The foci are in bold print. A Main line often 
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corresponds with a sentence, including complex sentences, and is about one central argument 
(Gee, 1991). Main lines form Stanzas, which are the “building blocks” of discursive language, 
which cluster into groups according to a topic, known as Strophes (Gee, 1991). These 
Strophes fall into larger units or themes, known as parts (Gee, 1991). In coherent texts, 
different components of the text are fairly uniform in length and structure (Gee, 1991). 
Gee (1991) argues that narrative texts are structured at five hierarchical levels, each of which 
is connected to the Main line and Stanza structure of the text. Each level plays a role in 
interpretation. Levels include Main line and Stanza structure (level 1); syntax and cohesion 
(level 2), Main line/non-main line (level 3); psychological subjects (level 4) and the focusing 
system (level 5). Corresponding with each of these levels is a particular role in interpretation, 
respectively including ideas and perspectives on characters, events, states and information 
(level 1); logic and connections (level 2); plot (level 3); point of view (level 4); and images or 
themes which build an overall interpretation of the narrative (level 5) (Gee, 1991). The 
interpretive questions raised include: how has the text been organised as speech? (Main line 
and Stanza structure). Why has the speaker made particular connections at this point? How 
does this connection make sense within the logic of particular narrative sections and within 
the overall interview? (syntax and cohesion). What is the main point or significance of the 
plot?  (Main line/non-main line). Who or what is the psychological subject of this Stanza: 
why does the narrator change subjects or shift perspectives? Are there patterns in these 
changes? (psychological subjects). Why is this focus so important? How does it fit with other 
focused material? (focusing system) (Emerson & Frosh, 2009).   
Lieblich et al. (1998) make the useful distinction within narrative research between holistic-
content analysis, holistic-form analysis, categorical-content analysis and categorical-form 
analysis. Respectively, these forms of analysis include taking into consideration the whole 
narrative and focusing on the content; taking into consideration the entire narrative and 
focusing on its form or structure; focusing on content as manifested in different parts or 
categories of the narrative; and finally, focusing on the form or structure of separate sections 
or categories of a narrative (Lieblich et al., 1998). These authors warn that researchers should 
not see these four modes of analysis as separate cells, but rather as occurring along a 
continuum. My analysis incorporates aspects of both categorical-content analysis and 
categorical-form analysis. The first descriptive results chapter based on the initial categorical-
content analysis is based on all 19 narratives, and I make thematic claims on the basis of 
comparisons across the full set of narratives. In the process of reading and analysing 
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narratives when conducting categorical-content analysis, the research becomes an interactive 
process as the narrative becomes open to the researcher’s interpretations. Hypotheses and 
theories are generated while the researcher is reading and analysing the narratives, as in 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2005), and these inform and enhance future reading of the 
material, which generates further hypotheses and theories in a continuously developing circle 
of understanding (Lieblich et al., 1998). Interestingly, the themes that emerged tended to 
reflect the responses to the open-ended questions, where women were allowed to speak freely. 
There was considerable overlap in their responses, given the variety of ways in which they 
could have responded to the open-ended questions.  
The presentation of results which follows in the next three chapters is divided into three 
sections. The first section (presented in chapter 7) is the descriptive categorical content 
analysis, and the second (presented in chapter 8) is an examination of the split self at 
individual, institutional and cultural level based on a dominant theme emerging from the 
initial categorical content analysis presented in chapter 9.  For the categorical-form analysis 
(using Gee’s framework), I have selected 5 long, complex narratives for analysis, and 3 short, 
compressed narratives for analysis. The reason I have ordered the analysis in this way is to 
firstly provide the reader with a broad overview of the data; a crucial narrative context for the 
subsequent more detailed analysis of the split self, and finally, the complex, in depth 
linguistic analysis which follows. I believe that this way of structuring the results 
demonstrates that categorical content analysis, and categorical form analysis (linguistic 
analysis) can complement one another, supplement the findings that each method is able to 
produce, and if ordered as I have suggested, provide the reader with a progressively in-depth 
and comprehensive analysis of the findings.  
The categorical content analysis is based on the data provided by all the participants, while 
the analysis of the split self is based on 10 narratives, and the categorical form analysis is 
based on 8 women’s trauma narratives. I selected the narratives focusing on fragmentation 
exclusively on the basis of evidence of non-linearity in the text (e.g. circularity, repetition 
etc.). The short narratives I chose to present were chosen on the basis of narrative length (they 
were the shortest narratives), to illustrate the effects of narrative compression, and the 
associated bodily encoding of unspeakable emotional pain.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
176 
 
 
 
 
Research Ethics 
 
When the story is about pain, trauma, and injustice, listening itself can be painful. 
Listening requires the willingness to put the other’s story at the centre of one’s 
attention, to resist defensive reactions, and to acknowledge the limits of one’s ability 
to put oneself in another’s shoes. (Chase, 2011, p. 428) 
Three types of participant reactions have been isolated in trauma-focused studies – those who 
are positive about the experience, those who experience participation as effortful and time-
consuming, and those who find it negative, intrusive, burdensome and painful (Seedat, 
Pienaar, Williams, & Stein, 2004). With survivors of IPV in particular, it was women with 
better mental health that experienced positive gain, while women with higher levels of 
depression and PTSD and poorer coping mechanisms were more likely to feel regret and 
distress (Seedat et al., 2004). Despite claims about the positive effects of disclosing trauma, 
past traumas can bring up a great deal of painful emotion, including fear, shame and anger 
(Seedat et al., 2004). It is inevitable that trauma studies will elicit some distressing emotion.  
The re-traumatisation of participants is a major ethical concern. Lieblich (as cited in Elliott, 
2005, p. 137) talks about her concern about “opening a Pandora’s box” and confesses that she 
was “constantly tormented with the sense of opening my interviewee’s wounds and (as I 
thought then) leaving them with the pain.” It must be remembered on the other hand that 
people may benefit from being able to talk about the difficult aspects of their lives to a skilled 
and interested listener (Elliott, 2005). Studies have shown that interviewees valued being able 
to contribute and be part of a worthwhile project, and enjoyed the unusual experience of 
talking to someone at some length about their lives (Elliott, 2005).  
Elliott (2005) argues that the narrative interview includes aspects of research and therapy. 
However, researchers do not always consider the ethical implications of the therapeutic 
potential of interviews. As I discuss in a later chapter, most of the women in my study said 
that their interviews had been an emotional unburdening for them, implying a therapeutic 
dimension to the interaction. Elliott (2005) advises that in such situations, the effects of 
interviewing on the experience of both the interviewer and interviewee needs to be 
considered.  
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One of the purposes of the use of personal narratives is to introduce previously marginalised 
voices into the record, to give voice to previously unheard stories (Maynes et al., 2008). In 
such instances, the researcher is interested in revealing hidden histories to develop new 
understandings of phenomena (Maynes et al., 2008). However, this is likely to give rise to 
sensitive material. Topics are considered “sensitive” if the research “intrudes into the private 
sphere or delves into some deeply personal experience; where the study is concerned with 
deviance and social control; where it impinges on the vested interests of powerful persons or 
the exercise of coercion or domination; and where it deals with things sacred to those being 
studied that they do not wish profaned” (Renzetti & Lee as cited in Phoenix, 2008, p. 124). 
What makes a topic sensitive is not its personal nature, but rather has to do with relational 
circumstances – it is in the relationship that interviewees’ feel content-related shame and 
vulnerability (Phoenix, 2008). It is important to note that in any research focused on sensitive 
topics, there is always the risk that interviewees will consider the researcher as superior to 
them. This may be because they are expected to tell stories about things that they are ashamed 
of, issues that are considered culturally inappropriate and events that have left them feeling 
vulnerable (Hyden, 2005). This may result in all manner of resistances which can seriously 
compromise data. Another danger is what bell hooks (as cited in Hyden, 2005, p. 128) calls 
“conceal(ing) your woman into her suffering” by focusing only on the difficult side of the 
interviewee’s life, which may cause secondary traumatisation. In my study, I attempted to 
avoid this danger by focusing on positive aspects of interviewees’ lives at the end of the 
interview. One danger that I did encounter which is discussed by Hyden (2005) is some 
interviewees’ difficulty in knowing when to stop a conversation that is becoming too painful; 
in other words, how to disclose appropriately.  
One of the primary concerns put forward in relation to narrative research is that interviewees 
who are marginalised and subjugated have little or no control over the representation, 
interpretation and dissemination of their accounts (Gready, 2008). Interviewees may also feel 
deceived if they assumed that the purpose of the interview was to glean “facts” and 
information, and the analysis and interpretation focuses not on content but on the structure or 
form of the narrative (Elliott, 2005). It may also be difficult to explain in sufficient detail what 
the research is about if a social constructivist approach is to be taken, as in my case (Elliott, 
2005).  
Many scholars argue that the use of narrative in research gives respondents more of a chance 
to become active agents within the research process, selecting what they believe is the most 
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important or relevant information in expressing the complexity of their lives, than more 
structured methods like structured interview schedules or questionnaires or surveys which 
limit the nature of response the individual may engage in (Elliott, 2005). However, because 
the narrative interview can take on the character of an intimate conversation between friends, 
there is a danger that respondents “have often revealed very private parts of their lives in 
return for what must be, in the last resort, very flimsy guarantees of confidentiality” (Elliott, 
2005, p. 136). The telling of life stories means that it is likely that interviewees may be 
identifiable to others who know them (Elliott, 2005). Elliott’s (2005) recommendation is that 
the researcher focuses on material that is already in the public domain, or that s/he produces 
fictional ‘composite’ characters, (the danger in this is that the researcher may unconsciously 
or deliberately choose aspects of different life stories that support his/her theory). As such, I 
decided to safeguard my participants by changing their names, and presenting only parts of 
the text. 
A number of ethical issues were carefully considered before conducting the study. Since the 
focus of the research was on examining traumatic experience, shame and narrative 
breakdown, I was aware that the interviews might provoke a great deal of painful emotion, 
which I needed to be skilled enough to contain. Although I have not trained as a clinical 
psychologist, I have recently completed both the Basic Counselling Skills and Advanced 
Counselling Skills programmes at the South African College of Applied Psychology 
(SACAP), which prepared me to some extent for responding sensitively and empathically to 
interviewees’ experiences, and to provide the necessary containment.  
It is very important in trauma studies to be guided by the principal of beneficence. Studies 
should only be conducted if it can be clearly shown that the importance and significance of 
obtaining sensitive and painful material justifies the psychological distress it may evoke, or if 
there is not another, less distressing way of obtaining the data (Seedat et al., 2004). The 
necessity of my study has been previously outlined, and there was no less upsetting 
alternative method of obtaining the data. To protect participants, I ensured that there were 
mechanisms in place to assist participants in the case of harmful outcomes (Seedat et al., 
2004). 
Three precautionary measures were taken to protect the welfare of the interviewees. Firstly, I 
ensured that interviewees were in a relationship with a counsellor at the Centre whom they 
could consult after the interview should they wish to. I made myself available to talk to the 
counsellor about any difficult emotional material that emerged in the interview, which may 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
179 
 
 
 
have needed to be processed during the next session (with the permission of the participant). 
Secondly, I offered each participant a follow-up interview should she wish to discuss any 
aspect of the previous interview. Thirdly, I sought supervision, both in preparation for the 
interviews, and during the process of conducting them, from a mental health professional who 
is very experienced in trauma-related therapeutic work.   
As I have described, I conducted a number of recruitment sessions about the research at the 
Centre, during which I described my research and invited women to participate. I handed out 
informed consent forms to the women who agreed to participate, and all the women 
completed them; in only one instance did a woman need clarification about the meaning of 
something written in the form. The consent forms outlined the nature and purposes of my 
study and what participation would entail, as well as giving assurances of anonymity and 
confidentiality, and were handed out during recruitment sessions (Appendix B). Although 
there is some debate about how much information potential participants in trauma studies 
should be provided with (due to concerns around bias and discouraging participation) (Seedat 
et al., 2004), I opted to tell women that I would ask them about the traumatic experiences in 
their childhood and adulthood, and how they felt about their experiences, in the spirit of full 
disclosure. The consent forms were available in both Afrikaans and English to ensure that the 
participants could read about the nature and implications of their participation in their first 
language. Informed consent was provided by all 19 participants during the recruitment 
sessions. The interviews were also conducted in the language preferred by the participant so 
that she could communicate in their first language.  
Participants were offered a R50 gift voucher from a chain of grocery stores (Pick ‘n Pay) as a 
token of my gratitude for their participation. 
Permission to conduct the study was granted by the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty 
for Health Sciences, Stellenbosch University, prior to the commencement of the study. The 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) number is IRB0005239.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Results and Discussion I 
 
The following two chapters are not results chapters in the traditional sense. They include 
substantial discussion, which contextualises and provides some interpretation for the evidence 
I present. In this chapter, which focuses on the results and some discussion of them, I present 
a background and context to the study. Then I present the results of the categorical content 
analysis of the data, supported by quotes from the interviews with 19 women resident at the 
Saartjie Baartman Centre for survivors of IPV. I begin with the categorical content analysis 
because it gives the reader a broad and global picture of the women’s experiences of trauma 
and shame. Its function is purely descriptive. In the second results and discussion chapter 
(chapter 8), I present a phenomenologically informed and social constructivist narrative 
analysis of cases where there is evidence of the split self, which is analysed at individual, 
organisational and cultural levels. In chapter 9, I conduct a more formal, in depth and 
complex categorical form analysis (using Gee’s 1991 model) of single cases where there is 
evidence of linguistic fracturing, representing the trauma-related disintegration of self. As is 
evident, I am interested both in what women’s stories were about (categorical content 
analysis, which will be presented in this, the first results and discussion chapter, and expanded 
upon in the next chapter), as well as how they narrated their experiences (categorical form 
analysis, which will be presented in the third results and discussion chapter; Chase, 2011). As 
such, I will: 1) identify themes across narratives (categorical content analysis) in pursuit of 
providing a detailed description of participants, 2) provide a more theoretically situated 
analysis of a specific and predominant theme emerging from this chapter (the trauma-related 
split self), and finally, 3) conduct a complex, in depth categorical form analysis of single 
cases where there is evidence of linguistic fragmentation. After providing background and 
contextual information, I begin with the categorical content analysis below. 
 
Contextualising the Study: Impressions Before and During the Interviews 
 
The ever-presence of violence in and around the Saartjie Baartman Centre provided a 
backdrop to this study. For example, one of the women residents at the Centre went out for 
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the weekend, and was gang raped by the brother of one of the other residents, and his 
associates. The women’s treatment of their children is also a testimony to the ubiquity of 
violence – their apparent abuse in particular, as well as their apparent physical abuse and 
neglect. During the time I was working at the Centre, one woman had her four children 
removed for physical abuse, and many others had been warned for similar behaviour. The 
threat of perpetrators, the ex-partners of the women, was additionally a constant feature. Men 
often threatened to come to the Centre when they found out that their ex-partners were there, 
and at times, threatened those in charge of security, and those in management. On occasion, 
they would arrive at the Centre and threaten violence. One woman’s ex-partner abducted one 
of her children who was only found a few days later. This provides a context to the high 
levels of fear and anxiety reported by so many of the women I interviewed. 
I had agreed with management to work at the Centre twice a week for two months before 
commencing recruitment, to get to know the women before I invited them to participate in my 
study. The purpose of this exercise was to encourage participation – if women were familiar 
with me, and felt comfortable with me, it was more likely that they would not only participate 
in an interview, but disclose deeply personal information. In the first few sessions, I simply 
helped staff and the women volunteers to sort out rooms filled with donations. After this, I 
spent a number of sessions in the on-site crèche. The level of neglect and deprivation that was 
evident in the children was startling. This was compounded by the number of children 
(between 20 and 30) in the crèche, and staff shortages. Even with volunteers assisting in the 
crèche, there were just not enough hands to go round, especially with children so emotionally 
needy. As an illustration of this level of emotional need, whenever I arrived at the crèche, a 
handful of children would run up to me and throw their arms around me, all desperately 
wanting to be held. This happened repeatedly, and often children would become aggressive 
with one another when they felt that they were not being given adequate attention. The level 
of attention seeking behaviour was striking, including negative attention seeking (antisocial 
behaviour) - at times it was as if some of the children would deliberately behave badly as a 
means of testing whether they would be rejected or abandoned; they were constantly testing 
boundaries. I found the experience in the crèche exhausting for that reason – so many children 
who were in need of basic care, all grappling; grasping for a bit of it.  
Another feature of the Centre was the fluidity of the population of women resident there. 
Women were constantly coming and going, changing the landscape of the Centre. I found 
that, for this reason, I needed to be flexible in my approach to recruitment. For example, I 
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recruited eight women during my first recruitment session, and a week later, half of those 
women were expelled from the Centre for substance misuse. What was particularly 
problematic about these changes in the population was its effect on my rapport-building with 
the women. When women left the Centre, this rapport-building was largely wasted, since 
women with whom I had developed a relationship were replaced by new, unknown women. 
These changes also meant that I had to do multiple recruitment sessions, to accommodate new 
residents. I felt complicit in a web of circumstances which through no obvious fault of my 
own or that of the Centre exacerbated rather than ameliorated the situation of all these women 
and their need for stable and reliable attachments, an issue to which I shall return towards the 
end of the thesis.  
The women who did not leave the Centre during my rapport-building quickly got to know me. 
Within a couple of sessions, they were familiar enough to greet me and talk to me during our 
organising sessions. This can be contrasted to the women’s behaviour after the interviews, a 
point to which I shall return. What I found particularly striking was that despite only knowing 
me for a relatively short while, women were very open about their experiences with me 
during the interviews. They sometimes described in excruciating detail what they had 
survived, particularly sexual humiliation and rape. Almost without exception, I felt that 
women over-disclosed during interviews. The women I interviewed had a history of having 
their rights violated by a more powerful other, and this may be one of the reasons why they 
over-disclosed to me, an outsider who was affiliated with Centre management, and also 
occupied a higher social position (middle-class, White, educated, etc.). It is very possible that 
women felt compelled – because of this power differential – to comply with my request for 
participation and disclosure.  
Perhaps in the context of this power differential, women struggled to assert their right to a 
reasonable degree of privacy, even within an emotionally evocative interview. Another 
interpretation is that, like their children, these women appeared to attach indiscriminately (a 
disorganised attachment pattern), characterised by transitioning from having a limited, or no 
relationship with me, to a sudden and surprising sense of familiarity and intimacy between us. 
This is likely to be the product of their own deprived backgrounds, and lack in adequate, 
consistent care from attachment figures.  
The perception that I was affiliated with management and its relationship to women’s 
compliance needs to be explored further. Women were very dependent on the management of 
the Centre, literally for basics such as food and shelter, so it was important to them to be seen 
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in a positive light by these staff members. This meant that women were highly compliant with 
requests or instructions from management. This compliance became apparent, for example, 
during a random drug testing procedure. It is Centre policy that there may be no drugs or 
alcohol on the premises, and consequently, the staff do spot checks to test for the presence of 
substances. My daunting task, the second time I volunteered at the Centre, was to watch the 
women urinate to ensure that they did not swap urine samples to avoid testing positive for 
substances. At no point did any of the women question a virtual stranger watching them 
urinate, and no women questioned the process generally and the possibility that their right to 
privacy was being violated (although the necessity of such testing is not denied). This level of 
compliance may very well be a result of having experienced chronic abuse, and the associated 
struggle or inability to safeguard personal rights and choices. In my view, it is this same 
compliance that determined women’s high response rate to my invitations to participate in my 
study, and their willingness to disclose deeply personal material.  
 
Categorical Content Analysis 
 
The themes extracted include the following: 
  
Exposure to IPV 
Physical Violence 
Sexual Violence 
Emotional Violence 
Verbal abuse and threats 
Sexual humiliation 
Jealous and controlling behaviour 
Financial deprivation  
Most Traumatic Experience 
Physical violence 
Emotional violence 
Children witnessing violence 
Most Difficult Feelings 
Helplessness 
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Fear 
Memories or flashbacks 
Ambivalent or mixed feelings towards the perpetrator 
Post-traumatic Changes in Perceptions of the Self and Functioning 
Positive changes 
Negative changes 
Positive and negative changes 
Feelings About Others 
Fear 
Mistrust 
Hate 
Anger  
Feelings Towards Perpetrator 
Hate 
Anger 
Fear 
Numbness 
Love 
Health and Psychopathology 
Symptoms of depression 
Symptoms of anxiety 
History of suicidality and/or current suicidal thoughts and actions 
Dissociation 
Stress-related illnesses and somatic complaints 
Descriptions of Shame 
Social shame or stigma 
Bodily expressions or descriptions of shame 
Hiding behaviours 
Overlapping concepts: humiliation and embarrassment 
Supports and Coping Mechanisms 
Spirituality/religion 
Social support 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
 
 
 
- Centre staff (counselling and management) 
- Friends 
- Children 
Defenses 
- Smiling as a “mask” 
- Avoidance (keeping occupied) 
Transgenerational Trauma 
Direct exposure to physical violence 
Indirect exposure to physical violence (witnessing) 
Direct exposure to sexual violence 
Emotional violence 
Table 7.1 below provides an overview of the number of themes extracted by means of 
categorical content analysis; thereafter each theme will be discussed in turn. Although almost 
all women experienced more than one form of violence, categories were considered mutually 
exclusive, and participants were counted accordingly. Table 7.1, by providing counts, is in its 
nature a reduction of the complexity of the qualitative data obtained, but it does give a useful 
overview and context for the discussion that follows. 
Table 7.1 
Categorical content analysis: Findings 
Intimate partner violence 
Physical violence Sexual violence 
18 5 
          
Emotional violence 
Verbal 
abuse 
Jealous/controlling 
behaviour 
Sexual 
humiliation 
Financial deprivation 
11 10 3 3 
       
Health and psychopathology 
Depression Anxiety Suicidality Dissociation Somatisation 
9 3 10 3 4 
       
Splitting of self 
Descriptions of self (other perspective) 
Inner strength Positive other 
11 7 
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Shame-based self-perceptions 
Worthless/useless/inadequate Dirty and 
contaminated 
Blame and deservedness 
11 3 10 
       
Transgenerational trauma 
12 
 
Exposure to IPV
19
 
All the women interviewed had experienced intimate partner violence.  Cheryl describes the 
ubiquity of IPV in her community:  
“Die omgewing wat ek uit kom is dit amper so, ek sal amper sê dis tradisie. Dis tradisie vir 
die mans om hulle vrouens te slaan of hulle meisies te slaan. Vir hulle is dit sort van om te 
bewys ek is in beheer en ek is baas… Vir ons is dit amper so, as jy nie jou vrou kan klap nie 
dan is jy ‘n moffie.” - Cheryl 
[Where I come from it is almost, I’ll almost say it’s tradition. The tradition is for the men to 
beat their wives or to beat their girlfriends. For them it’s kind of proving I am in control and I 
am the boss… For us it is almost like, if you can’t slap your woman then you’re a pansy.] 
 
Physical Violence 
 
All but one woman reported a history of physical violence perpetrated by her ex-partner. This 
included slapping, kicking, beating with implements and single or multiple stabbings. In one 
instance, an interviewee (Irene) reported that her ex-boyfriend set fire to her wendy house (a 
small wooden house), believing she was inside. This woman described multiple stabbings 
over an extended period of time:  
“He stabbed me, not last year, but the year before, and that’s besides other occasions where he 
also stabbed me. And then when it came to court dates, I withdrew all cases. I tell you, he 
stabbed me 12 times. Last year, just before Easter, I was stabbed 12 times. And believe you 
me, I withdrew the case, in the sense of, ag (oh well), give him another chance, maybe he will 
                                                 
19
 To distinguish participants’ quotes from published authors’ quotes, they will not be indented. Where 
translation is necessary, the translations will be italicised.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
 
 
change.  And then this year he stabbed me 15 times. I can show you the marks. My stab 
wounds were all five to six-and-a-half centimetres wide.” 
Cheryl described the beatings she received: 
“Hy het my geslaan met 'n spyker in 'n plank. Dit het 'n spyker voor in gehad. Maar die seer 
het ek nie gevoel nie. Vir my was dit net, kom, maak net klaar, maak nie saak wat gebeur nie, 
maak net klaar dat dit oor en verby kan wees. Of hy my nou dood slaan, vir my was dit net, 
maak net klaar. Hy het my seker so vir 'n uur-en-'n-half aanhoudend geslaan met daai plank.” 
[He beat me with a nail in a plank. It had a nail at the front. But I didn’t feel the pain. To me 
it was just, come, finish it off, doesn’t matter what happens, just finish it off that it can be over 
and done with. If he kills me, to me it was just, finish it off. He must have hit me with that 
plank for an hour and a half without stopping.] 
 
Sexual Violence 
 
Women relatively commonly reported experiencing sexual violence at the hands of their 
perpetrators. These women described regular demands for sex, always against their wishes.  
Annabelle described her terror at night: 
“As hy inkom in die aande dan bid ek dat dit kan dag raak want in die aande vat hy baie drugs 
dan klap hy my sommer wakker of force vir my om seks te hê”. 
[In the evenings when he comes in, I pray for the day to break, because in the evenings he 
takes a lot of drugs and then he just slaps me awake or forces me to have sex with him.] 
The violence and brutality of sexual attacks against her was described by Jeanine: 
“Daar was tye wat ek nie saam met hom wou geslaap het nie, en dan forseer hy my om by 
hom te slaap. Daar was tye gewees wat hy my klere van my liggaam afgeskeur het.” 
[There were times that I didn’t want to sleep with him, and then he forces me to sleep with 
him. There were times when he tore the clothes off my body.] 
Irene explained to a police officer how she initially did not think that sex against her will was 
rape, as she knew her perpetrator: 
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“He [the police officer] asked me a few questions, and he asked me, did he [perpetrator] have 
sex with you? I said yes. And he did ask me, was it against your will? I said, but I did tell him 
no. I said, I wanted to go to the police station and lay a charge of rape. Then I also said, no, 
but he didn’t rape me, I know the guy!” 
 
Emotional Violence 
 
Emotional violence among these participants included verbal abuse and threats, jealous and 
controlling behaviour, sexual humiliation and financial deprivation.  
Most of the participants reported that their perpetrators were verbally abusive towards them. 
This kind of abuse mainly consisted of belittling and undermining women, often in front of 
their children; using intimate details shared by women against them; and threatening women 
to prevent them from leaving the abusive situation.  
Perpetrators were described as verbally attacking roles and capacities women valued:  
“Daar was 'n stadium wat ek bereid was dat hy my kind kan vat, want ek het al begin glo ek is 
'n slegte ma. Hy het dit elke dag in my kop in gepraat, jy's 'n slegte ma, jy's 'n slegte ma”. 
(Cheryl) 
[There was a stage when I was prepared for him to take my child, because I started to believe 
that I’m a bad mother. Every day he drummed it into my head, you’re a bad mother, you’re a 
bad mother.]  
Patricia described the betrayal of her trust: 
“En om te dink, nadat hy in ‘n relationship gegaan het sou hy vir my beter verstaan het 
because hy weet waarvandaan ek kom en so, but hy het dit actually gebruik; hy het dit 
aanmekaar in my gesig gegooi”. 
[And to think, after he went into a relationship he would understand me better because he 
knows where I come from and so on, but he actually used it, he kept on throwing it into my 
face.] 
Felicia described a similar situation:  
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“Then when I met him, because we were trying to have a relationship, I opened up and I told 
him everything about my past. So because he knows all the things that I did in the past, then 
he keeps on bringing it up and he keeps on trying to push me down because of that.” 
Mandy described her perpetrator’s terrifying threats:  
“Then he threatened me and he said if I’m going to leave him, one of us is going to die. He is 
going to kill me or he is going to kill himself.” 
Cheryl described her perpetrator’s threat to kill her and have her raped by members of a local 
gang:  
“Hy het eenkeer vir my gesê dat hy gaan my vrek skiet, en dan gaan hy dat die hele JCY’s by 
my om gaan en so.” 
[Once he said to me that he would shoot and kill me, and then he would let all the JCY’s 
(name of a gang) rape me and so on.] 
Most of the participants’ perpetrators engaged in jealous and controlling behaviour. These 
men were described as insecure and obsessive in their relationships, and often falsely accused 
women of having sexual relationships with other men.  
Chantal described the following humiliation:  
“[Hy] vat my onderklere en dan sit hy dit in 'n plastic sak, dan sê hy vir my ons moet 
hospitaal toe stap dat die dokter nou vir hom sê met wat se mans ek mee geloop het”. 
[He] would take my underwear and put it in a plastic bag, then he would say we must walk to 
the hospital so that the doctor can tell him with which men I have been] 
Mandy described her perpetrator’s intrusive behaviour:  
“Everything was fine for a while, but there were hints of some sort of obsession or something, 
that he always wanted to be where I am. Like if I’m at work…I used to work at a movie shop, 
so everybody can come in, so he used to like hang around there a lot when I was on duty”. 
Patricia explained that her perpetrator’s jealous behaviour prevented her from taking care of 
her appearance:  
“Ek het nooit eers my hare geblow nie; ek gaan nie eers buitekant toe nie; ek trek my nie eers 
aan nie. Want nou kom Zavier se pa uit die werk uit as ek nou my hare miskien eendag gewas 
het, en dan is dit: is dit ‘n man?”. 
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[I never even blow-dried my hair; I don’t even go outside; I don’t even dress myself. Because 
just now Zavier’s father comes from work and if I perhaps washed my hair one day, and then 
it is: is this for a man?] 
It is worth noting here that my participants, almost without exception, did not take adequate 
care of their physical appearance. This could either be a function of continued or residual fear 
of their perpetrators’ jealous and controlling behaviour, as illustrated in Patricia’s quote 
above, and/or an indicator of depression. Despite the likely effect of poverty on how women 
presented themselves, the lack of care of physical appearance seemed amplified among the 
women I interviewed.  
Some participants reported sexual humiliation. This took the form of perpetrators’ bringing 
other women home and having sex with them in the home women shared with them.  
Veronica described the following:  
“He used to bring women in the house, then he will have sex with the women. I had to stand 
there and look at them.” 
Denise said: 
“The situation with my child’s father, and catching him in my bed with his ex-girlfriend, that 
was very difficult. I’m not a violent type of person, and I had to pretend to be violent at that 
moment. I still told him, if you want to sleep with this woman, just get out of my house. I’m 
not interested in you any more. Just get out. Don’t do your things in my house and in my bed. 
But she just kept on coming back; everyday she comes there to him and he locks the bedroom 
door and they do their thing in the room. I must still hear all the sounds and all that.” 
Financial deprivation was experienced by a few women. This took the form of perpetrators 
not financially supporting women or their children during and/or after the relationship, and of 
men taking money from women or selling their possessions. The latter was accompanied by 
an expectation that women should financially support their perpetrators, including covering 
the cost of their substance misuse.  
Isabelle described how her perpetrator used to abuse her financially:  
“So sometimes I would buy something like a TV set for the house, and when I would go to 
work he would sell that TV for a silly price, maybe R200 or maybe R500. Then he drinks up 
that money.”   
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Some women reported that their perpetrators’ substance misuse problems contributed to, or 
exacerbated their capacity for violence. These substances included dagga (cannabis), Mandrax 
(“buttons”) and Tik (crystal methamphetamine).   
Annabelle described the reason for her perpetrator’s violence as follows:  
“My boyfriend het eintlik begin drugs gebruik, die Tik. Hy raak deurmekaar, hy sien goeters 
en hoor goeters wat nie is nie… Dan kom hy sommer kwaad in, dan klap hy my.” 
[My boyfriend actually started using drugs, the Tik [crystal methamphetamine]. He gets 
confused, he sees things and hears things that don’t exist… Then he just comes in angrily, and 
slaps me.] 
 
Most Traumatic Experience 
 
A number of women described their most traumatic experience as involving emotional abuse. 
Some women cited physical abuse as their most traumatic experience, while others described 
how difficult it was for them when their children witnessed violence between them and their 
perpetrators. The rest of the participants reported that the death of a loved one (a family 
member) and separation from children were the most painful experiences for them.  
Cheryl describes how painful the emotional abuse by her perpetrator was for her:  
“Ek sal altyd sê, vir my is dit wat hy my geslaan het, ek sal nie sê dit was swaar nie. Maar die 
woorde wat hy nou daarby gesê het en goed, dit bly altyd vas sit.” 
[I’ll always say, to me that he hit me, I won’t say that was hard. But the words that he said 
with it and so on, that will always stick.] 
Chantal describes her worst experience as involving an unexpected and life-threatening 
physical assault:  
“Dit was Christmas gewees laas jaar, wat ek saam met my oukie by sy ouma-hulle gewees 
het. Want ons is oppad na sy vriende toe; ons gaan mos nou daar by hulle gaan sit. Toe ons 
nou oor die heuwel kom…nou, daar's 'n dam daar by hulle, en nou lê daar 'n klomp van daai 
harde berg klippe, toe het hy van die klippe beginne op tel en vir my gegooi. En ek moet vir 
hom soebat…en hy gooi nie om te speel nie - hy gooi ernstig om my dood te gooi. Ek het nie 
geweet wat moet ek maak nie.” 
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[It was Christmas last year that I went with my guy to his granny and family. Because we’re 
on our way to his friends; we’re going to go and sit with them, not so? When we got over the 
hill…now, there’s a dam there at their place, and now a lot of those hard mountain stones are 
lying there, then he started picking up the stones and throwing them at me. And I must plead 
with him…he is not throwing as if it’s a game – he throws seriously, to kill me. I didn’t know 
what to do.] 
Children witnessing the violence between parents evoked a great deal of guilt among women, 
and in all three cases, prompted them to leave the relationship. Cheryl describes her guilt as 
follows:  
“En laterhand…hy slaan my en hy slaan my, maar vir hom is dit net, so lank daar nou net 
bloed uit of whatever. En hy slaan my toe oor die kop agterna, en die spyker maak toe 'n gat 
in my kop en die bloed spuit uit, en hy slaan toe weer op my kop en daar's nog 'n gat. En ek 
het vir my dogtertjie op my arm soos wat hy my toe slaan, en toe spuit die bloed toe op haar. 
Sy is onder bloed en sy is histeries. Ek voel niks vir dit wat hy vir my doen nie, dis net die feit 
dat my dogter daaronder moet ly.” 
[And later on…he hits me and he hits me, but for him it is just, as long as there’s blood 
coming out or whatever. And after that he hits me on the head, and the nail makes a hole in 
my head and the blood spurts out, and then he hits me on the head again and there’s another 
hole. And I have my little daugther on my arm while he is hitting me, and then the blood 
spurts onto her. She is covered with blood and she is hysterical. I don’t care what he is doing 
to me, it’s just the fact that it causes my daughter to suffer.] 
 
Most Difficult Feelings 
 
Women described a range of feelings as being the most difficult for them, but responses 
clustered around helplessness, ambivalence towards their perpetrators, fear, and the 
experience of nightmares and flashbacks. Mandy describes how painful her helplessness in 
the context of her abusive relationship was: 
“When something happens to you, if you are able to defend yourself, you feel at least better 
that you tried to defend yourself. But if you can’t do anything, then it’s just a terrible feeling.”   
Irene described her mixed feelings towards her perpetrator as most distressing: 
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“You know, the thoughts and the feelings that I can’t cope with is where I think, I still love 
this man. And then it suddenly comes to me, how can you love him if he did this to you? Then 
I hate him again. I think that is what I call…they say it’s mixed feelings that I have.” 
Fear was cited as the most difficult feeling by other women. In Cheryl’s words, “vir my die 
swaarste was om in vrees te lewe”. [For me, the most difficult thing was to fear for my life.] 
Fear sometimes impeded women’s sleep: 
“There are many nights when I cannot sleep. Then, to me, it’s like he’s [perpetrator] at the 
window. The thought comes to me, but he cannot be at the window because we are upstairs.” 
(Irene) 
Patricia described her vivid nightmares as the source of most distress:  
“Sometimes kry ek nog nightmares, like as ek nou slaap, dan skrik ek wakker en ek het 
miskien gedroom Zavier se pa staan voor my. Hy choke vir my. Nou die nag toe skrik ek weer 
wakker, like struggle en daai, en toe dink ek Zavier se pa staan voor my.” 
[Sometimes I still get nightmares, so when I am sleeping, then I wake up frightened and 
perhaps I dreamt that Zavier’s father was standing in front of me. He chokes me. The other 
night I woke up again, struggling and so on, then I thought Zavier’s father was standing in 
front of me.] 
 
Post-traumatic Changes in Perception of the Self and Functioning 
 
The majority of the women I interviewed reported post-traumatic changes in their feelings 
about themselves and functioning. Changes were either positive or negative, although some 
women reported both positive and negative changes. Negative changes were those that 
endured as a result of the abusive relationship, while positive changes were more recent 
changes facilitated by the separation from the perpetrator. Irene described the negative shift in 
her feelings about herself as a function of her abusive relationship: 
“Before I met David, I felt like a lady… I know he is trying to get me down, man. You see, I 
feel filthy. I feel dirty. I feel messed up.” 
Linda describes a positive post-traumatic change in her perceptions about herself: 
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“I was always just surrounded in that bubble where I thought nothing of myself and that I’m 
worthless, and I can never achieve something because I’m not good enough; I’m not beautiful 
enough. I was living in that bubble all this time, and now I see things so totally differently (in 
a different perspective), that I know I can still achieve something if I just work and try to 
make that first step and start wanting to do something to make a change.” 
A similar change is described by Chantal: 
“Ja, en ek kan nou vir myself kyk in 'n spieël en sê, nee, maar jy's regtig 'n mooi meisie.  En 
ek wil nooit vir my sommer gekyk het in 'n spieël nie want vir my was dit altyd…hoe kan ek 
nou sê…ek het net gedink, nee, ek is nie 'n mooi meisie nie. Ek is nou eerlik, ek het altyd so 
gedink, maar vandag kan ek vir my in 'n spieël kyk en vir myself sê, nee, maar Chantal, jy's 
rêrig 'n mooi meisie. Jy verdien nie dit wat jy gehad het nie.” 
[Yes, I can now look at myself in a mirror and say, no but you are really a beautiful girl. And 
I never wanted just to look in a mirror because for me it was always…how can I put it… I just 
thought, no, I’m not a beautiful girl. I am honest now, I always thought that, but today I can 
look at myself in a mirror and say to myself, no but Chantal, you’re really a beautiful girl. 
You don’t deserve what you got.] 
Other positive post-traumatic changes included increased perspective-taking and empathy, 
and reduced anger.  
 
Feelings About Others 
 
The traumatic experiences that the participants had experienced resulted in a range of negative 
feelings towards others, including mistrust, fear, anger and hate.  
Cheryl explains: 
“Daar op Worcester kan ek niemand vertrou nie. En sake wat ek gemaak het teen hom en 
goeters, val sommer net so deur die mat want daar's nie getuies nie en daar's nie mense wat 
my kan bystaan nie.” 
[There in Worcester I cannot trust anybody. And when I tried to have him prosecuted and 
things, it just came to nothing because there are no witnesses and there aren’t any people 
who can support me.] 
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She adds: 
“Dis hoekom ek is op 'n punt waar dit vir my baie moeilik is om mense té naby my te laat, vir 
seer maak en vir teleurstellings. Ek praat met almal - ek het 'n verhouding met almal - maar ek 
gee hulle nie kans om té na aan my te kom nie.” 
[That’s why I am at a point where it’s very difficult for me to allow people too close to me, 
because of being hurt and disappointments. I talk to everyone – I have a relationship with 
them all – but I don’t give them the chance to get too close to me.] 
Fear of others was characteristic of a number of women’s narratives:  
“Dis amper so, soos nou bang. Ek voel eintlik bang om te meng met mense.” (Christine) 
[It’s almost like, like fear. I actually feel afraid to mix with people.] 
Mandy described both her mistrust and fear: 
“I also find it quite difficult to trust people, but I still know that there are good people. There 
are good people out there, but it’s just a bit difficult, ja (yes), it’s difficult. I’m afraid that 
somebody might try to hurt me as well, like I have been through already. It’s something that I 
don’t want to go through ever again.”   
Irene explains her anger and need for revenge: 
“That’s why I say, I don’t want to be involved with another man. I’ll never think of it because 
I will seker (probably) take my rage…my revenge, I will seker take it out on this next man 
that I must ever get involved with. Because the way he abused me and Harold abused me, I 
think I will abuse that man. Honestly, so I’m not interested. I’m not interested in another 
man.”  
Cheryl explained that people who reminded her of her abuser evoked her hatred:  
“Ek haat 'n persoon wat ander mense se lewe moeiliker maak, of wat 'n ander persoon in die 
gesig vat, of in beheer wil wees van daardie persoon se lewe. Want vir my is dit maar net, jy 
doen dieselfde wat daardie abuser doen, of jy is dieselfde.”  
[I hate a person who makes life difficult for other people, or one who insults another person, 
or tries to control that person’s life. Because for me it is just, you do the same that that abuser 
does, or you are the same.] 
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Feelings Towards Perpetrator 
 
Strong feelings were expressed towards perpetrators of IPV, as indicated in this comment: 
“I hate the man”. (Thobeka) 
Women felt a variety of feelings towards their perpetrators, including fear, anger, hate, 
numbness and love.  
Some women expressed intense fear of their partners. Her reason for experiencing anxiety-
related insomnia is chillingly articulated by Jeanine: 
“En dan lê hy nou so vir my en aankyk in die nag in as die ligte af is. Dan sit hy weer regop. 
Nou in daardie stadium het ek altyd gedink, wat gaan deur jou mind? Ek kan enige iets…'n 
mens kan expect dat so 'n persoon jou gaan wil dood maak in jou slaap.” 
[And then, lying down, he looks at me in the night when the lights are off. Then he sits up 
again. Now in that stage I always thought, what is going through your mind? Anything 
can…one can expect that such a person will kill you in your sleep.] 
Although women expressed a great deal of anger about their abuse, reasons for anger varied. 
Chloe describes the reasons for her anger as follows: 
“Daar is baie kere wat ek kwaad voel. Because baie kere dan try ek nie om daaraan te dink 
nie, because why, dan begin ek kwaad te raak because ek het baie, baie, baie ingesit in die 
verhouding. Ek het my ma-hulle afgestaan en so om vir hom te satisfy, en to think back, hy 
het nie dieselfde gedoen vir my nie.”  
[There are many times that I feel angry. Because there are many times that I try not to think 
about it, because then I get angry because I put a lot, a lot, a lot into the relationship. I gave 
up my mother and them to satisfy him, and to think back, he didn’t do the same for me.] 
Three women described feeling numbness in relation to the perpetrator. Numbness has been 
described as a pervasive feature in the lives of Holocaust survivors (Kraft, 2004). Mandy 
described her total lack of feeling towards her perpetrator in the following way: 
“I just feel numb towards him. I don’t feel anything”. 
Isabelle expressed love for her perpetrator. Disturbingly, she described her feelings towards 
her perpetrator in the following way: 
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“My husband, honestly, I love him. I love him. At some point I was thinking, it’s better I go 
back there and take the abuse.  It’s better being abused by someone who loves you.”   
 
Health and Psychopathology 
 
A number of women reported symptoms of depression (persistent sadness/depressed mood, 
loss of interest in personal appearance, and/or excessive sleeping/hypersomnia), generalised 
anxiety, a history of suicidality or current suicidal thoughts or actions and/or dissociation. 
Some women also reported stress-related illnesses and somatic complaints.  
Chantal described her depression, which persists in her current life, as follows: 
“Ek het gevoel…van die abuse besigheid…ek het gevoel eintlik laat ek ook suicide wou 
commit het. Ek het gevoel niemand gee om vir my nie en niemand is lief vir my nie, en daar 
gaan nie iemand wees wat my kan help nie. Die gevolg sal wees dat ek alleen wees, en ek huil 
en whatever, of ek loop sommer weg van die huis af, somtye. En daar was tye wat ek nie wil 
geëet het nie; bly sommer vir weke sonder kos want ek voel depressed. En ek het baie maer 
geraak - ek wou nie eet nie. Ek het depressed geword. Daar was ook tye wat ek net wou 
slaap.” 
[I felt…from the abuse business…I felt that I actually also wanted to commit suicide. I felt 
that no one cared about me and no one loves me, and there will be no one to help me.The 
result will be that I will be alone, and I cry and whatever, or I just walk away from home, 
sometimes. And there were times that I did not want to eat; stay without food for weeks 
because I feel depressed. And I got very thin – I didn’t want to eat. I became depressed. There 
were also times that I just wanted to sleep.] 
Felicia describes sleep as an escape from challenging feelings: 
“I can’t cope, sometimes I’ll just sleep the whole day and wish things would go away. And 
yes, I wake up, then I’m still in the same place.” 
Suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts were common among my participants, and were 
always understood as the results of their trauma exposure. Jeanine described the relentlessness 
of her thoughts of suicide:  
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“Maar daar was tye, ek het al probeer selfmoord…ek het dit al baie kere oorweeg, en dan het 
ek dit weer gelos, en dan kom dit weer op en dan los ek dit weer.”   
[But there were times, I have tried to commit suicide…I have often considered it, and then I 
left it again, and then it comes up again and then I leave it again.] 
The intrusiveness of her suicidal feelings is expressed by Denise: 
“Because while I was still at home, I sit down and I start thinking about what happened, and I 
just start crying or I think of taking my own life – and things like that.” 
Some women expressed a great deal of generalised anxiety, which was attributed to their 
abusive relationships. Cheryl described her continued apprehensive expectation that she is 
going to be hurt as a result of her perpetrator’s unpredictability: 
“Ek was baie lief vir boeke lees, maar sodra ek té lank lees, die stilte beginne raak vir my 
kriewelrig. Vir my het die stilte altyd iets beteken: wat kom nou weer na die stilte? So ek het 
nou al beginne gewoond raak aan, ek moet nou iets verwag ashy was nou heeltemal stil of hy 
was nou gister heeldag reg, en nou as hy nou inkom dan moet ek heeltyd sy houding en sy 
gesig en alles dop hou vir enige iets wat hom nou kan laat snap - klein dingetjies.”   
[I was very fond of reading books, but as soos as I read for too long, the silence makes me 
fidgety. For me silence always meant: what will follow the silence? So I have become 
accustomed to, I must expect something when… yesterday he was completely quiet, or 
yesterday he was fine the whole day, and now when he comes in then I must always watch his 
body language and his face and everything that can make him snap – small things.] 
Dissociation is a common defense to trauma (Putnam, 1989). Irene describes how she 
experiences a brutal attack by her perpetrator in the third person, as if looking at something 
unreal unfold:  
“I don’t know what happened, and he just took that knife and he put it into my leg, into my 
knee here. I’ll show you that mark. And here this knife is standing upright in my leg. I think 
that was the most…oooh, my god. I looked at the knife. I grabbed it, but it wouldn’t come 
out. I tried to get up, I couldn’t get up. Eventually, when I got up, I couldn’t walk. I actually 
did this with my leg, and once I did, I had to pull that knife out of my leg. And I think, that to 
me, pulling out his knife that he planted in my knee…he planted that knife there. I had to pull 
it out. It’s like watching a movie… A horrible movie.”   
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Women framed their physical illnesses and symptoms in particular ways, stressing the role 
played by trauma in their ill-health. Stress-related illnesses and somatic complaints included 
heart conditions, high blood pressure, nausea, headaches and infections such as pneumonia.  
 
Descriptions of Shame 
 
“In the beginning, was the relation”  (Buber, 1958, p. 31). 
Understandings of shame differed in this study from previous research. Among these 
participants, shame was either denied outright or it manifested as another emotion. H. B. 
Lewis (1971) argues that one of the most powerful defenses against shame is denial. Even if 
they admitted to feeling shame, the women I interviewed generally struggled to articulate 
what shame felt like, and what it meant to them. Many had limited vocabularies, and found it 
difficult to describe their emotional lives. When present, however, shame was often described 
in social or relational terms. So the shame described by the women who experienced it was 
external shame, which overlaps significantly with humiliation.  
A number of women referred to humiliation when asked about shame. Irene described her 
humiliation when her friends saw her injuries, emphasising the role of a hostile, mocking 
audience:  
“If Steve hits me now, he will walk with me, with that blue eye or that stab wound, wherever 
it is on my body, and it’s like nothing happened. But me, walking with him…we go to town 
Centre, say, we’re going to Cape Town now and we’re going shopping…and I will now walk 
past Maureen or one of my friends, I would feel so ashamed of myself, thinking, they know 
why my eye is blue… I would feel so ashamed of myself, look what I look like!” 
Veronica describes how she lied about the cause of her injuries because of her humiliation:  
“I said, jinne (goodness), man, I don’t want my family to see this. I always hid, and I always 
lied to them. Even my boss and my friends, they see me with blue eyes or a broken arm, I 
always lie. I would say, no, I got hurt, and that and that.” 
The perception that she is surrounded by a hostile or mocking audience also emerges from 
Christine’s narrative:  
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“Daar by ons is dit mos nou amper so, dis mos 'n klein dorpie, nou daar's mos nou baie wat 
nou al weet watter dinge ek nou al deurgemaak het en so aan. Ek voel skaam as ek partykeers 
loop in die straat.” 
[There with us it is almost so, isn’t it, it’s a small little town, isn’t it, now there are many who 
know by now what things I have gone through and so on. I feel ashamed when I sometimes 
walk in the street. ] 
Feelings about the self are intricately implicated in the experience of shame and humiliation. 
Mandy expresses this relationship well:  
“When he used to tell me that I’m useless, I’m going to be a nobody and I’m good for nothing 
and all that, I used to feel that’s maybe how I am, and I used to be ashamed of myself.”   
Finally, shame included feelings of being at fault; something for which the survivor was to 
blame. Patricia describes this feeling: 
“Vir my, iets soos abuse, is iets om skaam te wees oor.” 
[For me, something like abuse, is something to be ashamed of.] 
For Chloe, shame is judgement by others (which is characteristic of both humiliation and 
stigma); she says “ek is bang mense vind uit en hulle judge my.”  
[I am afraid people find out and they judge me]. 
A number of women talked about the stigmatised status of survivors of IPV, for example:  
“Because the stuff that I hear from staying in a shelter, people are going to classify you 
as…you are like…how can I say…you are useless, that’s why you had to go and stay in a 
shelter.  You can’t look after yourself… The stigma of having to stay in a shelter.”   
Shame was also confused with embarrassment. Embarrassment is a less intense emotion than 
shame, and it may be evaluative or non-evaluative in nature. It emerges in the context of 
relatively trivial or amusing transgressions, and is associated with a great deal of 
physiological arousal (e.g. blushing) (Tangney et al., 1996). Considering the gravity and 
intensity of IPV experiences, this choice of word seems at odds with the lived experience of 
IPV. In the following quote, Denise responds to my asking her what shame felt like, by 
describing both embarrassment and humiliation (hostile and mocking audience): 
“I was just embarrassed… I was also hurt. And I couldn’t go to anyone to ask them advice or 
to get help from them, because in that area everybody just sees for themselves. If they see 
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anything going on, then they are there first to see what’s going on, and then they laugh behind 
your back – you know, things like that.” 
Six women expressed shame in bodily terms, either verbally or through body language. Irene 
described her bodily shame: 
“It’s like I’m not a woman anymore; being a woman has been taken away from me. I just feel 
like I’m just there because I must be there. I cannot tell you how I feel, but sometimes I feel I 
can’t feel like a woman any more. How can a woman feel if her body looks like this? I don’t 
know if I’m explaining myself and if you can understand me, but the reason why also I don’t 
want to get involved or be involved with another man, I don’t want to answer his questions 
when he asks me questions: what happened there? What happened there? That’s why my 
body is like a map. It’s for me to…that is also one reason why I don’t want to get involved 
with another man, because I’m too conscious about my body at the moment, very, very, 
conscious about my body.”   
As mentioned earlier, a number of women displayed bodily shame during the interviews, 
including covering their faces with their hands, bending or curling over, or pulling clothes 
over their faces as they talked about their traumatic experiences (bodily expression of the 
wish to hide, which is so typical of shame). Many whispered, and their narratives were 
peppered with pauses and hesitations, also verbal indicators of shame. 
Lisa verbalised her understanding of shame in bodily terms, indicating its depth and 
pervasiveness:  
“It’s like something that crawls under your skin and you can’t get rid of it.” 
Among these participants, shame was also described using vague and diffuse emotional terms 
such as “hurt”, “pain” and “sore”. These words do illustrate, however, that shame is a 
negatively charged emotion for these women, which is consistent with the literature. Other 
words indicating shame were evaluations women made about themselves, like “stupid”, 
“worthless”, “empty”, “less than a person”. 
Shame was additionally associated with hiding behaviour in two of the women’s narratives. 
When asked what shame felt like, these women described that it felt like they had to avoid 
others, and hide from them. As Mandy said, “Maybe I must just keep myself from people”. 
This understanding of shame clearly overlaps with fear and mistrust of others.  
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A number of women felt that their financial dependence was a source of shame for them. 
Veronica responded to my question of how shame felt in the following way: 
“It’s like, being here I don’t have nothing. I don’t have an income… I don’t have a weekly 
income; not a monthly income; not a fourth-monthly income; I don’t have child support; I 
don’t have a grant. I thank the Lord that at Saartjie Baartman I eat every day. But I’m not 
talking about that. What I’m trying to say is, being here is not like being at home. I was very 
dependent upon where …the salary came in every Friday and it was given to me. I had money 
in my pocket. Here I don’t have money” 
 
Supports and Coping Mechanisms 
 
Religion played an important protective function in the lives of participants, as indicated in 
this comment from Veronica: 
“I’m very religious and I love my religion.”  (Veronica) 
A number of women cited spirituality or religion as a primary support in their lives. They also 
described a range of social supports. Other coping mechanisms included specific defenses and 
substance misuse.  
Mandy described her supports in the following way:  
“I think just praying to God for strength, and also just talking to friends. Counselling helps 
also. And just the urge to go on and try and survive, try to provide for your kids, try to look 
after them.” 
The role of religion in calming and consoling her is described by Isabelle: 
“I’m a Christian, and the one thing that takes me through all of this, it’s praying. If it weren’t 
for God…Ja (yes), so when I’m hurt, I always…when I pray, and after praying, I feel like I 
have this comfort in me; somebody tells me it’s okay and somebody is with me.”   
Denise describes the powerful protective role played by the church and praying:  
“I go to church and I listen to what they have to say there. You know, all these negative 
thoughts, praying and asking God for help, that helped me a lot. It helped me a lot to stop 
thinking all these negative thoughts. And afterwards, I couldn’t blame myself.  I mean, I 
didn’t ask for that [the abuse].”   
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A few of the women’s narratives were shaped by a broader religious discourse that 
emphasised the role of forgiveness. These women stressed that they would “forgive, but not 
forget” the trauma they had experienced. For Denise, the role of God was central in her 
decision to forgive her perpetrator: 
“I still forgive him, because if God forgives, why can’t I forgive?”    
Many of the women felt that their counselling sessions were the most significant support in 
their lives. Chantal described how helpful the interventions offered at the Centre are to her: 
“Hier by Saartjie Baartman, hulle help jou lekker. Daar is baie bystand van die staff. Hulle 
laat jou nie voel asof jy alleen is met daardie probleem nie, en jy sit alleen hier in die wêreld 
met jou probleem nie en daar's niemand wat jou kan help nie. Hulle laat jou sommer verstaan, 
maar ons is daar om vir jou te help, en hulle bied baie support groups… Jy het jou support 
group en jou eie counsellor. Dan het jy 'n sessie met jou eie counsellor wat jy praat nou van 
wat gebeur het, met jou counsellor en so, en dit help jou baie.” 
[Here at Saartjie Baartman, they help you nicely. There’s a lot of support from the staff. They 
don’t make you feel as if you are alone with that problem, and that you are sitting alone in the 
world with your problem and there is no one who can help you. They let you understand, but 
we are there to help you, and they offer many support groups… You’ve got your support 
group and your own counsellor. Then you have a session with your own counsellor that you 
talk to about what happened, and that helps you a lot.] 
Family did not feature as a significant support to all but two of the women I interviewed. 
Many women described conflictual and rejecting relationships with family members. Often, 
however, women severed contact with their families to protect them from the perpetrator, as 
described by Irene: 
“Before you (the perpetrator) go that far, rather stab me and rather hit me, but leave my 
family.  I protected them on so many occasions; then I just walk back with him and there we 
go again, like nothing ever happened.  But knowing deep in my heart, I know what I am going 
in for now, but rather kill me than hurt my family who doesn’t deserve this.  Because they 
cannot be blamed for what is happening between the two of us.”   
A few women cited friends as supports, while other women felt that their children helped 
provide meaning in their lives. Cheryl describes the role of her daughter in her life in the 
following way: 
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“Al wat my aan die gang hou is die feit dat ek 'n wonderlike dogtertjie het, en ek wil vir haar 
die beste gee.” 
[All that keeps me going is the fact that I have a wonderful little daugther, and I want to give 
her the best.] 
A number of women reported that they wore a smile as a “mask” to conceal difficult feelings 
from others. This seemed to help women feel less vulnerable and exposed. When trauma 
survivors speak of “masks” they are talking of concealing their authentic, shameful selves 
(Kraft, 2004). One survivor in Kraft’s (2004, p. 380) study says: “Beatrice S. admits in her 
testimony that her children do not know the ‘real’ me, conceding that she is playing the part 
that is expected of her: ‘You put on a smile and you go. You just become an actress.’” 
Linda describes this coping mechanism as follows: 
“I always carry a smile on my face, no matter what the circumstances or what position I might 
find myself in. I always can…because that is the way I think…it’s more like a mask. So that 
is my mask: I always have a smile on my face.”   
Veronica said: 
“I won’t come to you and tell you this is my problem and that is my problem. I’ll keep it to 
myself. I’ve always got a smile on my face.” 
Another coping mechanism employed by women was keeping occupied in order to avoid 
confronting and dealing with difficult emotions. Distraction can have enormous therapeutic 
value for people trying to escape unbearable pain, albeit temporarily (Kraft, 2004). In 
response to being asked how she copes with challenging feelings, one woman replied: 
“I tried not to think. I just blocked it out. And keep busy, at all times keep busy… I would do 
anything just to avoid it.”  
Cheryl said:  
 “Vir my depressie, ek gebruik my medikasie. En ek hou my besig.” 
[For my depression, I take my medication. And I keep myself busy.] 
Finally, both women who abused substances as a method of coping reported using alcohol. I 
sensed that more than just the two women who admitted to using substances did in fact rely 
on this method of coping, however the Centre policy was zero tolerance of any kind of 
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substance use. It is possible that my affiliation with Centre staff meant that women withheld 
this kind of information from me. 
 
Transgenerational Trauma 
 
The majority of the participants were exposed to some form of trauma during their 
childhoods. The types of trauma they were exposed to include direct exposure to physical 
violence, witnessing physical violence between caregivers, direct exposure to sexual violence, 
and emotional violence. Often this exposure was more traumatic and distressing for the 
women I interviewed than the adult-onset IPV. In addition, in agreement with much of the 
literature in this field, my participants who had suffered both child abuse and adult onset 
abuse tended to have poorer mental health outcomes than those who had only endured adult 
onset abuse (serious histories of depression, suicidality and dissociation for example).  
Many of my participants experienced beatings during their childhoods. Mandy described her 
abuse as follows: 
“She [mother] would hit us for any silly thing you did. We were at boarding school… I was at 
boarding school since I was about maybe nine years old, and if I lost a pair of socks, she 
would hit me. She would let me lie on the bed, naked, and hit me with an electricity cord. It 
was just normal now, but it was very, very painful.” 
A few of the participants reported witnessing their fathers physically assaulting their mothers. 
One of these women (Irene) describes being exposed to such violence, but fails to link this 
kind of exposure to her own abusive relationship later in life: 
“I was never abused, really, honestly. I was raised not very rich. We were poor. Daddy and 
mommy never had much money, but we survived. We ate every night. There was never 
abuse. My daddy, ja (yes), he used to hit mommy at times, but where I was concerned, I don’t 
know, I was never abused, not by my daddy and not by my mommy. We were reared very 
strictly, that is just to be married properly and to have manners. Where the house was 
concerned, it must be clean. But never abuse, never abuse. I don’t know where this abuse 
comes from.” 
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Women also described experiencing sexual abuse during their childhoods. This kind of abuse 
was shrouded in secrecy, and the women described being reluctant to disclose their abuse, 
mainly due to feelings of guilt towards their caregivers (mothers).  
One of these women (Felicia) explains how isolated she was in her suffering; how she felt she 
had no option but to endure the abuse:  
“When I was five years old, my mom’s cousin close by was expecting a baby, so she asked to 
look after me so that the baby could have someone to play with. I was five, and then the baby 
was still-born, so I went to go and stay with my aunt. Her reason really to ask me to come and 
stay with her, was so that she could get the grant money. So she took me and she got the grant 
money
20
. I stayed with her, and at the age of six or seven, her son was roundabout fourteen or 
fifteen, he [her son] started sexually abusing me at that age of six or seven. And it went on 
and it went on, and I wanted to tell my mother, but at the very same time this woman is trying 
to help me, and if I tell my mother I’ll be trying to create…that’s what I thought when I was 
still a child…that I’ll be trying to create a fight and I won’t have the future that my mother 
wants me to have. Like if I stay with my aunt, I’ll go to good schools and I’ll have a proper 
life. Then, if I stay with my mom, things were hard for her. She was kind of suffering, and she 
had me at an early age, and she just couldn’t take care of me and she had a life of her own.” 
Patricia described similarly protecting her mother:  
“My pa het tronk toe gegaan omdat hy my suster verkrag het. Toe was sy 14 jaar oud. But wat 
my ma tot vandag toe nie weet nie, dieselfde het met my ook gebeur, en nie een van hulle 
weet nie. Ek is altyd die sterk een in ons se familie. Hulle het altyd op my skouer gehuil, nou 
ek kan nie myself gebring het om my ma nog…want toe sy uitvind daaroor, toe is dit amper 
soos, sy is ook gebruik al, ek kan nie nog vir haar verder oor die edge gestuur het nie. Ek kan 
dit nie oor my hart gekry het nie.” 
[My father went to jail because he raped my sister. She was 14 years old then. But what my 
mother doesn’t know up to this day, is that the same happened to me, none of them know. I am 
always the strong one in the family. They have always cried on my shoulder, now I cannot 
bring myself to…my mother…because when she found out about that, it was almost, she has 
also been used, I could not send her further over the edge. I couldn’t bring myself to do it.] 
Felicia reported emotional abuse during her childhood. She described being broken down and 
made to feel she deserved suffering, as well as ridiculed by her family:  
                                                 
20
 The narrator is referring here to a Foster Care grant, part of the social security provision in South Africa. 
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“And also, my family telling me…not all of them, but some of them…telling me that I won’t 
get anywhere in life. I was born to suffer – those kind of things. Now they rejoice because 
they know that I’m suffering, and now I’m calling them to ask them for help. Those kind of 
things, it hurts when you are picking up that phone and calling that person, and you know 
even if that person helps you or not, but you know that you have the problem that you always 
have. Around my family, when I’m going to places and they see me, I’m a joke. That kind of 
thing, it hurts.”   
Quite a number of the participants were raised by their grandmothers. These women reported 
being well cared for during their childhoods, and although some felt rejected by their parents’ 
absence, they were grateful for the substitute care their grandmothers provided.   
In summary, the categorical content analysis revealed themes broadly centred around 
experiences of chronic trauma, post-traumatic reactions and functioning, understandings of 
shame, and supports and coping. Women were exposed to a great deal of violence, including 
physical, sexual and emotional violence. Women reported trauma-related depression, anxiety, 
a history of suicidality or current suicidal thoughts or actions, and/or dissociation. Some 
women also reported stress-related illnesses and somatic complaints. Some of the most 
difficult experiences women reported were emotional abuse and having their children witness 
the abuse between them and their ex-partner. Women used religion and counselling to help 
them cope. They also kept busy to keep themselves distracted, and spoke of wearing a smiling 
“mask” to cover painful feelings. Women described a range of negative feelings towards 
others, including mistrust, fear, anger and hate. They described fear, numbness, anger, hate 
and love towards the perpetrator. Women expressed both very positive beliefs about 
themselves, particularly that they are strong survivors, and very negative self-perceptions, 
which centred around shame. Shame was viewed as a social emotion (external shame), and 
often described as humiliation (and sometimes embarrassment), which required the presence 
of a mocking, hostile audience. This was interpreted in socio-cultural terms. 
Transgenerational violence was common, and was more distressing than adult-onset IPV. 
In this chapter there was a striking co-occurrence between chronic trauma, and shame and 
psychopathology. One of the most significant findings emerging from the categorical content 
analysis was the presence of a very particular form of trauma-related psychopathology, the 
split self amongst participating women (which is not reported here) – the authentic self who 
admitted to a great deal of shame when asked indirectly (which is related to the internalisation 
of the bad object), and the false self who was described in surprisingly positive terms (when 
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asked directly). Ten of the nineteen women presented with a split self. Due to the 
predominance of this theme, I have selected it as the focus of its own chapter, which follows.  
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
209 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Results and Discussion II 
 
“In adult life, forced competence may lead to considerable success. None of her 
achievements in the world redound to her credit, however, for she usually perceives 
her performing self as inauthentic and false. Rather, the appreciation of others simply 
confirms her conviction that no one can truly know her and that, if her secret and true 
self were recognised, she would be shunned and reviled” (Herman, 1997, p. 105). 
This chapter forms a theoretical “bridge” between chapter 7 (categorical content analysis) and 
chapter 9 (categorical form analysis), by situating the discussion in both phenomenological 
terms (women’s subjective perceptions of themselves), and paying attention to social 
constructivist-determined linguistic features of the women’s (counter) narratives. 
Phenomenologically, there are four aspects which are essential to the subjective experience of 
shame. Before discussing these features below, it is worth noting that shame was  described 
earlier as the inevitable response to loss of love; the loss of an important intimate relationship 
(H. B. Lewis, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c). This is consistent with the experience of my participants. 
My analysis of the authentic and the false self is based on Herman’s (1997) understanding of 
the terms. She argues that the development of a malevolent, shameful authentic identity is 
concealed by a socially conforming and valued false self (Herman, 1997). She diverges from 
Winnicott in that she does not focus mostly on the parenting context, and in that she 
understands this split to occur as a result of a multitude of different traumas. For Winnicott, 
the true self is who we are in the truest sense; it is when we feel alive and energised and 
stimulated; and only the true self can be creative and can be real (Anderson & Winer, 2003). 
When acting from the false self, the individual feels s/he is denying him/herself, s/he feels 
hollow, empty or unreal, that s/he is doing what is expected or necessary, rather than what is 
personally meaningful (Anderson & Winer, 2003). These authors argue that the false self 
develops when the child responds to the caregivers, rather than when the child is responded to 
by the caregiver, and the manifestation of the false self is an act of compliance and an 
expression of a wish to be loved.  
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Mollon (2002) argues that shame arises when the self expresses authentic feelings and 
aspirations which s/he feels are not recognised, understood or accepted. He argues that it is 
“akin to emerging from behind a mask, or taking off a costume, or exposing oneself as having 
been a fraud or imposter” (Mollon, 2002, p. 17).  The fear accompanying the shame of the 
emergence of the authentic self is that the self will embarrass the other, and that this always 
involves disruptions in the expectations the person or observer had of the self (Mollon, 2002). 
This leads to a continual monitoring of the presentation of the self, ensuring it fits in with the 
expectations of the other, which is the basis of self-consciousness (Mollon, 2002). Thus, 
shame emerges when there are discrepancies between the expectations of the other and the 
real emotions and behaviours of the self (Mollon, 2002).  
Although all  selves are constructed and fictional to some extent insofar as they are based on 
the roles, standards, rules, values and images available in the pre-existing culture into which 
the self is born, this process can become pathological when a loved other’s narcissism and 
grandiosity takes precedence over recognising, understanding and accepting the self (Mollon, 
2002). Mollon (2002) observes that the self fears being discovered that s/he is not what the 
loved other assume s/he is; that this knowledge will be met with shock and rejection, and that 
this possibility is so shame-filled that the self has to make absolutely sure that the authentic 
self remains concealed. 
  
Shame From a Phenomenological Perspective: A Brief Overview 
 
Firstly, to recap shame is an internal, stable and global emotion (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
Secondly, shame involves feeling that the self as a whole is inadequate, flawed, useless, 
defective and unworthy. Thirdly, shame involves wanting to hide or disappear, which is often 
encoded in bodily form. Fourthly, shame is associated with intense and painful emotions such 
as sadness or anger. Fifthly, in shame states, there is a split between affect and cognition – 
there is restricted cognitive activity and a great deal of affective (and autonomic) activity. 
How this manifests is that in these shame states, the self is unable to think clearly, rationally, 
logically and coherently, and terminates all activity; it is accompanied by a kind of paralysis 
that involves the inability to talk and the inability to take any action. Simultaneously, there a 
great deal of sensory activity and intense emotional experience. Shame also involves the 
integration of subject and object. There is a peculiar kind of fusion that occurs in shame 
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reactions, once the negative evaluation of the real or imagined audience has been internalised 
and has fused with the self. Thus, the self is divided in shame reactions in two ways – 
cognition and emotion are split, and the self is determined by the internalisation of the 
condemning and disparaging other, while it is simultaneously intensely aware of itself (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971). This divided activity of the self makes it very challenging for the self to 
function optimally.  
 
Theorising the Split Self 
 
Individuals who have been abused often feel inferior because they did not, or could not, help 
themselves (Cloitre, Cohen, & Koenen, 2006). Often, these survivors answer the question of 
why the abuse happens, particularly when at the hands of a loved one, with the belief that they 
deserved it (Cloitre et al., 2006). Messages that the self is worthless, and that their lives are of 
no value leaves the self feeling annihilated (Cloitre et al., 2006). Frequently survivors are 
identified as causing the abuse, because they are inherently “bad”, “defective” (Cloitre et al., 
2006). These feelings are amplified when the survivor betrays herself by keeping secret the 
abuse s/he is enduring, so conspiring with the perpetrator (Cloitre et al., 2006). Feelings of 
“badness”, self-blame and deservedness of abuse were rife amongst my participants. Negative 
self-perceptions, by definition, mimic shame (global negative emotional evaluation of the 
self). There is a great deal of overlap between constructing the self as “bad” and shame; these 
two constructs co-occur, and mutually influence each other. As has been noted, feelings of 
“badness” or “deservedness” are a typical defense among survivors of chronic trauma 
(Fairbairn, 1943). This overlaps with the process of identification with the aggressor, which 
links to feelings of shame-based rage (Ferenczi as cited in Orange, 2011). As I have 
previously pointed out, these survivors tend to identify with and internalise unbearably bad 
objects and bear the burden of shame because it is more tolerable to believe that the self is bad 
and so remain in control, than it is to accept that the loved perpetrator, whose abuse is random 
and unpredictable, is bad (Fairbairn, 1943). 
The characteristics about themselves that women reported included being worthless, useless 
and inadequate, dirty or contaminated, and as deserving the abuse they endured. However, 
they also reported being caring, being communicative, being sensitive or soft-hearted, being 
helpful and being friendly. But inner strength was the most common and most important 
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positive quality reported by the participants. Women’s descriptions of themselves as strong 
and as survivors are agentive, resistance narratives – rejecting the construction of women as 
helpless, subjugated, and disempowered. Bamberg (2004) argues that counter-narratives such 
as these are often characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions; a vacillation between 
complicity with master narratives, and active opposition. These discrepancies and 
contradictions are also indicative of multiplicity – of a plurality or split in identity (Halbertal 
& Koren, 2006). Individuals who have been traumatised, and feel a great deal of shame, often 
develop a split between the idealised projected self (the strong and proud survivor), and the 
inherently faulty or deficient (shameful) authentic self which s/he believes underlies her 
inauthentic projected persona (Herman, 1997). It is the hidden authentic self which is so 
“bad”, so shamed, that it deserves to be punished. This split has been described by Holocaust 
survivors as “a double existence” or “double lives” (Kraft, 2004, p. 379). This links to the 
emphasis that women I interviewed put on the presence of a hostile or mocking audience in 
shame (or more accurately, humiliation) – perhaps shame is most acutely felt when there is a 
danger of the hidden authentic self being exposed. 
Below I provide extracts from 10 interviews, where I ask women two questions – how they 
would describe themselves, and how they feel about themselves. These questions often 
elicited quite different responses, with women describing themselves in positive terms, and 
perceiving themselves in negative terms (feeling a great deal of shame and in some cases, 
humiliation). To me this suggests that when asked about feelings, which go deeper than mere 
descriptions, one is more likely to tap into the concealed authentic self situated beneath the 
projected false self.  
 
Extracts From Cases Which Demonstrate the Split Self
21
 
 
Linda 
“I’m starting to build up more confidence.  I feel more confident than ever before.  And 
for me, that is strange because I don’t really think anything of myself.  I was always just 
surrounded in that bubble where I thought nothing of myself and that I’m worthless, 
and I can never achieve something because I’m not good enough; I’m not beautiful 
enough.  I was living in that bubble all this time. 
                                                 
21
 I will highlight in bold words or phrases indicative of shame and positive descriptions of the self to draw 
attention to psychic splitting in the narratives. 
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…I see now that I’ve got ability and that I’m capable of doing a lot of things, but…that’s 
hard. 
 
I would describe myself as…I’m a good person.  I used to be closed up, but I’m starting to 
open up.  I love being around people.  I’m very forgiving, that’s the sort of person I am.  I 
always carry a smile on my face, no matter what the circumstances or what position I might 
find myself in.  I always can…because that is the way I think…it’s more like a mask.  So that 
is my mask: I always have a smile on my face. …. The true me is really a sensitive 
person; very much sensitive; very childish – I can say that.  I have a lot of love to give, a lot 
of love to give.  So I don’t see myself ever being bitter, but letting go of the past is hard.  
 
And me, I was born with a talent and nobody…with me**22 to go to university to do 
anything.  You know, to stay for whatever with…people approached me and asked me: 
“Linda, how do you do this?  Because here I am a professor or here I am this, and you know 
how to do it exactly, but I had to go to college to go and study for it - and here you have it.  
You were born with it.”  I don’t know, my given talent is to perform **.  I was born with 
that.  I was born with that…Because I’ve seen how people get…how people are touched by 
my music and by my singing.  I have never seen people sit with a dry eye.  A person told me 
they get goose bumps whenever I sing.   
  
But I feel like I want to hide where nobody could ever find me.  I feel like just being in the 
woods, all by myself and not being surrounded with the people, just all by myself where I 
know I won’t be harmed any more”.   
 
Interpretation 
This is a very interesting narrative because it contains so many contradictions, most notably 
for instance, the shame words, “I don’t really think anything of myself.  I was always just 
surrounded in that bubble where I thought nothing of myself and that I’m worthless” are 
contrasted by the realisation that she is able, that she is capable, at the end of the paragraph, 
and that “I am a good person”, including loving being with people and being forgiving, in the 
next paragraph. What I find particularly thought-provoking is the evidence of the split self – 
the false, projected persona who wears a smile as a “mask”, and who is so talented, and the 
                                                 
22
 The stars indicate a break in the text – what the narrator says is inaudible. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
 
 
 
“true” self that does not realise her talents, is sensitive and child-like (suggesting her inner 
vulnerability and defencelessness). Perhaps it is this inner child that wants to hide from 
others, a typical shame response – the urge to sink through the ground and cease to exist; 
become invisible. It is also interesting to note that the narrator refers to existing in a “bubble” 
more than once, suggestive of being split off or separated from others, isolation, and on a 
clinical level, perhaps even dissociation.  
 
Chantal 
“Hoe kan ek nou sê…okay, ek sien 'n verandering in my.  Ek was 'n baie skraal mens gewees.  
My ma is ook 'n skraal mens.  Ek en my ma was ewe skraal.  Maar ek kon sien ek het darem 
'n bietjie vetjies op getel.  Ja, en ek kan nou vir myself kyk in 'n spieël en sê, nee, maar jy's 
regtig 'n mooi meisie.  En ek wil nooit vir my sommer gekyk het in 'n spieël nie want vir my 
was dit altyd…hoe kan ek nou sê…ek het net gedink, nee, ek is nie 'n mooi meisie nie.  Ek 
is nou eerlik, ek het altyd so gedink, maar vandag kan ek vir my in 'n spieël kyk en vir myself 
sê, nee, maar Chantal, jy's rêrig 'n mooi meisie.  Jy verdien nie dit wat jy gehad het nie… 
Chantal is 'n baie grapperige mens, en Chantal is nie bakleierig nie.  Nie lief om mense 
in te doen nie.  Ek skel nie soos 'n straat-lêer nie.  Ek dink dis nou omdat ek weet ek is nie 
daai persoon nie, ek jok nou nie vir my auntie nie.  Chantal is 'n baie lieflike mens.  Okay, 
wat is daar nog…ek kan veel dinge…maar ek onthou dit nie… Okay, 'n mens wat baie lief 
is vir kommunikeer. Al ken ek nie mense nie, dan kommunikeer ek so dat dit lyk ons ken 
mekaar jare. Ek was altyd skaam gewees om met mense te praat, maar ek het daai skaamgeit 
eenkant gesit want skaamgeit bring 'n mens nêrens nie.  En wat is daar nog…maar dit is soos 
ek is. Ek is 'n baie sagte mens. As iemand vir my in doen of beledig of so, baie gou vir 
huil.   
 
Okay, ek vat dit as my skuld dat ek voor die tyd 'n kêrel gevat het en so.  Ek vat dit as 
my skuld dat ek my skool loopbaan net so gelos het; nie meer geworry het van my ouma 
en so nie. … Laterhand, was ek so skaam gewees. 
 
Ek het al so gevoel. Niemand dink niks van my nie. Ek voel minderwaardig. Hoe kan ek 
sê…almal wat met my kommunikeer en so, dink niks van my nie.  Ek voel net baie 
minderwaardig - so, baie minderwaardig… Die omstandighede waarin ek was, dit het 
my altyd so laat voel.    
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Hulle sê so ek lag vir als. Ek kan nie help nie, maar ek is baie lief daarvoor.  Nou sê 
hulle, iemand kan my slaan, seer maak of wat ook al, dan lag ek ook.  Die vroue sê 
hierbo, jy's so lief vir lag, Chantal, iemand kan jou slaan of wat ook al, maar dan lag jy ook 
daaroor.  Nou sê hulle vir my, hoe gaan jy maak die dag as jy op die hof gaan staan?
23
  Dan 
gaan jy seker ook staan en lag.  Ek sê, nee, daai dag moet ek ernstig wees.  Maar ek kan nie 
help nie, ek is té lief vir lag”. 
 
Translation  
“How shall I put it…ok, I see a change in me. I was a very thin person. My mother was also a 
very thin person. My mother and I were equally thin. But I can see that I put on a little bit of 
weight. Yes, I can now look at myself in the mirror and say, no really, you are a beautiful girl. 
And I never wanted to look at myself in the mirror because for me it was always…how shall I 
put it…I just thought, no, I am not a beautiful girl. I am honest now, I have always thought 
that, but today I can look at myself in the mirror and say to myself, no really Chantal, you are 
really a beautiful girl. You don’t deserve what you got… Chantal likes to joke, and Chantal 
doesn’t like to fight. Doesn’t want to do people in. I don’t shout at others like the people 
living on the streets.  I think it’s because I know I am not that kind of a person, I don’t lie to 
you, my aunty. Chantal is a very lovely person.  Ok, what else is there…there are many things 
I can…but I don’t remember them… Ok, someone who likes to communicate.  Even when I 
don’t know people, then I communicate as if we have known each other for years. I was 
always shy to talk to people, but I put that shyness aside because shyness brings you nowhere. 
And what else is there…but that is how I am.  I am a very soft person. If someone does me in 
or insults me or so, very quick to cry.   
 
Ok, I take it as my fault that I took a boyfriend too soon and so on. I take it as my fault that 
I left my school career just like that; didn’t worry about my grandmother and so on… Later 
on, I felt so ashamed. 
  
I have felt like that. Nobody thinks nothing of me. I feel inferior. How shall I put 
it…everyone who communicates with me, thinks nothing of me. I just feel very inferior – 
so, very inferior… The circumstances in which I found myself, it always made me feel like 
that.    
                                                 
23
 This narrator was gang raped a few weeks prior to the interview and was going to face her rapists in court in a 
few weeks time.  
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They say everything makes me laugh. I cannot help it, but I like it very much. Now they say, 
someone can hit me, hurt me or whatever, then I also laugh. The women up there say, you 
like laughing so much, Chantal, someone can hit you or whatever, but then you laugh about 
it. Now they say to me, what are you going to do the day when you have to stand up in court? 
Surely then you are also going to laugh. I reply, no, that day I must be serious. But I cannot 
help it, I love laughing too much”. 
  
Interpretation 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this narrative is the evidence of by-passed shame in the 
form of laughing. Chantal says that no matter how she is hurt, she cannot help but laugh; that 
she is afraid that when she goes to court to testify against her rapists, she will just laugh. By-
passed shame is unacknowledged, unconscious and repressed shame, which manifests as 
another cognition or emotion when the shame feeling is so unbearable that it has to be 
replaced by another, more bearable emotional reaction (H. B. Lewis, 1971). It is interesting 
that this laughing stands in stark opposition to her claim at the beginning of the narrative that 
“as iemand vir my in doen of beledig of so, baie gou vir huil.” (if someone does me in or 
insults me or something, [I] will cry very easily).    
 
Her narrative is also rife with contradictions: she describes herself as a “lieflike mens” (lovely 
person), and a “mooi meisie” (beautiful girl), as someone who likes to make jokes, who 
communicates readily, who is soft-hearted and sensitive, and well-mannered. These are 
features of her projected, false self or persona. She then counters these positive qualities with 
starkly different ones: she says that no one thinks anything of her, that she is inferior, so 
terribly inferior (“minderwaardig”), and that her abusive circumstances had made her feel that 
way. Her narrative also demonstrates a great deal of self-blame. She blames herself for 
choosing the boyfriend she did, and for leaving school and not worrying about her 
grandmother (her caregiver). She ends her narrative by saying that she continues to 
experience profound by-passed shame; the foundation of her mostly hidden, authentic self. 
 
Denise 
“I’m a very caring person.  I like to give as well.  And I’m very emotional: if I see 
someone else crying, then I will also start crying – that’s how I am.  So very soft-hearted, 
and I will give my last to someone.   
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And many people say, the things that I have been through, they are very much amazed 
because they say I’m a very strong person compared to what I went through.  If they 
knew what I went through…I should have been dead by now, honestly, the way that man 
abused me.  But with sore body, full of blood, I ran to the police station, I ran to the day 
hospital, on my own.  No one helped me.  I did it all on my own.  I had to be strong for my 
child’s sake.  And me having heart disease and high blood, I had to take care of myself (my 
body) for her because there’s no one else, no other family for her, besides my son.  And he’s 
also got a baby now, so I can’t expect him to take care of my child.  So I must be strong for 
her. 
 
Sometimes I think, why was I so stupid.  We were at high school together, but afterwards we 
never worried to talk to one another – we just knew one another.  But after all the years we 
met up again, and it was just too quick, man.  I was…everything happened so quickly, but I 
also blame myself for that, in a way.   
 
I couldn’t blame myself.  I mean, I didn’t ask for that…I didn’t ask for that”.   
 
Interpretation 
The most striking part of this narrative is its ending. The narrator berates herself for being “so 
stupid” for having been in an abusive relationship, and says “I also blame myself for that”, 
when very shortly afterwards she says, “I couldn’t blame myself. I mean, I didn’t ask for 
that…I didn’t ask for that”. This is evidence of a stark split between the false self (“I didn’t 
ask for that”) and the self-blaming, shamed authentic self (“I also blame myself for that”). 
There are also conspicuous contradictions in her descriptions of her personality – she 
describes herself as caring, generous, emotional and soft-hearted (some of which can be read 
as illustrative of a striking sense of emotional frailty, for instance, in the phrase, “I see 
someone else crying, then I will also start crying”, indicative of the vulnerability of the 
authentic self. She then contrasts this description with an explanation of how strong she has 
been capable of being for herself, and for the sake of her child, indicative of the false self.  
 
Veronica 
“I just ask myself, do I deserve…because my other sisters, they don’t allow things like I do in 
their lives.  My one sister’s husband had an affair, and the minute she heard about it, she went 
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straightaway to his work, grabbed him and told him, come, take me to that woman.  And I 
asked her, Jolene, why did you do it?  She said, Veronica, if I do it to him it’s okay, then he 
can help me.  I don’t hurt him.  I respect him.  I expect him to respect me also.  And he had to 
choose between the two of them, between my sister and the other woman.  Because he also 
lied to the woman and told her he’s not married and all that.  And I said to her, but how do 
you feel?  She said, no, I feel like a woman.  He must respect me as a woman, or he must 
leave me.  But, Amelia, me, I just looked and said nothing.  I kept it to myself.  
 
Oh, (I feel like) less than the person. Certain times…like if you hit me now I’ll think, jesus, 
huh-uh, I’m nothing.  I’m zero.  And then afterwards it was like a voice came: no, 
Veronica.  And I believe when you see two roads or footsteps, it’s when god walks with 
you, but when you only see one, it’s when he carries you.  I believe in that.  I’m strong with 
him, and that pulled me through.   
 
I won’t come to you and tell you this is my problem and that is my problem.  I’ll keep it to 
myself.  I’ve always got a smile on my face.  I dress well, clean and everything.  I will 
respect you.  That’s me. 
 
I used to think it’s (abuse) my fault by dressing…he used to tell me, why must your scarf 
go with your top?  Why must your shoes go with your bag?  You don’t have brains.  I said, 
ah, it’s all right, only you’ve got brains.  Just because of that, a broken arm and a blue eye.  
 
No, huh-uh, no.  I’m proud of what I am.  I’m proud I’m a human, and I’m proud I’m on 
my own.   
 
I don’t think there’s the word shame in my vocabulary.  I’m honest with you, no, I don’t 
feel shame.  I personally feel that God has a reason why he put me through all of this… 
Yes.  But as I’ve said, hate is not in my vocabulary, and to be rude, no.  It’s not in my 
vocabulary. 
 
(The counselling has) made me stronger, really, really, because I kept a lot of things in me. I 
usually tell them that there are a lot of rooms in my heart; my heart is divided up into a lot 
of rooms.  And the only thing that I can remember – what were the happy times in my life”.  
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Interpretation 
This is an extremely interesting and unusual narrative. It is narrated by the same woman who 
tells the “parrot story” in the next chapter. A persistent theme in this narrative is lack of self-
respect, particularly in the first paragraph where she listens intently to how her sister 
confronts her unfaithful husband, but “I kept it (her own unfaithful husband) to myself”. 
Shame is known to silence, to debilitate, to paralyse and inhibit action. The next paragraphs 
are a somewhat chaotic mix of good and shameful qualities the narrator sees in herself – she 
uses highly descriptive shame words, like “I’m zero”, “less than a person”, “I’m nothing”.  
The issue of blame is complicated in this narrative, because it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the narrator blames herself or her perpetrator for the abuse when she refers to the way she 
dresses as a reason for being abused. Although she is both flippant and angry about it, there 
was something in her tone that suggested that her exposure of the shame-based authentic self 
was compounded to some extent by self-blame for the violence directed against her. The level 
of investment in the belief that it was she that provoked the violence directed at her, though, I 
would not venture to guess at. 
 
There is evidence of an internal struggle in this narrative, when she describes herself in shame 
terms: she says “it was like a voice came: no Veronica”. She does, like many other narrators, 
refer to strength, but it is strength that she draws from God, it is strength she draws from an 
external source, it is not strength that she owns. Her false self is much weaker than the shame-
based authentic self – it is limited to her always wearing a smile on her face, dressing well, 
being clean, and respecting others, fairly superficial qualities. Yet paradoxically, and 
somewhat inauthentically, she says: “I’m proud of what I am.  I’m proud I’m a human, and 
I’m proud I’m on my own.” What struck me in this final quote is that being proud of who one 
is, and being proud of being independent are virtues worthy of being proud of, but that being 
“human” somehow does not fit in this category; it does not feel meaningful or heartfelt. This 
contributes to the sense of inauthenticity of some of her statements – in this case they seem 
clichéd and forced.   
 
Despite the consistent thread of shame through this narrator’s narrative, she says, “I don’t 
think there’s the word shame in my vocabulary.  I’m honest with you, no, I don’t feel shame.” 
Shame, particularly when felt acutely, is commonly denied (H. B. Lewis, 1971).  However, 
one of the most fascinating aspects of this narrative is that the narrator unconsciously equates 
shame with hate. She says, “But as I’ve said, hate is not in my vocabulary, and to be rude, no.  
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It’s not in my vocabulary.” There are many possible reasons for this slip of the tongue, but 
one of my educated guesses would be an unconscious recognition of the relationship between 
shame, and self-hate or loathing (the being “bad” Fairbairn [1943] talks about; the assumption 
of the perpetrator-defined identity).    
 
The final paragraph in this remarkable narrative points to fragmentation and selective memory 
loss, both reactions to chronic trauma. The narrator points to the volume of traumatic 
emotional material she has had to contain (which has been repeated in this narrative), and how 
she does so, by compartmentalising and forgetting what is painful. This is highly indicative of 
dissociation. In her words, “I kept a lot of things in me. I usually tell them that there are a lot 
of rooms in my heart; my heart is divided up into a lot of rooms.  And the only thing that I can 
remember – what were the happy times in my life”.  
 
Isabelle 
“If someone were to describe me, a lot of people just say that I’m a strong person. 
Ja, because really, I’m not put down that easily.  I’m not that.  I always try to find a solution 
for the situation.  I don’t let the situation get the best of me.  So I always tell the situation, 
you know what, I’m going to get over you.  You might be like you are winning for now, but 
then I’m going to get over you.  So I’m that kind of person.  Generally, I’m a hard labourer: 
I just love working, which is one of the things that is stressing me, it’s that I’m not working.  
I love being at something, at least I know I’m actually doing something.   
 
At certain places, ja, I feel shame.  Like when I used to work, you know, eventually 
everyone had to find out what had happened to me, and there are all these false stories 
around each and everything, so ja, at some places or around some people I do feel that way.   
 
It (shame) feels like…it is hurting because people are believing what they don’t really 
know about you.  I believe in the wrong story about you, so you feel like it’s something that 
is… I cannot really take everyone and put them together and tell them, no, this is not the right 
story, this is what happened and this is why this happened.  But I can’t change everyone, 
and I can’t change what they think about me now.  So it’s painful to know that people 
have the wrong things about you – but you can’t do anything about it. Shame is what 
other people think about you and what they say about you”.   
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Interpretation 
“Shame” in this narrative is actually humiliation. It is worth pausing here for a moment to 
recap on the differences between shame and humiliation. As discussed in chapter 3, 
humiliation is an intense and unpleasant emotion involving lowering in the eyes of others; 
loss of esteem, social status or dignity (Elison & Harter, 2007; Miller, 1985). Gilbert (1998) 
argues that humiliation is similar to shame in that it is experienced when an individual is 
subordinated; put in a debased or powerless position by someone more powerful. Humiliation 
thus usually occurs at the hands of another, and in most cases, there is a broader audience that 
observes the humiliating event; a hostile and contemptuous audience is a key predictor of 
humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007). Critically, as I pointed out in earlier, in humiliation the 
victim is seen as undeserving, the event tends to be viewed as an unprovoked attack (Elison & 
Harter, 2007). In other words, there is no acceptance that the negative judgment from another 
is justified (as in shame). So, unlike shame, humiliation does not involve the negative 
evaluation of the self by the self; instead it involves a focus on the other as bad (Elison & 
Harter, 2007; Gilbert, 1998). 
This narrator describes her false, projected self as strong and as able to make the best of a 
situation, and as a hard worker. So the good qualities that she can use to describe herself are 
limited. She describes the source of her “shame” or vulnerability in different terms to other 
narrators: she says: “Shame is what other people think about you and what they say about 
you”. It constitutes the spreading of “false stories” by others, producing a loss of esteem, 
social status or dignity. So, just as described above, her pain is caused by the negative 
evaluation of the self by a hostile and malicious audience. For this narrator, the audience is 
also ignorant: “it is hurting because people are believing what they don’t really know about 
you”. Here I believe she is referring to the hidden authentic self, which holds the truth not 
only about emotional reactions to her traumatic experiences, but also the pain related to her 
humiliation. Where the narrator diverges from understanding shame in terms of humiliation is 
in her response to this emotion. She says, “So it’s painful to know that people have the wrong 
things about you – but you can’t do anything about it” suggesting a great deal of helplessness 
and inaction, which is associated with shame, not humiliation. Humiliation is usually 
characterised by potent, agentive emotions such as anger or rage – typically expressed as a 
desire for revenge and retaliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilbert, 1998).  Thus, there is 
evidence that the two emotions overlap in this narrative.  
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Janine 
“Ek het gevoel…van die abuse besigheid…ek het gevoel eintlik laat ek ook suicide wou 
commit het.  Ek het gevoel niemand gee om vir my nie en niemand is lief vir my nie, en 
daar gaat nie iemand wees wat my kan help nie.  Die gevolg sal wees dat ek aleen wees, 
en ek huil en whatever, of ek loop sommer weg van die huis af, somtye.  En daar was tye 
wat ek nie wil geëet het nie; bly sommer vir weke sonder kos want ek voel depressed.  En 
ek het baie maer geraak - ek wou nie eet nie.  Ek het depressed geword.  Daar was ook tye 
wat ek net wou slaap…  
 
Daar is baie tye wat mense sal sê, ag, jy's nie worth…jy's nie iets werd nie. 
 
Ander mense sal altyd vir my sê, jy is 'n baie goeie mens.  Jy's baie sag.  Jy is baie 
bestaanbaar.  Jy's 'n mooi mens; kyk mooi na jouself.  Moenie laat daai dinge vir jou 
beweeg nie”. 
 
Translation 
“I felt…about the abuse business…I actually felt that I also wanted to commit suicide. I felt 
that no one cared about me and no one loves me, and nobody will be there to help me. The 
result will be that I will be alone, and I cry and whatever, or I just walk away from the 
house, sometimes. And there were times that I didn’t want to eat, just stay without food for 
weeks because I feel depressed.  And I got very thin – I didn’t want to eat. I became 
depressed. There were also times that I just wanted to sleep…  
 
There are times that people will say, oh, you’re not worth…you’re not worth anything. 
 
Other people will always say to me, you’re a very good person. You are very soft.  You are 
very considerate. You are a beautiful person; look well after yourself. Don’t let those things 
move you”.  
 
Interpretation 
In this short narrative there is a great deal of evidence of the split self. The narrator describes 
in the first paragraph a combination of depression and shame reactions (which overlap), and 
ends this part of the narrative by saying she is worth nothing. These self-perceptions are 
consistent with Janine’s appearance. She takes very poor care of herself physically and 
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outwardly it appears as if she lacks self-esteem and confidence. Yet in the next paragraph it is 
as if she is describing an entirely different person. She says she is a “mooi” (beautiful) person; 
a “goeie” (good) person, who should look after herself well (in stark contrast with the 
suicidality – which is commonly linked to shame - expressed at the beginning of the 
narrative), and who should stay steady, not get swayed by challenges. It is interesting, 
however, that these positive qualities are spoken by others, not owned by the narrator. In this 
narrator’s case, in her speech as well as her body language and dress sense, the authentic self 
was far more exposed than with other narrators, the false self only thinly veiling this very 
vulnerable, shamed part of the self.  
 
Mandy 
“I still feel like I’m strong.  I can survive, but I have been through quite a lot.  It’s always 
going to be there – my past – but I also try and not make myself maybe abusive to my 
children.  That’s what I’m scared of, that maybe I might be that monster like my mother was. 
 
I think they (others) will tell you I am a fighter.  I’ll try and try to make things better for me 
and for my kids.   
 
(I felt shame) when he used to tell me that I’m useless, I’m going to be a nobody and I’m 
good for nothing and all that, I used to feel that’s maybe how I am, and I used to be 
ashamed of myself.   
 
If you keep on hearing the same thing over and over, and this person you are staying 
with, almost every week you hear that, you are bound to start thinking, maybe it’s true.  
And also coming from an abusive childhood, I was just ashamed.  I never really wanted 
to tell anybody about what was happening because I was scared that maybe my friends 
would laugh at me or something. 
 
I think it’s (shame) painful.  It’s painful to be ashamed of yourself.   
 
(When I am ashamed) I just thought that maybe I don’t fit in.  I don’t fit in, maybe I must 
just keep myself from people.  I mustn’t talk too much with people.  I mustn’t be 
friendly with people.   
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It’s almost like hiding away”. 
 
Interpretation 
This narrator’s shame is amplified by the transgenerational nature of her abuse. The depth of 
her shame is palpable, and like the previous narrator, her shame-based authentic self is thinly 
veiled by a false self that is described simply as “strong” and as a “fighter”, who is able to 
ensure her survival. The rest of the narrative revolves around shame. She uses common shame 
terms, such as “I’m useless, I’m going to be a nobody and I’m good for nothing”; “I used to 
feel that’s maybe how I am, and I used to be ashamed of myself”. She also makes reference to 
the damaging effects of the chronicity of shaming messages: “Because if you keep on hearing 
the same thing over and over, and this person you are staying with, almost every week you 
hear that, you are bound to start thinking, maybe it’s true.  And also coming from an abusive 
childhood, I was just ashamed”. 
What I find interesting about this narrative is that although Mandy is very articulate, her 
description of how shame feels is vague at best (“painful”). This is consistent with the 
literature which emphasises the speechlessness associated with shame, and the difficulty of 
expressing it concisely in language (H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992). 
Finally, the narrator’s response to feeling shame is a common one which we have encountered 
before, the need to hide, to protect the self from further hurt. It is interesting that she says that 
the feeling of “not fitting in” pre-empts this, since it can be partially explained by 
evolutionary theory. Once a person is perceived as an outcast, or has lost SAHP, s/he can 
choose to engage in defensive, reparative or retaliatory action (Gilbert, 1998), and hiding is a 
defensive action.  
   
Lilly 
“Oh, this place helped me a lot, because even the time I came here, me and my children had 
huge things.  So now in this place, I can say that, no matter what, I can go outside.  The things 
to dress, ja, most of them I got from here.  So it was nice to me.  I experienced that the people 
here, they have patience and support, ja.  I was so empowered about that.  When I am 
here, I feel strong. 
 
The only thing I used to feel, it’s like maybe it was a mistake that I’m alive.   
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It’s just the feeling that I have, maybe if I can be successful in life.  But the problem is, if you 
are maybe going to look for a job, then they want experience or what-what.  Most of the time 
they are looking for those who have matric, and then me, I don’t have matric.  So I just 
blame myself”. 
 
Interpretation  
In this very short narrative, there are some indications of splitting, although I would argue that 
the self is essentially shame-based. There was more evidence of shame at a bodily level than 
can be demonstrated in the written narrative, and much of the excluded narrative revolved 
around suicidality. Shame has previously been associated with suicidality (Brown et al., 2009; 
Chan et al., 2005), so perhaps this feeling that “it was a mistake that I am alive” is at least 
partially an expression of the authentic, shame-based self. The narrator also seems to feel 
shame for specific reasons, like not having a higher education, leading to her blaming herself 
for not having employment, which is likely to further feed into a shame-based self-esteem. 
Although the narrator speaks about feeling supported and “empowered”, and describes how 
she has become “strong”, she does not own this power or strength, she hands it over to the 
Centre. These positive characteristics are so flimsy, and so poorly “owned”, I am not sure 
they constitute a false self at all.  The shame-based authentic self is definitely clearly exposed 
and predominant in Lilly’s case.  
 
Christine 
“Ek kan nie sê ek is sterk nie.  Ek is maar baie saggeaard.  Dis hoekom, as ek altyd 'n 
prent op die TV kyk, en dis miskien 'n hartseer storie, dan as daai een nou huil op die TV, dan 
huil ek ook.  Dis amper so.  Dit is mos nou nie werklikheid nie; party stories is die waarheid, 
maar nie altyd nie.  Maar ek bedoel, mens weet mos nou nie wat is die waarheid nie, maar dan 
huil ek ook maar saam.  Ek voel vir daai ene - so is ek.   
 
Ja, ek het dit (skaamte) baie keer al gevoel al.  Ek het baie keer al daai gevoel gekry van 
so…amper so, jy is…hoe kan 'n mens sê…jy is maar vir niks hier op aarde nie.   
 
Daar by ons is dit mos nou amper so, dis mos 'n klein dorpie, nou daar's mos nou baie 
wat nou al weet watter dinge ek nou al deur gemaak het en so aan.  Ek voel skaam as ek 
partykeers loop in die straat.  Mens weet mos, jy kry dan die gevoel iemand hou jou dop 
en so aan. 
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Dit (skaamte) het altyd seer gevoel.  Eerlik, dit het altyd seer gevoel. 
 
Is amper so, ek is amper soos sy vloerlap: hy kan maak met my wat hy wil.  So is hy.  Ek 
moet nou net klein speel, klein speel.  Maar ek het al die pad so klein gespeel, maar nou van 
ek so kerk geloop het, toe laat ek nie meer hy vir my sê nie.  Hy's amper soos 'n hondjie nou 
gewees onder my.  Hy's amper so, hy's nou bang om my te slaan.  Daai man is bang vir 
gaat tronk toe.  Hy is bang.  Hy ken die tronk.  Ja, hy ken die tronk en hy is bang.  Maar ek 
dink dis meeste die wat hy wil hê ek moet nou af kom huis toe want hy wil hê ek moet 
die saak terug trek.  Nee, ek gaan dit nie doen nie”.   
 
Translation  
“I can’t say that I’m strong. I’m quite gentle. That’s why, whenever I watch a film on TV, 
and if it’s perhaps a sad story, then whenever that one cries on TV, then I also cry. It’s more 
or less like that. It’s not real, is it? Some stories are true, but not always. But I mean, one 
doesn’t know what’s the truth, but then I cry with that one. I feel for that one – that’s what I’m 
like.  
 
Yes, I have often felt it (shame).  I have often had that feeling of…almost like, you are…you 
are just nothing here on earth.   
 
There at our place it’s almost so, isn’t it, it’s a small little town, isn’t it, there are many 
people, aren’t there, who know about the things which I have experienced and so on. I feel 
ashamed when I sometimes walk in the street. You know, don’t you, you then get the 
feeling someone is watching you and so on. 
 
It (shame) always hurt me. Truly, it always hurts.  
 
It’s almost like, I am almost like a doormat to him: he can do with me what he wants. That’s 
what he’s like. I must just play the little one, the little one. But I have played the little one all 
the way, but since I have gone to church, I don’t let him tell me what to do. He has almost 
been like a puppy with me. He’s almost so, he’s now afraid to beat me. That man is afraid of 
going to jail.  He is afraid. He knows the jail. Yes, he knows the jail and he is afraid. But I 
think he mostly wants me to come back home because he wants me to withdraw the case. 
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No, I’m not going to do that”.  
 
Interpretation 
The narrator starts by saying that she is not strong (a striking exception), but that she is very 
soft-hearted, and empathic, qualities she seems to value. But she immediately admits to 
feeling shame; to feeling like she isn’t on earth for any reason (“jy is maar vir niks hier of 
aarde nie”.) Then, very much like in Mandy’s narrative, this narrator describes shame in terms 
of humiliation. She talks about how she lives in a small village where everybody knows what 
happened to her and she describes how ashamed/“skaam” (humiliated) she feels when she is 
walking out in the open, in the street. The hostility and contemptuousness of the audience is 
captured in the phrase “Mens weet mos, jy kry dan die gevoel iemand hou jou dop en so aan” 
(You know, don’t you, you then get the feeling someone is watching you and so on). Like 
Mandy, she also describes shame in vague and diffuse terms – as “seer” (painful) once again 
pointing to the difficulty with which to accurately and precisely articulate the emotional 
meaning of shame in language. 
The last paragraph is a beautiful illustration of the juxtaposed authentic and false self. She 
speaks of herself as his “vloerlap” (a cloth to clean the floor with – a shameful, insulting 
Afrikaans term indicating a state of servitude) and immediately follows this description with 
an account of a process requiring immense inner strength - “hy wil hê ek moet die saak terug 
trek.  Nee, ek gaan dit nie doen nie” (He wants me to withdraw the case. No, I am not going to 
do it). 
 
Annabelle 
“Ek het baie mooi maniere, en ek is baie stil en so. Is nie eintlik iemand om eerste met ‘n 
mens praat of so nie. Ek dink ook baie. Ek try om nie te dink nie, maar dit gaan net aan en 
aan.  
 
As hy so vir my geforce het in die aande om seks te hê en as ek sê nee, sêe hy vir my is daar 
‘n ander man; hy vra vir my of ek met ‘n ander man gelê het of so. Hy ruk my sommer ** 
doen wat hy wil doen ** ek kan maar huil ook of sê nee ** 
 
Soos ‘n vuil hond het ek gevoel.   
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Translation 
I also have very good manners, and I am very quiet and so on. Not really someone to talk to 
a person first or so. I also think a lot. I try not to think, but it just goes on and on. 
  
When he forced me in the evenings to have sex and I say no, he tells me there’s another man; 
he asks me if I lay with another man or so. He just pulls me ** do what he wants to do ** 
even if I cry or say no ** 
 
Like a dirty dog I felt”.   
 
Interpretation 
I include this very short narrative purely for the last sentence, which as my title indicates, is a 
metaphor which I believe captures the essence of shame, an emotion, as we have established, 
which is so difficult to accurately, precisely articulate or express. This young woman 
describes herself as a quiet person with mild manners who thinks deeply, a woman with a 
relatively strong false self. Yet when she describes the horror of her rapes, and the more 
expressive reaction to this profound violation: “Soos ‘n vuil hond het ek gevoel” (like a dirty 
dog I felt), she gives voice to a deeper, concealed, shame-based authentic self.   
 
Patricia 
“My pa het tronk toe gegaan omdat hy my suster verkrag het.  Toe was sy veertien jaar oud.  
But wat my ma tot vandag toe nie weet nie, dieselfde het met my ook gebeur, en nie een van 
hulle weet nie.  Ek is altyd die sterk een in ons se familie.  Hulle het altyd op my skouer 
gehuil, nou ek kan nie myself gebring het om my ma nog…want toe sy uit vinne van daai, 
toe is dit amper soos, sy is ook gebruik al, ek kan nie nog vir haar verder oor die edge gestuur 
het nie.  Ek kan dit nie oor my hart gekry het nie.  Ek is altyd die sterk ene, tot vandag toe, 
maak nie saak wat ek deur gaan nie, ek hou my nog altyd sterk.  En hulle weet nie 
eers…ek is besig om in stukkies op te breek, en ek kan nie vir myself bring om dit vir hulle 
te sê nie.  
 
Even toe sy pa ook hier gekom het, dan staan ek agter 'n hek en dan sê ek, ek is nie bang vir 
jou nie want jy kan my niks maak nie.  Want as ek my voete in sit hier, dan voel ek gerus 
want die is huis vir my.  Mense kyk my aan…like ek is 'n baie harde person en daai, but ek 
break mos nie down voor mense nie. 
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Hy (partner) het my laat voel like ek is laer as die dirt op die grond. Worthless.  Ek sal 
nooit goed genoeg wees ook nie.   
 
Ek voel nou nog skaam, like even oor Sarie se pa wat vir my geabuse het.  Om te dink, 
ander tyd het ek geloop met blou oë in die pad in en daai.  Hy het my al geslaat in public, 
in ons se court en voor mense.  Toe kom leer ek vir Agnes ken, die intern counsellor wat ek 
by is, sy bly in dieselfde court wat ek bly in Mannenberg.  Mense in die court het al gesien al 
hoe slaat Sarie se pa vir my in public.  Dan loop ek met blou oë in public en ek is nou skaam.  
Al even is dit weg ook nou, dan loop ek nog altyd skaam buitekant.  Even tot nou toe, hy was 
gewees but nog altyd, ek is skaam want ek voel like…hy maak dit amper soos, is jou 
skuld laat ek vir jou geslaat het.  Even tot vandag toe, as ek hom sê is deur jou, dan sê hy 
my is my eie skuld gewees - dit was deur my.  Is my skuld dat hy so gereact het.  Dat hy 
vir my geslaat het. 
 
No. 1, ek is 'n sterk person.  Ek is ook 'n baie helpful person.  Ek is at all times willing to 
help, waarever.  So iemand wat my goed ken sal my so describe: sterk, helpful, en ek is 
friendly - nie baie nie - but ek is friendly.  As ek nou nie vir jou ken nie, ek gaan nou smile en 
jou groet, but ek gaat nie like 'n conversation hou met jou nie.  As ek jou miskien leer ken, ja, 
dan sal jy sien ek is meer sagtere, sal ek sê.  But ek is nie like overfriendly nie.  Ek lag nie met 
almal of met enige een in die pad nie.  En vir my is dit 'n bietjie baie ** om te smile.  ** wat 
Ashley gevat het, dan sê sy my altyd, Patricia, not a fake smile, please, a real one.  Dan sê 
ek vir haar, ek het nie vir jou 'n real smile nie, actually, then my face is going to hurt 
because ek is nie gewoond aan smile nie. 
 
Vir my, iets soos abuse, is iets om skaam te wees oor.  Even toe ek gekom het hier, toe 
was ek like skaam.  Want soos mense vir my aan kyk, hulle sal nie sê the way ek hard is, 
ek was abuse nie.  But die eerste twee maande wat ek hier was, toe voel ek skaam even 
om verby die mense te loop.  Dis like ek bly in 'n shelter vir abused women, en dis vir my 
iets om skaam te wees oor. 
 
(Ek voel worthless) Ook net 'n bietjie nog omdat ek nou nie financially independent is nie”.   
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Translation 
“My father went to jail because he raped my sister. She was fourteen years old then. But what 
my mother doesn’t know, up to this day, is that the same happened to me, and none of them 
know. I am always the strong one in our family. They always cried on my shoulder, now I 
cannot bring myself to…my mother…because when she found out about that, then it was 
almost like, she has also been used, I could not push her even further over the edge. I could 
not find it in myself to do it. I am always the strong one, up to this day, doesn’t matter what I 
go through, I still pretend to be strong. And they don’t even know…I am breaking into 
pieces, and I cannot bring myself to tell them that. 
  
Even when his father came here, then I stand behind a gate and then I say, I’m not afraid of 
you because you can do nothing to me. Because when I put my feet here, then I feel at peace 
because the house is for me. People look at me…as if I am a very hard person and all that, 
but I don’t break down in front of other people, not so? 
  
He (partner) made me feel I am lower than the dirt on the ground. Worthless.  I will also 
never be good enough.   
 
I still feel ashamed, like even about Sarie’s father who abused me. To think, that other time 
I walked with blue eyes in the road and all that. He beat me in public, in our quarters and 
in front of others.  Then I came to know Agnes, the intern counsellor with whom I am, she 
stays in the same quarters where I stay in Manenberg.  People in the quarters have seen how 
Sarie’s father beats me in public. Then I walk with blue eyes in public and then I am ashamed. 
Even when it is gone, then I still walk ashamed outside.  Even up till now, he was but 
still…I’m ashamed because I feel like…he almost makes as if, it’s your fault that I beat 
you. Even till today, when I tell him it’s through you, then he tells me it was my fault – it 
was through me. Is my fault that he reacted like that. That he beat me. 
  
No. 1, I am a strong person. I am also a very helpful person.  I am at all times willing to 
help, wherever.  So someone who knows me well will describe me like this: strong, helpful, 
and I am friendly – not very much - but I am friendly.  If I now don’t know you, I will now 
smile and greet you, but I’m not like going to have a conversation with you. If I perhaps learn 
to know you, yes, then you will see that I am more softer, I’ll say. But I’m not like 
overfriendly.  I don’t laugh with all people or with anyone in the street. And for me it’s a bit 
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very ** to smile.  ** that Ashley took, then she always says to me, Patricia, not a fake smile, 
please, a real one.  Then I say to her, I don’t have a real smile for you, actually, then my 
face is going to hurt because I’m not used to smiling. 
 
For me, something like abuse, it’s something to be ashamed of. Even when I came here, 
then I was like ashamed. Because how people look at me, they won’t say the way I am hard, 
I was abused. But the first two months that I was here, then I even felt ashamed to walk 
past the people. It’s like I am staying in a shelter for abused women, and that is for me 
something to be ashamed of. 
 
(I feel worthless) Also a little bit because I’m not financially independent”.   
   
Interpretation 
Patricia repeatedly emphasises that she is “sterk” (strong), hard and tough (“ek is ‘n baie 
harde person en daai, but ek break mos nie down voor mense nie”/ I am a very hard person 
and so, but I don’t break down in front of people), but the very first paragraph ends with the 
dramatic phrase indicative of dissociation: “ek is besig om in stukkies op te breek” (I am 
breaking into pieces). The secret of her abuse as a child, that she keeps from her family to 
protect them, because she believes she must be the “strong” for them is literally breaking her 
apart, causing internal disintegration, fragmentation. The narrators strength, her ability to be 
hard and tough - these qualities that should be positive in high-risk environments, the ones she 
projects as her false self, are in fact tragic for her, and have heart-breaking consequences – 
years of silence that lead to this unconcealed, conscious fragmentation. 
There is a great deal of humiliation (which the narrator calls “skaam” or shame) and self-
blame in this narrative. Again, like in previous narratives, Patricia explains that she 
experiences “shame” when she has to walk in public with blue eyes or when her partner hits 
her in public. The underlying assumption is that those who witness this will evaluate her (not 
her partner) negatively; that her pain will be perceived by a hostile and contemptuous 
audience. The self-blame reactions are fuelled by her shame-based authentic self. Her 
narrative suggests that she buys into her perpetrator’s projection that it her own fault that she 
was abused; that she somehow provoked the attacks: “…ek is skaam want ek voel like…hy 
maak dit amper soos, is jou skuld laat ek vir jou geslaat het.  Even tot vandag toe, as ek hom 
sê is deur jou, dan sê hy my is my eie skuld gewees - dit was deur my.  Is my skuld dat hy so 
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gereact het.  Dat hy vir my geslaat het” (I’m ashamed because I feel like…he almost makes as 
if, it’s your fault that I beat you. Even till today, when I tell him it’s through you, then he tells 
me it was my fault – it was through me. Is my fault that he reacted like that. That he beat me). 
In the next part of the narrative, Patricia returns to the false self, and emphasises her strength, 
and other good qualities, such as being friendly and helpful. But unlike many other 
participants, Patricia does not wear a smile as a mask. Interestingly, there is a greater 
authenticity in her interactions with others. Not surprisingly, given her history, she says, “my 
face is going to hurt because ek is nie gewoond aan smile nie” (…because I’m not used to 
smiling). 
The narrative has a fragmented quality, mirroring the narrator’s fractured self. In the final 
parts of her narrative, she returns to the theme of shame, and she says quite simply that abuse 
is something to be ashamed about. Then she slips into humiliation when describing living in a 
shelter for abused women, expressing a concern for what outsiders might think; how she will 
be humiliated, negatively evaluated by that mocking, hostile imaginary audience.  This 
narrator covers many aspects of shame, and ends with another source of shame, her lack of 
financial independence, which is particularly shaming in individualistic, Western cultures. I 
believe that this participant’s shame-based authentic self is so pervasive because of the 
chronicity of her exposure to abuse.   
 
Overall Interpretation from a Phenomenological and Social Constructivist Narrative 
Analysis Point of View 
 
I am going to begin the overall analysis by discussing the sources of psychic splitting at an 
individual/clinical level. I will then move on to examine how the split might have been 
unintentionally exacerbated by the organisational context in which the women were 
embedded. I will end this section with brief commentary on how psychic splitting is 
reinforced at cultural level.  
 
Psychic Splitting at Individual Level 
 
Severe and sustained trauma, like my participants experienced, is likely to lead to the splitting 
of self (M. Lewis, 1992). The purpose of splitting is to protect the traumatised, shamed and 
concealed authentic self from being exposed to further harm by producing another part of the 
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psyche which conceals and compensates for the often unconscious pain experienced by this 
vulnerable part. As I outlined above, shame itself is subjectively experienced as a split 
emotion – it is experienced as the internalised negative evaluation of a real or imagined other, 
while the self remains acutely aware of itself; it is self-reflective. Shame-proneness has also 
demonstrated a negative relationship with self-esteem, stability of the self, and a positive 
association with self-consciousness, fear of negative evaluation, and splitting (Tangney, 
Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995).  
At an individual clinical level,  psychic splitting and fragmentation as a post-traumatic 
response often co-occurs with shame, which are both central to Complex PTSD and 
DESNOS, both syndromes that are a response to prolonged or chronic trauma, like the women 
I interviewed had been exposed to (Ford & Courtois, 2009). Furthermore, as discussed earlier 
in the thesis, PTSD has three key features – hyperarousal, intrusion and constriction (Herman, 
1997). Each of these symptoms is exaggerated (in intensity and duration) in survivors of 
chronic trauma, particularly constriction (Herman, 1997). In constriction, the self is defeated, 
in a state of surrender – the survivor escapes from an unbearable situation by altering his/her 
state of consciousness. One of the aspects of life that constriction interferes with are plans for 
the future (e.g. a sense of foreshortened future), forcing survivors to live in an endless present, 
the past becoming split off into dissociated fragments, which are often difficult to access 
(Herman, 1997). 
Finally, in terms of understanding the phenomenon of splitting at individual level, it is worth 
mentioning that in a number of cases, women kept their abuse hidden or secret for long 
periods of time. This silencing and secrecy causes a second injury or betrayal trauma (Ford & 
Courtois, 2009). It has been argued that it can lead to splitting in the personality, where the 
individual maintains a front of an “ostensibly normal” personality which is functional and 
effective in the world and, critically, gives the survivor a role in protecting the public from 
being exposed to the inconceivable and unspeakable. This façade may be split off or 
disconnected from the underlying “emotional” personality which is debilitated psychosocially 
by the subjective knowledge of the trauma (Ford & Courtois, 2009, p. 18). These authors’ 
description is in complete agreement with Herman (1997) and Kraft’s (2004) understanding 
of the false self and the authentic “emotional” self.  
 
 
Psychic Splitting at Organisational Level 
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Individuals may use their talk to develop self-views they would like to hold but which are not 
yet in existence (Pasupathi, 2006). Individuals engage in this kind of talk to embed them in a 
life story in the hope of creating supportive evidence and coherence, and also with the hope of 
social confirmation (Pasupathi, 2006). It is relevant here that the ethos of the Centre, and the 
discourse driving counselling was an empowering one; one that emphasised the women’s role 
as survivors (as opposed to victims), and women were keen to embed this characteristic in 
their narratives both implicitly and explicitly, and have this validated.  
It is worth pausing here a moment to consider counter-narratives. As Bruner (2001) has 
pointed out, a story is made interesting by the violation of canonical expectancy, but in a way 
that is culturally acceptable. Bruner (2001) argues that narrative “turning points” are crucial to 
attempts to individualise a life, to resist automatic, folk-psychological or cultural canonicality, 
and it is what makes the ordinary and expectable, idiosyncratic and agentive. Women’s 
descriptions of themselves as strong and as survivors are agentive, resistance narratives – 
challenging and violating the canonical or master narrative that constructs women as 
subjugated, disempowered. These counter-narratives not only reflected a change or “turning 
point” for women in how they viewed themselves, but were made micro-culturally acceptable 
by their consistency with a broader discourse of survival and empowerment promoted by the 
Saartjie Baartman Centre. Identity cannot be separated from the local discursive context 
(Freeman, 2001). Women often attributed feeling strong to the interventions they had been 
exposed to at the Centre, particularly counselling. As Lisa said: “that’s what my counsellor 
first told me. She would always try to encourage me: I know you are strong.” 
Women’s counter-narratives were informed by this discourse. In these cases, counter-
narratives were filled with emotional references to women’s empowerment process and 
survivor status. Sarbin (1989) argues that such emotions or “passions” are rhetorical acts 
performed not only in attempts to maintain or enhance moral identity, but constitute the 
reconstructed plots of narratives encountered during the process of enculturation, in this case, 
through the predominant ethos of the Centre. 
It is important to notice, however, that these claims of inner strength are at odds with the 
anxiety and fear that so many women reported feeling; the sense of imminent threat, reported 
in the previous chapter. There is a tension between these feelings, interviewees’ shame and 
associated vulnerability, and their overt descriptions of themselves as active, strong survivors. 
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It is possible that for these reasons, and because women had typically only been exposed to 
counter-narratives for a short period of time, I felt the articulated constructions of the self as 
strong, as survivors, were often thinly-veiled and inauthentic.  
There is another point worth considering. Counter-narratives by definition are resistance 
narratives; they imply authority, potency, agency. Although women’s attempts at constructing 
themselves as strong, proud survivors did resist the broader patriarchal culture from where 
they came, one which normalises and socially sanctions violence against women, it is not in 
opposition to the ethos of the Centre (and I am not suggesting here that it should be). The 
identity that women are expected to internalise is – however well-intentioned – one which is 
imposed upon them. It is not one that emanates from the women themselves, perhaps making 
them less agentive than I had initially claimed. This may be another reason why the 
constructions of themselves which were consistent with the ethos of the Centre felt 
unconvincing and lacked psychological depth.  
Bamberg (2004) argues that individuals’ counter-narratives are often characterised by 
inconsistencies and contradictions; an oscillation between complicity with master narratives, 
and active resistance. These inconsistencies and contradictions are also indicative of 
multiplicity – of a splitting or plurality of identity (Halbertal & Koren, 2006). Gregg (2006) 
similarly maintains that counter-narratives construct identities which are organised according 
to a deep structure founded on binary oppositions. These oscillations between complicity and 
resistance against master narratives, when analysed using a social constructivist approach to 
narrative analysis, demonstrate psychic splitting unconsciously exacerbated by the well-
intentioned master narrative or ethos at organisational level.  
 
External and Psychic Splitting at Cultural Level 
 
All selves are illusory “false selves” – no matter how vigorously and sometimes 
violently they might be defended – formed out of this plastic and elusive substance 
that pre-exists us and yet continually evolves. The threat of shame in its social 
function binds us to the ground, to the culture – and to the illusion. But there is always 
the threat – a barely perceptible dread – that the illusion will unravel. (Mollon, 2002, 
p. 49).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
236 
 
 
 
I include three quotes to begin this section of the discussion of findings: 
 
Cheryl 
Ja, en so het dit basically erger en erger geraak.  Maar vir my was dit nie so snaaks nie, want 
die omgewing wat ek uit kom is dit amper so, ek sal amper sê is tradisie.  Dis tradisie vir die 
mans om hulle vrouens te slaan of hulle meisies te slaan.  Vir hulle is dit soort van om te 
bewys ek is in beheer en ek is baas.  Maar ek het dit nie besef nie, totdat ek vier-en-'n-half jaar 
vas gevang gewees het in dit. … En in die posisie wat ek vir my bevind het, dink ek is omdat 
in ons omgewing is daar te min bewusmakings en veldtogte teen vroue mishandeling. 
Soos ek sal nou ** geslaan, maar ek gaan niks maak nie want vir my is dit net, ag, dan gebeur 
dit maar net weer.  Dit gebeur miskien vir elke… dit gebeur in agtien huise in een straat 
miskien, so dit is nie snaaks nie.  Die kinders groei so op en dit moet so wees.  
 
Translation  
Yes, so it basically got worse and worse. But to me it wasn’t so strange, because the 
environment out of which I come, it is almost like, I could almost say it is a tradition. It’s a 
tradition for men to beat their wives or girlfriends. But I did not realise it, till I was caught in 
it for four-and-a-half years. … And the position that I found myself in, I think is because in 
our environment there is too little awareness-raising and resistance against the abuse of 
women. Like I will now ** beaten, but I am not going to do anything because for me it is just, 
oh, then it just happens again. It happens perhaps for each…it happens in eighteen houses in 
one street perhaps, so it isn’t strange. The children grow up and believe that it should be so. 
 
Irene 
Actually, I’m Irene.  I’ve been a married woman for 28 years.  I’m married to a Harry Isaacs, 
and in our marriage we had two children.  The first year of marriage, it was like rosy.  Going 
into my second year, he was my first abuser.  He used to drink a lot and hit me.  And I just 
thought, ag, everybody says when you get married, that is just how life is.  You must just 
make the best of it.   
 
Felicia 
Because in their (Xhosa) culture, beating a woman is fine.   
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Women said more frequently than I expected that they felt stigmatised by their status as an 
IPV survivor, both in this and the previous chapter. They described acute humiliation 
reactions as a result of being resident at a shelter such as the Saartjie Baartman Centre. This 
seems to contradict the routine character of IPV in many of the communities the women came 
from. IPV was described as a “tradition” by one interviewee in the quote above (an expanded 
version of the quote provided in chapter 7), suggesting that it was the norm rather than the 
exception in her community. It is interesting, as this suggests that these women were familiar 
with cultures of honour, “where living is hard” (Patricia said: “ekke kom al klaar uit 'n harde 
lewe uit.” [“I already come from a hard life”]), where there are strong and oppressive 
patriarchal values among men (Cohen et al., 1998, p. 277). I would argue that these cultures 
undoubtedly contribute to IPV and facilitate the (presumably unconscious or by-passed) 
development of cultures of shame among women (Cohen et al., 1998). In fact, I would further 
argue that men’s particular form of masculinity in these contexts is maintained by the reactive 
shame that women feel and that this is a shame-based response pattern that is cyclically 
repeated at cultural level. In such a culture where patriarchal structures such as male strength 
and power are highly valued and deeply embedded in the social system, and where poverty is 
pervasive and consequently social status is held in high esteem, one can only expect the 
existence of binary oppositions – alongside this patriarchal self (perhaps symbolic of the false 
self) must be the shame-based self (perhaps symbolic of the authentic self), who has lost 
dignity, power, and control. Yet a strange dynamic creeps in here. In these cultures, as in 
many South African communities, wrongs are not only indiscretions against the (male) 
individual, but also to the (male) individual’s reputation, which includes those with whom he 
is intimate, particularly females for whom men are considered responsible (Cohen et al., 
1998). It is likely that they are held responsible for “their” women, and that these women 
accept this to varying extents because they have been so subjugated and disempowered by 
occupying a gendered position that facilitates cultures of honour’s particular brand of 
patriarchy. It is perhaps this process which causes the ambivalence that some of my 
participants felt towards their partners – although their partners literally beat them down, they 
also took care of them, took possession of them, a pattern of attachment that is likely to be 
seductive for those who have grown up in abusive homes and have established disorganised 
attachment patterns. Self-sufficiency, especially at an economic level, may have helped 
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interrupt the dependency characteristic of these attachment styles, and facilitated an (at the 
very least partial) escape of the shame felt by the authentic self.  
So what I have argued so far is that highly patriarchal (male) selves are represented by 
cultures of honour, and highly subjugated, disempowered (female) selves are represented by 
cultures of shame. So, this is external, not internal or psychic splitting. As I have noted, I 
believe cultures of honour and shame are two sides of the same coin; they are cyclical 
reactions to one another. This may be why, then, IPV occupied such an apparent normative 
status.  
At an individual level, I would argue that IPV paradoxically still evoked shame, humiliation 
and embarrassment among my participants despite IPV’s normative status, because of 
individual self-blame. For women who have internalised a perpetrator-defined identity; 
accepted the “bad” self (Fairbairn, 1943), and who have taken responsibility for their abuse; 
who feel deserving of their abuse (as most do), will feel all these challenging emotions despite 
the prevalence of this form of violence in their cultures. This self-blame is compatible with 
my earlier theory that women are unconsciously complicit in maintaining the gender-based 
status quo – they protect the supremacy, strength and power of men in cultures of honour, and 
the “right” of these men to own or possess them at the cost of valued parts of themselves, 
which is an undeniably painful process, however unconscious (e.g. their own dignity, sense of 
self-worth and self-respect). 
The concern with social status and respect was prominent among the women I interviewed, 
especially in chapter 7 and this chapter. Women’s narratives indicated that they valued being 
respected by others a great deal, which may be exaggerated by their gendered subjugation at 
cultural level. These women displayed a great deal of stigma consciousness, which does not 
only involve an individual’s awareness that s/he has a stereotyped, or diminished status, but 
involves his/her focus on, or preoccupation with, his/her stigmatised status (Mosley & 
Rosenberg, 2007). As will be shown, many of the women’s descriptions of shame actually 
point to the experience and awareness of stigma. Stigma is closely aligned with (lack of) 
respect. Hollway and Jefferson (2009) competently demonstrate how important respect is, 
particularly in disempowered, working class communities where there tends to be 
preoccupation with social status, a phenomenon known as status anxiety (a term coined by De 
Botton, 2005). Status anxiety occurs when an individual feels in danger of not conforming to 
the ideals of success determined by society, and that s/he will be stripped of dignity and 
respect, just as the women I interviewed had been by their marginalised, subjugated and 
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powerless position in the communities they came from. It is often accompanied by worrying 
that the self is occupying a low and stigmatised rung, or that s/he is about to descend to one 
(signalling the loss of SAHP). One of the reasons for status anxiety is dependence, and these 
women were highly dependent (often emotionally and financially) on their perpetrators, and 
were particularly resentful that they struggled to achieve financial independence or self-
sufficiency. Perhaps this preoccupation with status and financial independence was because, 
having escaped the interdependent, gendered cultures of honour and shame, women were 
seeking freedom, and were in the process of reclaiming the parts of themselves that they had 
unconsciously sacrificed to maintain the gender-based power differential; attempting, as we 
saw in the counter narratives, to shed their own subjugation, disempowerment and shame, and 
regain (or gain for the first time) their pride, independence, self-respect, dignity and an 
elevated social status at cultural level. As I argued when discussing the counter-narratives, the 
process of assuming a new identity of this kind, however, is a lengthy one. It cannot simply be 
acquired in a few sessions; it requires long-term and sustained psychological intervention.  
Kaufman (1993) argues that in Western or individualistic cultures, compared to African or 
Asian cultures, shame is centred around competition for success, being independent and self-
sufficient, being popular and conforming, and being in a successful relationship, all strivings 
my participants would struggle to meet (Kaufman, 1993). Although South Africa is a 
complex, multi-cultural context, it appears that the majority of my participants identified with 
Western or individualistic cultures, and the ideals and values propagated by this cultural 
system. I believe the numerous references to seeking financial security in both chapter 7 and 
this chapter is a culturally compatible compensatory effort made by the individual false self 
for the culturally-determined shame felt by the authentic self.  
In the next chapter I go into greater depth on the topic of trauma-related splitting, but I focus 
on a more dramatic form thereof using a different method of analysis. I focus on psychic 
fragmentation as it is represented in language, where the self has disintegrated. Severe and 
chronic trauma and prolonged shame can become so potent and incapacitating that it needs to 
be altered and/or avoided (M. Lewis, 1992). It is during this shame-avoidance process that 
fragmentation of self, and dissociation, occurs (M. Lewis, 1992; Nathanson, 1992; Putnam, 
1989). Although I have loosely referred to narratives and counter-narratives in this chapter 
from a social constructivist point of view, the next chapter will use a more formal type of 
narrative or categorical form analysis (Gee’s, 1991 model) to analyse this chronic shame and 
trauma-related fragmentation.  
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CHAPTER 9 
Results and Discussion III 
 
The ‘wild country of time’ is a place where things only ever go missing; planting our 
narrative flags in its inhospitable soil and claiming a piece of its ground as our own, 
though perhaps ultimately a futile gesture, is nonetheless what we need to do to 
survive the pain of this life, to get to the ‘there’ that must follow the ‘gone’. (Schnell, 
2008, p. 181) 
In this chapter, I comment on the structure of women’s narratives using Gee’s (1991) 
linguistic approach to narratives. This method was considered the most appropriate for 
assessing narrative fragmentation. Other current measures of narrative organisation, like those 
assessing sentence length in words and average number of syllables per word, lack face 
validity and are not empirically supported measures of the cohesiveness of a text (some argue 
that these measures are proxy measures for cognitive ability) (Gray & Lombardo, 2001; 
O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). I also considered Gee’s (1991) approach more appropriate and 
suited to the linguistic or structural analysis of narratives than Stein and Glenn’s (1979) 
episodic analysis system, and Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) high point analysis system (as 
cited in Riessman, 1993), as I have discussed in chapter 6.  
It is important to know that verbatim memory is the original representation of the traumatic 
event(s), whereas gist memory organises and structures verbatim memory and its linguistic 
form (Kraft, 2004). The distortions, the ellipses, the repetitions, the errors and the intrusions 
that we will encounter in the narratives that follow, occur within gist memory; verbatim 
memory persists and endures, and remains resistant to distortion and assimilation (Kraft, 
2004).  
Most, but not all, of my participants told their stories in vivid and great detail; telling their 
stories about their abuse at great length. Five examples of longer narratives, which will be 
subject to linguistic analysis, and three shorter, compressed narratives, will be presented. 
Another important consideration is that for most of the women I interviewed, it is likely that 
the traumas they endured shattered their assumptions about the world; the world as safe, as 
benevolent. This is common in individuals who have been traumatised (Brewin & Holmes, 
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2003). Perhaps this sense of shattering is what is reflected in the fragmentation of women’s 
trauma narratives, to which I will turn shortly.     
It is important at the outset for those intervening with shamed individuals to be able to 
identify the variants and correlates of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). As I have previously noted, 
signs of overt shame include acute, painful self-consciousness, depression (which can be 
understood as a product of self-directed hostility), soft self-boundaries (including fusion of 
self and other), feeling the contagiousness of shame, shyness (defined as acute dread and 
chronic tension), wordlessness, obsessive rumination, disgust, and autonomic arousal (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971). In therapy, shame may additionally manifest as feelings of numbness and 
depersonalisation, possibly as a reactions against feelings of “badness”, contamination and 
filthiness (Wurmser, 1987). Finally, shame may also be masked as haughtiness – cold 
arrogance and withdrawal; as envy; as paranoia of being watched, spied on or controlled; or in 
the grandiose claims characterising narcissism and states of apparent shamelessness 
(Wurmser, 1987). 
An important defense that therapists should look out for is by-passed shame, which refers to 
unacknowledged, unconscious and repressed shame, which typically manifests as another 
cognition or emotion (H. B. Lewis, 1971). To recap, by-passed shame occurs when the feeling 
of shame is so aversive that it is intolerable, so it is pushed from awareness and substituted 
with a less painful emotion, like sadness or anger or rage at either oneself or another (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992). This sadness is often transformed into depression, which is 
often understood as anger turned inward (H. B. Lewis, 1987b; M. Lewis, 1992). Anger may 
develop in response to a specific event, while rage is a response to prolonged shaming; to an 
injury to the self (M. Lewis, 1992). Substitution may involve focusing on a single feature of 
the entire emotional state, or on a new emotion (M. Lewis, 1992). By-passed shame can be 
recognised by the fact that it evokes a “wince” or a “jolt” to the self, followed by negative 
thoughts about the self (H. B. Lewis, 1987a). Unlike by-passed shame, when shame is 
acknowledged and experienced, it may be dispelled by allowing the emotion to dissipate by 
itself, shifting one’s attention to something different, denial, forgetting, using humour and 
laughter or confession to distance the emotion (M. Lewis, 1992; Mills, 2005; Tomkins, 1963). 
Other ways of diffusing shame is through affirmation (of non-shamed aspects) of the self 
(Izard, 1977). 
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In addition to signs of overt shame, a number of these veiled indicators of shame manifested 
themselves in the interviews I conducted with the women. Wherever they appear, I will draw 
the attention of the reader to the substitute emotion.  
Scholars as early as Janet claimed: 
Forgetting the event which precipitated the emotion…has frequently been found to 
accompany intense emotional experiences in the form of continuous and retrograde 
amnesia… If people become too upset to tell their story, memories cannot be 
transformed into a neutral narrative: A person is unable to make the recital which we 
call narrative memory, and yet he remains confronted by (the) difficult situation. This 
results in a phobia of memory that presents the integration (“synthesis”) of traumatic 
events and splits the traumatic memories from ordinary consciousness: The memory 
traces of the trauma linger as unconscious fixed ideas that cannot be “liquidated” as 
long as they have not been translated into a personal narrative and instead continue to 
intrude as terrifying perceptions, obsessional preoccupations and somatic re-
experiences such as anxiety reactions (as cited in Van der Kolk, 1994, p. 585). 
It is worth noting at the outset that definitions of narrative fragmentation are imprecise and 
sometimes distinctions are made between narrative disorganisation and narrative 
fragmentation, and sometimes the terms are used interchangeably (O’Kearney & Perrott, 
2006). In this thesis, the term fragmentation will be used interchangeably with 
disorganisation, and will be defined as addressing both narrative cohesion (connectedness) 
and narrative coherence (conceptual organisation) (O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). Although 
these two concepts are related, they describe different ways in which the narrative can be 
organised or fragmented, with very different implications for conclusions drawn about 
memory fragmentation in individuals who have been traumatised (O’Kearney & Perrott, 
2006). Cohesion refers to the additive, comparative, temporal and causal connections between 
sentences or clauses, while coherence refers to connections between goals, actions, outcomes, 
topics, themes or event sequences irrespective of their cohesiveness (O’Kearney & Perrott, 
2006). It has been argued that recovery from Complex PTSD should be tested by narrative 
coherence of personal memories (Brown, 2009).  
Baerger and McAdams (1999) argue that a substantial body of research indicates that 
narratives which adhere to a recognizable or canonical story structure are more easily 
remembered than those that deviate from the structure. Story quality is frequently based on its 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
244 
 
 
 
coherence (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). The first basic requirement for life story coherence 
is that the narrative starts with an orientation that provides the audience with pertinent 
background information to enable understanding (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). This includes 
providing the life story, including the central characters, locating the narrative in time, and 
describing the events that precede this particular moment (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). The 
second basic requirement for life story coherence is that there is temporal or sequential 
ordering, facilitating the construction of a linear, chronological or causal structure (Baerger & 
McAdams, 1999). The third essential component of life story coherence revolves around the 
emotional aspects of the storytelling (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). A narrative will not be 
coherent if there is not a consistent affective tone, one which imbues the narrative with an 
evaluative stance (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). The final basic requirement of life story 
coherence is integration, which involves the narrator being able to synthesise the separated 
pieces of his/her life into a story (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). None of the trauma or shame 
narratives generated by my participants adhered to all these criteria, particularly the ability to 
develop a linear or sequential story or plot, and having an appropriate and consistent affective 
tone – in fact, one of the participants laughed throughout her verbal recollection of being 
gang-raped, another typical example of by-passed shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) focus on the relationship between linguistic structure and 
emotion – how linguistic features intensify or subdue affect functions - and drawing on their 
work, it is interesting to look at the use of personal pronouns in the trauma and shame 
narratives of my participants. Fourteen of the 19 interviewees often used personal pronouns 
other than “I” when talking about events and experiences that had happened to them – they 
often used the word “you”, or sometimes even spoke in the third person. This can be read as a 
symptom of dissociation, which functions to decrease the proximity of the trauma from the 
person who has experienced it. Fear, dissociation and depression/suicidality were common 
responses to the traumas my participants were exposed to, as was explored in the categorical 
content analysis. Unlike in Klein and Janoff-Bulman’s (1996) interesting study, however, 
there were no consistent differences amongst my participants between child abuse survivors 
and those who had not been victimised during childhood in terms of narrative length, whether 
their narratives focused more on the past or the present (they focused mostly on the past, with 
some discussion of current practical worries, usually of a legal or financial nature) and their 
narratives did not consistently de-emphasise the self and emphasise the perpetrator – women 
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tended to talk both about themselves (their feelings and actions) and their experience of the 
perpetrator.  
Baerger and McAdams (1999) found that the most significant correlation was between affect 
and integration, suggesting that the transmission of factual information during narration is less 
important than the subjective communication of meaning, and that these two constructs are 
dependent upon one another to make the narrative’s central evaluative point. By contrast, the 
least important association was between orientation and integration, suggesting that setting 
the scene or contextualising the narrative is less important than expected (Baerger & 
McAdams, 1999). Finally, mental health was found to be associated with a coherent life story 
(Baerger & McAdams, 1999). Specifically, there were significant correlations between life 
story coherence and depression, happiness and satisfaction with life (Baerger & McAdams, 
1999). Depression was negatively related to life story coherence, while happiness and 
satisfaction with life were only modestly related to life story coherence (Baerger & 
McAdams, 1999). As previously noted, depression was identified as a significant mental 
health problem among my participants.  
Baerger and McAdams (1999) argue that psychological problems result from participation in 
an unsatisfying, oppressive or incoherent story, or alternatively, occur when the narrator lives 
out stories that others have about his or her life, preventing the narrator from developing 
his/her own dominant life narrative. Narrative interviewing, like narrative therapy, is likely to 
facilitate narrative revision – a means of reconstructing “the unstoried chaos of the 
unconscious…under conscious narrative control” (McAdams as cited in Baerger & 
McAdams, 1999, p. 75). In their study of the relationship between life story coherence and 
psychopathology, participants’ narrative coherence was scored according to orientation, 
structure, affect and integration (Baerger & McAdams, 1999).  
The results of Baerger and McAdam’s study are fascinating, and it is worth pausing briefly to 
consider integration. Narratives that scored high on the integration index were those that 
synthesised distinct narrative elements into a unified life story, linking the narrative to larger 
life themes (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). Life stories that scored low on the integration index 
were those that did not resolve or reconcile contradiction or ambiguity, or did not make links 
to the larger life context that surrounded them (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). Most women I 
interviewed tended to see the world in polarised terms, perhaps because their traumatic pasts 
had been so complex and confusing. Very few of my participants were able to link their past 
and current experiences to the larger life context that surrounded them, which is 
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understandable given that so many of them were still in crisis situations. Although women’s 
identities were shaped by the discursive context that surrounded them, most women were 
focused on past traumas, and only on occasion on the here and now – their present context –
which usually involved concentrating on how to solve legal battles with the perpetrators, find 
employment, and take care of their children, while struggling with their own post-traumatic 
reactions. But their focus was on emotional and physical survival. 
In a recent study conducted by Freer, Whitt-Woosley and Sprang (2010) survivors of 
repetitive traumatic exposure produced narratives with greater awareness and perception of 
trauma severity and greater emotionality than survivors of a single traumatic event, pointing 
to a “dose-response relationship”. Like in my participants, in this study, exposure to trauma 
during childhood resulted in narratives with higher levels of emotionality than traumas which 
occurred during adulthood – the women I interviewed were often much more emotional and 
distressed about childhood abuse than they were about IPV in adulthood. Consequently, in 
this study, focusing on the more distant past seemed the most distressing. 
The majority of the trauma narratives were long, vivid and detailed in my study; only five 
were short and compressed. Some scholars have suggested that greater arousal, personal 
salience, and rehearsal lead to longer and more detailed narratives about a traumatic incident 
compared to other kinds of narratives (Beaudreau, 2007). Furthermore, some researchers 
argue that personal salience and extreme arousal associated with trauma impairs the capacity 
to produce a cohesive narrative. The speechlessness associated with trauma, as a result of 
unconscious repression of memories and the presence of implicit memory associations, 
however, especially affective and somatosensory information, can render trauma narratives 
shorter than other life narratives. A number of other factors can affect narrative length, 
including conscious avoidance of painful or shameful memories, the willingness to discuss a 
trauma, and the time that has passed since the trauma took place (Beaudreau, 2007).  
These narratives also illustrate some key points make by Orange et al. (1997). They argue that 
psychic fragmentation, somatic fragmentation and psychosomatic fragmentation leads to the 
experience of self-loss, which includes the loss of inner cohesion, subjectivity, affectivity, 
authenticity, agency, temporal continuity, and self-differentiation. This chaos calls into 
question or even destroys parts of ourselves which we take for granted. For example, the 
individual may disintegrate into unrelated parts, dissolve into others or diffuse into the 
physical environment. S/he may feel an inner deadness or numbness, lose the sense of being a 
subject and become an inert physical object, being inauthentic and false, a simulation lacking 
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substance, lose possession of him/herself as his/her thoughts are usurped by a foreign will, 
and feel such extreme discontinuity in who one is that fragmentation takes place along the 
axis of time (Orange et al., 1997). Note how these experiences overlap with the dissociation 
found in my participants. This feeling of self-loss is understood as the product of an 
intersubjective catastrophe, as occurs in IPV. 
When using narrative analysis, it is important to look at narrative structure or form as well as 
content. In many of the interviews, particularly when interviewees were talking about 
traumatic experiences, the narrative structure was disrupted. Sometimes the trauma is so 
overwhelming that meaning is lost (Simon, 2008). The fragmented nature of these narratives 
is evidence of how narrative coherence is disturbed by trauma; interviewees literally “lost the 
plot” (Van der Merwe & Gobodo-Madikisela, 2008). Because trauma often represents a crisis 
in meaning, in these narratives, the chronology or order of events which connects experiences 
in a meaningful sequence with a beginning, middle and end, is lost. The chronicity of trauma 
that my participants had been exposed to meant multiple disruptions to the coherence in the 
narrative, resulting in non-linearity due to the often chaotic piecing together of traumatic 
memories and associated thoughts and feelings. Five examples follow. In these examples, it is 
clear that the self, splintered and fragmented from trauma (Putnam, 1989) is reflected in the 
quality of the narratives. In other words, narrative form mirrors narrative content. It is worth 
pausing here for a moment. From a social constructivist point of view, lack of coherence, 
multiplicity, contradiction, conflict and fragmentation are thought to characterise identity and 
narrative, and the kind of disorganisation I report on below would thus not be interpreted as a 
sign of pathology (Raggatt, 2006). This is a point I consider next.  
 
Theoretical Positioning 
 
The self and narratives are not only socially and culturally constructed, but also historically 
determined (Freeman, 2001). Personal identity, and the stories we tell, are changeable across 
time, space and the discursive contexts within which identity is negotiated and produced 
(Freeman, 2001). Personal identity and the narrativisation of experiences are configured in 
particular ways across the course of history, and currently, post-modernist and social 
constructivist understandings of self and narrativisation are predominant in certain contexts.   
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Some may say I have analysed the data from what may be termed a clinical point of view – I 
have understood the fragmentation in narratives as a post-traumatic response. There is 
however, another theoretical way in which these narratives could be interpreted. From a social 
constructivist point of view, life narratives are discontinuous, heterogeneous, random and 
fragmented. From this point of view, any narrative coherence or order is imposed on a life 
which is essentially meaningless and formless (Freeman & Brockmeier, 2001). It is a 
distinctly modernist point of view to see life, and autobiographical memory, as characterised 
by narrative coherence, temporal linearity and as reflective of a singular, unified self 
(Freeman & Brockmeier, 2001). In fact, Freeman (2001) argues that narrative order and 
coherence are fictional, defensive strategies for convincing ourselves that our lives are 
meaningful. From this point of view, narratives can be seen as stifling, constricting and 
delimiting meaning (Freeman, 2009). So, from a structural analysis of language it is to be 
expected that such fragmented, socially constructed identities would emerge. I would argue, 
however, that the trauma narratives which follow are more fractured and disrupted than other 
narratives, narratives not focused on trauma. Although very few of the narratives were as 
ordered and coherent as the typical modernist narrative ought to be, the trauma narratives 
were distinctly more fractured than a typical social constructivist text, suggesting the validity 
of a clinical approach. It is further worth noting that oral narratives – whether about trauma or 
not - are less likely to constitute well-made stories with central subjects, clear beginnings, 
middles and ends; they are less linear and coherent than written texts (Ochs & Capps, 2001). I 
do believe that the clinical approach does not invalidate the social constructivist approach; I 
would argue that awareness of the clinical sequelae of trauma simply amplifies the socially 
constructed non-linearity, incoherence and fragmentation that characterise all texts to varying 
extents.  
As noted in the previous chapter, Hollway and Jefferson (2009) suggest looking for 
unconscious material in the text, which may be illustrated at a structural level. It is worth 
pointing out once again that, from a narrative analytical point of view, language is not 
considered a transparent communication medium; it is seen as socially, culturally and 
historically constructed. Although I have used a structural linguistic approach for analysing 
narratives, I do not view language in modernist terms. Instead, I used Gee’s (1991) approach 
to uncover unconscious material reflected in language. In other words, I view language as 
unconsciously constructed. Specifically, in my analysis, I aimed to demonstrate how 
(unconscious) fragmentation of self is made visible in the fractured usage of language. A 
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related, somewhat controversial observation is that, unlike Gergen (1994) and other 
postmodernists’ argument, in the case of the five fragmented narratives I have analysed, 
language is remarkably representational – but in agreement with Gergen (1994), it is 
descriptive and indicative of an underlying psychological structure.  
 
The Analysis 
 
Two of the narrators were selected to illustrate the fragmentation of the narrative due to the 
pervasiveness of the trauma-related shame-based self. It is important to note at the outset, that 
prior to the interview, Narrator 2 disclosed to me that her husband suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, which is the “madness” referred to in the text. As will be seen, what is 
interesting about her recollection of her experiences, is the delusional nature of some of her 
narrative. I was left wondering in this interview if it was not in fact the narrator who suffered 
from a psychotic illness, but I confirmed with her counsellor that this was not the case. She 
did disclose to me that her mental health deteriorated as a result of her abuse, but that it was 
depression that she tended to struggle with, not a psychotic illness. I chose her narrative for its 
remarkable emphasis on the importance of bearing witness to traumas the survivor cannot 
believe or articulate herself. Other narratives include fracturing around important trauma-
related themes such as humiliation, dissociation, disorganised attachment patterns and 
abandonment, and were chosen for that reason. But the main reason any of these narratives 
were selected was for their length, complexity and non-linearity, and each and every one of 
these narratives have a particular non-linear structure, and a fracture which occurs at a 
significant or traumatic point of the narrative.  
To review, following Gee’s (1991) approach, the narratives below will be divided into Parts, 
Strophes, Stanzas and Main lines. “Idea units” are the smallest component of narratives. Each 
Main line is made up of one or more than one idea unit (indicated with a slash or / in the 
narratives that follow). Each idea unit contains a piece of new information which is called the 
focus, and it has a unitary intonation contour consisting of one pitch disruption (the pitch 
glide) (Gee, 1991). Thus, the focus of the idea unit is determined by the pitch glide, which is 
the change in the pitch of the voice, including falling, rising, rising-and-falling, or falling-and-
rising in relation to the base pitch level of the sentence (Gee, 1991). The foci are in bold print 
below. A Main line often corresponds with a sentence, including complex sentences, and is 
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about one central argument (Gee, 1991). Main lines form Stanzas, which are the “building 
blocks” of discursive language, which cluster into groups according to a topic, known as 
Strophes (Gee, 1991). These Strophes fall into larger units or themes, known as Parts (Gee, 
1991).  
As I have described, Gee (1991) argues that narrative texts are structured at five hierarchical 
levels, each of which is connected to the Main line and Stanza structure of the text. Each level 
plays a role in interpretation. Levels include Main line and Stanza structure; syntax and 
cohesion, Main line/non-main line; psychological subjects and the focusing system. 
Corresponding with each of these levels is a particular role in interpretation, respectively 
including ideas and perspectives on characters, events, states and information; logic and 
connections; plot; point of view; and image/theme (Gee, 1991).  
 
Narrative 1 
 
PART 1: (Changes in the relationship) 
Strophe 1: (Rosy) 
Stanza 1 (In the beginning it was rosy) 
1. To me…in the beginning/, everything was…like in the relationship 
everything was rosy/.   
 
Strophe 2: (Start of violence)  
Stanza 2: (Slapping and kicking and hit with implements) 
2. And then the part came where the slapping began/ and the kicking began/ 
3. And the more everything started/, the more…the harder I got beaten up/ 
4. Then it was spoons, axes, knives/ – whatever object he should get/, he 
would start an attack/.   
 
PART 2: (Deservedness) 
Strophe 3: (Bad child) 
Stanza 3: (Disobedience and punishment) 
5. And, for me/, in a sense, I felt that I deserved it/ 
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6. The reason why is because I haven’t been the best of children for my 
parents/ And…that I lived being disobedient/, to me, I felt like I 
deserved that/.  That’s how I felt/.   
7. I was just taking my punishment/.  But I didn’t think of anything else/, 
because I just felt that I deserved it/, although I never did anything 
wrong/.  
 
PART 3: (His mommy) 
Strophe 4: (His mommy’s sickness) 
Stanza 4: (Wanting to look after his mommy) 
8. Because I looked up to his mommy/: his mommy had arthritis/ 
9. She had arthritis in her whole body/ so she was in a wheelchair, 
paralysed, so to speak/   
10. She couldn’t do anything for herself/ 
11. And with the hard I had/, I wanted to look after her/.  
 
PART 4: (My son) 
Strophe 5: (My son and I were separated) 
Stanza 5: (Separation at the shelter) 
12. Because me and my son were separated that time/  
13. Also because I left him/ in the shelter/. 
 
PART 5: (Worthless and alone) 
Strophe 6: (A rightful burden
24
) 
Stanza 6: (Nobody can help, this is my situation) 
14. And, to me/, the way I felt/, I felt then that I was worthless/ 
15. Everything I thought of myself then/, I just thought, hey, Linda/, this is 
just it/. This is yours.  This is your package/ that you have to take to the 
market/ 
16. And nobody can help me/, although I never wanted to reach out and ask 
for help/ 
                                                 
24
 In discussing whether the burden referred to here was “rightful” or not, there was some debate around whether 
this interviewee felt that her burden was deserved. However, the term was retained because from my (the 
interviewer’s) point of view, from my felt sense of the woman’s emotional experience and from her 
paralinguistic cues, there was a strong sense of deservedness. 
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17. I always thought, hey/, this is my situation/, I have to deal with it myself./ 
 
 PART 6: (Help) 
Strophe 7: (Availability of help) 
Stanza 7: (Help will be available if there is need and sacrifice) 
18. But it wasn’t so./ Now I see it/: there are people out there that can help 
us/, if you really want to be helped/  
19. And not mess around and play around/  
20. You really, really need help/ 
21. And you are willing to sacrifice everything to get help/.   
 
PART 7: (Blame and responsibility)  
Strophe 8: (I wasn’t wrong) 
Stanza 8: (I didn’t provoke him)  
22. That was him really/ …I allowed myself to be torn apart/ with all the 
things that he had done to me/ and all the things he had said to me/ 
23. Although I knew it wasn’t wrong./  It wasn’t right for him to say those 
things/ because I knew how innocent I was/ in the whole situation/.   
24. Sometimes people – the other party – provokes that person/ to abuse 
them/.  But coming from my way/, I see myself/ where I never provoked 
him/ to abuse me/. 
 
Strophe 9: (He took it out on me) 
Stanza 9: (I let him take it out on me)   
25. Because it’s always like his thing/ that’s going on in his mind/, and if his 
friends didn’t arrive at the party/, then he would take it out on me/ 
26. When he didn’t have money/ or he didn’t have what he wanted/, he would 
like force me to get what he wanted/, and when I didn’t want to do it/, 
then he would take it out on me at all times/ 
27. I was the one who had to look for food/ and see that he had cigarettes/, 
and he would just lie there/.  I was the one who had to do everything/ 
28. And I allowed him to do that to me/.   
 
PART 8: (Unconsciousness) 
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Strophe 10: (Denial) 
Stanza 10: (Blindness) 
29. But yet again, I was blinded/ 
30. I was in denial/ and I was blinded/.  
 
The Main line, Stanza, Strophe and Part structure of the text (level 1) divides the narrative 
into related and hierarchically ordered information, ideas, events, characters and states which 
comprise the narrative (Gee, 1991). Unlike the example that Gee (1991) uses in his analysis, 
the narrative’s form is not uniform across Stanzas and Strophes and Parts (they are not equal 
in length or complexity); which compromises the coherence and unity of the narrative. It is 
noteworthy that Gee (1991) has two Stanzas per Strophe in his analysis, but that the Stanzas 
in Narrative 1 vary in content; most of the Strophes consist of only one Stanza.  
The next level of narrative structure is syntax and cohesion, a level which is dramatically 
affected in the above narrative. Gee (1991) argues that the syntactic system consists of 
cohesive devices that link Main lines to each other within Stanzas, and Stanzas to each other 
across the entire narrative in a logical manner. Cohesion is achieved by a range of linguistic 
devices, such as conjunctions, pronouns, demonstratives, ellipsis, adverbs, repeated words and 
phrases (Gee, 1991). Aside from the use of the word “and” (which at times is used to link idea 
units of Main lines that are quite distinct in their meaning), there is a virtual absence of 
connecting words and phrases in this narrative. In some instances, connecting words such as 
“because” are used, but they do not link Main lines, they are used to signal the beginning of a 
new idea unit (see Stanza 3, Main line 1, Stanza 5, Main line 1 and Stanza 9, Main line 1). In 
fact, the word “because” in all three instances is phatic because it does not follow on from the 
previous Main line, explaining its contents. It is used to facilitate ongoing social contact rather 
than to convey specific meaning. What is interesting here is that although the narrator uses 
linguistic devices which superficially suggest a narrative order or coherence (connecting 
words), they are not used to convey content; they are used for interpersonal purposes. 
Connecting words are used in this text both to signal fragmentation at a semantic level, and 
attempts to facilitate interpersonal connection. 
Despite the linking phrase “But it wasn’t so” (Stanza 7, Main line 1), the themes covered in 
Part 5 and Part 6 are also divergent, and on the surface, seem contradictory. In Part 5 the 
narrator says that nobody can help her, while in Part 6 she states that there are people willing 
to help her. This suggests an internal struggle around whether help is really available, and 
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whether it can be used to her benefit. This struggle is a product of whether she feels she is 
worthy of help.  The most significant inner conflict is about whether she deserves the abuse 
(Part 2, Strophe 3, Stanza 3) or whether she was underserving of the violence directed against 
her (Part 7, Strophe 8, Stanza 8). This internal struggle is based on the split self we examined 
in the previous chapter - the authentic self defined by shame and self-blame, and the false self 
that resists.  
The narrative is rife with contradictions, which is consistent with the theme of the split self, 
and there are clear points of fracturing (look, for example, at the breakdown in coherence and 
meaning from Part 2 to Part 3 and Part 3 to Part 4). As soon as the trauma of physical 
violence is uttered in Strophe 2, Stanza 2, the narrative begins to fragment. It is worth pausing 
here for a moment to consider the significance of repetition. Foa, Molnar and Cashman (1995) 
argue that repetition in trauma narratives is the most direct index of fragmentation. In this 
narrative, there is a pattern of themes being revisited at odd intervals from the point of trauma 
onwards (look for example how the theme expressed by Part 2 is brought up again in Part 5). 
This repetition is significant, because it demonstrates what is important to the narrator; what 
she wants to emphasise, and here it is her deservedness and worthlessness. I would like to go 
into further detail about the contradiction in meaning between Parts 2 and 5, and Part 7. In 
Parts 2 and 5 the narrator states that she deserved her abuse, that she is worthless and brought 
her abuse on herself. This is radically contested in Part 7, where she states that she was 
innocent in her abusive situation, and that she did not do anything to provoke her perpetrator. 
This contradiction is re-iterated in Main line 4 of Stanza 3, where she says “I just felt that I 
deserved it, although I never did anything wrong”. As I have noted, these repetitive 
contradictions are the product of an internal struggle around blame and responsibility; a 
conflict between the shame-based authentic self and the resisting false self. Although there is 
an internal struggle, this narrator leans towards evaluating herself negatively (illustrated by 
her more frequent emphasis on deservedness and worthlessness compared to innocence), 
locating the blame and shame in herself, rather than her perpetrator, indicating that her shame-
based authentic self is more prominent than the false self (three Stanzas are devoted to the 
authentic self, and two to the split self). 
Another repetition occurs in Part 8 (Main lines 1 and 2). Here the narrator emphasises her 
“blindness”. Her emphasis once again suggests what is important to her, and it is interesting 
that this blindness may be a reference to her own inability to see that she is not to blame or 
responsible for her abuse; that the shame should be located outside her, in the perpetrator. 
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What is striking is the surprising reference to the narrator’s son in Part 4, which links to 
another emotion related to shame, guilt. To contextualise, at the time of the interview, the 
narrator had been warned by the staff at the Centre that if she did not look after her son better, 
he would be removed by social services. She had received her last warning the day of the 
interview, after leaving her son unsupervised for a night at the shelter. She showed extreme 
remorse about this, and it came up multiple times during the interview. She felt that because 
she had been rejected and abandoned by her own parents as a child, she was doing the same to 
her son. Like we will see many times in this chapter, history repeats itself.  
This affects the Main line/off Main line of the plot (Gee, 1991). There are noteworthy 
disruptions at this level of the narrative. Gee (1991) argues that in past tense narratives, the 
Main line events of the plot are built up from main clauses (non-subordinate, non-embedded) 
and expressed in perfective aspect (simple past tense and the historical present). That is not to 
say that the subordinate clauses are unimportant. As Gee (1991) argues, the plot needs to be 
interpreted in light of off Main line material. Below are the main clauses of the narrative 
which establish plot.  
 
Narrative 1: Main line/off Main line of the plot 
 
PART 1: (Changes in the relationship) 
Strophe 2: (Start of violence)  
Stanza 2: (Slapping and kicking and hit with implements) 
1. The slapping began and the kicking began. 
2. I got beaten up. 
PART 2: (Deservedness) 
Strophe 3: (Bad child) 
Stanza 3: (Disobedience and punishment) 
3. I felt. I deserved it. 
PART 5: (Worthless and alone) 
Strophe 6: (A rightful burden) 
Stanza 6: (Nobody can help, this is my situation) 
4. I felt. I was worthless. 
5. Nobody can help me. 
PART 6: (Help) 
Strophe 7: (Availability of help) 
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Stanza 7: (Help will be available if there is need and sacrifice) 
6. It wasn’t so. I see it. There are people out there that can help us. 
PART 7: (Blame and responsibility)  
Strophe 8: (I wasn’t wrong) 
Stanza 8: (I didn’t provoke him)  
7. I knew how innocent I was.  I see myself I never provoked him to abuse    
me. 
Strophe 9: (He took it out on me) 
Stanza 9: (I let him take it out on me)   
8. It’s his thing. He would take it out on me. 
 
In the whole narrative earlier, the themes expressed in parts diverge from one another in 
content. It was difficult to discern a plot at first reading as there was no clear narrative 
progression. There is no clear beginning, middle and end in the full narrative. In its entirety, 
the narrative is characterised by loosely strung together, often disconnected subordinate 
clauses, and somewhat haphazardly placed main clauses. Again, it is as if the narrator is 
trying to use structural or linguistic means (numerous subordinate clauses) to create the 
illusion of coherence or a sense of plot (chronological and/or logical linking of characters, 
events, and states). When the Main line material is presented, what is immediately striking is 
the abundance of (removed) subordinate clauses. This suggests that the narrator felt the need 
for a great deal of supporting or qualifying information to tell her story. However, I would 
argue that in this case, it is less challenging for the reader to discern the underlying theme, an 
internal struggle. This is because, even in the absence of chronological or logical progression 
in the Main line narrative, it is more clearly focused on particular themes and contradictions 
without the distraction or interference from non-essential information in terms of plot (e.g. 
“his mommy” or her “son”). What can be said is that the Main line or main point or 
significance of the plot, paradoxically, through its contradictions, emphasises the central 
theme of the split self: violence (Part 1, Strophe 2, Stanza 2) and deservedness (Part 2, 
Strophe 3, Stanzas 3 and Part 5, Strophe 6, Stanza 6), the availability of help (Part 6, Strophe 
7, Stanza 7) and resisting self-blame (Part 7, Strophe 8, Stanza 8; Strophe 9, Stanza 9). Note 
the perfect balance in terms of Main line material devoted to deservedness and worthlessness, 
and resisting self-blame.  
There is some surprising consistency in the psychological subjects of this narrative. The 
psychological subject represents the points of view from which the material in the Stanza is 
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viewed; so they are the entities with whom/which the narrator is empathising (Gee, 1991). 
The psychological subject helps the reader ascertain something about the narrator’s stance and 
how it changes across the narrative (Gee, 1991). “I/me” is the psychological subject of every 
Stanza except Stanza 3 Main line 2 (“my parents”) and Stanza 4 Main line 2 and 3 (“his 
mommy”). The narrator expresses a great deal of her own feeling in this narrative. It is 
interesting to note that when the psychological subject changes, in each instance, the narrator 
is expressing feelings of duty and deservedness. The change in psychological subject suggests 
that the content of the Main lines comes from a changed perspective – that the narrator feels 
that from their (her parents and his “mommy”) perspective she needs to compensate somehow 
for her “disobedience” and for her “hard” life.    
Finally, level five of the system, the focusing system, refers to the pitch used to signal the 
focus of a particular idea unit. The change in pitch shows that the information that is being 
shared is new, salient or important, that it is the information the reader should focus his/her 
attention on (Gee, 1991)
25
. I argue that there is a series of disruptions in the articulation of 
focal areas, after the disclosure of abuse in Strophe 2. The major shifts in focus occur between 
Part 2 and Part 3, and Part 3 and Part 4. The focus abruptly changes from slapping began; 
kicking began; everything started; beaten up; spoons, axes, knives; should get; an attack; for 
me; I deserved it; my parents; being disobedient; I deserved that; I felt; my punishment; 
anything else; I deserved it; anything wrong to looked up; arthritis; whole body; a 
wheelchair; paralysed; anything for herself; I had; and look after her. The next Stanza’s 
focus also changes radically, to separated; I left him; shelter. There is another significant shift 
in focus from Part 6 to Part 7, where focal areas such as it wasn’t so, I see it, can help us, 
want to be helped, play around, need help, everything to get help, to him really, torn apart, 
had done to me, had said to me, wasn’t wrong, wasn’t right, how innocent, whole situation, 
I’ve seen, people, the other party, to abuse them, see myself, provoked him.  
What is interesting here, in addition to the shifts, is the frequent focus on violence and 
shame/deservedness.  
 
Narrative 2 
 
PART 1: (Isolation) 
Strophe 1: (Limited contact with friends and family) 
                                                 
25
 I use italics at this level of analysis to make it easier for the reader to distinguish different foci.  
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Stanza 1: (No friends and seeing family twice a year for an hour) 
1. He never allowed me to have friends/ 
2. He only took me twice/ to my own family/, and my family/ stays in 
Stellenbosch/ 
3. He took me twice/ to my family/, twice per year, and that was only for an 
hour./ 
  
Stanza 2: (Excuses and lies) 
4. And whenever they want to come/, then I had to come up with an excuse/ 
like, no, we are not at home/; we are going out for the weekend/ 
5. Then I must lie/.  We are going out for the weekend/ or I’m working/ 
 
Stanza 3: (Mommy wants to help) 
6. And my mommy said/, that was before/ she passed away/, but, no, it’s 
mos (not so/isn’t it?) nothing/, then I can cook for you/ or do something 
for you/.  Because I used to work from nine o’clock till nine o’clock/ at 
night in a shop/.   
 
PART 2: (Shame and stigma) 
Strophe 2: (Lies about abuse) 
Stanza 4: (Lied to boss and friends) 
7. Then I would say, no, mommy/, we are not going to be at home/ 
8. Then my children would ask me, mommy, why?/  I said, jinne (goodness), 
man/, I don’t want my family to see this/ 
9. I always hid/, and I always lied to them/ 
10. Even my boss and my friends, they see me with blue eyes or a broken 
arm/, I always lie./  I would say, no, I got hurt, and that and that/.   
 
PART 3: (The parrot) 
Strophe 3: (The parrot can talk) 
Stanza 5: (So excited about Grysie) 
11. And then, Amelia, my boss gave me a parrot/ 
12. I never knew a parrot could talk/, that was so interesting/ 
13. She gave me a parrot,/ a little one/, and I gave him the name Grysie/ 
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14. She gave it to me as a birthday present/ 
15. It was in its cage/, and a big bag of mealies/.  I was so excited about this                   
bird/.   
 
Strophe 4: (The parrot tells the truth) 
Stanza 6: (The parrot opens my eyes to his madness) 
16. The first night he was sitting/ in the cage/, just looking at us/ 
17. The second night when I got home/ he told me, hey, you vark (pig)/, you 
are fast asleep!/  He is bringing in a lot of girlfriends/ 
18. And then he clawed my fokken face/. I said, huh?/   
19. He said, ja (yes), and he told me/, you know what/, and that bloody thing 
is mad/ 
20. And that opened my eyes./  That was on the 16th of March 1990/, and that 
bird opened my eyes/ 
21. I won’t lie to you/, that bird told me/, you know, he took a lot of tablets/.   
 
PART 4: (Madness) 
Strophe 4: (He is mad) 
Stanza 7: (He is a mad donkey, a monkey, not human) 
22. And his sister came this morning with a big bag/, a lot of packets and 
packets of tablets/, he’s mad/!   
23. That is why he’s going on like a mad donkey/.  He acts like a monkey/; 
he’s not human/.   
 
PART 5: (The parrot is not dead) 
Strophe 5: (The parrot is used to this) 
Stanza 8: (The parrot told me not to worry) 
24. And then he went to the cage/, took the bird out/ and…I thought the bird 
was dead/ 
25. And then Grysie said in Afrikaans: naai (no), don’t worry!/ I’m used to 
this/.   
 
PART 6: (Abuse) 
Strophe 6: (You don’t talk about the abuse) 
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Stanza 9: (Something wrong and bruises) 
26. I phoned my boss/ and I said, auntie Asma/, why did you give me this 
thing that talks?/   
27. She said, you know why/, because you don’t talk, my child/ 
28. And I know there is something wrong/ because I see the bruises on you/ 
29. And I don’t feel lekker (nice)/ to see you in pain every day./   
 
PART 7: (The parrot is needed) 
Strophe 7: (The parrot is needed by somebody special) 
Stanza 10: (Someone special) 
30. And she told me/ the bird was eight years old/ and it belonged to her 
brother/ 
31. She asked her brother, give that bird,/ I need that bird/ 
32. I want to give that bird to someone special/.   
 
PART 8: (The parrot tells the truth) 
Strophe 8: (The parrot talks to the policeman) 
Stanza 11: (The parrot tells the policeman everything) 
33. The first time I laid a charge against him/ and the policeman walked in/, 
the bird told the policeman every single thing/ 
34. Everything/.  
 
PART 9: (I ran out) 
Strophe 9: (I ran out because he killed the bird) 
Stanza 12: (He wrung his neck) 
35. He killed the bird/ a day before I left the house./  He killed the bird/ 
36. He took him/ and he wrung his neck/ 
37. And that was in 2009/ when I left./  That is when I ran out/.    
 
Again, the narrative’s form is not uniform across Stanzas and Strophes and Parts and there is 
some variation in the length and complexity of these components of the text. The Parts, 
Strophes and Stanzas are either quite elaborate and detailed, or are relatively short and end 
abruptly to give way to a dramatically new and different theme. Only one Strophe consists of 
more than one Stanza. This gives the narrative a disrupted, fragmented quality.  
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There are insufficient connections between Parts, Strophes, Stanzas and Main lines. However, 
the connecting words “and” and “then” do function to link different components of the text 
(see Stanzas 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9). However, as in Narrative 1, these words sometimes do not 
carry any meaning, and their function is solely structural. It is worth paying attention to Main 
line 3 of Stanza 6 in particular. The surprising content of Main line 3, which bears no direct 
relevance to preceding or following Main lines, disrupts the flow of this Stanza. This is 
despite the use of the words “and then”. The meaningless use of connecting words (once 
again, “and then”) recurs in Stanza 8 (Main lines 1 and 2) where the theme changes from 
madness (Stanza 7) to the parrot not being dead (Stanza 8). 
As has been noted, the point at which the plot is “lost” is Part 3 (the parrot). Up until this 
point there had been a loose but logical progression from social isolation (Part 1) to shame 
and stigma (Part 2). The narrator’s abuse is brought up again in Part 6, but she returns to the 
theme of the parrot in Parts 7, 8 and 9. What is striking about this “plot” is the disconnected 
repetition of particular themes or topics, most notably, lies and truth. This is a tension that 
characterises the whole narrative. Part 1, Stanza 2, Part 2, Stanza 4 and Part 6, Stanza 9, 
which all focus on excuses and lies about the abuse and the madness that evokes it (see Part 
4), can be starkly contrasted with the “truth” of her perpetrator’s madness told by the parrot in 
Part 3. In this Part, the parrot becomes a witness to the perpetrator’s indiscretions (girlfriends) 
and his madness (for which he takes tablets); his function is to validate the narrator’s 
(unspoken) knowledge. The narrator’s silence (see Stanza 9, Main line 1) is also contrasted 
with the parrot’s outspoken disclosure of “everything” (Stanza 11). Where she conceals, the 
parrot tells. The juxtaposition of lies and truth is most dramatic in Main line 6 of Stanza 6, 
where the narrator says: “I won’t lie to you, that bird told me, you know, he took a lot of 
tablets”. Thus, in this narrative, the main points of the plot are lies (Stanzas 2 and 4) and the 
parrot/truth (Stanzas 5, 6, 8, 10, 12). The presence of the parrot indicates multiplicity; the 
existence of oppositional, contradictory voices within the self (Raggatt, 2006). 
Many trauma survivors struggle to believe that the traumas they survived occurred in reality – 
a phenomenon which is at least partly caused by dissociation and loss of traumatic memory 
(Putnam, 1989). This is why it is often important for trauma survivors to have someone who 
can bear witness to the traumas they have survived; to validate their experiences. Ferenczi (as 
cited in Orange, 2011, p. 92) argues that when traumatised the individual may feel “split – 
innocent and culpable at the same time – and his [sic] confidence in the testimony of his own 
senses is broken”. It is very important to this narrator that she is believed (Stanza 6, Main line 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
262 
 
 
 
6), perhaps because she struggles to believe herself. The formulation of the kind of delusions 
this narrator has developed in relation to the parrot takes place in contexts of radical 
invalidation, where the individual’s sense that his or her feelings have any validity whatsoever 
are lost (Orange et al., 1997). What is ironic is that the parrot fails at his task as validator; as 
“objective” witness. It is not his own words that he is using, but the narrator’s forbidden ones; 
the ones she is too ashamed to utter. There is a mergence between the bird and the voiceless 
narrator; the bird, who in Strophe 5, Stanza 8, symbolises the narrator who is already 
emotionally deadened against the continual onslaught of abuse from the perpetrator. The 
projection of her own feelings onto the bird is most dramatic in the following scene: “And 
then he went to the cage/, took the bird out and…I thought the bird was dead. And then 
Grysie said in Afrikaans: naai (no), don’t worry! I’m used to this”. This is the narrator’s 
experience; a flippant expression of her own familiarity with the experience of near death. 
The bird expresses everything the narrator knows, but cannot say.  She puts words in the 
bird’s mouth, and in so doing, destroys her validation, her “objective” witness. Although it is 
the perpetrator that ultimately kills the bird (Stanza 12), at a symbolic level, she has already 
destroyed him (i.e. his functions).  
There are other parts of the text where repetition occurs. As we have seen, repetition 
illustrates what is important to the narrator, what she wants to emphasise. This repetition 
occurs for the first time in Stanza 1, when she talks about how seldom the narrator saw her 
family during the abusive relationship. This emphasis tells the reader that social isolation was 
clearly very painful for her. The importance of uncovering the “truth” of the madness of her 
perpetrator in the narrative is demonstrated in Stanza 6, where the narrator repeats how the 
parrot opened her eyes, an expression that suggests that it was the first time the narrator could 
see clearly. The last repetition occurs in Stanza 12, where the narrator tells the reader how her 
perpetrator killed the bird (she repeats it three times in this Stanza). This death symbolises the 
death of self, truth, validation, support. It is perhaps this that leads the narrator to leave her 
abusive relationship for the last time.  
In order to analyse the plot, or the breakdown of the plot, I list the Main line material in the 
text below. 
 
Narrative 2: Main line/off Main line of the plot 
 
PART 2: (Shame and stigma) 
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Strophe 2: (Lies about abuse) 
Stanza 4: (Lied to boss and friends) 
1. I always hid, and I always lied to them. 
PART 3: (The parrot) 
Strophe 3: (The parrot can talk) 
Stanza 5: (So excited about Grysie) 
2. My boss gave me a parrot. 
3. I never knew a parrot could talk. That was so interesting. 
4. She gave me a parrot. I gave him the name Grysie. 
Strophe 4: (The parrot tells the truth) 
Stanza 6: (The parrot opens my eyes to his madness) 
5. That bird opened my eyes. 
6. I won’t lie. That bird told me.  
PART 4: (Madness) 
Strophe 4: (He is mad) 
Stanza 7: (He takes tablets; he is a mad donkey, a monkey, not human) 
7. He’s mad!   
8. He’s going on like a mad donkey. He acts like a monkey. He’s not human. 
PART 8: (The parrot tells the truth) 
Strophe 8: (The parrot talks to the policeman) 
Stanza 11: (The parrot tells the policeman everything) 
9. The bird told the policeman. 
10. Everything.  
 
The Main line material demonstrates the tension between the predominant theme of lies (the 
perpetrator and the perpetrator-defined identity) and truth (the parrot). From the point that the 
parrot is introduced into the narrative (Part 3), the full narrative loses its structure and 
becomes somewhat chaotic, but at Main line plot level, the partial narrative above quite 
clearly illustrates the main theme, and although I would not call the Main line plot linear, it is 
not as fractured as the full narrative; it includes less disruptions and diversions. What is 
interesting is that even at Main line level, there is overlap between Stanzas which borders on 
repetition - truth is referred to in three Stanzas, which is unusual and draws particular 
attention to the importance to the construct that is being emphasised. For this narrator, it is 
vitally important that the (her) truth is heard and validated. The centrality of this process in 
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the healing of individuals who have been exposed to chronic trauma has already been pointed 
out.  
What is interesting in this narrative with regard to the psychological subject is that it varies 
substantially across different components of the text, and that psychological subjects even 
change within one Stanza. This shifting of perspectives fits with the chaotic structure of the 
narrative.  In Stanza 1, the psychological subject is “he”, while in Stanza 2 it is “I” and in 
Stanza 3 it is “mommy”. In Stanza 4 however, the psychological subject changes from “I” to 
“boss and friends” to “I”, and in Stanza 5, it shifts from “my boss” to “I” to “she” to “I” to 
“she” to “parrot” to “I”. The chaotic shifting continues in Stanza 6 (“parrot” to “I” to parrot 
[“he”] to “I” to parrot [“that bird”], but abates again in Stanza 7 (“his sister” to “he”). In 
Stanza 8 the psychological subject changes from “he” to “I” to parrot (“Grysie”), and in 
Stanza 9 it shifts from “I” to “she” to “I”. In Stanza 10, this pattern is reversed and the 
changes are from “she” to “I” to “she”. In Stanza 11, the shift is from “I” to the parrot (“that 
bird”). Stanza 12 closes with a more chaotic shifting from “he” to “I” to “he” to “I”. Note that 
the most dramatic shifting takes place in Stanzas 5 and 6, which are all centred around the 
parrot, and mark the most irrational (if not delusional) part of the narrative in terms of 
content. It is significant that the psychological subject is so unstable in this, the most 
fragmented, section of the text.     
There are dramatic shifts in foci in this narrative. What can be seen when studying the 
narrative is that there is some coherence in the focal areas in Parts 1 and 2. The focus, 
however, completely changes in Part 3; Part 4 shows another radical shift, and Part 5 returns 
the focus to the parrot. Part 6 is once again a shift in focus from the parrot, but the narrator 
returns once again to the parrot in Parts 7, 8 and 9. Key examples of the changes in foci 
include: Family; friends; lying (repeated 3 times in up to Part 3) to  could talk; so interesting; 
a parrot; a little one; name Grysie; birthday present; its cage; of mealies; so excited to 
opened my eyes; March 1990; opened my eyes to the cage; bird out; was dead; naai (no), 
don’t worry! (I’m used) to this to someone special to everything; killed the bird; took him; his 
neck; in 2009; I left; ran out. The chaotic shifts in psychological perspectives in the narrative, 
the disorganised changes in focus reflect an incoherent, fragmented narrative; a narrative 
representative of significant psychic fracturing.  
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Narrative 3 
 
PART 1: (Dissociation) 
Strophe 1: (A horrible movie) 
Stanza 1: (The knife) 
1. A horrible movie/. He planted the knife here/; I had to pull it out/ before I 
could walk/. 
 
Stanza 2: (The stones, the rocks)   
2. And I eventually came out by the door/ and I went to the neighbour/, and 
whilst lying by the neighbour’s door/, he was throwing me with stones/, 
believe you me. 
3. I think that was the worst experience I’ve ever had/ because…I’ll never 
forget that day!/  
4. And they removed the fence/ and the old stuff that was in there - /the pigs 
- and the pieces of stone were lying there/, he actually stood in the 
driveway and picked up those rocks and threw it at me.   
 
Stanza 3: (The knife) 
5. And he had stabbed me in my knee already/, I don’t know what for/. We 
were just sitting and talking/. Oh yes, I remember, my daughter or my son 
phoned me, and he wouldn’t believe it’s them/. Then he stabbed me just 
like that/.  He took the knife and planted it in my knee/.   
6. I think why I will never forget it/, it’s because we were chatting so lekker 
(nicely) with one another/, and all of a sudden he just grabbed the knife/, 
planted it in my knee here/ and walked out.   
 
Stanza 4: (The knife, the stones, the rocks) 
7. And I’m like, oh, my god/, I couldn’t believe this thing is standing up in 
my knee!/  You know, with both hands I had to/ …picture it/ …jô, I 
didn’t know what was going to happen/, I just pulled and it wouldn’t 
come out/, because it’s got that riffle on/. I had to do this!   
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8. And eventually I got it out/, and I limped out of the house/.  I went to the 
neighbour and I fell there on the stoep (verandah)/.   
9. Then he took the bricks and he threw it at me.   
 
Stanza 5: (The worst part of the abuse: out of the blue) 
10. I thought to myself, ooh/ …I think that was the worst part of his abuse/, 
besides the other parts where he like/ …but that, to me, because I saw 
everything/. Okay, the other stabbings I also saw/, but I was like more 
careful/. It was out of the blue/.   
11. Just now here the knife is standing inside of my leg/, and I couldn’t get it 
out/. It was so deep in/ …I mean, this part was out of my leg/ and the rest 
was all in/. I had to struggle to get it out/ because I couldn’t get up/. I 
couldn’t push my leg straight/.  I had to remove this thing first before I 
could get up/.   
 
PART 2: (The crucifixion) 
Strophe 2: (Humiliation) 
Stanza 6: (Redemption of the shame-based self) 
12. And the other time he crucified me/ …I said, jinne (goodness), I saw the 
movie, The Crucifixion of Jesus Christ/ …he crucified me once/.   
13. I will never forget that day also/.   
14. Whilst standing on the stoep there where we stayed/, you know, when I 
looked up I saw the whole street/ …to me, it was like Jerusalem/ and I’m 
there on the stage/, and the people are standing there/ …because we lived 
on a high hill/, our house was very high/ and you can stand there and look 
down/ …and as I was looking down/, all the people were standing there 
in the road/.   
15. And he’s like performing/, as he is shouting and stabbing me like that/, 
and the people are like, oh, Petrus, don’t do that/, and he’s just doing 
this/, and in my arms and here and here/.   
16. I said, jô, this cannot be true/.  Believe you me/, and I withdrew all those 
cases/, meaning I’ll give him a second chance/ – he might change/. And 
he never changed/, until today he never changed/. I said, enough is 
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enough where withdrawing cases is also concerned:/ I’m not withdrawing 
any more cases/.  
Like the previous narratives, the narrative’s length and complexity across Stanzas, Strophes 
and Parts varies, indicating some structural instability, however, what is most striking is the 
cyclical repetition in this narrative. As I noted earlier, Foa et al (1995) argue that repetition in 
trauma narratives is the most direct demonstration of linguistic and psychic fragmentation. 
This narrative is fascinating because of its particular form of non-linearity – its undeniable 
spiral structure.  More accurately, it forms a fractured spiral structure through its significant 
repetitions – it is a typical example of a chaos narrative. It is interesting that although there is 
a great deal of use of connecting words such as “and”, and on occasion, “then” at the 
beginning of lines, suggesting progress and linearity, these words are used to hold together a 
structure comprised of circular reiteration of the central trauma. Unlike the other narratives, 
the theme does not change, the narrative is a description of a single incident; the theme is not 
what indicates fragmentation. The detailed repetition, particularly of phrases around never 
forgetting (Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 2; Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 3; Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 
6), suggests hypermnesia rather than the amnesia we encounter in other women’s narratives in 
this chapter (please note that hypermnesia can co-occur or alternate with the emotional 
numbness or paralysis of dissociation, although dissociation is more typically associated with 
amnesia [Payne, Nadel, Britton, & Jacobs, 2004]). The randomness of the cyclical repetition, 
however, does suggest that the narrative does not function as a cohesive whole, with a 
beginning, middle and an end. Although there is a great deal of thematic repetition across 
Stanzas, they are not calculated, they are choked out in panic, shock, without any regard to 
narrative order.  For example, Stanza one is focused on the knife, Stanza two is focused on the 
rocks and stones, Stanza three returns to the knife and Stanza four includes both the knife, and 
the rocks and stones. This narrator returns to describe the same unbelievable scene, over and 
over. She repeats that the knife is in her knee no less than five times. Survivors like Irene 
become immersed in visualising the traumatic event, the outside world “dissolves”, and the 
survivors convey the traumatic images “in raw form, unstructured, and testimony can seem 
incoherent to the listener” (Kraft, 2004, p. 354). There is some significant contradiction in the 
narrative. The narrator says on two occasions that she will never forget that day, but then says 
she cannot believe it happened.  
This leads me to the theme of dissociation (Part 1). There are several indicators in this 
narrative of dissociation; of the narrator emotionally distancing herself from an experience 
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that is too traumatic for her to metabolise. She says repeatedly that what is happening cannot 
be real, cannot be true (Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 2; Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 6). In fact, that is 
how the narrative starts, the narrator refers to the event as “a horrible movie” – so disowning 
the emotional experience, projecting it onto an imaginary screen. It almost sounds like she is 
experiencing an out of body experience. Part 1 links to Part 2 in fascinating ways. Again, 
there is the theme of performance, most dramatically demonstrated in the reference to the film 
“The Cruxifiction of Christ”, and on a lesser scale when describing Petrus’ behaviour (see 
Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 6 - Petrus  is described as “performing”). She also describes herself 
as “there on the stage”, again emphasising a performative element; the pervasive non-reality 
of the nightmarish unfolding events.  Something very interesting is happening here in the 
identification with this film. In surrounding narratives not reported here, Irene expressed very 
high levels of shame and humiliation. The image of her up on the hill, with a frozen audience 
watching her hideous trauma from below (her symbolic “crucifixion”), but who does not 
make any real effective attempt at intervening, is one of profound, shameful exposure and 
humiliation. But Irene turns this theme around, and identifies with Christ, the archetypal 
figure of both shame and humiliation; and one of absolution and redemption. She transforms 
her fractured, dissociated self; her broken body, into a heroic figure who suffered for sacred 
reasons. This is where a thematic and structural split occurs between Part 1 and Part 2. In Part 
1 she is undeniably the victim; helpless, passive. In Part 2 she is making a vivid statement 
about her identification with a holy figure, which can be interpreted in several ways. I believe 
that this identification is a dramatic shame-based compensatory effort on her part.  I would 
argue, based on the rest of the lengthy interview I conducted with Irene, that she suffered 
from a great deal of self-loathing and self-hatred, and was seeking any means to reduce her 
self-blame (evidence of which was her continual withdrawal of cases against Petrus, see the 
final Stanza), to forgive herself and feel absolution and redemption from self-blame for her 
abuse; to no longer identify with a victim status. I do not think that it was co-incidental that 
Irene had attempted suicide three days before I interviewed her, just after the incident she 
describes here had taken place; this act is consistent with the death of Christ. I believe that her 
identification with Christ was an exaggerated, if somewhat deluded attempt in keeping with 
compensating for a profound shame-based self. I also believe that in escaping death, she was 
attempting at creating and embracing a kind of  symbolically “resurrected” self based on 
freedom; an identity based on redemption; one that was strong and persevering, illustrated in 
the statement in the final Stanza: “I’m not withdrawing anymore cases”. 
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This is the major fracture in the narrative. However, there are many more “micro-fractures” in 
this dramatically non-linear narrative. The narrative has a raw, immediate quality about it, and 
the narrator uses several devices to hook the reader in, particularly at points where she finds 
her experience particularly disturbing and unbelievable. We have established that many 
trauma survivors find it difficult to believe that the traumas they endured took place in reality 
– this is partly caused by dissociation, which is a major theme in this narrative, and loss of 
traumatic memory (Putnam, 1989). As I have noted, repetition is a significant feature of this 
narrative; one which signals fragmentation, and being believed is a persistent theme, which is 
consistent with dissociation. This is perhaps why the narrator tries so hard to draw my 
attention to particularly ghastly parts of her narrative – she needs me to hear; to believe; to 
bear witness for her, for whom this narrative is intolerable. This narrator draws my attention 
to the unbelievable, unbearable horror that she is going through by using exclamations like 
“With both hands I had to/ …picture it/ …jô, I didn’t know what was going to happen” (Part 
1, Strophe 1, Stanza 4). This sentence was uttered in the context of the horror of: I couldn’t 
believe this thing is standing up in my knee! Another example includes: And the other time he 
crucified me …I said, jinne (goodness) (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 6).  
A number of Main lines show dramatic fracturing, as we will see, and once again, they occur 
at points of intolerable trauma. The first sentence I described above in the context of 
exclamations shows significant fragmentation; all the strings of words before the exclamation 
are incomplete fragments that do not constitute clauses. Another set of examples follows:  
“I thought to myself” (incomplete sentence, there is no object) 
“I think that was the worst part of his abuse” (“that” is unspecified),   
“besides the other parts” (“other parts” is also unspecified) 
“where he like…but that, to me, because” (incomplete, incoherent, fractured  sentence). 
“I saw everything”. (What did she see?) 
“Okay, the other stabbings I also saw, but I was like more careful”.  
“It was out of the blue”.  (This is the only part of the narrative that is coherent). (Part 1, 
Strophe 1, Stanza 5). 
It is clear from this example that when the narrator talks about what was “worst”, most 
painful for her, her narrative collapses. There are several ellipses, a great deal is implied, she 
is vague, unspecific and implicit about what she means, and at certain points, her “sentences” 
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are incomplete, fractured and non-sensical. Even the use of the linking word “because” does 
not make this part of the narrative coherent. It ends an incomprehensible, fragmented phrase. 
My interpretation of this excerpt is that when the narrator attempts to speak about the most 
agonising aspects of her abuse, her total helplessness associated with the unpredictability of 
the attack, she communicates it through the structural breakdown in language and what she 
leaves out; what is absent in the narrative. One of the reasons that so much remains unspoken, 
other than that it is just too painful to be uttered, is that she is ashamed that she could be 
treated this way; her identification with the Christ figure certainly suggests this. Further 
examples follow: 
“And he’s like performing as” (incomplete sentence – “as” should be followed by “then”) 
“He is shouting and stabbing me like that. And the people are like, oh, Petrus, don’t do that. 
 And he’s just doing this (implied meaning).  And in my arms and here and here”. (incoherent 
sentence)   
“I said, jô, This cannot be true”. (dissociation) 
“Believe you me”. (split self) (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 6) 
This excerpt also has prominent features of the narrative as a whole: the exclamation, drawing 
my attention once again to the juxtaposition between the contradictory “This cannot be true” 
AND “Believe you me” which are indicative of clinical features (dissociation and the split 
self); ellipses, implied meanings, and at certain points, her “sentences” are incomplete, and 
difficult to comprehend. This “micro-fracturing” also occurs at a highly significant point in 
the narrative, when she has experienced humiliation, the inefficiency of the observing crowd, 
the compensatory identification with the archetypal figure of both shame and humiliation; and 
of absolution and redemption – a point that pre-empts her final defiance against her 
perpetrator; her taking legal action against him. 
In order to analyse the plot, or the fracturing of the plot in greater detail, the Main line 
material (main clauses) are included below. 
 
Narrative 3: Main line/off Main line of the plot 
 
PART 1: (Dissociation)  
Strophe 1: (A horrible movie) 
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Stanza 1: (The knife) 
1. (It was like) A horrible movie. He planted the knife here. I had to pull it out. 
Stanza 2: (The stones, the rocks)   
2. I went to the neighbour. He was throwing me with stones. Believe you me. 
PART 2: (The crucifixion)  
Strophe 2: (Humiliation) 
Stanza 6: (Redemption of the shame-based self) 
3. I saw the movie. (I saw) The Crucifixion of Jesus Christ. He crucified me 
once.   
4. It was like Jerusalem. I’m there on the stage. We lived on a high hill. You 
can stand there and look down. All the people were standing there in the 
road.   
5. This cannot be true. Believe you me. I’m not withdrawing any more cases.  
 
The plot of this narrative consists mainly of main clauses, there is not a great deal of 
“padding” or use of subordinate clauses to draw the reader’s attention away from the central 
trauma. However, paradoxically, the narrative is dense with repetition, and there are many 
main clauses, and some adjectival phrases, which have been excluded in this narrative as Gee 
(1991) suggests. As a whole, the narrative has a fractured spiral structure, which is peppered 
by the excluded cyclical repetitions; the tone of the narrative is increasingly urgent; 
catastrophic, until the disconnected revisiting of the scene of abuse (the knife, the stones, the 
rocks) gives way to her symbolic crucifixion, the associated shame and humiliation, and her 
absolution of her self-blame through the redemptive identification with the Christ figure. One 
theme adds to the chaotic (non) structure of the “plot”: the shift in the narrator’s identity from 
Part 1 to Part 2. In Part 1 she is undeniably the victim, helpless, passive, under attack. In Part 
2 she takes a peculiar kind of humiliated, shame-based control, and through her particular 
identification, transforms herself into an archetypal figure who survives; resurrects, and re-
invents herself (will not withdraw anymore cases). However, two themes give this 
dramatically non-linear narrative some coherence: the theme of dissociation which runs 
throughout Part 1 and Part 2 and the associated tension between believing and not believing 
the horror this narrator survived (see for example the juxtaposition in Part 2, Strophe 2, 
Stanza 6, final Main line), which have significant links with shame (and convincing me of the 
truth of her experiences). 
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The patterning of who constitutes the psychological subject of aspects of the narrative mirrors 
the fractured spiral structure of the narrative as a whole. There is a to-and-froing between the 
narrator (“I”) as psychological subject, and her perpetrator as psychological subject (“he”) – a 
cyclical alternation. Although the narrator’s daughter or son is introduced in Part 1, Strophe 1, 
Stanza 3, they are mere characters, they do not “speak” in the narrative, and do not share any 
point of view. Part 2, Strophe 1, Stanza 6, demonstrates the same alternation, but the 
perspective of the frozen, passive audience is introduced. This is consistent with the major 
fracture in the narrative. However, overall, even where her perpetrator is the psychological 
subject, it is from the narrator’s own disbelieving, dissociated “I” perspective.  
As I have noted, the focusing system refers to the pitch used to signal the focus of a particular 
idea unit. The change in pitch demonstrates the importance of the information, and in this 
narrative, I argue that there is remarkable consistency in the focal areas in Part 1 (centred 
around violence: stabbing, throwing; the knee, the knife, the rocks, the stones). There is a 
disruption in the focal areas when the fracture in the narrative takes place in Part 2. Here the 
focus shifts to words and phrases such as crucified; the stage; the whole street; Jerusalem; 
standing there; high hill; stand there; and look down; standing there; like performing. There 
is repetition here too, focused on the audience, the passive audience, whose attempts to 
intervene are weak and ineffective. The narrator is alone, helpless, watching with horror, as if 
from a distance, how she is brutally, publically attacked. It is this intolerable helplessness and 
humiliation which is perhaps the motivation for her use of the dramatic metaphor to describe 
her shameful experience – the Crucifixion of Christ – and the dissociative, (shame) 
compensatory identification with the Christ figure.   
 
Narrative 4 
 
PART 1: (Ons gaan kuier) 
Strophe 1: (Ek was dronk) 
Stanza 1: (Hulle los my net so) 
1. Toe het ek saam met haar gaan kuier die Vrydag/. En ons kom toe die 
Vrydag aand daar/ ...toe die hokkies/, net soos die huise s'n/, so aan die 
agterkant/ ...ek meen, hierso is die huis/ wat ons kuier/, en hier agter 
waar die huise is is daar die hokkie/. Is mos nou nie ver nie/.   
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2. Toe los hulle vir my net so/. 
3. Want ek het ook gedrink/, ek is eerlik/, ek het ook gedrink/, maar ek weet 
ek is nie 'n drinker nie/. En toe is ek nou seker maar té dronk/, en toe los 
hulle vir my net so/.   
 
PART 2: (Die groepsverkragting) 
Strophe 2: (Hulle verkrag en slaan my) 
Stanza 2: (Carel bly by my) 
4. Toe vat drie ouens vir my uit/ en neem my daar af/. Hulle al drie neem vir 
my ** sex toe/.   
5. Ek kan nog baie mooi sy naam onthou/. Dit was Carel/. Al drie het sex 
met my/.  Hoe sê 'n mens nou/ …in my anus het hulle ook sex gehad met 
my/.  Hulle het my geslaan/.   
6. Die heel nag/ …nee, nie heel nag nie/ …seker hier by die oggend ure/ toe 
gaan die twee huis toe/.   
7. Toe hou Carel vir my daar by hom/.   
 
PART 3: (Liefde uit skaamte) 
Strophe 3: (Carel bly by my) 
Stanza 3: (Verlief) 
8. Sy ma-hulle het geslaap daai tyd toe/.  Maar dit was nou seker so/, die 
twee het nou huis toe gegaan/ en Carel hou vir my daar by hulle huis/.  
Die Saterdag oggend toe kom loer die twee nou weer in/, maar hulle het 
nou nie verder aan geworry nie/.   
9. Toe is ek so skaam/: ek het nog nooit in my lewe so iets oor gekom nie/. 
Toe's ek so skaam/.   
10. Ek sit net daar op die bed/.Toe sit en kyk ek vir hulle so/.   
11. Hulle maak nou jokes onder mekaar en so/. Nou drink hulle nou weer/.   
12. Die Saterdag toe vra die twee nou vir Carel, maar gaan hulle nie weer kan 
**/, die twee nou vir die Saterdag aand/. Hulle sing mos en dit gaan mos 
so/. Dit was net 'n naweek of so gewees/, maar toe kom ek mos nou dit 
oor/.   
13. Toe sê hy, nee, maar hy gaan nêrens heen nie/.  Hy gaan heel tyd by my 
wees/.   
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14. Nou sê Chriska, lyk my hy het toe nog verlief ook geraak op jou/. Want 
hy het my die heel naweek by hom gehou/. Hy het nie rond geloop nie/. 
Hy het net gesit daar by my/. Hy het my ook nie lelik getreat of wat nie/.  
Nou sê hulle mos nou, dit lyk my hy het nog verlief ook geraak/.   
 
PART 4: (Transformasie) 
Strophe 4: (Verwarring oor die verlede en die teenwoordige) 
Stanza 4: (Carel = Ricardo [oorsponklike IPV mishandelaar], and skuiling = 
Ouma [haar versorger, haar huis/tuiste]) 
15. Toe sê hy, nee, maar hy gaan nie worry nie/. Toe gaan hulle seker ook 
nou na **/.  Hulle het my die Vrydag aand daar gehad en die Saterdag 
aand, en dis eers die Sondag oggend, toe sê/ …as ek ook nie vir hom gesê 
het nie/, sou hy seker nog altyd vir my daar gehou het/.   
16. Toe sê ek vir Ricardo, "maar Ricardo, ek moet nou huis toe gaan./ Jy weet 
mos ek bly nie hier nie - ek kom kuier net."/ Want ek dink, ek wil ook nie 
lelik wees nie/, want ek weet mos nou nie wat is sy reaction nie/.   
17. Toe sê ek vir hom, ek wil nou nie lelik wees nie/, maar ek moet huis toe 
gaan/. Toe sê hy, ja, okay/, ek gaan 'n endjie saam met jou stap/. Hy het 
'n endjie saam met my gestap/, en toe gaan ek nou na die huis toe/ waar 
ons gekuier het daar waar ouma is/.   
 
Stanza 5: (Versmelting van verlede en teenwoordige tyd: Ouma/skuiling gee nie om 
nie) 
18. Maar ouma het nie eenkeer gebel of rond gekyk waar ek is nie/, so dit wil 
vir my sê hulle was nie eers geworried waar ek is nie/.  Die tyd wat ek by 
die huis kom/, toe sal hulle vir my sê/, ons was bekommerd oor jou, maar 
hulle sit en drink/.  Nie eenkeer het sy gesê sy het uit gebel om te luister of 
ek miskien by die shelter terug gekom het of enige iets nie/.  So dit wil 
mos nou sê hulle was nie geworried van my nie/.   
19. Toe het ek net vir hulle gesê, okay, is all right/, ek gaan nie nog worry om 
te eet nie/.  Dis die Sondag mos nou/, ek gaan nie nog wag om te eet nie/. 
Ek gaan nou my sak vat/ en dan gaan ek huis toe/.   
20. Nee, maar Chantal, jy kan nie sonder my huis toe gaan nie/ - en al die 
klomp goed/.  Toe sê ek, nee,/ maar ek gaan huis toe/ want ek voel 
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ongemaklik./   
 
PART 5: (Terug in die teenwoordige) 
Strophe 5: (Stilte uit skaamte en uitwissing van die verkragting) 
Stanza 6: (Skaamtevolle erkenning) 
21. Toe het ek my nou eers gewas/. Want hulle mos nou die Maandag ** en 
toe neem sy my mos nou hospitaal toe/, toe sê hulle ek moes nie gewas 
het nie/. Maar ek het mos nou nie geweet nie/, want ek het ongemaklik 
gevoel van die Vrydag aand af tot die Sondag/. Toe het ek mos nou vir 
my gewas/. Ek het net klaar gewas/, en nou pak ek nou my sak uit/.   
22. Toe sê ek vir hulle, maar ek gaan nou stap/.  Toe kom ek op gestap/.   
23. Toe ek hier by die huis kom/, my lyf was vol bommels soos die vlooie en 
goed my gebyt het/. Dele van die bommels was tot op my voete/.   
24. Toe ek hier kom/, toe sê ek net vir my auntie Labia ek is honger/, want 
toe het ek mos nou nie daar geëet nie/. En die mense het sommer gesien 
ek lyk nie lekker nie/, alhoewel ek wil gepretend het dat daar niks 
verkeerd is nie/, het hulle klaar agter gekom ek lyk nie lekker nie/.  En 
die Maandag toe sou ek 'n ** duty gedoen het/.   
25. Ek het net beginne werk/, maar toe kan ek nie meer dit vir myself hou 
nie/. Toe dink ek, ek kan nie, ek moet praat/. Ek gaat dit nie vir ewig vir 
myself hou nie/.   
26. En toe het ek nou met iemand gesels in die office/, en ek vertel toe 
daarvan/.  Sy was eintlik so ** en sy sê, Chantal, hoekom het jy nie al 
gister gepraat nie?/  Hoekom het jy nie al gister vir my gesê toe ek hier af 
gekom het nie?/   
27. Toe sê ek, nee/, ek was nog eerste te skaam om te praat/.   
28. Toe sê ek nou die Maandag ook vir Chriska/, en toe het Chriska mos nou 
vir Dorothea in die counselling/, toe vertel ek nou vir hulle/ en toe vat 
hulle my sommer dadelik hier na ** se hospitaal toe/. Toe het hulle nou 
weer bloed getrek en als daai/. Die Vrydag, toe gaan ek vir my uitslag/.  
Toe sê hulle ek moet Vrydag kom/. Die Maandag het hulle my uitslag 
**,/ bloed en so gevat/. En vir die aande was dit sulke stokkietjies en goete 
mos nou vir …dat ek nie AIDS sal kry nie/. Toe het hulle vir my pille 
gegee wat ek vir drie weke moes gedrink het vir die Aids en vir die 
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infeksie - en als daai./ 
 
PART 6: (Terug in die verlede) 
Strophe 6: (Stockholm Syndrome) 
Stanza 7: (Obsessie met Ricardo) 
29. Ek weet nie of ek dit kan hanteer/ …ek voel all right/, maar die dag is 
daar wanneer dit vir my 'n bietjie pla/.   
30. En as ek met iemand praat/, dan noem ek gedurig Ricardo se naam/. Ek 
weet nie, dit begin nou al van die weke wat dit net so/ …as ek met 
iemand praat/, dan noem ek Ricardo se naam/, ek weet nie hoekom nie/. 
Want sy naam kom net so/ …nie dat ek dink aan hom of wat nie/, want ek 
wil nie eers dink aan hom nie/ …maar noem net 'n naam/, dan noem ek 
altyd sy naam/.  Dan sê ek, ag, man, Ricardo, want dan maal dit weer by 
my/. Dan dink ek net die aand daaraan./ 
 
Translation 
PART 1: (We go visiting) 
Strophe 1: (I was drunk) 
Stanza 1: (They leave me just like that) 
1. Then I went visiting with her that Friday/. And we came there the Friday 
night/ …then the sheds/, just like those of the houses/, so at the back/ 
…I mean, here is the house/ where we visit/, and here at the back where 
the houses are there is the little shed. /. Now it’s not so far, is it?  
2. Then they left me just like that /. 
3. Because I also drank/, I’m honest/, I also drank/, but I know I’m not a 
drinker/. And then I suppose I must have been too drunk/, and then they 
left me just like that /.   
 
PART 2: (The gang rape) 
Strophe 2: (They rape and beat me) 
Stanza 2: (Carel stays with me) 
4. Then the three guys took me out/ and they take me down there/. All three 
of them take me ** to sex/.   
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5. I can still remember his name very well. / It was Carel/. All three of them 
had sex with me/.  How does one say it now/ …in my anus they also had 
sex with me/.  They beat me/.   
6. The whole night/ …no, not the whole night/ …I think towards the 
morning hours/ then the two went home/.   
7. Then Carel kept me there with him/.   
 
PART 3: (Shame-based love) 
Strophe 3: (Carel stays with me) 
Stanza 3: (In love) 
8. My mother and them slept that time/.  But I suppose it was like this /, the 
two now went home / and Carel keeps me there at their home /. Now the 
Saturday morning the two popped in again /, but they didn’t worry any 
further /.   
9. Then I’m so ashamed/: never in my life has something like that 
happened to me/. Then I’m so ashamed/.   
10. I just sit there on the bed/.Then I sit and watch them and so on/.   
11. They are joking among themselves and so on/. Now they are drinking 
once again /.   
12. The Saturday then the two ask Carel, but can’t they again go and **/, the 
two now for the Saterday night/. They sing, don’t they, and it goes like 
that, doesn’t it/. It was only a weekend or so /, but then this happened to 
me, didn’t it /.   
13. Then he said, no, he is not going anywhere /.  He’s going to be with me 
all the time /.   
14. Now Chriska says, it seems to me he then also fell in love with you /. 
Because he kept me with him the whole weekend. He did not wander 
around /. He just sat there with me /. He also didn’t treat my in a nasty 
way or anything /.  Now they say, don’t they, it seems to me that he also 
fell in love /.   
 
PART 4: (Transformation) 
Strophe 4: (Past and present confusion) 
Stanza 4: (Carel = Ricardo [original IPV perpetrator], and shelter = Ouma [her 
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caregiver, her home]) 
15. Then he said, no, but he’s not going to worry /. Then I suppose they also 
went to**/.  They had me there the Friday night and the Saturday night, 
and it’s only the Sunday morning, then he said / …if I didn’t tell him /, he 
would probably still have kept me there.   
16. Then I said to Ricardo, "but Ricardo, I must go home now./ You know, 
don’t you, that I do not live here – I’m only visiting."/ Because I think, I 
don’t want to be rude /, because I don’t know what his reaction will be, 
not so?  
17. Then I said to him, I don’t want to be rude /, but I have to go home /. 
Then he said, yes ok, I will walk a little way with you/. He walked a little 
way with me /, and then I went home / where we visited, there where my 
granny is /.   
 
Stanza 5: (Past and present fuse: Ouma/shelter doesn’t care) 
18. But granny didn’t phone once or look around where I was /, so that tells 
me they weren’t even worried where I was /.  At the time when I came 
home /, then they would tell me /, we were worried about you, but they sit 
and drink /.  Not once did she say that she phoned out to hear if I maybe 
had come back to the shelter or anything /.  So it tells me, doesn’t it, that 
they were not worried about me /.   
19. Then I said to them, okay, it’s all right/, I am not going to worry about 
eating /.  It’s Sunday now, isn’t it /, I’m not going to wait to eat /. I’m 
going to take my bags / and then I’m going home/.   
20. No but Chantal, you cannot go home without me / - and a lot of such 
things /.  Then I said, no, / but I’m going home / because I feel 
uncomfortable./   
 
PART 5: (Back in the present) 
Strophe 5: (Shame-filled silence and obliteration of rape) 
Stanza 6: (Shameful admission) 
21. Then I first washed myself /. Because the Monday they ** didn’t they and 
then she takes me to the hospital, didn’t she /, and then they say I 
shouldn’t have washed /. But I didn’t know, did I /, because I felt 
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uncomfortable from the Friday evening until the Sunday /. Then I washed 
myself, didn’t I /. I have just finished washing /, and now I unpack my 
bag /.   
22. Then I said to them, but I am going to walk now /.  Then I came walking 
up /.   
23. When I came here at the house /, my body was full of bumps where the 
fleas and thing bit me /. Some of the bumps went down to my feet /.   
24. When I came here /, then I just said to my auntie Labia I’m hungry/, 
because I had nothing to eat there, not so? /. And the people could just see 
that I didn’t look well /, although I tried to pretend that nothing was 
wrong /, they had already realised that I didn’t look well /.  And the 
Monday I would have ** done a duty/.   
25. I had just started working /, but then I couldn’t keep it to myself any 
more /. Then I thought, I cannot, I must talk /. I’m not keeping this to 
myself forever /.   
26. And then I spoke to someone in the office/, and then I tell what happened 
/.  She was actually so ** and she says, Chantal, why didn’t you talk 
yesterday already? / Why didn’t you tell me yesterday already when I 
came down here?/   
27. Then I say, no/, at first I was too ashamed to talk /.   
28. Then I told Chriska on Monday too /, and then Chriska has Dorothea in 
the counselling, doesn’t she /, then I now told them / and then they just 
took me straight away here to ** hospital /. Then they took my blood and 
all that /. The Friday, then I went for my results /.  Then they said I must 
come on Friday /. The Monday they have my results**,/ took my blood 
and so on /. And in the evenings it was little sticks and things like that you 
know for…that I won’t get AIDS/. Then they gave me tablets that I had to 
drink for three weeks for the AIDS and the infection – and all that./ 
 
PART 6: (Back in the past) 
Strophe 6: (Stockholm Syndrome) 
Stanza 7: (Obsession with Ricardo) 
29. I don’t know if I can handle it / …I feel all right/, but the day comes 
when it bothers me a bit /.   
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30. And when I talk to someone /, then I say Ricardo’s name all the time /. I 
don’t know, it started from the weeks that it just / …when I talk to 
someone /, then I mention Ricardo’s name /, I don’t know why /. 
Because his name comes just like that / …it’s not that I think about him 
or so /, because I don’t even want to think about him / …but just 
mention a name /, then I always mention his name /.  Then I say, oh 
man, Ricardo, because then it just mills in my head again /. Then I just 
think about it in the evening. 
 
Purely structurally, the narrative’s form is not even, with Stanzas in particular differing in 
length and complexity. Only one part consists of more than one Stanza, and significantly, it is 
the Part where the narrative breaks down (Part 4). Some Stanzas are particularly long and 
detailed. Note that the Stanzas focused on shame and staying/abandonment, are the lengthiest. 
As I have noted previously, chaos narratives are characterised by a proximity, by a “and then, 
and then” present tense style (Frank, 1995). The narrator uses the connecting word “toe” 
(then) (which are mostly reflected in the subordinate clauses, not indicated here) frequently 
during all Parts in the narrative, barring the last one, where the tone changes and reflects a 
bewildered sense of confusion, disorientation and loss.  
Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 1 begins with the narrator’s short tale of going to a visit at a house 
nearby the shelter. However, significantly, a split is immediately introduced between self-
blame for what happened (she had been drinking), and her blaming her friends, who left her at 
the mercy of her rapists. This is the basis of the shame-based self. The relatively short Stanza 
2 describes the gang-rape, and what is immediately striking here is that there is no description 
of what happened; the central trauma is absent from the narrative, and the audience does not 
know if this is an amnesiac response which links later to a profound disorientation in time. 
The only mention of what happened during the rape is the reference made to anal rape, to 
which I will return later. Certain survivors protect themselves by omitting details, and by 
talking about the traumatic event(s) in cryptic terms (Kraft, 2004). In this Stanza, the reader 
also first hears about Carel, one of the rapists. Carel is different from the other rapists, he 
stays with her throughout her three day ordeal, whereas everyone else in her life leaves (other 
sections of the interview indicated significant abandonment in childhood, and in this scenario 
her friends leave her to be raped). Carel stays; he never leaves her, even in her most shameful 
state: “Toe is ek so skaam: ek het nog nooit in my lewe so iets oor gekom nie. Toe's ek so 
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skaam.” (Then I’m so ashamed: never in my life has something like that happened to me. Then 
I’m so ashamed).   
Carel introduces important themes in the narrative: once again, the shame-based self, the 
narrator’s significant abandonment terror, which relates to her disorganised attachment 
patterns. For example, what is particularly striking about this narrative is what the narrator 
considers being “lelik getreat” (treat me in a nasty way) (Part 3, Strophe 3, Stanza 3). Carel 
raped her and beat her, yet she says he did not treat her badly. It is as if his refusal to abandon 
her obscures all else. This is evidence of the themes I have mentioned: a tremendously shame-
based sense of self, the internalisation of a perpetrator-defined identity (being “bad” and so 
deserving of punishment that it is not even acknowledged or noticed) and a highly 
disorientated, conflicted, disorganised pattern of attachment based on deep-seated fears of 
abandonment. 
In this Stanza, this deep appreciation of Carel not leaving her alone after her acute trauma, 
develops into a kind of shame-based infatuation. Note the disturbing repetition in this Stanza 
of the word “verlief” (in love) indicating its centrality in the narrative. It demonstrates to the 
reader the distorted understanding the narrator has about love, perhaps only as a result of this 
trauma, but it could be a long-standing pattern that facilitated her experience of IPV. 
In the brief Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 4, the past and present begin to merge. It appears as if 
the narrator is confusing the present and the original adult trauma, for which she sought 
shelter at the Centre in the first place (IPV). Confusion in thought can be caused by both 
trauma and shame. Levendosky et al. (2011) suggest that trauma, particularly among those 
with a history of IPV, can lead to dissociation which impairs cognitive capacities through 
intrusions of disorganisation, disorientation and confusion. Shame, in turn, is a global 
negative self perception associated with confusion in thought, interruptions in current 
behaviour, and speechlessness (M. Lewis, 1992). I will further elaborate on possible reasons 
for this mergence in the section where I analyse the plot. 
Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 5 amplifies this confusion between past and present. The reader is 
entirely unable to distinguish between “ouma” (grandmother/granny) and “hulle” (them, her 
friends), and the “huis” (home) and the shelter. The personal and proper pronouns do not 
correspond with any linear chronology. A coherent timeline is indiscernible from this part of 
the narrative. The reader is left wondering from where the narrator is leaving and where she is 
going. The narrator is highly disorientated and this manifests in the non-sensical way 
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language is used in this Stanza – it is difficult to understand or extract any linear micro-
narrative from this Stanza.  
The reader is returned to the future in Part 5, and it lends some coherence to the narrative, 
however short-lived. Stanza 6 is a long Stanza that revolves around shameful disclosure, but 
also physical needs, and the practicalities of preventing sexually transmitted diseases. The 
physical realities of her gang-rapes seem to ground the narrator, and bring her back into the 
present, making her more lucid and the narrative more coherent. The reader knows she is 
aware that she is back at the shelter because she names staff members at the Centre. So, a 
post-traumatic transition to the present appears to have been made. The speechlessness of 
shame comes up once again in this Stanza, as it takes the narrator considerable time to confess 
what happened to her (H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992): “ek was nog eerste te skaam om 
te praat.” (at first I was too ashamed to talk).    
In the concluding Part 6, the reader is taken back into the past, back to Ricardo. One is unsure 
whether this Stockholm Syndrome-like obsession with the man she cannot stop thinking about 
is her ex-partner, Ricardo, or her rapist, Carel. The narrator is aware that something is 
“wrong” (maar die dag is daar wanneer dit vir my 'n bietjie pla/but the day comes when it 
bothers me a bit), but she has a compulsion to return to any form of “love”, which she 
interprets as the opposite of abandonment, a life-long theme for her, despite the consistent 
care she insists her primary caregiver during childhood, “ouma” provided. Thus, this narrative 
begins and ends with abandonment. As I have noted before, the urgent need for love and 
acceptance in survivors of chronic trauma may lead to trusting others indiscriminately or 
becoming very compliant with others in an attempt to prevent abandonment from them, 
typical of disorganised attachment styles (Herman, 1997; Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). This 
increases the chance that chronically traumatised individuals will be emotionally or physically 
or sexually abused by others again, as was the case with this narrator.  
This narrative has a number of linguistic features which point to the psychic reality of 
Chantal, the narrator. Like other narrators in this chapter, there are ellipses, and there are 
incomplete sentences, and they do not occur randomly, they occur at particularly painful or 
significant points of the narrative. For example, in Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 2, the narrator 
includes the incomplete fragments of sentences relating to the length of her captivity and the 
gang-rapes: “Die heel nag…nee, nie die heel nag nie…seker hier by die oggend ure” (The 
whole night…no, not the whole night…I think towards the morning hours). These phrases do 
not constitute clauses (they do not include verbs), and they are also indicative of trauma-
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related disruptions in time, which become a feature of this narrative. Another example occurs 
in Part 6, Strophe 6, Stanza 7 where she talks about her obsessive thoughts about Ricardo: 
“Ek weet nie, dit begin nou al van die weke wat net so…” (I don’t know, it started from the 
weeks that it just…) and the sentence trails off.  
I now turn to analyse the Main line text or plot of this complex narrative. 
 
Narrative 4: Main line/off Main line of the plot 
 
PART 1: (Ons gaan kuier) 
Strophe 1: (Ek was dronk) 
Stanza 1: (Hulle los my net so) 
1. Ek het saam met haar gaan kuier die Vrydag. Hier agter is daar die 
hokkie.  
2. Hulle los vir my net so. 
3. Ek het ook gedrink. Ek is eerlik. Ek het ook gedrink. Ek weet ek is 
nie 'n drinker nie. Ek is nou seker maar té dronk.  
PART 2: (Die groepsverkragting) 
Strophe 2: (Hulle verkrag en slaan my) 
Stanza 2: (Carel bly by my) 
4. Drie ouens vat vir my uit.  
5. Ek kan nog baie mooi sy naam onthou. Dit was Carel. Al drie het 
sex met my.  Hoe sê 'n mens nou. …In my anus het hulle ook sex 
gehad met my.  Hulle het my geslaan.   
6. Die twee gaan huis toe.   
7. Carel hou vir my daar by hom.   
PART 3: (Liefde uit skaamte) 
Strophe 3: (Carel bly by my) 
Stanza 3: (Verlief) 
8. Ek is so skaam. Ek het nog nooit in my lewe so iets oor gekom nie.  
9. Hy sê, nee. Hy gaan nêrens heen nie.  Hy gaan heel tyd by my 
wees.   
10. Lyk my hy het ook verlief geraak op jou.  
PART 4: (Transformasie) 
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Strophe 4: (Verwarring oor die verlede en die teenwoordige) 
Stanza 4: (Carel = Ricardo [oorspronklike IPV mishandelaar], and skuiling = 
Ouma [haar versorger, haar huise/tuiste]) 
11. "Maar Ricardo, ek moet nou huis toe gaan. Jy weet mos ek bly nie 
hier nie. Ek kom kuier net."  
12. Ek wil nou nie lelik wees nie. Ek moet huis toe gaan.  
Stanza 5: (Versmelting van verlede en teenwoordige tyd: Ouma/skuiling gee nie om 
nie) 
13. Ouma het nie eenkeer gebel nie. (Ouma het nie) rond gekyk nie. 
Hulle was nie eers geworried nie.  Hulle sal vir my sê. Ons was 
bekommerd oor jou. Maar hulle sit en drink.   
14. Ek gaan nou my sak vat. Ek gaan huis toe.   
15. Ek voel ongemaklik.   
PART 5: (Terug in die teenwoordige) 
Strophe 5: (Stilte uit skaamte and uitwissing van die verkragting) 
Stanza 6: (Skaamtevolle erkenning) 
16. Toe het ek my nou eers gewas.  
17. Sy neem my mos nou hospitaal toe.  
18. Hulle sê ek moes nie gewas het nie.  
19. Ek is honger. Ek het mos nou nie daar geëet nie. Ek lyk nie lekker 
nie.   
20. Ek nie meer dit vir myself hou nie. Ek moet praat.  
21. Ek vertel toe daarvan.  Sy sê, Chantal. Hoekom het jy nie al gister 
gepraat nie?   
22. Ek sê, nee. Ek was nog eerste te skaam om te praat.   
23. Hulle vat my sommer dadelik hier na ** se hospitaal toe. 
PART 6: (Terug in die verlede) 
Strophe 6: (Stockholm Syndrome) 
Stanza 7: (Obsessie met Ricardo) 
24. Ek noem gedurig Ricardo se naam. Ek weet nie hoekom nie. Ek wil 
nie eers dink aan hom nie. Dit maal weer by my. 
Translation 
PART 1: (We go visiting) 
Strophe 1: (I was drunk) 
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Stanza 1: (They leave me just like that) 
1. I went visiting with her that Friday. Here at the back is the little 
shed.  
2. They leave me just like that. 
3. I also drank. I am honest. I also drank. I know I’m not a drinker. I 
suppose I must have been too drunk.  
PART 2: (The gang rape) 
Strophe 2: (They rape and beat me) 
Stanza 2: (Carel stays with me) 
4. Three guys took me out.  
5. I can still remember his name very well. It was Carel. All three of 
them had sex with me.  In my anus they also had sex with me. They 
beat me.   
6. The two went home.   
7. Carel kept me there with him.   
PART 3: (Shame-based love) 
Strophe 3: (Carel stays with me) 
Stanza 3: (In love) 
8. I am so ashamed. Never in my life has something like that 
happened to me.  
9. He says no. He is not going anywhere. He is going to be with me all 
the time.   
10. It seems to me he also fell in love with you.  
PART 4: (Transformation) 
Strophe 4: (Past and present fuse) 
Stanza 4: (Carel = Ricardo [original IPV perpetrator], and shelter = Ouma [her 
caregiver, her home]) 
11. "But Ricardo, I must go home now. You know, don’t you, that I do 
not live here. I am only visiting."  
12. I don’t want to be rude. I have to go home. 
Stanza 5: (Past and present fuse: Ouma/shelter doesn’t care) 
13. Granny didn’t phone once. (Granny didn’t) look around. They 
weren’t even worried. They would tell me. We were worried about 
you. They sit and drink.   
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14. I’m going to take my bag. I’m going home.   
15. I feel uncomfortable.   
PART 5: (Back in the present) 
Strophe 5: (Shame-filled silence and obliteration of rape) 
Stanza 6: (Shameful admission) 
16. I first washed myself.  
17. She takes me to the hospital, didn’t she.  
18. They say. I shouldn’t have washed. 
19. I’m hungry. I had nothing to eat there, not so? I didn’t look well.   
20. I couldn’t keep it to myself anymore. I must talk.  
21. Then I tell what happened.  She says, Chantal. Why didn’t you talk 
yesterday?  
22. I say, no. At first I was too ashamed to talk.   
23. They just took me straight away here to ** hospital.  
PART 6: (Back in the past) 
Strophe 6: (Stockholm Syndrome) 
Stanza 7: (Obsession with Ricardo) 
24. I say Ricardo’s name all the time. I don’t know why. I don’t even 
want to think about him. Then it just mills in my head again.  
 
There is significant circularity and repetition in the full narrative (excluded above). This Main 
line text has no linearity and disintegrates entirely at a number of points. This disintegration is 
both trauma- and shame-related and involves not only non-linearity or a total break-down of 
plot, but fractures in temporality and identity. Up until Part 3 the reader is able to discern 
some kind of structure – the initial context or background described in the first Part, and very 
significantly, the introduction of a major theme, abandonment. Part 2 is dramatic in its (lack 
of) description of the gang rape and beatings, but in stark opposition to the abandonment by 
her friends in Part 1, Carel, the rapist, is introduced, the abuser who stays. The abuser who 
does not abandon, the very worst pain of all. The narrator describes Carel’s “care” of her as a 
protective presence (an inversion of what truly happened, which was an invasive violation); 
almost as a kind of fatherly love in the face of what she sees as her most shameful moment 
(as opposed to his). Her “love” for him is fear-based, shame-based and includes a great deal 
of dependence, but when speaking to the narrator in the interview, she seemed delighted that 
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the deputy manager of the shelter suggested that Carel had fallen in love with her in the next 
Part. Part 4 and 5 constitute a complete rupturing of the plot. As I have already noted, there is 
a complete fusion of past and present and different identities which represent similar 
(perpetrators) and different (ouma and friends/hulle) experiences to her. Part 5 returns the 
narrator to the present, and centres around shame-filled hesitations, silences; feelings of 
contamination and the final admission of the gang rape. The plot does not conclude as one 
would expect, in the present, or looking towards the future – instead the reader is cyclically 
taken in and out of the present and the past, and the end of this text does not constitute an end 
at all; the narrator is back in the past, pining for a past perpetrator. 
There is a great deal of contradiction in this narrative as a whole. This occurs in the very first 
Stanza, where the narrator admits twice that she had been drinking (admission of guilt; self-
blame), and once that she was drunk, but then contradicts herself and says she is not a drinker 
and shifts the blame for what happened to her onto her friends, who abandoned her. So there 
is a circular shifting of blame in this Stanza. The words “seker maar” ([I] suppose) in the 
second last main clause in Stanza 1 suggests that a reluctant admission of guilt and self-
blame, which links so painfully with shame.  
The narrator chooses somewhat formal wording in the Stanza 2 (after a significant hesitation) 
to describe her anal rapes. She has no formal education, and I was surprised at her use of the 
word “anus”.  I wondered whether she was trying to formalise, even medicalise, the 
experience, to emotionally distance the experience and make it more palatable for herself, and 
perhaps also for my sake, this “ordentlike” (decent) White middle class woman. Irrespective 
of the reason, her description was remarkably emotionally blunted. Part 3, Strophe 3, Stanza 3 
revolves around the narrator’s search for love. She persistently repeats that Carel stays with 
her. There is a perfect balance in this Stanza, which begins with the two other rapists (wat) 
nou nie verder aan geworry nie ([who] didn’t worry any further); followed by the shame 
associated with her trauma (Ek is so skaam. Ek is so skaam/I am so ashamed. I am so 
ashamed) as well as humiliation (Hulle maak nou jokes onder mekaar en so/They are joking 
among themselves and so on) – indicating a hostile, dismissive audience as occurs in 
humiliation). The Stanza ends with the opposite of abandonment. In the last paragraph, the 
narrator says four times, in four different ways, how Carel did not leave her. This is a very 
dramatic emphasis, showing its significance to her. The Stanza ends with the suggestion that 
Carel had fallen in love with her. It is interesting, however, that this repetition introduces a 
total fragmentation and breakdown in the narrative in Part 4.  
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As I have already noted, the past and the present begin to fuse in this section of the narrative. 
There could be many reasons for this. Perhaps the original adult trauma (IPV) was less 
traumatic than the gang-rape, and functioned as a form of displacement. Perhaps the fusion 
was further facilitated by similarities between Carel and Ricardo. In this context it is helpful 
to reflect on certain clinical features associated with severe trauma. Diagnostic criteria for 
DESNOS include among other things, disruptions in attention or consciousness, distorted 
perceptions of the perpetrator/s,  profound shame and guilt, and disorganised attachment 
patterns (Ford & Courtois, 2009). Dissociative disorders are commonly associated with 
disruptions in chronology and “lost time” (Putnam, 1989). Furthermore, acute shame has also 
been associated with forgetting (M. Lewis, 1992; Mills, 2005; Tomkins, 1963).  
However, one can also explain such “lost time” or amnesia-like behaviour 
biopsychologically. Payne et al. (2004) argue that there is a difference between episodic and 
semantic memories. What is of interest for us, is episodic memory, which involves 
remembering the particular context of an experienced event, including the time and place of 
its occurrence (Payne et al., 2004). The literature suggests that chronic glucocorticoid 
elevation and loss of hippocampal volume disrupts the storage of information about place, 
time and context of the traumatic experience, as well as the connecting process that binds 
aspects of the experience to the context and to one another (Payne et al., 2004). Thus, trauma 
memories are encoded without a well-developed spatio-temporal frame to organise them 
(Payne et al., 2004). So, memories created when stressed, and under the influence of elevated 
levels of glucocorticoids, are likely to be fractured and fragmented, lack spatial and temporal 
contexts and so produce deficits in episodic memory (Payne et al., 2004). In a sample of 
individuals with PTSD, these authors found that participants tended to struggle to report 
contextually specific memories with a specific source, including time and place. They also 
report that those who have been exposed to prolonged trauma, like war veterans, may struggle 
with remembering recent events, but have detailed memories of previous traumas that 
occurred a long time ago (Payne et al., 2004). This is consistent with Chantal’s experience. It 
is also worth noting that Chantal had been drinking alcohol, which is associated with memory 
impairment.  
One of the most fascinating aspects of this part of the narrative is that the narrator hesitates 
before telling “Ricardo” that she has to go home, as if to soften the possible pain of her 
departure, because in her mind, since he did not leave her, and he was good to her, loved her, 
her departure may hurt him. She struggles to utter the words that she has to leave – she 
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repeats twice: “ek wil nie lelik wees nie”. (I don’t want to be rude). Once she has told the 
audience that if she had not asked to leave he would still have kept her there, she is able to 
speak what needs to be spoken without hesitation, without pauses. So once again, she is 
emphasising: “hy sou seker nog altyd vir my daar gehou het” (he would probably still have 
kept me there) if she had not asked to leave (Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 4). It is this sentence 
(which indicates for her that she is wanted) that allows her to speak, and to take action to 
leave.  
From Part 4, the narrator talks about home, when in fact she has no home. There are two 
observations of importance here. Later, when I present the compressed narrative, I will 
present more material produced by Chantal, about her mother. She makes a point of telling 
me that her “real” mother “swerwe” (wanders aimlessly), and hence has no home. Here is an 
uncomfortable repetition of the past. In this narrative, I believe that in her confusion, Chantal 
is looking for her primary caregiver during childhood, her “ouma”, because she represents the 
only home she has ever known, the only comfort she has ever known. But “ouma” is in 
Worcester, quite inaccessible. Perhaps this is what Carel offers her, a substitute, temporary 
home; one where she is not alone, where she feels protected and loved, however distorted that 
perception of love may be.  
Another interesting contradiction characterises this narrative.  As I have noted, there are major 
disruptions in place and time. However, the narrator is quite capable of maintaining a 
particular kind of chronology. She frequently speaks of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and 
Monday, and what happened on these days. But this is dramatically undermined by the 
complete mergence of past and present that occurs in Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 5. At a 
linguistic level, this Stanza makes no sense. She juxtaposes “huis” (house) (as opposed to the 
reality of the shelter), with the plural pronoun “hulle”, which would be consistent with the 
shelter, but not with “ouma”, since she lived alone with her “ouma”. Furthermore, her “ouma” 
did not drink, but the people described in this Stanza do drink, like at the party the narrator 
went to. She keeps repeating that she is going “huis” toe, but that no one “geworried is nie”, 
which again is incongruent with her description, provided during the interview, of the home 
her “ouma” created for her. It is her friends who aren’t “geworried” (worried), not her 
“ouma”, who in any case is oblivious of what has happened to the narrator. The reader asks 
him/herself, where is she? Who is she talking to? The over-riding theme again is one of angry, 
disorientated and confused abandonment.  
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It seems that in Part 5, Strophe 5, Stanza 6, the narrator’s story becomes more lucid, perhaps 
due to the time that has passed since the trauma. Again, the theme of this Stanza is around 
shame. Many rape survivors feel contaminated and dirty after their experiences, and this can 
be accompanied by self-blame and shame. The narrator emphasises this filth by describing the 
“bommels” (insect bites) on her body. One concrete way of addressing these feelings is to 
engage in the purging and cleansing symbolised by the act of washing. The first part of the 
Stanza is about physical needs. Washing, and hunger; the narrator repeatedly says she is 
hungry. It is tragic that the narrator continues to feel that Carel took such good care of her, but 
he did not feed her for three days. Although Chantal repeatedly says she is hungry, it is stated 
in an almost flippant, emotionally blunted way. This is either a function of dissociation, or 
constitutes familiarity with a profound experience of deprivation. Simply being there with 
her; not abandoning her, is enough for this narrator; love is stripped down to its most basic 
(and inadequate) components. It does make one wonder whether the upbringing with “ouma” 
was idealised by the narrator, if these conditions of deprivation are what she is accustomed to 
at some level, but one can only hazard a guess since the narrator insisted that she was well 
cared for as a child.  
The second part of the Stanza is about overcoming shame, a central theme in the narrative 
(“Ek was nog eerste te skaam om te praat”/At first I was too ashamed to talk) and breaking the 
silence of what happened to her. The Stanza ends as it started, by addressing her physical 
needs; the use of preventative medicine. Again, where the content of the narrative becomes 
especially distressing, the language breaks down. The narrator describes (in subordinate 
clauses) the treatments she has to use to prevent the development of HIV/AIDS, but before 
she can utter this terrible potential outcome, she says: “mos nou vir…” (You know now for…). 
She hesitates for a great length of time before she can consider what she is being treated for; 
what possibilities lie ahead for her.  
Part 6, Strophe 6, Stanza 7 includes far more subordinate clauses than any of the other Parts. 
Perhaps these clauses help conceal, or “pad” some of the most painful truths. The repetition in 
this Stanza is striking: “Ek noem gedurig Ricardo se naam. Ek weet nie, dit begin nou al (wat 
dit net so…). Ek noem dan Ricardo se naam. Ek weet nie hoekom nie. Want sy naam kom net 
so. Ek wil nie eers dink aan hom nie. Dan noem ek altyd sy naam.  Dan sê ek, ag, man, 
Ricardo. Want dan maal dit weer by my. Dan dink ek net die aand daaraan”. [I say Ricardo’s 
name all the time. I don’t know, it started from the weeks (that it just…). I mention Ricardo’s 
name. I don’t know why. I don’t even want to think about him. Then I always mention his 
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name. Then I say, oh man, Ricardo. Then it just mills in my head again. Then I just think 
about it in the evening.]  
Whether the narrator is talking about Ricardo or Carel cannot be determined. All that is clear 
is that there is evidence of significant regression, displacement, amnesia or forgetting, 
dissociative disruptions in time and place, and overt and by-passed shame. Overall, I would 
argue that this narrator represents a self that has been overwhelmed by trauma, and has 
clinical features of Complex PTSD, DESNOS and dissociative disorders.  
In Part 1 the narrator is the psychological subject, although the focus shifts to her abandoning 
friends twice in Strophe 1, Stanza 1. As we have established, abandonment is a significant 
issue for the narrator, which, as noted, is indicated by the repetitive shifts in the psychological 
subjects in this Stanza. 
In Part 2 the rapists are the psychological subjects, with a special focus on Carel, who 
becomes her focus, her obsession, the one who stays with her. He stands in radical opposition 
to her abandoning friends in Part 1. 
There are a number of psychological subjects post- gang-rape described in Part 3. Carel’s 
mother, the other two rapists (casual, mocking, indifferent), the narrator and her shame, and 
Chriska, the shelter deputy manager, who expresses a central theme in the narrative (in love). 
The chaotic inclusion of so many psychological subjects may be expressive of the peri-
traumatic chaos characterising traumatic experiences such as rape.  
Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 4 consists of a confusing alternation between the narrator and 
Carel/Ricardo. This is the moment where the narrative fractures, and it is interesting that it 
follows the somewhat chaotic Part 3 from a psychological subject point of view.  In the 
second Stanza, “ouma” is introduced as a psychological subject, but the reader does not know 
if she is “real”. The reader also does not know who, in fact, the narrator is talking to. There is 
no indication who the “hulle” (they) are who she is speaking of. She remains the 
psychological subject throughout – almost all lines begin from the “ek”/ “I” position - but one 
who is disintegrating, fracturing, splitting into a form of co-consciousness in which past and 
present are indistinguishable.  
Part 5 is more coherent, and the narrator (“I”) remains the psychological subject until she 
reaches psychological breaking point and cannot keep her experience a secret any longer. 
Briefly, Chriska becomes the psychological subject, but the narrator quickly returns to hold 
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the main perspective, and tells, however, matter-of-factly, of her frightening experiences at 
the hospital; the real-life consequences of her traumatic experiences.  
The narrative fractures again in Part 6. Here the narrator is the sole psychological subject, 
who is immersed in the past. There is no conflict or tension between the past and present, 
there is total regression.  
The foci in this narrative are numerous and diverse. Part 1; Strophe 1; Stanza 1 describes the 
context within which the trauma occurs, with words such as die Vrydag; hierso is die huis; 
wat ons kuier; en hier agter waar die huise is is daar die hokkie (the Friday; here is the 
house; and here at the back where the houses are there is the little shed). But the theme of 
abandonment is immediately introduced, and repeated twice: los hulle (her friends) vir my net 
so (they [her friends] left me just like that). 
Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 2 focus on die drie ouens/the three guys (the rapists); sy naam 
onthou/remember his name; Carel; daar by hom/there with him. Part 3 foci are the results of 
the rape: ek is so skaam/I am so ashamed; (yet Carel) gaan nêrens heen nie/he is not going 
anywhere; by my wees/be with me; verlief ook geraak op jou/also fell in love with you; by hom 
gehou/kept me with him; (nie) rond geloop nie/ did not wander around;gesit daar by my/sat 
there with me; (nie) lelik getreat of wat nie/he didn’t treat me in a nasty way or anything; nog 
verlief ook geraak/fell in love also. These foci point to shame-based love; to a self that has 
been so profoundly abandoned (in childhood and in adulthood) that any consistent figure, any 
figure who stays, becomes an attachment object.  
Part 4 is the part of the narrative that breaks down, where there is present and past confusion. 
In Strophe 4, Stanza 4, the foci are centred around (maar Ricardo), ek moet nou huis toe gaan 
(“I must go home now”). Here again, the term “huis” is meaningless. The reader is not sure 
what home means to the narrator in her post-traumatic state. In Stanza 5 the foci point to the 
narrator’s distress that “ouma” or “hulle”  (nie) geworried waar ek is nie/weren’t even 
worried where I was; she repeats this twice, perhaps experiencing it as yet another rejection; 
abandonment. Before the end of the Stanza, the narrator again repeats twice that ek gaan huis 
toe (want) ek voel ongemaklik (“I’m going home [because] I feel uncomfortable”). The reader 
wonders whether she herself knows where home is, where she is longing to be in order to stop 
feeling “ongemaklik”(“uncomfortable”).  
The foci in Part 5 brings the reader back to the present. The narrator repeats the term “gewas” 
(“wash”) four times during this Part, indicating the depth of her feelings of filth and 
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contamination, despite the negative consequences thereof for her examination at the hospital. 
As I have already described, at this level of analysis, this sense of dirtiness is also amplified 
by her description of the marks on her body where fleas my gebyt het (“bit me”) during her 
captivity. The foci direct us to a picture not only of dirt and pain, but of deprivation, the 
narrator frequently mentioning that she is honger/hungry and eet/eat or geëet/eaten (three 
times) (this despite Carel’s “care”). The temporary break in the captivation with Carel is when 
she admits she knows (ek) lyk nie lekker nie (repeated twice), and makes her disclosure: (ek 
kon nie) vir myself hou nie; ek moet praat; ek gaat dit nie vir ewig vir myself hou nie; vertel 
toe daarvan(“I couldn’t keep it to myself;  I must talk; I’m not keeping this to myself forever; 
then I tell what happened”).  Yet we return to an old focal area; her silence up until this point 
was that she was: te skaam om te praat (“too ashamed to talk”). This Part ends with a return 
to the focus on the hospitaal/hospital and the terrifying possible physical consequences of her 
gang rape.  
Part 6 is a unsettling end to this narrative. The initial foci are on the narrator’s ability to 
recognise that she is feeling pain (bietjie pla/bothers [me] a bit) but that she can cope (kan 
hanteer[can handle]/all right), suggesting that she has some capacity to understand that what 
Carel and the others did to her was wrong, but her claim that she is coping is flimsy and 
unconvincing. The focus remains on Ricardo, whose name is repeated twice. As she says in 
the concluding sentences: altyd sy naam/always his name; maal dit weer by my/it just mills in 
my head again. As a whole, given this narrative, it is difficult to imagine Chantal escaping 
from a lifetime of shame-based violence.  
 
Narrative 5  
 
PART 1: (Ambivalence) 
Strophe 1: (Running away)  
Stanza 1: (Running away and returning) 
1. Because in their culture, beating a woman is fine/. So that’s how it started, 
and I thought it would be like an on-and-off thing/.  
2. But at the very same time/, from my past also/, at home when they started 
to beat me/, I’ve had this thing of running away/. I didn’t like that 
tension of/ …if you start to beat me/, I don’t know, I think I get scared 
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inside/ and then I start running away/, but I’ll come back home/ when 
they have forgotten about everything/.  Then I’ll apologise/ and I’ll stay 
at home/.   
3. With him, I also did the same/: I ran away/ and I went to a children’s 
home in Blouberg/, the first time it happened/.   
 
Stanza 2: Escape 
4. I know the owner./ I used to be in that home, ***./  I used to stay there 
from 2006 till 2008, when I was eighteen./  So I went to her for help./ She 
was willing to help me./ She asked me if I had anyone to go to,/ and I said 
my cousin in Joburg./ 
5. The younger cousin called me;/ she asked me how am I doing and 
everything/, and I told her what had happened./  She went to speak to her 
older sister,/ then her older sister said why don’t I come down to Joburg./  
She offered me education and everything./ And mainly for him,/ they 
would welcome me in their home./   
6. So I told my partner that I was moving to Joburg./  He didn’t like the 
idea,/ but he ended up letting it go./  
 
PART 2: (Running away and returning) 
Strophe 2: (Co-dependence) 
Stanza 3: (Love/hate relationship) 
7. But he tried to fetch us at their home;/ he pulled tantrums there/ and 
then the police chased him away/.   
8. Then he called me/, and because I still love him/, then he asked me to 
come back/ and help me to further my studies./  Then he made empty 
promises./   
9. I did come back,/ and within two weeks it started again./  It started 
again./  He started shouting./   
10. When it was time for him to come back home,/ it was always…I don’t 
know…I won’t be free/. I’ll start getting scared/, wondering what is he 
going to be angry about today/ and what are we going to argue about 
today/ – because everyday we would argue./  Everyday we would argue./   
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11. And he’ll get phone calls/, and if I ask him why don’t you answer your 
phone,/ now he’ll get angry at me/ and start shouting at me/.  He’ll get 
mysterious calls;/ he’ll go to the bathroom and talk in the bathroom/.  
He’ll actually speak to these women,/ and say that he’s not staying with 
his girlfriend and the baby./ He’s not staying with the mother of the baby 
and the baby./   
12. You know, he’ll start saying it’s not mine and all that,/ and then when I 
actually confront him about these things/, he says that he didn’t say it./  I 
said, but I heard you speaking,/ then he’ll start getting angry/** - those 
kind of things./ I’m lying/, he never said such things./   
13. Then we’ll also argue about that,/ and then he’ll also start beating me 
because of that./ So he’s got also a temper problem, I think./   
14. But he doesn’t admit it,/ so it will never stop./ I always pray and hope that 
he’ll change,/ but he’ll never change./  I didn’t finally decide, enough, to 
really say./   
 
PART 3: (Intergenerational abandonment) 
Strophe 3: (Giving my child up) 
Stanza 4: (Guilt and longing) 
15. I went to my cousin/ …that day we had a fight/ …I went to my cousin and 
I gave my child up./ I left him at a children’s home/ and asked them to 
keep him for me/ until I’m finished with my studies/ or finished with 
working/ …until I could afford him./ 
16. But then later on in my life my cousin said that, no,/ go and fetch your 
child/, because once your child is there he’ll never have an opportunity to 
know/** the way he would if he was staying with you./   
17. Your mother never left you,/ but your mother couldn’t afford you./That 
child living at that home,/ he will never forgive you/ when he’s older/.   
18. And ja, I couldn’t live without him/: I would cry/ and get emotional/. I 
could visit him/, but sometimes I couldn’t do things because he’s not 
around./  
19. I’ll just sit down at home/, and instead of trying to go and find a job/, I’m 
sitting down and thinking about my child/, wishing that he was here/ – and 
those kind of things./  So I went to go and fetch him./  
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PART 4: Return 
Strophe 4: (Co-dependence) 
Stanza 5: (Fear of abandonment by partner) 
20. And when I went to go and fetch him his father called and said can you 
please come back home./ And I went back again!/  Then we stayed with 
him for a week./ We started to argue again./   
21. He asked us to leave/, and that’s when I didn’t have anywhere to go./   
22. And I said, actually, this person really, really, really loved/ …the kid 
really loved him,/ even though I stayed in an abusive home./   
23. But the fact that he’s asking us to leave,/ and then tomorrow he’ll call us 
and ask us to come back,/ it’s time to actually really leave./ He’s asking 
me to leave now,/ let me just leave/ and never come back./   
24. Because he’ll ask me to leave because he needs space/, but then how long 
am I going to do that?/  Every time he needs space/, must I go on the 
street/ and stay with the child?/   
25. Because he does need space/ – he needs time with those women./ So I 
said to myself,/ let me not fool myself:/ he doesn’t love us at all,/ if he can 
ask us to leave./ And I’ll tell him to his face,/ we do know that you have 
no **/. You do know that I’m carrying the child on my back/ and then you 
still say, I need some space./    
 
PART 5: (All my fault) 
Strophe 5: (Conflict over child) 
Stanza 6: (Fear of abandonment by the child) 
26. That I broke his heart and everything/ …you know, he’ll turn stories 
around and I’ll be the bad guy./  Everything that happens is because of 
me./   
27. He did this because of me,/ and I don’t want him to see his child/ – that’s 
a lie./   
28. I said, if you want to see your child/, you are more than welcome,/ but it 
will mean for you to take the responsibility/ to come and fetch your 
child,/ where your child is at/, and then you bring the child back./   
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29. And he said the child must stay with him permanently,/ and I’m only 
allowed to see the child once a month./  What are you trying to do?/  
30. You are trying to make my child forget me/ and then be used to the new 
women./  There’s not just one woman/ – it’s different women,/ in-and-out 
of his place,/ so I don’t want my child to be also surrounded by that kind 
of environment./  
 
This narrative, like all the others, consists of Parts, Strophes and Stanzas of different lengths, 
levels of detail and complexity, suggesting structural instability, and demonstrating points of 
significance in the narrative. This narrative has a funnel shape, starting with painful but 
present-based, easily recalled and immediate personal experiences, which gradually deepen 
after a central fracture in the narrative to reflect deep-seated, unconscious material being 
played out in the narrator’s life. Both the “top” and the “bottom” of the funnel reflect the 
over-riding theme of leave-return. Like in all the other narratives, repetition, an important sign 
of narrative fragmentation, occurs in this narrative at a number of points, and includes not 
only leave-return, but related constructs such as ambivalence, co-dependence and fear of 
abandonment. Thus, more accurately, this narrative has a fractured funnel shape. There are 
few linking or connecting words or phrases in this narrative, so without the repetition, it 
would be very difficult to follow. The Main lines and Stanzas and Strophes and Parts would 
feel somewhat disconnected if it were not for the significant repetition which deepens our 
understanding of what is important to the narrator on each occurrence.  
In Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 1, the tension between abuse and running away which 
characterises the majority of the narrative is immediately introduced, a tension which parallels 
the split self, the shame-based self that stays and “apologises” for her abuse and thinks it is 
acceptable if the abuse is an “on-off thing”, and the false self that tries to escape because 
unconsciously she believes she deserves better. 
Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 2 which centres around the narrator moving to Joburg to escape her 
abusive situation is the only coherent Stanza, the only Stanza not characterised by conflict, 
confusion and ambivalence.  It is the only Stanza characterised by leaving, and (as yet) no 
returning to the abusive situation. It is also the shortest Stanza. At a semantic level, this 
structural feature suggests that its content is the most unusual or infrequent.  
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The next Stanza (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 3) returns to the tension between leaving and 
returning. This Stanza is the longest Stanza, and it centres around the narrator’s partner, 
suggesting his prominence and importance in her life; in this Stanza she admits that she still 
loves him. Her partner’s disowning of the narrator and their son is acutely shaming for her, as 
is his sexual humiliation of her. This Stanza is rife with many forms of violence; as we have 
seen, there is a great deal of emotional violence, but there is also physical violence. The 
narrator underplays this dramatically, stating “So he’s got also a temper problem, I think”. 
This kind of understatement suggests she is not acknowledging the seriousness of the violence 
perpetrated against her, possibly because she wants to justify her continual returns to him, 
suggesting “it’s not so bad”. The continual return to him suggests she is highly dependent on 
him, and he on her dependence on him. They are stuck in a spiral of leave-return; leave-
return, which reflects their love-hate relationship. This is reflected at linguistic level – the 
narrative guides the reader to the perpetrator, and then away from him again. There is no 
commitment here on the narrator’s part, to leave and not to return, but the situation is not 
sustainable for her, as is demonstrated later in the narrative (see Part 4). This eternal return 
suggests the prominence of a shame-based sense of self. Like so many of the participants, but 
even more strikingly in this narrative, this leave-return cycle represents a disorganised 
attachment pattern; a pattern of seeking intimacy with a partner whose abuse is familiar, 
known to her, and then, out of fear, running from and escaping an emotional intimacy which 
is so dangerous for her, a pattern acquired during her neglectful and abusive childhood 
(Fonagy, 2011).  
Part 3 is the most significant point of narrative fragmentation. This narrative fracture from the 
previous Parts, Strophes and Stanzas, I believe, is the thematic heart of the narrative. It is 
from this Stanza onwards that the narrative gains psychological depth. The reason for the 
narrator’s cyclical leave-return, leave-return is fear of abandonment, which, like the previous 
narrator, was a constant feature during her childhood. From other interview material not 
reported here, the narrator tells of severe abuse for which she was blamed as a child, and 
being abandoned by her mother (unlike her cousin claims), and two of her aunts who were 
substitute caregivers, until she left home at sixteen. She had no consistent caregiver, and was 
passed from one adult to the other, all of whom eventually left her. Abandonment is 
intolerable for her. Yet this is also unconscious for the narrator, and so she repeats the past, 
and abandons her own child, until the guilt and longing is too great for her. It is unbearable 
for her to have lost both her partner and her child. 
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What is interesting here is that high levels of shame and personal distress are not associated 
with empathy (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). The narrator does not 
empathise with how her child may experience this abandonment, perhaps because she has not 
processed her own feelings about her abandonment as a child. However, she does cry and get 
“emotional” about leaving him; I wonder if perhaps she is crying out of longing for him as 
much as for her own unprocessed, unarticulated childhood of abandonment. She seems 
emotionally disconnected, even naïve – the belief that she can drop her child at a children’s 
home and pick him up again at her convenience seems out of touch with reality. Here again, 
the tension between the leave-return, leave-return emerges (leaving her child, and periodically 
returning), but it has far greater psychological depth and significance because it more closely 
mirrors the cause of her adult behaviour, which is rooted in her experience of her own 
childhood.  
A great deal of her motivation for actions appear to be unconscious, and the narrative reflects 
this – it starts with the most immediate, easily accessible and repetitive theme in her life, her 
relationship with her partner and her pattern of leave-return, which deepens and gains 
unconscious significance through the same intergenerational pattern of repetition with her 
child from the point of narrative fracture (Part 3).  
In the penultimate Part 4, the refrain of co-dependence recurs, but Stanza 5 is filled with more 
fear, and more anger than previous Stanzas. It is as if the previous Stanza, which brought 
about the rupture and the theme of abandonment, unleashed these strong emotions. These 
feelings are centred around being left, around her partner wanting “space”; about tolerating 
being shamed in this way. In Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 3, the narrator talks about the other 
women, but the tone is quite different, and there is no conviction that she will leave as a result 
of their presence in her partner’s life, as there is here. Longer narratives have been associated 
with progress and psychological recovery (Gray & Lombardo, 2001) – perhaps this long and 
complex narrative has helped make conscious for the narrator what was unconscious before, 
and helped instill some self-respect, some potency and agency, in a predominantly shame-
based self.  
The final Part 5, Strophe 5, Stanza 6 is reminiscent of Part 3, Strophe 3, Stanza 4, where the 
narrator experiences a dreadful fear that she has lost, or is in the process of losing both her 
(ex) partner and her son, and the blame is located in the narrator, which causes a great deal of 
internal conflict. The acute experience of the possibility of abandonment from her son is 
articulated in “You are trying to make my child forget me”. This, however, is a far more 
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conscious statement of fear of abandonment than would have appeared at the beginning of the 
narrative, perhaps suggestive of some progression despite the significant fracturing which 
occurs. The narrative ends with a chilling sense of isolation; a sense that the narrator feels 
quite alone,  trying to negotiate her way through a hostile, abandoning, loss-filled world in 
which she has to fight unaided, unloved, for her emotional survival.  
There are a number of unusual linguistic tools used by the narrator, for different reasons. 
Besides the major fracture that takes place in Part 3, the most interesting aspect of this 
narrative is the frequency of “micro-fracturing”, at which particular points in the narrative 
they occur, and how they manifest. The “micro-fracturing” starts in Part 2. There are 
examples of 1) incomplete sentences (for example: “Then he called me. And because I still 
love him (incomplete sentence). Then he asked me to come back” (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 
3). At points there is no logical sentence structure, like for example: “When it was time for 
him to come back home, it was always…I don’t know…” (subordinate clauses). What is 
evident here too, is the presence of ellipses. In this sentence, she is concealing, or at the very 
least, not explicitly stating, that she allowed herself back into the abusive situation. This 
narrator makes use of ellipses a number of times when the content of what she is uttering is 
too emotionally painful. At the end of Part 2, she makes the ambigious statement: “I didn’t 
finally decide, enough, to really say”. What she means is very difficult to interpret here. I 
would argue that what she is leaving out is that she knows she cannot help herself from 
returning, and that this is too shameful for her to utter.  
Like most of the narratives, there is significant repetition – I have already mentioned the 
repetition of the theme of leave-return, but at a micro-level there is parallel or related 
repetition about “the women” her ex-partner sees. She repeatedly mentions them and openly 
resents being disowned because of them: “He’ll actually speak to these women. And say that 
he’s not staying with his girlfriend and the baby. He’s not staying with the mother of the baby 
and the baby” (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 3). These kinds of statements would simply fuel the 
narrator’s abandonment terror, her shame, and her disorganised attachment patterns.   
A final example of “micro-fracturing” is how the broader theme of conflict between the 
narrator and her ex-partner manifests in Part 4, Strophe 4, Stanza 5 and 6. The cyclical 
alternation; the conflict between the narrator and her ex-partner also mirrors the major leave-
return theme, and adds to the non-linearity of the narrative: 
He’s asking us to leave. Then tomorrow he’ll call us and ask us to come back. It’s time to 
actually really leave. He’s asking me to leave now. Let me just leave and never come back.   
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He’ll ask me to leave. He needs space.  How long am I going to do that?  Must I go on the 
street and stay with the child?  Because he does need space. He needs time with those women. 
So I said to myself, let me not fool myself, he doesn’t love us at all. And I’ll tell him to his 
face. You do know. And then you still say, I need some space. (Stanza 5).    
Lastly, the narrator uses inversion a number of times, for example: “mainly for him (the 
narrator’s son), they would welcome me in their home” (Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 1), which 
should read, “they would welcome me in their home, mainly for him”.  Another example is: 
So he’s got also a temper problem, I think (Part 2, Strophe 2, Stanza 3). Finally, in Part 4, 
Strophe 4, Stanza 5, the narrator says: “Every time he needs space (subordinate clause), must 
I go on the street and stay with the child?”  This inversion, for whatever reason (perhaps lack 
of grammatical proficiency) adds to the disorganised quality of the narrative.   
I now turn to the analysis of the Main line/off Main line of the plot.  
 
Narrative 5: Main line/off Main line of the plot 
 
PART 1: (Ambivalence) 
Strophe 1: (Running away)  
Stanza 1: (Running away and returning) 
1. Beating a woman is fine.  
2. I’ve had this thing of running away. I think I get scared inside. 
Then I start running away. I’ll come back home.  Then I’ll 
apologise. I’ll stay at home.   
PART 2: (Running away and returning) 
Strophe 2: (Co-dependence) 
Stanza 3: (Love/hate relationship) 
3. He called me. He asked me to come back.  
4. I did come back. It started again.   
5. He’ll speak to these women. (He’ll) say that he’s not staying with 
his girlfriend and the baby. He’s not staying with the mother of the 
baby and the baby.   
6. He’ll never change.   
PART 3: (Intergenerational abandonment) 
Strophe 3: (Giving my child up) 
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Stanza 4: (Guilt and longing) 
7. I gave my child up.  I left him at a children’s home. (I) asked them 
to keep him for me. 
8. My cousin said no. (My cousin said) go and fetch your child.  Your 
mother never left you. Your mother couldn’t afford you. That child 
will never forgive you.   
9. I went to go and fetch him.  
PART 4: Return 
Strophe 4: (Co-dependence) 
Stanza 5: (Fear of abandonment by partner) 
10. His father called. (He) said can you please come back home. I went 
back again!   
11. He asked us to leave. That’s when I didn’t have anywhere to go.   
12. The kid really loved him.  Even though I stayed in an abusive 
home.   
PART 5: (All my fault) 
Strophe 5: (Conflict over child) 
Stanza 6: (Fear of abandonment by the child) 
13. He said the child must stay with him permanently. I’m only allowed 
to see the child once a month. What are you trying to do?  
14. You are trying to make my child forget me.  
 
Firstly, this narrative has a great deal more subordinate clauses than the previous two 
narratives, qualifying the main clauses. Thus, more descriptive context is given to the 
narrative, and it also gives it a less raw, immediate and dazed quality than Irene’s narrative, 
for instance. The narrator additionally frequently included long descriptions of the object, 
which could almost constitute a whole new sentence, which I have excluded as Gee (1991) 
suggests, even where I feel it adds to the meaning of the narrative. So this narrrator’s Main 
line text was complex to analyse at a linguistic level. The linguistic and thematic patterning of 
this Main line material is fascinating. The Main line text starts with Part 1: (Ambivalence); 
Strophe 1: (Running away); Stanza 1: (Running away and returning) to Part 2: (Running away 
and returning); Strophe 2: (Co-dependence); Stanza 3: (Love/hate relationship) to Part 3: 
(Intergenerational abandonment); Strophe 3: (Giving my child up); Stanza 4: (Guilt and 
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longing) to Part 5: (All my fault); Strophe 5: (Conflict over child); Stanza 6: (Fear of 
abandonment by the child). The non-linearity of the plot is not only due to the excluded 
cyclical repetitions of leave-return, but due to the emotional enmeshment between the narrator 
and her partner, and the narrator and her son, which presents at linguistic level. As I have 
noted, the disclosures of leave-return, leave-return cycles manifest at linguistic level by 
appearing and disappearing. The emotional enmeshment can be observed most clearly at 
heading level; headings (representing themes) melt or fuse into each other, and equally apply 
to both partner and child at different moments in the text. The narrative opens with the theme 
of ambivalence about vacillations; instability, the narrator’s desperate quest to be loved. Right 
from the outset, she tells us that she runs away from some situations when she becomes 
afraid. Yet she is drawn to situations that are likely to make her afraid, and this is due to her 
own abusive past (repetition compulsion). She does not feel she deserves any better. When 
she does stay with her partner, it is a relationship of co-dependence. This co-dependence 
elicits complex feelings of love (dependence) and resentment (about being “owned” or 
“possessed” and so feeling demeaned and helpless), but are typical of disorganised attachment 
patterns such as this narrator is clearly displaying. These kinds of patterns of attachment are 
typically characterised by an inability to regulate emotional closeness – a running towards 
intimacy, and then a fearful backing away. So what the narrator is doing in a concrete way 
represents her emotional/attachment life. This is transferred onto her child, whom she 
abandons, then returns to again.  
Part 3 is where the narrative deepens. At linguistic level, the lie told by the cousin (about the 
narrator’s mother not abandoning her), who continues not to believe the experiences of the 
narrator, cannot be identified. What is interesting, knowing the narrator’s history, is that the 
story she tells in Part 3, Strophe 3, Stanza 4, is not the story of the narrator’s son, but the story 
of the narrator. This is the beginning of the past and present merging. In Part 4, Strophe 4, 
Stanza 5, she says: “The kid really loved him. Even though I stayed in an abusive home”. 
Note here how she slips from “the kid” to her own abusive home. I would argue that she fears 
a repetition of her own childhood despite her enacting parts of it (hence her distress when 
abandoning her child, the point where the narrative deepens). The disconnected Stanza 6 of 
the final Part centres entirely around self-blame (for all that has gone wrong in her life – see 
excluded subordinate clauses in the full narrative) and abandonment, and her fear of the loss 
of her child, just as her own mother abandoned her. The past and the present have fully 
merged (see Payne et al., 2004).  
It is interesting that the first Part (Strophe 1, Stanza 1) and the final Part are characterised by 
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the narrator as psychological subject, suggesting she has the most to say about the themes 
coming up in these parts, pointing to their importance in the narrative. Part 1 introduces the 
theme of leave-return, and Part 5 centers around a related or subtheme, abandonment.  
In Part 1, Strophe 1, Stanza 2, the psychological subject is initially the owner of the children’s 
home in Blouberg, then shifts to the cousin in Joburg, first the younger sister, then the older 
sister, and then to her (ex)partner. At this point in the narrative, all the psychological subjects 
are intricately involved in the narrator’s intension to escape her abusive situation. 
In Part 2 there is an intermingling of psychological subjects: the narrator and her (ex) partner, 
suggestive of their enmeshed relationship/leave-return relationship. But the perpetrator’s 
voice is predominant, and the narrator’s point of view is disregarded (e.g. “when I actually 
confront him about these things, he says that he didn’t say it”.). The intervening voice of the 
narrator is dependent, helpless, captive, tragic, including such statements as: “I still love him. 
I did come back, and within two weeks it started again. I won’t be free. I’ll start getting 
scared. So he’s got also a temper problem, I think. I always pray and hope that he’ll 
change,but he’ll never change.  I didn’t finally decide, enough, to really say”.   
Part 3 is where a rupture in the narrative occurs; where the deepening in the narrative takes 
place. At a structural level, this is not reflected in the perfect alternation between the narrator 
and her cousin in terms of who constitutes the psychological subject. However, the content of 
the perspectives of these psychological subjects reflect the deep-seated reasons for Felicia’s 
repetition compulsion, acted out here in her relationship with her child.  
Like Part 1, Part 5 is entirely from the perspective of the narrator. In this case, an anxious, 
angry narrator, who fears losing her child. Although she enacts it, it is also her greatest fear. 
The tip of the funnel, from the perspective of this psychological subject is: You are trying to 
make my child forget me, just like the narrator was herself as a child. 
The foci in this narrative are relatively repetitive until Part 3 where the first deepening or 
fracturing of the narrative takes place, and they center around running away and returning, 
asking for help, and returning. In Part 2, the focus is on the consequences of the narrator 
returning, for example, foci include typical IPV phenomena: Would argue, phone calls heard 
you speaking; start getting angry; lying; never stop; never change. In Part 3 the theme of 
leaving (and then returning) continues, but the narrator’s reactions include sadness and grief, 
she cries and feels“emotional”. She feels guilt because her cousin says (Your mother) never 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
305 
 
 
 
left you, (but your mother) couldn’t afford you (although this is not factually true). The foci in 
Part 4 center around a repeated return of another kind, the return to her partner, and once 
again, the catastrophic consequences thereof (typical foci include: Back again, argue again, 
needs space, those women, (and I) must go on the street; (with) the child. In the final Part, the 
focus is on the heart of the narrative, the angry terror of abandonment, and the foci are the 
other women, and the child she fears losing (with him permanently; once a month; child 
forget me; new women; different women). 
To conclude this section, I would like to argue that although Gee’s (1991) model is an 
excellent tool with which to illustrate linguistic fracturing, its focus is less on semantics, or on 
the interpretation of the subjective meaning of the fracturing; the phenomenology of what lies 
beneath this broken narrative. This is quite appropriate since this model focuses on narrative 
form rather than content. Nonetheless, I would like to take a moment to draw the reader’s 
attention to something that could supplement the findings facilitated by Gee’s (1991) model. 
If the reader looks closely at these narratives, at a semantic level; at a phenomenological level, 
there is some consistency: coherence. There are overarching trauma- and shame-related 
themes that run throughout the narratives – that remain intact - despite their linguistic 
fracturing. They are, in order of narratives, 1) shame/self-blame and deservedness; 2) 
truth/lies and bearing witness; 3) shame, humiliation and dissociation; 4) the concealed, 
shame-based self, including amnesiac-like disorientation of place and time; and 5) patterns of 
cyclical leave-return reflecting perpetrator-instilled abandonment terror, including 
disorientation of time. Although language remains representative – narrative structure mirrors 
narrative content (these narratives are fractured, and represent fractured selves) – there is also 
the intriguing possibility of a disjuncture between form and content; and that thematic 
coherence and narrative fracturing can co-exist.  
I would argue that from these five narratives we can detect both a linguistic and semantic 
pattern. At linguistic level, the narrators produce non-linear, fractured narratives through the 
use of repetition, connecting words such as “and”, “then” and “because” that do not fulfil 
linking functions, ellipses, incomplete “sentences”, and non-sensical phrases. These linguistic 
features happen at particularly significant or painful parts of the narrative. There is also 
evidence of both “macro-fracturing” and “micro-fracturing” in some of the narratives. In 
terms of the thematic coherence or consistency I referred to above, the theme of shame is 
pervasive in at least two of the narratives (Irene and Chantal), and is a central feature in a 
third narrative (Felicia). Four dimensions of chronic trauma also emerge from the narratives – 
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firstly, the related themes of disorganised attachment patterns, and abandonment terror; 
secondly, the issue of credibility/being believed and the need for survivors to have someone 
bear witness to their trauma, and thirdly, the belief in the perpetrator-defined identity – the 
self as “bad” and as to blame, which overlaps with shame. As I have emphasised, most trauma 
survivors have difficulty believing that the traumas they experienced occurred in reality – this 
is often associated with loss of traumatic memory and dissociation (Putnam, 1989). Fourthly, 
there is evidence of significant disorientation; disruptions in space and time which occur 
when trauma memories are encoded without an adequate spatio-temporal frame to organise 
them (Payne et al., 2004). Consequently, trauma memories created when stressed are likely to 
be disjointed and fragmented, lack spatial and temporal contexts and so produce deficits in 
episodic memory (Payne et al., 2004). These dimensions are either associated with, or 
constitute diagnostic criteria of chronic trauma syndromes such as chronic PTSD and 
DESNOS, and overlap with shame themes in the narratives analysed above (e.g. particularly 
with Irene and Chantal, but also with Felicia and her shameful perpetrator-defined identity, 
and to some extent Linda through her self-blame). Thus, I would suggest that there is a 
significant overlap or co-occurrence between exposure to chronic trauma, and trauma-related 
clinical symptoms, including shame, which occur in narratives, which without exception, 
show prominent linguistic fracturing.  
 
Urgency to Talk vs. Narrative Compression 
 
We do not talk about our inner meaning using conversation as an instrument, but 
rather we exist in it (Ferenczi as cited in Orange, 2011, p. 103). 
 
An important goal of narrative research is that subordinated individuals are given a voice – 
there is an urgency to speak, to be heard, to develop collective narratives and to create public 
dialogue (Chase, 2011). The trauma narratives of my participants are more than individual 
stories: they link to a collective story of a marginalised social group (Chase, 2011). It is 
important when such narrativisation takes place – the narrative will vary in structure and 
content according to the interviewee’s proximity to the traumatic event (Chase, 2011). Not 
much time had elapsed since the women I interviewed had left their abusive partners (a few 
months at most), so many women were still in a crisis situation.  
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Due to this proximity, there was an urgency to share traumatic experiences. In many 
instances, these women’s stories about their traumatic experiences persisted throughout the 
interview to its conclusion, and questions not directly relevant to these experiences were 
largely left unanswered. Among the women whose narratives were the most incoherent, it 
seemed like the urgency to talk about what had happened to them was most acute. It is likely 
that women who had the most incoherent and fragmented narratives experienced their traumas 
most intensely (perhaps due to its proximity), and consequently felt more pressure to talk.  It 
is likely, in such instances, that the plot would be “lost”, because the interview would consist 
of pieces or fragments of urgently expressed trauma, which may bear little relation to one 
another.  
It is interesting that the women who felt the most pressing need to talk about their traumatic 
experiences tended to rush out of the interview room after the interview, as if wanting to 
escape what had been disclosed. These women, as I noted in the methods section, when 
encountering me on occasion after the interview, avoided eye-contact with me, turned their 
faces away from me, and did not greet me or engage in conversation with me as they had 
prior to the interviews. This kind of avoidance is an expression of shame associated with 
over-disclosure. I do not intend to use the term “over-disclosure” in a judgmental way. What I 
mean, is that for some, but not all, people who have experience significant trauma, there is an 
urgency to talk incessantly and without discretion about their experiences because the 
pressure of trauma-related emotions is so great (Payne et al., 2004).  
The apparent opposite of the urgency to talk is silence. Silences suggest the presence of the 
unspeakable, the incommunicable – these untellable events make the narrative skewed, 
erratic, interrupted and compressed (Scarry, 1985; Simon, 2008). This is why traumatic 
memory is so often encoded in bodily form (Simon, 2008). Van der Kolk (1994) suggests that 
traumatic memories are not semantic memories at all but somatosensory memory fragments 
related to overwhelming previous experiences. Charon (2008) argues that the body is the 
portal that allows the doctor into the psyche of the patient; our bodies are our humanity, they 
house our selves – our bodies are constantly telling, if only the telling is heard. Recent work 
on autobiographical narratives have focused on and emphasised the body – Descartes’ belief 
in the separation of body from mind has been long left behind (Charon, 2006). The body 
attests to the singularity of the self, it is corporeal evidence of the individuality, the 
authenticity of the experience of the self (Charon, 2006). Charon (2006) argues that to fail to 
recognise and acknowledge the body is to fail to recognise and acknowledge the self, 
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including its traumatic experience. As noted by Hartman (as cited in Schnell, 2008, p. 169), 
“Perhaps the only way to overcome a traumatic severance of body and mind is to come back 
to mind through the body. We recall how the voice dries up, and chokes its way out again”.  
Chaos narratives are always embodied and always beyond speech (Frank, 1995). The chaotic 
body is “contingent, nomadic, lacking desire, and dissociated” (Frank, 1995, p. 104). Chaos 
narratives are characterised by an immediacy, by a self-interrupted “and then, and then” 
present tense style (see Narrative 2) and are told without being able to reflect on the self; these 
narratives are necessarily lived through the body (Frank, 1995). Scarry’s (1985) work on the 
body in pain also has important implications for this study. Like Frank (1995), one of her 
main points is that pain resists, if not destroys, objectification in language (Scarry, 1985). This 
is what Frank (1995, p. 109) has called the “claustrophobic terror of muteness”. Scarry (1985) 
argues that pain destroys or negates the contents of consciousness; that it obliterates all 
psychological content, and so renders the subject silent (Scarry, 1985). This means that the 
self, which would be expressed and projected through language, disintegrates (Scarry, 1985), 
much like the language and selves captured in the first narrative which follows. 
All bodily manifestations of shame are designed to conceal the self; make the self smaller, 
less significant, less conspicuous. M. Lewis (1992) calls such bodily indicators of shame, the 
self “imploding”, which is associated with the body curved in on itself, head bowed and eyes 
closed (M. Lewis, 1992). As the reader may remember, Retzinger (1987, p. 171) states that 
the external bodily expressions of shame may also include: 1) the hand covering all or certain 
parts of the face; 2) turning in, biting, or licking the lips, or biting the tongue; 3) gaze 
avoidance, eyes lowered or glancing; 4) blushing; 5) forehead wrinkled; and 6) false smiling 
and masking behaviours. Nonverbal markers of shame also include shame phrases (e.g. It was 
sore, it hurt; I am nothing; I am dirty), repetitious speech, and fragmented speech (Retzinger, 
1987).  
Five of the 19 interviews contained short life narratives. I present three here. It is interesting 
that in the shorter narratives, women expressed more emotion through their bodies. It is as if 
in the absence of words, the body expressed what could not be spoken in a more elaborate or 
detailed fashion. What is striking in the narrative which follows is not only its surprising 
brevity, but that the interviewee sat hunched up with her hands over her eyes, crying, 
throughout the interview. Sometimes she pulled her shirt over her face, gestures typical of 
shame (making the body smaller as if to disappear). Sadness is an important indicator of by-
passed shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). In addition, her sentences were punctuated by long 
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silences, as if what she was talking about was unspeakable to her. The narrative below is all 
she could manage to tell me (in verbal form) about her experience of IPV: 
Amelia:  Can you tell me a bit about that relationship?   
Lilly:  He used to hit me…  And when he hit me, I’ve got the other child, so the other child is 
not his child…  So I’ve got two children.  So when he hit me…my child is the first child that 
is not his child, so he asked, why you hit my mom, and then he started to hit him also…  And 
then he got hold of things and hit me…  The last time I got the feeling that I must come here, 
it was the time he liked to point at me with a big knife, so I said he has almost killed me now 
and then I left, because I was staying at his home with him.   
In the next short narrative, it is clear that the speaker has “lost the plot”. The actual narrative 
has no storyline. It is a random collection of disconnected traumatic memories, interspersed 
with nonsensical phrases like “Hy loop al in die rondte in die huis” (he walks in circles all 
round the house), a phrase which is repeated in different form (“Dan draai hy in die 
rondte”/he turns round and round) later in the short narrative. What makes her narrative 
interesting is its amorphousness, its lack of structure, and the extreme anxiety and shame that 
she expressed at a bodily level while she was telling me her story. She was also extremely 
shy, which is characteristic of by-passed shame; something that was not common among other 
women, who tended to be outspoken (H. B. Lewis, 1971). She was rocking back and forth, 
curled forward, biting the sleeves of her shirt, looking down and avoiding eye contact with 
me, and periodically covering her mouth with her hands, which made her already soft voice 
inaudible at times. She whispered her story, as if she did not want it to be heard, and 
stammered and paused and hesitated throughout her short narrative. These are all 
manifestations of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1998). What she was unable to say, 
her body was communicating for her. The narrative follows below: 
Amelia: Vertel vir my ‘n bietjie van die verhouding waarin jy was, en hoekom jy na die 
sentrum toe gekom het. [Tell me a little bit about the relationship you were in, and why you 
came to the Centre]. 
Annabelle: My boyfriend het eintlik beginne drugs gebruik, die Tik, hy raak hy deurmekaar, 
hy sien goeters en hoor goeters wat nie is nie. Hy loop al in die rondte in die huis. Ek sit in die 
huis maar…(inaudible). Senoumaar ek gaan na die winkel dan se hy sommer mans kyk vir my 
of ek kyk vir hulle, maar dan is dit nie so nie. Dan draai hy in die rondte, en ek moet in die 
huis sit dan hoor hy mense buite dan maak dit hom kwaad, dan kom hy sommer kwaad in dan 
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klap hy my. Hy se ek lieg altyd vir hom dan is dit nie so nie. Dit is (inaudible) tyd wat dit nou 
so aangaan (inaudible) na ander mense toe (inaudible) dan kan die mense niks maak of doen 
nie. Een aand was ek nog pregnant met hom, dit was in die nag in gewees, maar dit was rustig 
gewees, toe kom haal hy vir my uit die mense se huis uit, hy het so ‘n dun rooi pypie gehad, 
toe klap hy my daarmee. Toe ek my ander een gedra het van twee jaar oud.  
[My boyfriend actually started using drugs, Tik (crystal methamphetamine), he got confused, 
he saw things and heard things that weren’t there. He walks in circles all around the house. I 
sit in the house but…(inaudible). Imagine I go to the shop then he will say men are looking at 
me or I am looking at them, and then it isn’t so. Then he turns round and round, and I must sit 
in the house and he hears people outside and it makes him angry, and then he comes in angry 
and hits me. He says I always lie to him and then it isn’t so. It is (inaudible) time that it is 
going on like this (inaudible) going to other people (inaudible) then there is nothing that 
people can do. One night I was still pregnant with him, it was in the night, but it was calm, 
then he came to fetch me from other people’s house, he had a thin red pipe, and he hit me 
with it. When I was pregnant with my other one of two years old.] 
In this final short narrative, I explore the notion of the fragmented mother – the substitute 
mother, the real mother and the ideal mother. I include this narrative because it is an 
extremely striking example of a particular form of by-passed shame, expressed at bodily 
level.  Specifically, the most disturbing part of this narrative is that Chantal, the same woman 
who had suffered the gang rape in the lengthier narrative above, smiled and laughed 
throughout the narrative that follows. She sat close to me, straight-backed, leaned into me, 
making the interview both emotionally and physically intimate. Her body language 
communicated the opposite of shame, yet I knew she felt significant shame. This was both 
defensive, and she had no means of negotiating boundaries, so I found her emotional material 
immensely contagious. Whereas shame conceals and tries to be contained by the imploding 
body, her body reached out to me, laughingly. This discrepancy between her mood and 
demeanour, and the trauma she had experienced, was a function of suppression and denial, 
but I could feel the weight of the experience she dismissed with a smile or laugh transferred 
onto me – the false smiling and masking behaviours referred to by Retzinger (1987). I felt that 
there had just been too much trauma in her short life, and that confronting it would destroy 
her. Perhaps her denial and suppression in such circumstances was not only adaptive, but also 
resilient? Whether that is the case or not, I felt burdened and weighed down by her avoidance 
for days afterwards, leaving me feeling depleted and depressed, while as Chantal says “ek lag 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
311 
 
 
 
vir als” (“everything makes me laugh”).  In this narrative, I will indicate material about the 
substitute mother by underlining the relevant text, text about the real mother is in bold print, 
and the idealised mother is indicated by the use of bold italics. The translation, as is the 
convention in this thesis, is in italics. What is evident from presenting the short narrative this 
way, is that the narrator is searching for a stable maternal figure, but the tragedy is that she 
cannot find this in her real mother, so she turns to substitutes and idealised versions of her. A 
predominant part of the (underlined) text is dedicated to the stable substitute maternal figure, 
suggesting that in reality, she plays the most significant caregiving role in her life; that it is 
she who cares for her the most frequently, and consistently. She is the most “real” and the 
most immediate. Yet despite this, the narrator continues to search for her real mother in the 
narrative. This real mother is no mother at all, the narrator admits she hardly knows her (“My 
ma ken ek ook nie eintlik rêrig nie”/My mother I also don’t really know), but the further her 
mother “swerwe” (travels aimlessly), the more her daughter longs for her and feels compelled 
to find her. The narrator becomes increasingly preoccupied about her real mother’s well-being 
towards the end of the narrative; expressing enormous worry about her; where she sleeps, 
where she eats, as if there is a real relationship between them. The real mother is slippery, 
forever disappearing, ungraspable, while her daughter longs for emotional connection which 
she cannot express. Her ideal mother, the one who takes up the least space in the narrative, 
can be found; she is traceable, tangible: she goes to work every day. It is that mother – the 
imaginary, illusory, longed for mother of whom she is the only cherished child - whom the 
narrator misses so terribly. It is a tragic narrative, filled with loss and abandonment-related 
shame, which the narrator attempts to dismiss with her bizarrely incongruent bodily reactions.  
 
“Daar was dae wat daar nooit 'n stukkie brood in die huis was nie.  Daar was een vrou, sy is 
26 en haar man is 28, hulle tweetjies is getroud en hulle het drie kinders, maar hulle is nog 'n 
jong paartjie, en was dit nie vir daai vrou nie wat in die yard is nie, dan weet ek nie.  Sy het 
vir my altyd gesê ek is soos 'n kind vir haar.  Dis omdat ek mos nie rêrig eintlik my ma…en 
my pa is nou vier jaar oorlede.  Ek het maar net vir 'n kort tydjie my pa geken, en toe het hulle 
hom ook dood gesteek en hy's ook maar net weg.  En my ma is nie al die tyd op Worcester 
nie.  My ma ken ek ook nie eintlik rêrig nie: my ma swerwe ook maar dan hier en dan 
daar.  Ja, was dit nou nie vir haar nie, dan het ek nooit…daar was dae wat ek honger gelê 
het…maar was dit nie vir haar nie, weet ek nie.  Sy het elke dag vir my… sy het tot vir my 
klere en toiletries altyd gekoop, tot skoene het sy ook altyd vir my gekoop.  Sy was soos 'n ma 
vir my, want ek het mos nou by my ouma al die tyd gebly.  Nou sy was net soos 'n ma en haar 
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man was soos 'n pa vir my, want my pa is mos nou nie meer daar nie.  Ek weier om weer 
terug te gaan Worcester toe, regtigwaar. Want ek kan nie sê ek gaan na my ma toe nie, want 
ek is bekommerd oor my ma.  Hier's baie aande wanneer ek ook nie…dan sê ek vir ** of vir 
Chriska…dan is daar baie aande wat ek nie kan slaap nie want dan is my gedagte nou net by 
my ma:  wat eet sy elke dag?  Een ding van my ma, sy het nie 'n regte blyplek nie, maar 
sy's elke dag in haar werk, al moet sy ook sonder 'n stukkie brood gaan werk.  Nou dis 
waarom ek baie bekommerd is, wat eet my ma elke dag?  Waar slaap sy elke dag?  Is nie 
lekker om elke dag, dan vanaand by die een en dan vanaand by daai een nie.  Die mense 
is snaaks.  Die mense is baie snaaks.  Ek is baie geworry oor my ma want vir my voel dit net, 
ek kan nie lekker lewe die kant en dan is ek nie geworried van haar daai kant nie, as ek weet 
dat my ma nie 'n blyplek het daai kant nie.  Ek sê baie ** nie elke keer van my ma nie, 
maar ek kan nie help nie.  Dit henner my.  Ek mis my ma, en ek is al kind van my ma - my ma 
het nie nog kinders nie”. 
 
Translation 
“There were days when there was not a morsel of bread in the house.  There was one woman, 
she is 26 and her husband is 28, the two of them are married and they have three children, 
but they are still a young couple, and if it wasn’t for that woman who is in the yard, then I 
don’t know. She always told me that I was like a child to her. It’s because I actually didn’t 
really… my mother…and my father died four years ago. I only knew my father for a short 
while, and then they stabbed him and he died and he was also just gone.  And my mother is 
not in Worcester all the time.  My mother I also don’t really know: my mother also wanders 
about, now here, then there. Yes, if it wasn’t for her, then I would never…there were days 
that I lay hungry…but if it wasn’t for her, I don’t know. Every day she…she even always 
bought me clothes and toiletries, even shoes she always bought me.  She was like a mother to 
me, because I stayed with my granny all the time, not so? Now she was just like a mother and 
her husband was like a father to me, because my father isn’t there anymore, not so?  I refuse 
to go back to Worcester, really. Because I cannot say that I’m going to my mother, because I 
am worried about my mother.  There are many evenings when I also don’t…then I say to ** 
or Chriska…then there are evenings when I cannot sleep because then my thoughts are just 
with my mother:  what does she eat every day?  One thing about my mother, she doesn’t 
have a real place to stay, but she’s at her work every day, even if she has to go and work 
without a piece of bread. Now that’s why I am very worried, what does my mother eat every 
day? Where does she sleep every day? It’s not nice, every day, this night with this one, the 
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next night with another one.  People are funny. People are very funny. I’m very worried 
about my mother because it just feels to me, I cannot enjoy life this side and then I’m worried 
about her on that side, if I don’t know that my mother has a place to stay that side. I don’t 
often say  ** every time about my mother, but I cannot help it. It troubles me.  I miss my 
mother, and I am my mother’s only child – my mother has no other children”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The past three chapters have been dedicated to presenting the themes emerging from the 
interviews and the structure and fragmentation of selected trauma narratives. In the 
concluding chapter, the main findings will be reviewed, particularly the complex and 
surprising shame-related findings, and self-reflexivity. The South African socio-cultural 
setting will be considered, and the limitations and recommendations for future research and 
practice will be presented.  
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CHAPTER 10 
Review of Findings and Conclusions 
 
I began this thesis with a review of exposure to chronic violence, self and memory 
fragmentation and IPV, focusing on South Africa in chapter 1. I have located the study in 
terms of a particularly psychological shame theory (phenomenology), and pointed to specific 
features of other theories which were of relevance in the context of my study.  I have drawn 
distinctions between shame and related (self-conscious) emotions and associated constructs to 
provide the reader with a complete and detailed understanding of shame, which, as a complex 
construct, is not effortlessly defined. In my penultimate literature review chapter I focused on 
shame and culture, paying particular attention to the international literature on cultures of 
honour and shame which so closely correspond with poor, urban, patriarchal South African 
communities. I also describe guilt and shame as they manifest in individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures, and universalist and cultural understandings of shame. In my final 
literature review chapter, I investigate the relationships between exposure to trauma, shame 
and a range of psychopathologies. I then describe my method, focusing on my choice of 
analytic method, narrative analysis, from a social constructivist point of view.  
 
Chapter 7 begins by providing a background to my establishment of a relationship with my 
interviewees, and describes the rapport-building process with them. Then I use categorical 
content analysis to describe my participants’ accounts of their traumatic experiences, 
reactions, and coping mechanisms. The next chapter is clearly located within 
phenomenological theory and uses a social constructivist narrative approach to the informal 
narrative analysis conducted in one part of this chapter (the organisational split self). Using 
categorical content analysis, it describes the participants’ conflicting descriptions of 
themselves, indicative of a split between the authentic self and the false self; a typical post-
traumatic response. I analyse this split at individual, organisational and cultural levels. It is 
this theoretically eclectic chapter that introduces the final, most complex results chapter. 
Chapter 9 presents a categorical form analysis that expands, deepens and formalises the 
narrative analysis used in chapter 8. This chapter includes a more complex linguistic analysis 
of trauma and/or shame narratives to demonstrate the relationship between narrative and 
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psychic fragmentation. It also explores the role played by the body in communicating the 
unspeakable; the trauma or shame which is too unbearable to utter.   
My detailed plan for this final chapter is to describe the findings emerging from the 
categorical content analysis of 19 whole interviews (chapter 7), then follow with a description 
of the results of the trauma and shame-based split from 10 narratives, based on categorical 
content analysis as well as a social constructivist approach to narrative analysis in chapter 8.  I 
conclude with an in-depth, complex and comprehensive formal linguistic analysis of 5 long, 
complex trauma and shame narratives, and an informal narrative analysis of 3 short, 
compressed trauma/shame narratives. 
The chapters have been ordered in this way for a reason. As I have previously noted, I begin 
with a broad, descriptive account of a wide array of women’s trauma-related experiences to 
introduce the reader to the data. I then narrow my focus to one particular, highly significant 
theme, the split self, which emerged from this initial categorical content analysis, and focus 
my next chapter on this dimension. I conclude with the most complex, most intricate, and 
most detailed data analysis, which, once again, is a sub-theme of the split self. I use a highly 
formalised categorical form analysis/linguistic analysis to demonstrate the association 
between psychic and linguistic fragmentation. All results are discussed in the context of the 
theory and the empirical literature presented in the extensive literature review chapters. 
Finally, I discuss the limitations to my study, and conclude by presenting the reader with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
Trauma and Shame Related Findings: Categorical Content Analysis 
 
Exposure to Trauma 
 
IPV is one of the leading causes of morbidity and mortality for South African women (Gass et 
al., 2010). All but one of my participants reported a history of physical violence perpetrated 
by her intimate partner. This included slapping, kicking, beating with implements and single 
or multiple stabbings. Unlike the South African literature indicates (Abrahams et al., 2010) 
guns were not used in the violence directed against the women I interviewed. Five women 
reported experiencing sexual violence at the hands of their perpetrators. These women 
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described regular demands for sex, always against their will. Rape and sexual coercion are 
rife in South Africa, and high-risk ages are between 17 and 48 years, which is similar to the 
age range among my participants (Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002). It is important to note that 
non-consensual sex (sex agreed upon after blackmail, threats, trickery or pleading) occurring 
within marriages or dating relationships – due to self-blame or shame – is often under-
reported (Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002), so it is possible that this kind of sexual behaviour 
occurred more often than was disclosed. Verbal abuse and threats, sexual humiliation, jealous 
and controlling behaviour, and financial deprivation – all types of emotional abuse – were 
also reported by the vast majority of my participants, and as noted by Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, 
Yoshihama et al. (2004) constitutes part of a more general pattern of dominant and controlling 
behaviour. Emotional abuse was often cited by women as the most painful part of the abusive 
relationship. 
In keeping with the literature, transgenerational trauma was common in my participants. The 
majority of my participants were directly exposed to physical violence, witnessed physical 
violence between caregivers, and/or were directly exposed to sexual and emotional violence 
as children. Child abuse is a significant risk factor for IPV (Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, 
Yoshihama et al., 2004). Typically childhood exposure was more traumatic for the women I 
interviewed than the adult-onset IPV. Furthermore, similar to the majority of research 
findings in the area, the women I interviewed who had suffered both child abuse and adult 
onset abuse tended to experience greater shame and have poorer mental health outcomes than 
those who had only endured adult-onset abuse (Cloitre et al., 2009; Kim, Talbot, & Cicchetti, 
2009). Andrews (1998) found that women who had experienced childhood abuse felt 
pathological guilt, and had suicidal plans and actions. In Andrew’s (1998) study, abusive 
experiences from early childhood contributed to a tendency to feel both shame and 
pathological guilt in adulthood, and shame played a mediating role in the association between 
early abuse and depression.  
Violent or abusive caregivers (often because they have histories of abuse themselves and have 
complex attachment patterns) produce (often lifelong) disorganised, unpredictable attachment 
behaviour in their children (De Zulueta, 2011). Disorganised attachment patterns were evident 
in both the women and children I encountered during my research, and during the time I spent 
at the Centre, there were movements towards and away from emotional intimacy with me. 
Lutwak, Panish and Ferrari (2003) found that individuals who tend towards self-derogating 
thoughts, and those who tend to blame both the self and others, fear intimacy and create 
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conditions that are not conducive to its experience. Although not measured in my study, this 
pattern of attachment has been associated with BPD and dissociative disorders in adulthood 
(De Zulueta, 2011). 
 
Post-traumatic Reactions and Psychopathology 
 
The feelings women described as being most difficult for them to cope with were 
helplessness, fear, nightmares, flashbacks, and ambivalence towards their perpetrators. 
Feelings towards the perpetrators ranged (in order or frequency) from fear, numbness, anger, 
and hate, to love. Because of the traumas these women had been through, they also felt a 
range of negative feelings towards others in general, including mistrust, fear, anger and hate. 
Women openly expressed finding it difficult to trust others, and that they often felt suspicious 
about others’ intentions towards them, a feeling which sometimes bordered on paranoia. But 
the more striking emotion reported by women was anger (and hate), which were important 
features in their lives. However, there was also a grave reluctance to talk about anger; there 
was far more emotional investment in the discourse of “forgive and forget”, which may have 
to do with the high level of religiosity among these participants. But their rage was real, it was 
palpable, even when turned inward, despite the explicit investment in this discourse. Despite 
their reluctance to engage at any length or in depth with their anger, anger is a natural 
response to intense injury to the self when exposed to repeated shaming experiences (Mills, 
2005). The literature tells us that the shame-rage which develops in abusive situations results 
in aggression targeting the individual who induced abuse and associated shame, or sometimes, 
it is displaced onto safer targets (Mills, 2005). I wondered whether that could be the reason 
why there was so much conflict between the women living in the shelter; why there was so 
much anger and aggression between them. Over time, this shame-rage cycle begins to foster a 
hostile interpersonal style, which is characterised by distrust of others, hostile attributions, 
and hostile solutions to interpersonal problems, all features of these women’s lives (Mills, 
2005). However, anger also has an adaptive function. Because anger is a potent, authoritative 
emotion, it counteracts some of the helplessness and paralysis of shame, giving the individual 
back their sense of power and agency, although it is less effective in this regard when turned 
inward against the self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
318 
 
 
 
A number of women described symptoms of depression (persistent sadness/depressed mood, 
loss of interest in personal appearance, and/or excessive sleeping/hypersomnia), generalised 
anxiety, a history of suicidality or current suicidal thoughts or actions and/or dissociation. 
Some women also reported stress-related illnesses and somatic complaints, including heart 
conditions, high blood pressure, nausea, headaches and infections such as pneumonia. 
Somatic complaints, particularly complaints for which no medical explanation could be 
found, have repeatedly been associated with exposure to trauma (Van der Kolk et al., 1996). 
My findings are consistent with the literature on PTSD and Complex PTSD, although since 
my study was a small-scale qualitative study, the association between IPV and these clinical 
outcomes were not measured. However, shame was an important feature in both chronic 
trauma exposure and psychopathology in these participants. It is clear that fear and anxiety 
was a predominant feature in the lives of these women. They spoke freely and frequently 
about persistent feelings of fear. PTSD is generally understood as an anxiety disorder in 
which fear is the most dominant emotion (Lee et al., 2001). Similarly, anxiety is a central 
emotion in shame (Gilbert, 1998). Shame and guilt play prominent roles in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD (Lee et al., 2001).  
PTSD and depression frequently co-occur – anxiety and depression are common responses to 
trauma (H. B. Lewis, 1987b; Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). Women tend to be more vulnerable to 
PTSD, anxiety and depression, across cultures, even when the severity of the trauma is taken 
into account (Seedat, Stein, & Carey, 2005; Suliman et al., 2009). The literature tells us that 
women who were sexually abused as children are in the highest risk group for depression 
(Feiring et al., 1996, 2002), and a number of my participants had been abused in this way. The 
chronic hyperarousal and intrusive memories of post-traumatic stress amplify the vegetative 
symptoms of depression, leading to insomnia, nightmares, and somatic complaints, all of 
which were reported by my participants (Herman, 1997). The numbing of initiative associated 
with chronic trauma combines with the lethargy and helplessness of depression, symptoms 
which were both frequently reported by my participants (particularly helplessness), and 
clearly visible to the observer (particularly lethargy) (Herman, 1997). The pervasiveness of 
depression is perhaps accountable for the suicidality and the high suicide rate among 
survivors of IPV, as was evident in my participants (the frequently reported histories of 
suicidality and suicide attempts) (Herman, 1997). 
One of the most dramatic and challenging aspects of post-traumatic shame is its links with 
dissociation (Talbot et al., 2004). Women frequently complained of feeling numb, like they 
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were “living in a bubble”, that they felt emotionally deadened and as if they were watching 
their lives unfold before them from a distance. It is important to note the increased likelihood 
of dissociative disorders in patients with sexual abuse histories, and as I have noted, a number 
of my participants reported histories of this kind of abuse (Ford & Courtois, 2009; Putnam, 
1989). The dissociation evident in my participants is concerning yet unsurprising. It is a 
central aspect of Complex PTSD, which, as commented on earlier, although not measured, is 
likely to be highly prevalent amongst the women I interviewed. One of the most common 
outcomes of chronic trauma exposure is Complex PTSD (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). This 
disorder involves multiple affective and interpersonal domains in functioning, including 
among other symptoms, impaired self-regulatory capacities, anger and aggression, avoidant 
behaviours, and significantly, as noted, dissociative symptoms (Cloitre et al., 2009; Kaminer 
& Eagle, 2010). This was also true for PTSD: According to Van der Kolk et al., (1996), PTSD 
rarely occurs in isolation. In Van der Kolk et al.’s (1996) study, participants who met criteria 
for current PTSD had significantly higher levels of dissociation, somatisation and affect 
dysregulation (all of which were highly interrelated) than those who did not meet criteria for 
lifetime PTSD, who in turn had fewer symptoms than those who did not meet criteria for 
PTSD at all. Again, although not measured, my participants displayed considerable 
dissociation and somatisation.  
Disorganised attachment patterns have been associated with dissociation and the ability to 
mentalise (make sense of one’s own and other’s mental states) (Fonagy, 2011; Schimmenti, 
2012; Steele, 2011). As described in the background to my study, the over-disclosure, and 
then shame-filled avoidance of me after the interviews I attributed to transgenerational 
disorganised attachment patterns. Research has shown that rejection by the primary 
attachment figure, or his/her having a disorganised attachment style him/herself are risk 
factors for dissociation and a shame-prone emotional style (Fonagy, 2011; Mills, 2005). 
Certain types of family environments also contribute to dispositional shame, for example, 
parental over-control or coercive interactional styles (Mills, 2005). Abusive and abandoning 
family environments encourage the development of disorientated, conflicted, disorganised 
attachment patterns that are remarkably stable from childhood into adulthood (Fonagy, 2011). 
Mothers experiencing IPV are likely to be in a fearful and overwhelmed state, and may react 
to the child with either projective identification or projection – the child is likely to be 
perceived as either helpless and vulnerable like the mother or like the abusive perpetrator, and 
may be treated (and behave) accordingly (Levendosky, Bogat, & Huth-Bocks, 2011). These 
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authors suggest that the trauma of IPV is likely to cause dissociation which impairs the 
mother’s cognitive capacities through intrusions of disorganisation, disorientation and 
confusion, impeding her parenting and making it challenging for her to focus on her child’s 
needs and mental states. These kinds of relationships may also be characterised by role-
reversal and emotional loss of boundaries and identity fusion, which contributes to the 
trangenerational transmission of violence (Levendosky et al., 2011).  
As noted earlier, many women reported that the experience of emotional abuse was the most 
difficult for them. Emotional abuse has been identified as an important determinant of shame-
related pathological outcomes, especially PTSD, anxiety and depression (Cloitre et al., 2009; 
Street & Arias, 2001; Webb et al., 2007). A number of women described their worst 
experience as involving situations where their children witnessed their abuse. In all reported 
cases, women’s guilt enabled them to leave the abusive situation. This leads me to important 
differences between shame and guilt – shame which debilitates, and guilt which motivates 
amendment of the specific guilt-inducing situation. Because the self is not debilitated with 
guilt, and because it involves focusing on specific and controllable behaviours, it is more 
likely to be accompanied by reparative action, hence the demonstrated association between 
guilt and prosocial feelings and behaviour (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lazarus, 1991; Tangney, 
1991). Shame incapacitates and is accompanied by a wish to die or disappear; it is an intense 
negative state in which the whole self is seen as defective, flawed, inferior; a global 
perception that results in an interruption of current behaviour, confusion in thought, 
helplessness and speechlessness; it is comparative to the self “imploding”, accompanied by 
the body curved in on itself, head bowed and eyes closed (M. Lewis, 1992). Shame is an 
involuntary, devastating self-focused emotion that has severely negative effects on 
psychological outcomes and on interpersonal behaviour (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, it 
was guilt that stimulated the women who could not bear seeing their children witness their 
abuse, to leave. They were not incapacitated, and were able to take corrective action.  
 
Post-traumatic Changes and Coping Mechanisms 
 
Most of my participants described post-traumatic changes in their feelings about themselves. 
Changes were either positive or negative, although some women experienced both positive 
and negative changes. Negative changes were described as shame reactions, such as feeling 
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“dirty”, “worthless”, like “nothing”, as never being able to “achieve anything”, while positive 
changes included feeling less cut off or dissociated, and feeling more confident about physical 
appearance, decreased anger, and increased empathy and perspective taking. These findings 
are congruent with the literature that demonstrates that although the majority of outcomes 
associated with trauma are negative, there may also be some positive outcomes associated 
with such exposure (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010; Kleim & Ehlers, 2009). It is possible that 
women’s increased confidence in their physical appearance is due to no longer experiencing 
abuse, particularly sexual humiliation, facilitating a new appreciation for their bodies. It is 
possible that reports of decreased anger are defensive (denied because they are incongruent 
with predominant discourses or the ethos of the Centre), or that the levels of anger women felt 
were relatively less than they felt while in the abusive situation. It is worth noting that shame-
prone individuals are less likely to have an empathic disposition, are less likely to be able to 
take another person’s perspective, and that shame is more likely to be related to poor 
interpersonal relationships (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). By contrast, the 
guilt-prone individual is much more likely to shift perspectives and engage in empathic 
concern (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It has been demonstrated repeatedly that shame, low 
empathy, high self-preoccupation and high personal distress tend to co-occur (Lindsay-Hartz 
et al., 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). Perhaps those women who reported increased empathy and 
perspective taking were more guilt-prone than shame-prone.  
Social support has been identified as an important protective factor in the lives of people with 
PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). A great number of participants cited spirituality or religion 
as a primary support in their lives. They also reported the supportive role of counselling, 
although many reported conflictual and unsupportive relationships with their families. 
Specific psychological defenses reported by the women included wearing a smile as a “mask” 
to disguise painful feelings from others. This protected women from feeling vulnerable and 
exposed. Women frequently reported that “keeping busy” to distract themselves from their 
emotional pain was an effective coping mechanism. Only two women reported using alcohol 
to cope. It is likely that a greater number of women abused substances in order to help them 
cope, but since I was affiliated with the Centre which had a zero tolerance policy to drugs and 
alcohol, it was unlikely that women would make this kind of admission to me.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
322 
 
 
 
 
How Was Shame Described? 
 
Manifestations and understandings of shame in this study were unexpected. Shame was often 
described as humiliation, embarrassment, and in one instance, shyness. In no instance was 
shame described as a positive emotion, as claimed by Bradshaw (2005). H. B. Lewis (1971) 
argues that one of the most powerful defenses against shame is outright denial, a finding that 
was replicated in this study. Even if the women admitted to feeling shame, they generally 
struggled to articulate what shame felt like, and what it meant to them. Perhaps due to limited 
education, some women with lower education levels had restricted vocabularies and found it 
difficult to describe their emotional lives. This is one possible explanation, although I believe 
there are many others, which will be discussed shortly. When present, however, shame was 
typically described in social or relational terms. So the shame described by the women who 
experienced it, was external shame. Gilbert (2007) defines external shame as the manner in 
which the self believes it exists in the minds of others. Gilbert (2007) argues that the core 
source of shame is the experience of lack of social safeness; a sense of heightened social 
threat and an uncertain sense of social positioning (Gilbert, 2007).  High levels of external 
shame exist when individuals believe that because of possessing certain characteristics they 
will not be able to create positive or acceptable images of the self in the eyes of the other 
(Gilbert, 2007). This is why external shame may also be associated with humiliation (Gilbert, 
2007).  
As discussed in chapter 3, humiliation is an intense and unpleasant emotion involving 
lowering in the eyes of others; loss of esteem, social status or dignity (Elison & Harter, 2007; 
Miller, 1985). To recap, Gilbert (1998) argues that humiliation is similar to shame in that it is 
experienced when an individual is subordinated; put in a debased or powerless position by 
someone more powerful. As I outlined earlier, the most common causes of humiliation 
include 1) being harassed, teased, ridiculed, debased; 2) public behaviours or accidents that go 
against social norms; and 3) incompetence or mistakes seen by others (Elison & Harter, 
2007). What is vital is the role played by the audience, who mock or laugh at the victim 
(Elison & Harter, 2007). As I have already noted, humiliation thus usually occurs at the hand 
of another, and in most cases, there is a broader audience that observes the humiliating event; 
a hostile and contemptuous audience is a key predictor of humiliation (Elison & Harter, 
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2007). Critically, in humiliation the victim is seen as undeserving, the event tending to be 
viewed as an unprovoked attack (Elison & Harter, 2007). In other words, as I have noted 
previously, there is no acceptance that the negative judgment from another is justified (as in 
shame), and no re-evaluation of the self takes place. Instead, the individual may feel 
motivated to make the other give up or take back his/her negative judgment (Tantam, 1998). 
So, unlike shame, humiliation does not involve the negative evaluation of the self by the self; 
instead it involves a focus on the other as bad; there is an external rather than internal 
attribution for negative events; a sense of injustice and unfairness; and a strong desire for 
revenge and retaliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilbert, 1998).  
From this description, it is obvious that humiliation also overlaps in important ways with 
stigma, which is also defined in external, social or relational terms. In M. Lewis’ (1998, p. 
126) understanding, as I pointed out in chapter 3, shame can be defined as “an intense 
negative emotion having to do with the self in relation to standards, responsibility, and such 
attributions as global self failure” (an internal experience) whereas stigma is a “public mark” 
or violation (an external experience), something that is noticeable to others and involves a 
“spoiled identity”. Thus, the stigmatised person is publically marked by his/her deviation 
from the norm in appearance or in behaviour (M. Lewis, 1998; Nussbaum, 2004). A related 
construct is stigma consciousness. It refers to an individual’s expectation that s/he will be 
prejudiced against or discriminated against on the basis of dispositional or situationally 
induced differences (Mosley & Rosenberg, 2007). Stigma consciousness refers both to an 
individual’s awareness that s/he has a stereotyped status, and to the individual’s focus on 
his/her stereotyped status (Mosley & Rosenberg, 2007). As will be shown, many of the 
women’s descriptions of shame actually point to the experience and awareness of stigma. 
Stigma is closely aligned with (lack of) respect.  
It is worth pausing here for a moment to consider the shame-related findings. There is 
considerable overlap between shame, humiliation and embarrassment, although, as I have 
pointed out, there are important theoretical and clinical differences between them. There is a 
social dimension to shame which permeated women’s accounts of their experiences of shame. 
In their narratives, there was always a hostile and judging audience accompanying the 
experience of any of the shame variants. What is interesting here is that, in contrast to the 
literature, the experience of humiliation did not lead to the expression of rage and a strong 
desire for revenge in many women. Instead, the more typical pattern was that women turned 
that anger against themselves and took responsibility for the abuse perpetrated towards them; 
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perceiving themselves as deserving and as to blame
26
. Perhaps it is this process that 
exacerbated the development of post-traumatic and somatic symptoms. A theme to which I 
will return later in this chapter is the frequency with which women said that they felt 
stigmatised by their status as an IPV survivor; how humiliated they were to be a resident at a 
shelter like the Saartjie Baartman Centre. This seems to contradict the routine character of 
IPV in many of the communities the women came from. IPV was described as a “tradition” 
by one interviewee, suggesting that it was the norm rather than the exception in her 
community.  
As I said at the outset of this thesis, current theories of shame focus on intimate attachment 
relationships and do not engage with broader experiences of discrimination and 
disempowerment which may also facilitate the development of shame and shame defenses 
(Kaminer, personal communication, May 24, 2012). Individual shame commonly co-occurs 
with group-level shame (Kaminer, personal communication, May 24, 2012), and reminds the 
reader not to make simple distinctions between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. 
Group or societal-level cultures of masculine or patriarchal honour are likely to be particularly 
pertinent to the individual women I interviewed, who are likely to have experienced 
individual trauma, historical trauma, and collective trauma, which will sensitise them to the 
experience of shame (either overt, or unconscious or by-passed) both as stigmatised 
individuals and individuals belonging to a stigmatised group. However, although their 
experience of shame was social, it was not experienced as reflecting on the group as a whole. 
Shame was also referred to as embarrassment. Embarrassment is a less intense emotion than 
shame, and it may be evaluative or non-evaluative in nature. It emerges in the context of 
relatively inconsequential or amusing wrongdoings, and is associated with a great deal of 
physiological arousal (e.g. blushing) (Tangney et al., 1996). Considering the seriousness and 
intensity of IPV experiences, this choice of term seems at odds with the experience of chronic 
trauma of the nature these women had been exposed to. The only reason to which I could 
attribute this finding was a lack of the necessary vocabulary – that in instances where women 
wanted to use words with a graver emotive tone, they could not find the words to express 
themselves appropriately.  
                                                 
26 It is also worth noting that there has been a long history of victim blaming in psychiatry which may influence 
the tendency to self-blame. As noted by Herman (1997, p. 116):  “This tendency to blame the victim has strongly 
influenced the direction of psychological inquiry. It has led researchers and clinicians to seek an explanation for 
the perpetrator’s crimes in the character of the victim.” 
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Consequently, another important issue has to do with language, and how shame is expressed. 
As described in chapter 4, it is important to note that in different cultures shame may be 
differently conceptualised, experienced and expressed (Bedford, 2004; Bedford & Hwang, 
2003). Not only is shame not a negative or pathological construct in all (particularly 
collectivistic) cultures, but not all languages discriminate clearly between different 
dimensions of shame and shame and other self-conscious emotions. Some have argued that 
languages in which concepts are highly elaborated, and which are more discriminating, are 
likely to belong to cultures which are more sensitive to shame (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). 
Some scholars have suggested that because of the highly elaborated nature of the concept of 
shame in Chinese language, it might be worthwhile for Chinese researchers to work with 
Western, English-speaking researchers to achieve a more discriminating and precise 
conceptualisation of shame (Edelstein & Shaver, 2007). Furthermore, certain emotions, like 
shame, may occur with greater frequency in one culture than another, may be more focused 
on and conceptualised in greater detail, may be valued more highly, and may be captured in 
language with greater precision (Edelstein & Shaver, 2007).  
Firstly, the emotion, shame, in English and Afrikaans, is not highly differentiated, specific 
and precise – it is a broad concept which includes a range of thoughts and feelings, hence the 
complexity of defining this construct. Secondly, there are potentially different interpretations 
of the word “shame” in Afrikaans and in English (C. N. van der Merwe, personal 
communication, June 11, 2012). Although, of course, both share the same etymological roots 
(to hide; to cover). In English, the word shame has connotations not only of exposure, but of 
woundedness. It is quite different in Afrikaans. In Afrikaans the word “skaamte” includes the 
dimensions of shyness, of scandal (“skande”), the latter of which carries or implies blame (C. 
N. van der Merwe, personal communication, June 11, 2012). Self-blame can be emotionally 
toxic. The reader might recall an earlier study referred to where characterological self-blame, 
shame, learned helplessness and depression often co-occur with feelings of powerlessness, 
betrayal, and subordination/submissiveness or inferiority in survivors of domestic violence, 
and child sexual and physical abuse (Andrews & Brewin, 1990). Another important point is 
that there is no separate word in Afrikaans for shyness. This is perhaps why the one woman 
who confused shame with shyness interpreted shame in the way she did. However, shyness is 
also a form of by-passed shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). Women like those I interviewed, who 
have been made to feel weak and helpless through histories of such extreme subjugation, are 
likely to avoid admitting to feelings which are associated with culpability and fallibility, and 
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in some instances, imply blame. Particularly among the prouder and more defended women, it 
was as if admitting to shame in itself was a shameful thing. Admitting shame has previously 
been linked to individuals feeling defective and weak (Miller, 1985). Perhaps this is one of 
the reasons that many of my participants did not admit to feeling “skaamte” when asked 
directly, although they manifested significant levels of shame at bodily level and when asked 
about how they felt about themselves. The suggestion of blame is entirely inconsistent with 
the survivor ethos and (imposed) counter-narratives of the women I interviewed, and 
therefore unlikely to be admitted to when asked directly.  
 
How Did Theoretical Understandings of Shame Fit Into My Study? 
 
For the women I interviewed, shame was a purely social emotion, although individual shame 
surprisingly did not reflect on the group as occurs in collectivistic cultures. The interviews 
were congruent with aspects of phenomenological, evolutionary, and self psychological 
approaches to understanding shame, because each of these theories has a social dimension. I 
have selected only particular parts of these shame theories to discuss, those that are relevant to 
shame as a social emotion, to indicate which theories are consistent with my shame-related 
findings and which are not. It is worth pointing out that no theory provides an explanation for 
individual (external, social) shame experiences, which do not reflect on the group as a whole, 
as I found.  
 
 
Phenomenological Theory 
 
Shame is experienced as an unrestrained, immensely painful and debilitating self-focused 
emotion that has intensely negative consequences for individuals’ psychological well-being 
and interpersonal functioning (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has been described as an 
incapacitating emotion that is associated with a great deal of autonomic activity, virtually no 
cognitive activity, and speechlessness (H. B. Lewis, 1971). At a bodily level, shame reactions 
are characterised by a bowed head, closed eyes, and the body curled in itself, to make the 
person as small and as unobtrusive as possible (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971). What makes 
shame so painful is that it affects the entire self, which is experienced as inferior, defective, 
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flawed, contaminated or worthless; it is an undifferentiated emotion, where the whole self, not 
just a behaviour, is evaluated as “bad”, as contemptible (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Miller, 1985; 
Tangney, 1991). As I noted earlier in the thesis, “when guilty we feel ‘as if’ we are bad”, 
while with shame, this “as if” circumstance falls away, and the shamed individual becomes 
the “anti-ideal” (Lindsay-Hartz, Rivera, & Mascolo (1995, p. 295).  
Phenomenological theory supports a social understanding of shame. What is relevant here is 
that in H. B. Lewis’ (1987a) phenomenological understanding, shame is constructed in 
relational terms - it is the unavoidable response to loss of love; the loss of an important social 
relationship, in the case of IPV, the perpetrator. H. B. Lewis (1987a) argues that shame, the 
result of the loss of the other, is inevitably accompanied by humiliated fury, and many of my 
participants expressed a great deal of both humiliation and rage towards their ex-partners. H. 
B. Lewis (1987a) argues that the purpose of humiliated fury is to protest the loss and demand 
restitution of the other’s positive feeling towards the self, which then leads to feelings of guilt. 
However, none of my participants expressed guilt towards the perpetrator. In order to 
preserve physical proximity to the love object the self may choose to avoid him/her, instead of 
reacting with aggression towards him/her (H. B. Lewis, 1987a). This seemed to be the pattern 
of most participants – most did not want to face their perpetrators again, and were intensely 
afraid of them. According to H. B. Lewis (1987a), the self may also repress rageful longings 
towards the other to protect the social tie (H. B. Lewis, 1987a).  
 
Evolutionary Theory 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, in contrast, the core tenet of evolutionary theory is that human 
beings are social animals who are motivated to engage in behaviours which promote survival 
and reproduction. Gilbert (1998) argues that evolution has resulted in a range of biosocial 
goals and strategies (e.g. finding a sexual mate, caring for offspring) which enhance the 
likelihood of survival and reproduction of the species. Social signals are humans’ most 
important source of information, showing us whether our search for these evolutionary goals 
has been successful or not (Gilbert, 1998). These social signals are crucial in the maintenance 
of internal regulation and in indicating how attuned individuals are to their social roles 
(Gilbert, 1998). Shame signals misattunement, which leads to physiological dysregulation and 
indicates the need for defensive, reparative or retaliatory action (Gilbert, 1998). Shame 
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activates the need to hide from view what is considered worthy of rejection, attack or 
ostracism (Gilbert, 1998). It may also be accompanied by depression or anxiety associated 
with the perception that there has been a reduction or diminishment in social status, respect 
and social attractiveness (Gilbert, 1998). As explored earlier in the thesis, in order to avoid 
shame, and to ensure ongoing social attention holding power (SAHP), individuals may rely on 
attractiveness or aggression (Gilbert, 1998). Human shame is typically not focused on being 
physically attacked or injured, but rather on having SAHP damaged in some way. In modern 
societies, SAHP is associated with social standing rather than with dominance (Fessler, 2004).  
This concern with social status and respect was very prominent in my participants. Women’s 
narratives indicated that they valued being respected by others a great deal. Hollway and 
Jefferson (2009) emphasise how important respect is, particularly in subjugated, working 
class communities where there is often a concern with power and with status; where there is a 
great deal of status anxiety (De Botton, 2005). One of the reasons for status anxiety is 
dependence, and these women were highly dependent (often emotionally and financially) on 
their perpetrators, and were particularly resentful that they struggled to achieve financial 
independence. Kaufman (1993) argues that in Western or individualistic cultures, compared 
to African or Asian cultures, shame is centred around competition for success, being 
independent and self-sufficient, being popular and conforming, and being in a successful 
relationship (Kaufman, 1993). Although South Africa is a complex, multi-cultural context, it 
appears that the majority of my participants identified with Western or individualistic 
cultures, and the ideals and values propagated by this cultural system.  
 
Psychoanalysis and Self-psychology 
 
As I have said from the outset, Freud had “no consistent theory of shame. Shame received 
relatively little attention in the Freudian corpus, especially as contrasted with anxiety and 
guilt” (Broucek, 1991, p. 12). Freud’s limited attention to shame meant he understood it only 
as reactive, inhibitory, and prohibitive, opposing the pleasure principle and preventing 
engagement in natural but shameful behaviours, including sexual activities such as voyeurism 
and exhibitionism or activities centred around waste elimination (Broucek, 1991). Although 
the limited consideration of shame in psychoanalytic theory and practice was not entirely a-
social, it did not, until recently, emphasise the social or relational dimension of shame. 
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Orange et al.’s (1997) thoughtful and thorough scrutiny of psychoanalytic theory and practice 
emphasises the relational over the intra-psychic and examines the possible sources of shame 
in the therapeutic relationship. Unlike Miller (1985) and other “purist” psychoanalytic 
colleagues’ exclusive focus on sexual exhibitionistic impulses and genital inferiority as the 
(only) source of shame, Orange and colleagues broaden their focus to examine the 
intersubjective or relational origins of shame. Orange (2008) describes the therapeutic 
interchange as inherently shameful, for a number of reasons that have been described in an 
earlier chapter, and will be dealt with later in the current chapter. This kind of work 
humanises psychoanalysis, and makes it compatible with more contemporary theoretical work 
which focuses on the co-construction of social relationships.   
 Unlike the experience of my participants, who mainly described external shame, articulated 
by their fears of being judged, or being ridiculed or being mocked, self-psychologists like 
Kohut argued that the experience of shame is entirely internal, and as such, may develop in 
isolation (A. P. Morrison, 1987). However, there is a great deal of Kohut’s work which is 
relevant to the women’s experiences. Many women described neglectful, chaotic and abusive 
childhoods, with inadequate care from primary caregivers, which resulted in disorganised 
attachment patterns. Kohut emphasised the conditions needed for the self to achieve cohesion: 
firstly, through the empathic mirroring of the exhibitionistic grandiose self, usually by the 
mother, and secondly, the presence of an empathic, idealised selfobject later on, usually the 
father, who accepts the child’s identification, idealisation and desire for merger (A. P. 
Morrison, 1989). For Kohut, a selfobject which is unresponsive to the self’s need for 
mirroring and idealised merger contributes to vulnerability towards shame – in his 
understanding, as is evident, shame is a manifestation of weaknesses or deficiencies in the self 
with regards the ideal self (A. P. Morrison, 1987). Specifically, shame is understood as the 
consequence of overwhelming, unmirrored grandiosity and selfobject unresponsiveness. 
However, in my view, this reaction is based on an interaction with a selfobject, which does 
not make it entirely internal. Although the struggle is primarily internal, its consequences are 
partly social in nature: for example, in the search for the merger in adult selfobjects. This is 
often focused on intimate partners, and those who have not experienced mirroring and 
merging early on in life, an inability to endure any separation or difference between oneself 
and one’s partner is likely to develop, which could lead to shame-rage spirals as are seen in 
domestic violence situations (Brown, 2004). Thus, although the experience of shame is 
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primarily understood as an internal battle, it does have a social dimension in the search for the 
external selfobject. 
What is interesting in the context of the fragmentation of some of the women’s trauma and 
shame narratives, is that Kohut described the consequence of the selfobject’s failure to mirror 
and affirm age-appropriate exhibitionistic needs as fragmentation, disintegration; the opposite 
of cohesion (A. P. Morrison, 1989). Psychological depletion, on the other hand, is understood 
as a response to the absence of the needed, wished-for, omnipotent and idealised selfobject, 
which leads to emptiness, depression and shame (A. P. Morrison, 1989). 
Before moving onto the results of chapter 8 on the split self, it is important to briefly recap on 
Fairbairn’s (1943) important thesis.  Feelings of “badness” are a typical defense among 
people who have been abused. Abuse survivors identify with and internalise insufferably bad 
objects and accept this “badness” and shame because it is more bearable to believe that the 
self is bad, than to admit to oneself that the loved perpetrator, whose abuse is unpredictable 
and erratic, is bad (Fairbairn, 1943). The main functions of this internalisation is to try to 
control these bad objects that have so much power over the person who is being abused; by 
splitting the internalised bad object into the exciting or needed object, and the rejecting 
object; and/or by splitting off from his/her central ego and repressing two secondary or 
subsidiary egos (Fairbairn, 1943). This theory overlaps to some extent with Herman’s focus 
on the existence of the trauma-related, shame-based authentic self and the false self. 
 
The Split Self: Categorical Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis 
 
In this section I review the the results from chapter 8. I analyse the authentic and false self as 
understood in Herman’s (1997), not Winnott’s terms, at individual, organisational and cultural 
levels. Herman (1997) suggests that the shameful authentic identity is obscured by a idealised 
false self that is defined by its socially conforming nature (Herman, 1997). 
As outlined in the literature review, phenomenologically, when shame is experienced, there is 
a split between emotion and cognition – there is limited cognitive activity and an abundance 
of affective (and autonomic) activity. The result of this split is that the individual finds it 
difficult to think clearly, soundly, reasonably and rationally, and it ceases all activity; which 
results in total inaction (H. B. Lewis, 1971). In these shame states the individual also 
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experiences intense sensory activity and emotions (H. B. Lewis, 1971). In addition, shame 
also encompasses the fusion of subject and object. There is a unusual kind of mergence that 
takes place in shame reactions, once the negative appraisal of the real or imagined audience 
has been internalised and has united with the self. Consequently, the self is divided in shame 
response in two ways – cognition and emotion are divided, and the self is the product of the 
internalisation of the accusing and disapproving other, while it is concurrently profoundly 
aware of itself (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
The characteristics about themselves that women reported included being worthless, useless 
and inadequate, dirty or contaminated, and as deserving the abuse they endured. However, 
they also reported being caring, being communicative, being sensitive or soft-hearted, being 
helpful and being friendly. But inner strength was the most common and most important 
positive quality reported by the participants. The women seemed proud of the positive 
characteristics they reported. Pride is associated with dominance/superiority; believing in the 
importance of the standards one has upheld; maintaining good feelings about oneself; 
believing that others will think one is good; inclinations to show or tell others about one’s 
achievement; the self as agent; moderately tense voice, flushed face and high heart rate 
(Barrett, 1995). Research suggests that pride can be an important motivator of altruistic 
behaviour (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). Pride motivates prosocial behaviour by helping 
individuals improve the image of the self that other people see and evaluate, or by helping 
individuals feel better about themselves (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). The ability to feel both pride 
and shame at the same time can be explained by the split in identity so common in those who 
have been traumatised (Halbertal & Koren, 2006). This split was plainly visible in all ten 
short narratives that I analysed.  
Women’s portrayals of themselves as strong and as survivors are agentive, oppositional 
narratives; denying the construction of women as weak, defeated, disempowered. Counter-
narratives such as these are often comprise irregularities and incongruities; an alternation 
between collusion with master narratives, and dynamic resistance. These inconsistencies and 
contradictions also demonstrate multiplicity or a split in identity (Halbertal & Koren, 2006).  
A brief summary of the interpretation of the results of the chapter are provided below, based 
on the narratives of eleven women.  
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Psychic Splitting at Individual Level 
 
Briefly, at individual level, the function of splitting is for the false self to protect (conceal, 
disguise) the traumatised, shamed authentic self from further exposure to potential harm. It is 
also, along with fragmentation, a post-traumatic response that can occur alongside shame, 
which are both core features of Complex PTSD and DESNOS, syndromes attributed to 
exposure to chronic trauma (Ford & Courtois, 2009). In addition, with one of PTSD’s most 
important dimensions, constriction, the trauma survivor escapes an intolerable situation by 
changing his/her state of consciousness; however, it is also associated with the past being split 
off into dissociative fragments, which are often forgotten and difficult to access consciously 
(Herman, 1997). 
Another point worth mentioning is that the frequent silencing and secrecy around chronic 
trauma causes a second injury or betrayal trauma, which can produce or enhance splitting 
(Ford & Courtois, 2009). In these cases, the individual develops a socially conforming or 
“normal” front which allows the survivor to protect the public from being exposed to the 
unthinkable and unspeakable. This façade becomes disconnected from the underlying 
authentic, shamed self which is incapacitated psychosocially by the personal knowledge of 
the trauma(s) (Ford & Courtois, 2009). 
 
Psychic Splitting at Organisational Level 
 
Women’s portrayals of themselves as strong and as survivors challenge and contest the 
canonical or master narrative that constructs women as dominated, subjugated, 
disempowered. These counter-narratives were made micro-culturally acceptable by their 
correspondence with a wider discourse of survival, enablement and empowerment promoted 
by the Saartjie Baartman Centre. Women frequently attributed feeling strong to the ethos 
underlying the interventions they had been exposed to at the Centre, especially counselling. 
There is, however, a significant tension between women’s powerful feelings of anxiety, fear 
and threat (see chapter 7), and their explicit descriptions of themselves as dynamic, strong 
survivors. As I suggested in chapter 8, I would argue that because women had only 
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encountered counter-narratives for a short period of time, I felt their expressed constructions 
of the self as active, strong, as survivors, were often forced and inauthentic.  
Counter-narratives by definition suggest resistance, authority, potency, agency. Although 
women’s counter-narratives did challenge the broader patriarchal culture they were familiar 
with, one which normalises and regulates violence against women, their counter-narratives 
are not in disagreement with the ethos of the Centre; not that I am implying it should be. The 
strong survivor identity that women were encouraged to own, to internalise, is – however 
well-meaning – one which has been selected for them. It is not one that is based on their own 
choice; it is not an alternative, empowered identity which they chose for themselves, which 
suggests that these counter-narratives may be less agentive or authorative than I had originally 
believed. 
 
External and Psychic Splitting at Cultural Level 
 
Despite the fact that IPV was considered routine (a “tradition”) in the communities my 
participants came from, they frequently reported feeling highly stigmatised by their status as 
an IPV survivor, and that they were extremely humiliated to be seen as a resident of a shelter 
such as the Saartjie Baartman Centre.  
I believe that cultures of shame and honour contribute to IPV. Specifically, I believe that the 
type of patriarchy associated with cultures of honour produce cultures of shame among 
women; a shame-based reaction that is cyclically repeated at cultural level (Cohen et al., 
1998). In cultures of honour, which are also characterised by poverty, hierarchies are 
important, so patriarchal structures such as male strength and power are highly valued and 
deeply entrenched in the cultural system. Social status is held in high esteem in these 
contexts, which contributes to the presence of binary oppositions – parallel to this patriarchal 
self (symbolic of the false self) is the shame-based self (symbolic of the authentic self), who 
has sacrificed dignity, power, and control to maintain the existing gender-based status quo. 
In cultures of honour men are also held responsible for “their” women, and it is perhaps this 
process of ownership or possession which caused the ambivalence that some of my 
participants felt towards their partners – although these men abused them, they also took care 
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of them, “owned’ them, which signals a pattern of attachment that is likely to ensnare and 
entrap women who had never had the opportunity to established healthy attachment patterns.  
Although paradoxical, considering its normative status, IPV still produced shame, humiliation 
and embarrassment for my participants, which I would attribute to self-blame. Internalising a 
perpetrator-defined identity (Fairbairn, 1943), and taking responsibility for their abuse; and 
feeling deserving of their abuse continue to be painful emotions despite how common their 
causes are. Which brings me Foucault’s theory of self surveillance (1977), which is 
symbolically based on the design of the Panopticon, a circular building with an observation 
tower in the middle of an open space surrounded by an outer wall.  In this theory, the outer 
wall of the Panopticon includes cells (for occupants like prisoners or mental patients for 
instance). The cells are flooded with light, so inhabitants are easily discernible and visible to 
an official invisibly positioned in the central tower/office. However, the concrete walls 
dividing the cells make the occupants invisible to each other. The ever-visible occupant, 
Foucault argues, is always "the object of information, never a subject in communication". He 
goes on to suggest that, 
"He [sic] who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays 
both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (Foucault, 1977, p. 202-
203). 
 By constantly observing the occupants and positioning them in a state of constant visibility, 
the efficiency of the institution is optimised. Those who are constantly watched, adopt the 
identity that is thrust upon them by those who observe them, so it guarantees the continued 
function of power, even when there is no one actually asserting it. It is in this respect that the 
Panopticon functions routinely; automatically. It is not difficult to see how this metaphor 
extends to the often jealous, ever-surveilling perpetrator in cases of IPV, how it facilitates the 
perpetrator-defined identity, even in his absence, and how this leads to isolation, self-blame 
(and incidentally, victim-blaming), and shame.  
Protecting the dominance, authority, strength and power of men in cultures of honour, and the 
duty or “right” of these men to own or possess women at the cost of prized parts of 
themselves, is an unquestioningly painful process, even if it does not occur on a conscious 
level (e.g. their own dignity, sense of self-worth and self-respect). 
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The gendered subjugation occuring on a cultural level had a number of interesting outcomes. 
Women were highly concerned with social status and respect (in chapter 7 as well as chapter 
8), and were frequently preoccupied with their stigmatised status (stigma consciousness) 
(Mosley & Rosenberg, 2007). Descriptions of shame were often actually portrayals of the 
experience of stigma. This is not surprising - working class communities are often concerned 
with respect, social status or with status anxiety; these constructs are highly relevant in 
communities where poverty and associated disempowerment is pervasive (De Botton, 2005; 
Hollway & Jefferson, 2009)  
One reason for my participants’ preoccupations with economic independence and social status 
was that having removed themselves from subjugating, disempowering cultures of honour, 
women were in the process of creating new identities based on reclaimed parts of themselves 
that they had unconsciously surrendered to maintain the gender-based power differential. 
These women seemed to want to aspire to the valued cultural assets associated with Western 
individualism; pride in themselves as individuals, economic independence, self-sufficiency, 
being conforming and popular, having self-respect, and dignity, which are all associated with 
an elevated social status at cultural level. I would argue that these preoccupations and efforts 
are a culturally compatible compensatory effort made by the individual’s false self for the 
culturally-determined shame long felt by the authentic self.  
However, a shift in identity of this magnitude does not take place overnight, as I argued when 
discussing counter-narratives; it requires enduring and persistent psychological intervention.  
 
Linguistic Analysis of Trauma and Shame Narratives 
 
I analysed examples of narrative disruption or breakdown using Gee’s (1991) linguistic 
approach to narrative, which is suited to lengthier oral narratives. As the reader will recall, 
narratives are divided into Parts, Strophes, Stanzas and Main lines. Gee (1991) suggests that 
narrative texts are structured at five hierarchical levels, each of which is connected to the 
Main line and Stanza structure of the text. Each level plays a role in interpretation. Levels 
include Main line and Stanza structure; syntax and cohesion, Main line/non-main line; 
psychological subjects and the focusing system. Corresponding with each of these levels is a 
particular role in interpretation, respectively including ideas and perspectives on characters, 
events, states and information; logic and connections; plot; point of view; and image/theme 
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(Gee, 1991). I analysed five longer trauma narratives using this framework, and then 
examined three particularly short trauma narratives. 
To review, Narrative 1 lacks coherence and unity because the narrative’s form is not uniform 
across Stanzas and Strophes and Parts; they are not equal in length or complexity. Connecting 
words are used in this text both to signal fragmentation at a semantic level (they bear no 
meaning), but do constitute attempts to facilitate interpersonal connection. Stripped down to 
its main elements, it is clear that the themes expressed in Parts deviate from each other in 
content. As such, it is difficult to discern a plot at first reading. One set of Main line material 
does not lead up to the next set of Main line material, each Part has a quite distinct theme, 
which does not represent narrative progression. There is no clear beginning, middle and end 
here, which is compounded by the repetition of especially important parts of the narrative at 
odd intervals. Overall, the narrative is characterised by loosely strung together, often 
disconnected subordinate clauses, and somewhat haphazardly placed main clauses. Again, it 
is as if the narrator is trying to use structural or linguistic means (numerous subordinate 
clauses) to create the illusion of coherence or a sense of plot (chronological and/or logical 
linking of characters, events, and states). However, it is challenging for the reader to discern 
an underlying chronological or logical progression in this narrative.  
The contradiction in meaning between parts where the narrator states that she deserved her 
abuse, that she is worthless and brought her abuse on herself, which is then radically 
contested, suggests the presence of a split self. There is some surprising consistency in the 
psychological subjects of this narrative despite this split. The psychological subject represent 
the points of view from which the material in the Stanza is viewed; so they are the entities 
with whom/which the narrator is empathising (Gee, 1991). The narrator frequently speaks of 
her feelings of deservedness – it is a fairly consistent theme in her narrative. Finally, the 
focusing system refers to the pitch used to signal the focus of a particular idea unit. The 
change in pitch shows that the information that is being shared is new, salient or important, 
that it is the information the reader should focus his/her attention on (Gee, 1991). I argue that 
there is a series of disruptions in the articulation of focal areas, after the disclosure of abuse. 
In Narrative 2, it is striking that the narrative’s form is not uniform across Stanzas and 
Strophes and Parts and there is some disparity in the length and complexity of these 
components of the text. The Parts, Strophes and Stanzas are either quite elaborate and 
detailed, or are relatively short and end abruptly to give way to a radically new and different 
theme. Like Narrative 1, most Strophes consist of only one Stanza. This gives the narrative a 
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disrupted, disconnected quality. However, the connecting words “and” and “then” do function 
to link different components of the text. But, as in Narrative 1, these words sometimes do not 
carry any meaning, and their function is solely structural. Like in the previous narrative, there 
is no clear narrative thread which connects components of the text from early on in the 
narrative, and the repetition does not contribute to connections between Parts, Strophes and 
Stanzas. Instead, the narrative feels like it contains a fairly random, disconnected revisiting of 
particular themes or topics.  
The plot is “lost” when the parrot is introduced. There is some loose progression up until this 
point from social isolation to shame and stigma, then a return to the theme of abuse and then 
the focus shifts onto the parrot. What is interesting here is the tension between truth (the 
parrot/narrator) and lies (the perpetrator) that runs throughout the narrative, and the 
importance of bearing witness to the violence this narrator endured, perhaps because she 
cannot believe it herself (the role of the parrot). The narrator’s silence is compared with the 
parrot’s brazen disclosure of “everything”. Where she obscures, disguises, the parrot 
expresses. Once again, this tension is indicative of a trauma-related split in the self. The 
narrator’s repetition of the traumatic killing of the bird indicates its psychological significance 
to her. I would argue this bird symbolised truth, validation, support. This death is what 
prompts the narrator to finally leave her abusive husband. The psychological subject varies 
substantially across different components of the text, and that psychological subject even 
changes within one Stanza. This shifting of perspectives and dramatic changes in foci fits 
with the chaotic structure of the narrative.  
Narrative 3 also varied in length and complexity across Stanzas, Strophes and Parts, 
demonstrating significant structural instability. However, what is most striking is the cyclical 
repetition in this narrative, its (fractured) spiral structure. Although the narrator frequently 
uses connecting words such as “and”, and sometimes, “then”, suggesting linear development, 
these words actually fulfil the function of linking together a structure consisting of a circular 
repetition of the central trauma. Unlike the other narratives, the narrative revolves around a 
single incident; the theme is not what produces fragmentation. The thematic recurrence, 
repetition in the first Part of the narrative, is unplanned, it is blurted out in horror, in panic, in 
shock, without any thought to narrative order; the narrator cannot stop herself from revisiting 
the same intolerable, unbelievable scene of trauma, repetitively, over and over. 
In the second Part of the narrative the theme is dissociative identification and its implications. 
There are numerous signs in this narrative of dissociation. Firstly, she says a number of times 
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that what is happening cannot be real, cannot be true. Secondly, there is a strong performative 
aspect to the narrative; the narrative almost feels as if it is being projected onto a screen. At 
times the reader feels that she is having an out of body experience. The narrator presents the 
audience with the image of her up on the hill, with a passive, ineffectual audience watching 
her hideous trauma from below (her symbolic “crucifixion”), is one of intense, shameful 
exposure and humiliation. But Irene inverts this experience and identifies with Christ, the 
archetypal figure of both shame and humiliation; and one of absolution and redemption.  It is 
clear that there is both a thematic and structural split between the first and second Parts of the 
narrative. In the first Part she plays the role of the dissociated victim; powerless, helpless, but 
in the second Part she transforms herself into a holy figure. This identification can be 
interpreted as a vivid shame-based compensatory effort on her part. 
The plot includes mainly main clauses, with few subordinate clauses, giving the narrative a 
striking immediacy. However, there are numerous “micro-fractures” (which occur at 
particularly traumatic points in the narrative), especially when she finds her experience 
particularly distressing, traumatic and unbelievable. She uses repetition, exclamations, and 
ellipses, which cause sentences to collapse into non-sensical fragments.  
There is a to- and froing between the narrator (“I”) as psychological subject, and her 
perpetrator as psychological subject (“he”). This cyclical alternation parallels the spiral 
structure of the narrative in its entirety. 
In the first Part of the narrative the foci are consistently centered around the trauma, while in 
the second Part of the narrative, once the fracture has taken place, the foci shift to dissociative 
identification, humiliation, shame and redemption.  
At a structural level, like all the other narratives, Narrative 4 has a disorganised form, with 
Stanzas specifically differing in length and complexity. Only one Part consists of more than 
one Stanza, and it is interesting to note that this is the part where the narrative breaks down 
(Part 4). The Stanzas that are especially long and detailed focus on shame and 
staying/abandonment, very significant themes in this narrative. This disintegration in the 
narrative which is mostly caused by circularity and repetition are both a product of trauma 
and shame and does not only point to non-linearity, but disruptions in temporality and 
identity. Other than circularity and repetition, other linguistic features which allow us to 
experience the psychic reality of the narrator, are ellipses, and incomplete sentences, which, 
as I have indicated in previous narratives, occur at especially painful, shameful or significant 
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points of the narrative. These incomplete sentences, or phrases also point to trauma-related 
fractures in time, which is an important aspect of this narrative.  
The narrative centers around the gang-rape of the narrator, Chantal. What is immediately 
noticeable when she “talks” about her experience is that she provides barely any information 
about what happened. From this moment onwards, the attentive listener begins to wonder if 
this is due to trauma-related amnesia (a response which would be consistent with dramatic 
disorientation in time later in the narrative).  
The second significant theme in this distressing narrative is Chantal’s experience of one of her 
rapists, Carel. In a Stockholm Syndrome-like manner, she attaches to him (and later believes 
he is in love with her), because whilst the other rapists left her, he stayed with her for the 
duration of her captivity. She forges a deeply appreciative relationship with him, one typical 
of someone who has Chantal’s history of abandonment and disorganised attachment pattern.  
In the last paragraph before the narrative fractures (Part 4), the narrator says multiple times 
how Carel did not leave her, indicating the profound significance to her of his staying. It 
cannot be ignored, however, that this repetition is followed by a total fragmentation and 
collapse in the narrative in Part 4. 
The past and the present begin to merge in this section of the narrative. There could be many 
reasons for this, which include psychological and psychobiological causes, described in the 
previous chapter. The most dramatic confusion is between Carel and her ex-partner or 
perpetrator, Ricardo. She starts to call Carel by Ricardo’s name, and asks him to walk her 
back home. The narrator appears to be looking for her childhood home. In her trauma-related 
confusion, Chantal is looking for her primary caregiver during childhood, her “ouma”; she is 
fully immersed in the past, searching for the woman who represents the only care she has ever 
known, the only security she has ever known. Perhaps Chantal’s attachment to Carel post her 
terrible trauma (despite his involvement) is because he offers her substitute “care”; he does 
not leave her alone in her most shameful state. She slips between “huis” (home) and “shelter” 
and “ouma” and those who drank (likely her “friends” at the party), and between those who 
weren’t “geworried nie” and the “ouma” who cares. Her tone is angry, disorientated, confused 
and abandoned. There is another surprising contradiction in this narrative.  As we have seen, 
there are significant disruptions in place and time. However, the narrator is quite capable of 
managing another kind of chronology. For example, she often speaks of Friday, Saturday, 
Sunday and Monday, and she seems aware of what happened on these days. 
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In the next section of the narrative, the narrator seems to be more logical and lucid, and the 
focus is on the body. She is ashamed, deeply ashamed, describes feeling uncomfortable and 
dirty, as many rape survivors do, stressing her exposure to filth by describing the “bommels” 
(insect bites) on her body. Thus this part of the narrative is about physical needs – washing 
and hunger, both needs which are repeated several times. It appears as if concrete needs 
ground the narrator, and brings her back into the present.  
The second part of the Stanza is again centred around shame, a significant theme in the 
narrative and the courage it took to speak about what had happened to her. As in other 
narratives, when the experience described becomes too traumatising, the language breaks 
down. The narrator describes (in subordinate clauses) the treatments she has to use to prevent 
the development of HIV/AIDS, but before she can speak this terrifying potential outcome, she 
says: mos nou vir…(You know now for…). Considering what possibilities might lie ahead for 
her is peppered with anxiety-driven hesitations.  
Never is the pattern of an abandonment-driven disorganised attachment pattern more clearly 
articulated in the tragically repetitive longing for Ricardo: Ek noem gedurig Ricardo se naam. 
Ek weet nie, dit begin nou al (wat dit net so…). Ek noem dan Ricardo se naam. Ek weet nie 
hoekom nie. Want sy naam kom net so. Ek wil nie eers dink aan hom nie. Dan noem ek altyd 
sy naam.  Dan sê ek, ag, man, Ricardo. Want dan maal dit weer by my. Dan dink ek net die 
aand daaraan. (I don’t know, it started from the weeks [that it just]. I don’t know why. 
Because his name comes just like that. It’s not that I think about him or so. I don’t even want 
to think about him. But I just always his mention a name.  Then I say, oh man, Ricardo. 
Because then it just mills in my head again. Then I just think about it in the evening). 
There is significant evidence of psychopathology in this narrative. Overall, I would suggest 
that this narrator has been overwhelmed by trauma, and has symptoms of Complex PTSD, 
DESNOS and/or dissociative disorders.  
There is some shift in the psychological subjects. But the most important psychological 
subjects are the rapists, especially Carel, who stands in stark opposition to her abandoning 
friends in the first part of the narrative.There are several psychological subjects post- gang-
rape described during and after the major fracture in the narrative. The foci in this narrative 
are copious and varied. 
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Narrative 5, like all the others, consists of Parts, Strophes and Stanzas which vary in length, 
levels of detail and complexity, suggesting some structural instability, while at the same time 
indicating points of significance in the narrative. The narrative has a funnel shape, starting 
with emotionally challenging but present-based, conscious and immediate personal 
experiences, which slowly deepen after a crucial disruption in the narrative to reflect 
entrenched, unconscious material being repetitively played out in the narrator’s life. Thus, the 
structure of the narrative is actually a “fractured” funnel shape.  
The narrative’s main theme is of leave-return (to and from her perpetrator). Like in all the 
other narratives, repetition, an important sign of narrative fragmentation, appears in this 
narrative at significant moments, and does not only include a focus on leave-return, but on 
associated constructs such as ambivalence, co-dependence and fear of abandonment. There is 
a virtual absence of linking or connecting words or phrases in this narrative, so without the 
significant repetition, it would be a very difficult “plot” to follow. 
Unlike most of the other narratives, this narrative has numerous subordinate clauses and there 
is a great deal of micro-fracturing, demonstrated by the use of ellipses, resulting in incomplete 
sentences. As we know, this occurs when the content of what is being uttered is too 
emotionally painful or shameful.  
The reason for the narrator’s cyclical leave-return, leave-return is fear of abandonment, which 
like the previous narrator, was a significant part of her childhood. Abandonment is unbearable 
for her, however unconscious it is. She unconsciously repeats the past, and abandons her own 
child, and then, because of her guilt, she returns to collect him. Thus, the leave-return cycle 
occurs on another, deeper level. 
The narrative deepens when there is confusion between the story of the narrator’s son and the 
story of the narrator. This is the beginning of the past and present fusing. In the quote: The kid 
really loved him. Even though I stayed in an abusive home, the audience’s attention is drawn 
to how the narrator slips from “the kid” to her own abusive home (subordinate clause). The 
disconnected part of the narrative focuses exclusively on abandonment, and her fear of the 
loss of her child, just as her own mother abandoned her. Here, there is a complete fusion 
between past and present (see Payne et al., 2004).  
In the final part of the narrative, which is reminiscent of earlier parts of the narrative, the 
narrator experiences an excruciating fear that she will lose, or has lost both her (ex) partner 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
342 
 
 
 
and her son and she blames herself for it, which causes a significant internal struggle.  The 
critical experience of the potential abandonment from her son is articulated in “You are trying 
to make my child forget me”. But this is a significantly more conscious statement of fear of 
abandonment than would have occurred at the beginning of the narrative, perhaps suggestive 
of some progression despite the significant disruption which occurs. 
Lastly, the narrator uses inversion a number of times, which adds to the disorganised quality 
of the narrative.  
The psychological subjects and foci are plentiful and diverse, and typical of the somewhat 
chaotic nature of the narrative.  
I also examined three, short, compressed trauma narratives. These narratives were 
characterised by silences, pauses, and hesitations. Unlike the majority of women with longer 
trauma narratives, these women expressed no urgency to talk. Silences occur in the presence 
of the unspeakable, the incommunicable – these unutterable events make the narrative 
skewed, erratic, interrupted and compressed (Scarry, 1985; Simon, 2008). This is why 
traumatic memory is so often expressed through the body, which was starkly visible among 
my participants with shorter trauma narratives (Simon, 2008). It is as if, in the absence of 
words, the body expressed what could not be spoken. In the first narrative, the interviewee sat 
hunched over with her hands over her eyes, crying, throughout the interview. At times she 
pulled her shirt over her face, gestures typical of shame. Crying, which signals sadness, is an 
important sign of by-passed shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). In addition, her sentences were 
characterised by long silences, as if what she was talking about was too horrific for her to 
speak about.  
The next short narrative had no plot to speak of. What makes the narrator’s story interesting is 
its total lack of structure; its chaos and disconnection, and the extreme anxiety and shame that 
the narrator expressed at a bodily level while she was telling me her story. She was also 
tremendously shy, which is characteristic of by-passed shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). She was 
rocking back and forth, biting the sleeves of her shirt. She looked down and avoided eye 
contact with me, and periodically covered her mouth with her hands, which made her already 
soft voice imperceptible at times. She whispered her story, as if she did not want it to be 
heard, and stammered and paused and hesitated throughout her short narrative. These are all 
manifestations of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1998). What she was unable to say, 
her body was expressing for her. As I described in an earlier chapter, some of the most 
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important indicators of bodily shame include hands covering all or certain parts of the face; 
avoidance of eye contact, eyes lowered or glancing; repetitious speech, and fragmented 
speech (Retzinger, 1987). 
In the final short narrative I present, I focus on a particular type of unconscious or by-passed 
shame, which manifests at bodily level, namely, narrative-incongruent laughter. In the 
narrative, the narrator, Chantal, unconsciously explores the notion of the (her) fragmented 
mother – the substitute mother, the real mother and the ideal mother. The incongruency 
between the content of the narrative - which centred around the loss of, and the longing for 
the ideal mother, the desperate search for a substitute mother, and the significant distress 
evoked by the real mother - and the constant interruptions in the narrative due to unexpected 
bouts of laughter, was disturbing. The narrator’s body language also denied all evidence of 
shame, when I knew from the lengthier interview with her that she felt a great deal of shame. 
In fact, her body language bordered on defiant, perhaps a defence against shame, and against 
the intrusive questions I was asking. She sat close to me, straight-backed, leaning towards me, 
particularly towards my face, making the interview both emotionally and physically intimate. 
The uncomfortable, somewhat bizarre disjuncture between the content of her narrative and her 
emotional and bodily reaction to it, combined with her inability to regulate physical and 
emotional boundaries, made her confusing emotional experience unusually contagious. 
Whereas shame disguises and tries to be contained by the imploding or hunched over body, 
her body reached out to me, laughingly.  
Thus, this inconsistency between the narrator’s mood and demeanour and the trauma she had 
experienced was a function of suppression and denial, but through the contagion I spoke of in 
the previous paragraph, I could feel the weight of the experiences she dismissed with a smile 
or laugh transferred onto me – the false smiling and masking behaviours referred to by 
Retzinger (1987). In my analysis, I suggest that perhaps her suppression and denial in 
circumstances where she has experienced chronic and severe trauma from a young age was 
not only adaptive, but also resilient. Whether that is the case or not, she had transferred her 
unconscious losses and longings onto me, as I felt depleted by her avoidance for days 
afterwards, while as Chantal says “ek lag vir als” (I laugh about everything).   
To conclude this section, on the basis of the lengthy, complex trauma and shame narratives I 
analysed before the shorter, compressed narratives presented above, I would argue that from 
these five narratives, it is possible to note that on linguistic level, the narrators produced non-
linear, fractured narratives mainly through the use of repetition, the meaningless use of 
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connecting words such as “and”, “then” and “because, ellipses, and incomplete sentences. 
These linguistic features happen at especially significant, painful or shameful parts of the 
narrative. There is also evidence of both “macro-fracturing” and “micro-fracturing” in some 
of the narratives.  
However, shame is difficult to articulate concisely. For many, shame resists objectification in 
language (M. Lewis, 1992; Scarry, 1985), which is why it is often described in vague and 
diffuse terms, and is frequently encoded in bodily form. But it always carries associations that 
the self is bad. At bodily level, the most common response to this emotion is to conceal or 
disguise the self, make the self smaller, less significant, less conspicuous because the self 
wants to hide and disappear (to prevent judgment or attack). However, it can also manifest at 
by-passed or unconscious level; and/or manifest as a defensive reaction, as was the case with 
my final narrator. Shame is many-faced, and since its purpose is concealment, the prevention 
of exposure, it may be very difficult to detect.  
 
Self-reflexivity and Intersubjectivity in Data Collection and Interpretation 
 
As historian Luisa Passerini writes in the first chapter of Autobiography of a Generation: 
Italy, 1968: I conducted my first interviews with the protagonists of ’68. The 
interviews plunge me into my own past: as I listen, the film of what I was doing at the 
time unreels. (as cited in Maynes et al., 2008, p. 100) 
Often this work (with shame people) is both facilitated and impeded by the analyst’s 
capacity and/or propensity for shame. (Orange, 2008, p. 96) 
Trauma is contagious. In the role of witness to disaster or atrocity, the therapist at 
times is emotionally overwhelmed. She experiences, to a lesser degree, the same 
terror, rage, and despair as the patient. This phenomenon is known as ‘traumatic 
countertransference’ or ‘vicarious traumatization’. (Herman, 1997, p. 140) 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) suggest that the researcher starts the interpretation of results 
with a consideration of his/her autobiography. As such, I will give the reader some 
background to my interest in trauma, shame and associated psychopathology. 
My interest in trauma in particular is long-standing. My Honours thesis focused on the 
association between community (chronic) violence and the development of aggression and 
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other antisocial behaviour in young people. My Masters studies were informed by this choice 
of subject and widened it to focus on the associations between community violence, antisocial 
and pro-social tendencies, parenting practices, social support and selected household and 
demographic variables. After my Masters studies, most of my work was focused on violence, 
trauma, resilience and children’s rights. 
But what I also brought to the interview situation was my personal history of physical, sexual 
and emotional violence, and my own feelings of shame. So I have both a long history of work 
in this field to inform my analytic decisions, as well as an experiential, intuitive understanding 
of both trauma and shame due to my personal history.  
It is these experiences that brought me to the point of being ready to explore the associations 
between chronic trauma, shame and psychopathology. My personal familiarity with trauma 
and shame had both advantages and disadvantages. Because of my experiences, I believe I 
have a capacity for hearing and digesting traumatic material, and giving others the space to 
articulate them. As one participant said, she felt I was not “scared” of her trauma; she felt she 
did not have to edit or sanitise her account of her experiences to protect me. She felt she could 
“tell it as it is”, and that I would accept, and not judge her by her experiences. This was not 
always easy, but I felt it facilitated the production of immensely rich data. The personal cost 
of collecting such data was that I was often struck by the contagiousness of shame (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971). Sometimes, especially when shame was expressed via the body, and 
accompanied by feelings of self-blame, dirtiness or filthiness, I would leave an interview 
feeling contaminated through identification, my own feelings of trauma-related shame 
amplified. Because of my specific vulnerabilities, I also experienced myself dissociating 
when particularly evocative material was brought up, material that reminded me of my own 
past. Inevitably, I would experience an out-of-body sensation, and be consumed by a sense of 
unreality.  
Orange (2008, p. 21) suggests that “experiential worlds, I believe, are transformed only in an 
atmosphere of radical acceptance”, something I believe I was able to provide, because of my 
own familiarity with exposure to violence. As Charon (2006, p. 180) argues, the process of 
bearing witness does not violate the narrator, instead allowing him/her:  
…to tell their story in order to survive. There is, in each survivor, an imperative need 
to tell and thus to come to know one’s story…to know one’s buried truth in order to 
be able to live one’s life.  
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Opportunities for sharing traumatic narratives allows survivors first to remember and then to 
forget, so that they can learn again how to be functional in the world, to work and love 
(Charon, 2006). 
Interviewees without exception told me that the interviews had been an emotional 
unburdening for them, and that they felt lighter afterwards. Research seems to support the 
health and mental health benefits of sharing trauma narratives. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that imagined dialogues about trauma (as opposed to writing about the trauma 
in isolation) facilitated greater present-oriented, affective experiencing and cognitive 
processing (Burke & Bradley, 2006). Imaginal exposure to the trauma has also been 
associated with higher levels of narrative organisation, suggesting the therapeutic dimension 
to engaging with, and remembering the traumatic event (Van Minnen, Wessel, Dijkstra, & 
Roelofs, 2002). Finally, some scholars have emphasised the long-term benefits on health and 
immune system functioning of both written and verbal disclosure of traumatic experiences 
(Foa et al., 1995). 
Many participants had had few opportunities to talk about their traumas. As Kraft (2004) 
argues, those with traumatised backgrounds learn the value of not talking about the past, and 
they learn not to reminisce; much remembering remains unspoken, they are not narrated or 
expressed. For example, one woman said: “You are the first person where I let it…at least I 
let it all out. At least, since I came here, I found someone to let it all out to”. Again, I think it 
was my own empathic familiarity with the kinds of violence the women described, that 
facilitated this kind of disclosure.  
The work of Orange et al. (1997) – from an intersubjective, psychoanalytic point of view – is 
highly relevant to my interviews. Orange (2011) distinguishes between the hermeneutics of 
suspicion and the hermeneutics of trust. The former is represented by Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud, who believed that their patients brought to them conscious material which was 
inevitably “false” and whose manifestations had to be deciphered by experts (which 
immediately exaggerates an existing power differential). Thus, for Freud, patients’ 
consciousness always disguised and concealed the truth, and always reached the analyst 
accompanied by a tangled mess of underlying hidden motives, made obvious to the analyst by 
dreams and neurotic symptoms only they could interpret (Orange, 2011). With this school of 
thought comes the “blank slate” therapist, who has little human-to-human contact, who aims 
to uncover unconscious or latent falsehoods and deception, and who considers transference 
and countertransference as merely a nuisance factor to be dismissed or ignored (Orange, 
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2011). This approach may be damaging because a suspicious, mistrustful, sceptical, cynical, 
deconstructive attitude creates a distance between the analyst (or in this case, interviewer), 
and his/her patient (or interviewee’s) experience, devaluing and objectifying him/her (his or 
her experience is negated, because the analyst/interviewer believes in the opposite of what 
s/he is saying). Lastly and most importantly, commitment to this approach means that the 
analyst (interviewer) is afraid, distant and defensive of their own emotional experiences or 
processes, and therefore has no choice but to treat their patients (interviewees) with (perhaps 
unconscious) disdain and veiled superiority (Orange, 2011).  
By contrast, the hermeneutics of trust creates a climate of trust and a participatory sense of 
inclusion and respect (Orange, 2011). The father of the hermeneutics of trust is Sándor 
Ferenczi, who “through embracing a hermeneutics of trauma, that is, by allowing the 
suffering of others to traumatise him, he began to trust the embodied voices of shattered 
people.” (Orange, 2011, p. 82).  The hermeneutics of trust does not include the notion of the 
“expert” – by contrast, analysts (or interviewers) are encouraged to acknowledge openly how 
little they understand, their fears, confusions, frustrations and at times, exhaustion (Orange, 
2011). This model requires the same sincerity from the analyst (or interviewer) as the 
authenticity or honesty expected of the patient, while maintaining appropriate boundaries 
(Orange, 2011). Centrally, supporters argue that phenomena which emerge in a particular 
psychological field are made up of the intersection of two subjectivities – that of the analyst 
and that of the patient. For them, intersubjectivity theory is the dialogic attempt of two people 
to make sense of one person’s emotional experience by understanding together their 
intersubjectively configured experience. Unlike the hermeneutics of suspicion, transference or 
countertransference (or cotransference), the organising activity of both people within the 
analytic experience constitutes the intersubjective field of the analysis (Orange et al., 1997). 
Transference and countertransference create an intersubjective system of mutual influence – 
neutral analysts, pure, objective interpretations, uncontaminated transferences are 
mythological and cannot exist in this kind of system (Orange et al., 1997). This unfortunately 
means that the analyst’s subjective world may facilitate or impede the analytic situation. But 
as Orange (2011, p. 109) concludes: 
To explain the ‘therapeutic action’ in intersubjective systems or relational terms, I 
must describe what both parties bring to the field, how complex and interdependent 
are the processes of mutual influence and how asymmetric (Lévinasian) role 
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responsibility. I must relate how both of us have been changed by each other, and by 
the work/play/struggle we have done together.” 
My approach supported the hermeneutics of trust, and I entered into my interviews with an 
openness to suffer with my interviewees. This, along with my first-hand familiarity with 
trauma, may have facilitated personal disclosure of immense pain, but as I have indicated, it 
may have (unconsciously) encouraged over-disclosure, and placed interviewees at 
psychological risk. Something I have not yet considered is how my dissociative responses 
may have affected the intersubjective interaction. I spoke earlier of how I was consumed by 
an out-of-body sensation when emotional material which was particularly provocative for me 
emerged in the interview situation. On reflection, despite my intention to remain 
psychologically open and undefended, I was using dissociation as a defense against trauma or 
shame contagion – it was a means of boundary management for me; a means of regulating the 
emotional distance between myself and the interviewee. Perhaps in some instances 
interviewees sensed this, although my felt sense was that it did not prohibit disclosure; in fact, 
as I have indicated, evidence suggests the opposite – as illustrated by the nature and length of 
the majority of the interviews and how women described their experiences of disclosure to 
me, the intersubjective interaction facilitated (perhaps overly so) rather than impeded intimate 
disclosure.  This suggests that I may have been more successful in communicating the 
principles of the hermeneutics of trust than I thought when considering my dissociative 
responses.  
I have mentioned the striking over-disclosure of intimate and personal information during 
interviews, and the deliberate, shame-filled avoidance of me after interviews. I think this is a 
very significant finding. Although I believe that the over-disclosure of interviewees was 
largely due to disorganised attachment patterns, I also wondered whether my attempts at 
creating a safe, accepting, empathic space for women to narrate traumas they had rarely (or 
never) spoken before may have allowed and encouraged an outpouring or flooding of more 
painful revelation than I (or the narrators) were able to contain, particularly in a single 
session. Most women felt an urgency to talk, but were understandably overwhelmed by the 
content of their narratives. In my view, they avoided me because I had become a receptacle of 
trauma and shame for them, and they did not want to confront that trauma and shame again. It 
was emotionally safer to suppress traumatic and shameful content, and defend against it with 
a smile and keeping busy. 
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Individuals who have been chronically traumatised form a very particular type of transference 
in the therapeutic relationship, which may be of relevance here. Their psychological responses 
to people in positions of power, as I was, have been affected by the experience of terror 
(Herman, 1997), which may have contributed to heightened levels of submission, and 
exaggerated compliance with requests for highly personal information in the interview, 
however committed I might have been to the hermeneutics of trust and equalising the 
relationship. This power differential between analyst or interviewer and patient or interviewee 
sets up an intrinsically shameful situation. Orange (2008) argues that the therapeutic situation 
is shaming for a number of reasons, some of which are applicable to the interview situation, 
including having a stigmatised or shameful status (as an IPV survivor), the painful revelations 
disclosed by the patient or interviewee, the shame felt by the analyst or interviewer through 
identification with the patient or interviewee, and the shameful power differential between 
analyst or interviewer and patient or interviewee as discussed in chapter 2.  The only way 
shame can be held or healed in this kind of relationship is if the analyst or interviewer has 
acknowledged his/her own shame, and is willing to work with it; and if s/he is able to restore 
the “interpersonal bridge” between shamed self and other in the relationship over time, once 
power differentials have been addressed and processed, as one would if one was a supporter 
of the hermeunetics of trust (Kaufman, 1993, p. 33; Orange, 2011).  
The trauma narratives women present are often chaotic. Chaos narratives, which do not 
constitute a “proper” story, where there is a lack of coherent sequence; a lack of control, are 
difficult to hear (Frank, 1995). Orange et al. (1997, p. 42) call this “the dread of structureless 
chaos”. They are difficult to hear because they are personally threatening (Frank, 1995). This 
is because what the listener hears becomes a possibility or a reality in the life of the listener; 
the listener often has to distance him/herself from the narrative to make it bearable (Frank, 
1995). Frank (1995, p. 101) reflects on how interviewers directed Holocaust survivors 
towards alternative narratives that demonstrate “the resilience of the human spirit”, failing to 
bear witness to the real stories the survivors have to tell because of their own fears; their own 
emotional inadequacies. In a similar vein, therapists often make claims of neutrality when 
their patients’ transference attributions threaten or endanger central features of their sense of 
self (Orange et al., 1997). These authors talk about the “exquisite vulnerability that is inherent 
to an awareness of the embeddedness of human experience in relational systems” (Orange et 
al., 1997, p. 42). Interviewers who cannot bear their potential likeness to their traumatised 
interviewees tend to steer their interviewees towards a restitution narrative of progress, for 
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example, by encouraging them to focus on the liberation, when survivors, unlike their 
interviewers, did not experience liberation as the great dividing line that ordered and gave 
meaning to their experience (Frank, 1995). (Shapiro [2011, p. 69] calls believing in the 
inevitability and greater authenticity of these restitution narratives and quest narratives [where 
you are better off at the end of the story than the beginning], “comic”, in reference to the 
“comic plot” as opposed to the “tragic plot” in literary theory). In fact, for people about whom 
Frank (1995) writes, with liberation “the real trouble begins: the trouble of remaking a sense 
of purpose as the world demands” (Frank, 1995, p. 107). This calls to mind the horseman in 
Kluger’s (2001) tale, who feared crossing a lake covered by a thin layer of ice. Once he had 
made it to the other side, he looked back, and instead of feeling relief or joy, on realising what 
he had survived, he died of fright.  
There are a number of challenges in interviewing severely traumatised individuals. Firstly, 
many complexly traumatised people exhibit insecure or disorganised attachment styles. They 
may have underdeveloped self-capacities reflected in emotional dysregulation that is manifest 
in intense and rapidly changing affect states, dissociation, aggression (including being abusive 
towards the interviewer) and self-injurious behaviours (Pearlman & Caringi, 2009). Chronic 
trauma affects survivors’ ability to remain connected to personal systems of meaning and 
hope, and impedes the development of satisfying interpersonal relationships, and their 
interactions may be characterised by a great deal of depleting cynicism and despair (Pearlman 
& Caringi, 2009). Memory disruptions may mean that interviewees re-enact their memories in 
ways that are unnerving and leave the interviewer feeling hopeless and de-skilled (Pearlman 
& Caringi, 2009). Somatic complaints for which the interviewee is unable to find effective 
treatment might evoke the same reaction in the interviewer (Pearlman & Caringi 2009). 
Finally, trauma is contagious, and interviewees are likely to experience secondary 
traumatisation (Pearlman & Caringi, 2009). Some of these factors affected my interviews, 
including changing affect states, emotional dysregulation, and despair amongst the 
interviewees, and I often felt hopeless and de-skilled, as well as traumatised by the content of 
the interviews. 
Pearlman and Caringi (2009) argue that there are a range of contributing factors of the 
interviewer that affect the interaction between the interviewer and participant, including 
personal trauma history and avoidance of difficult emotional material. I do not believe that it 
was possible to avoid the effects of my own personal trauma history on the nature and 
intensity of traumatic disclosure by interviewees. Like Orange et al. (1997), I believe every 
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relationship is a co-construction. Pearlman and Caringi (2009) suggest that interviewers cope 
by seeking social support, consultation, engaging in a spiritual life, engaging in self-care, 
working within a particular theoretical framework, staying connected to personal experience, 
remaining aware of the present moment and the treatment frame, and accepting the 
inevitability of vicarious trauma and our own personal and professional limitations (Pearlman 
& Caringi, 2009). Furthermore, although this is more applicable to clinical settings, these 
authors emphasise the importance of focusing on the process rather than the outcome, 
focusing on the positive, reinforcing desired behaviour and outcomes rather than focusing on 
shortcomings and disappointments, and being aware of appropriate boundary management. 
Additionally, Pearlman and Caringi (2009) attend to the interviewer’s bodily and emotional 
responses to the interviewee. I believe I was able to seek the appropriate support and 
supervision, and engaged in the necessary self-care to enable me to continue conducting 
supportive interviews, and remain conscious of the effects of traumatic (or shame) contagion. 
Despite these attempts to protect myself, as I have noted, sometimes it was emotionally 
complex to negotiate the interviews. I can only imagine how much more complex and 
exhausting the counselling sessions were for the social workers working at the Centre, given 
their ongoing nature. Tronto (2010, p. 167) argues that careworkers should find care 
rewarding, both on personal and economic grounds, so that they are not affected by the 
“opportunity cost” of caring. This translates to an organisational level. It is well known that 
organisations which provide crisis interventions are often in crisis themselves (financially, 
organisationally), mirroring at organisational level the chaos, exhaustion and depletion that is 
happening on individual client level. It is likely that staff at these organisations are suffering 
from vicarious trauma or trauma fatigue.  
Wood (2012) found that in his study of staff working with young people with anorexia 
nervosa, that the majority of these staff found the trauma work involved “overwhelming, 
confusing, deskilling, exasperating and thankless task” (p. 84).  This, Wood (2012) argues, 
may become manifest in the unconscious experience of an organisation in a number of 
destructive and damaging ways, one of which is incohesion or splitting, fragmentation among 
staff; incapable of sustaining co-operative work. It is also worth bearing in mind that in 
voluntary organisations, funding is seldom secure and the existence of the organisation is 
always fragile; precarious. Ironically, in such circumstances, it is particularly important that 
there is strong, boundaried and containing leadership, to promote group cohesiveness and a 
supportive environment (Corbett, Cottis, & Lloyd, 2012). This can be facilitated by having a 
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regular, designated time to process the traumatic and toxic effects of working with trauma by 
an external, experienced facilitator – a time to think and process, reflect and consider the 
impact the work has on workers in the trauma field (Corbett et al., 2012).  Without these 
protective processes in place, organisations, like people, may experience demoralisation; may 
stereotype and/or scapegoat their clients; staff may become emotionally numb or treat their 
clients’ problems as routine; staff could develop paranoid feelings towards their managers, 
who are not helping them as they are helping their clients; splitting and fragmentation could 
occur in the team; and finally, individual worker reactions to the constant onslaught of trauma 
may occur which will interfere with their work  - the so-called social defence system – and 
may leave workers feeling deskilled; finally and alternatively, they may engage in “anti-tasks” 
with their clients, tasks or processes which are easier and more rewarding to resolve than 
those that are more pressing but more difficult emotionally to tackle (Hinshelwood, 2012). It 
is also worth noting that individuals as well as organisations vary in their capacity to work 
with trauma; however, organisational resilience and hardiness are the outcomes of the 
decisions and behaviours of the staff and management of an organisation, it is within their 
control and good decisions and actions can be encouraged and fostered (Kleinberg, 2012). 
Staff hopefulness has been identified a central facet of work-group processes (Kleinberg, 
2012). 
Healthy organisations, according to Tronto (2010), are those that that adhere to three 
principles: politics: the recognition that there are relations of power within and outside the 
organisation and agreement of common purpose; particularity and plurality: attention to 
human activities as specific or particular and acknowledging that there are different ways of 
doing them, and that there are diverse individuals who have different ideas about how needs 
might be met; and purposiveness: awareness and discussion of the ends and functions of care. 
It is important to note, particularly when thinking about women’s counter-narratives and the 
split self I spoke of earlier, that Tronto (2010) does not promote a standardised model of care 
– she recommends that the care each individual receives is tailored to their specific, unique 
needs. This potentially additionally avoids the significant and rapid leap promoted by the 
Centre from the felt sense of the self as victim, to the construction of self as survivor. 
Although this may be difficult to achieve in practice (the reality of staff members’ typically 
narrow areas of expertise or way of working), I believe that individualised care constitutes a 
way of healing the trauma-related split between the authentic and the false self.  It remains 
difficult, given the complexity of the issues at stake, for me to offer any “recommendations” 
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for improvement in care practices at the Centre, and in resisting offering clear 
“recommendations” I am aware that I am also resisting a convention common in many 
doctoral theses. The nature of the material I have collected and the analytic framework I use 
support my decision not to offer recommendations of the conventional type. 
Orange et al. (1997) argue that analysts often have misguided beliefs that they can prevent 
their own personalities from being present in the analytic dialogue, which may be harmful, 
and produce transference artefacts that may be counter-therapeutic. Orange et al. (1997) go as 
far as to say that the notion of analytic neutrality is a grandiose defensive illusion which 
should be replaced by the principles organising the patient’s experience (empathy), the 
principles organising the analyst’s experience (introspection) and the ever-changing 
psychological field produced by the interplay between the two known as intersubjectivity. 
This has implications for the discussion of the co-construction of painful experiences which 
follows shortly – specifically, how interviewing traumatised individuals requires a great deal 
of introspection and self-awareness on the part of the interviewer (of both the beneficial and 
harmful effects of what s/he is evoking), and the importance of avoiding making use of 
grandiose defenses to protect the self from the reality of the pain that is emerging in the 
intersubjectively created psychological field. 
Up until now, I have emphasised the therapeutic nature of sharing traumatic material, 
although I have given some consideration to the possible causes and risks of over-disclosure 
in my participants in particular. But I would like to explore in further detail the darker side of 
traumatic revelations. I would like to address next a complex issue that is relevant both self-
reflexively and ethically. Any research which involves exploring sensitive and often painful 
experiences comes with emotional risks for the participant. What I think is of relevance to my 
research is the co-construction of painful experiences, which occurs when interviewers elicit 
traumatic material from the interviewee, facilitating the recollection and re-experiencing of 
emotionally charged memories. As noted by Orange (2011, p. 100), “we must accept 
responsibility for our current contribution to our patient’s suffering. We must be sincere.” As 
an interviewer doing research on a sensitive topic, asking explicitly about traumatic 
memories, it is perhaps inevitable that I felt complicit in my interviewees’ painful reliving of 
their experiences. But I think this tendency to feel complicit in others’ pain was exaggerated 
for me, because of my own experiences of trauma, and being involved in the injury and pain 
of others. This complicity, this co-construction of emotional pain evoked a great deal of 
shame in me. This was amplified not only by the contagiousness of (interviewees’) shame, but 
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by my knowledge that these women often had highly disorganised attachment styles, 
displaying a conflicted pattern of approaching then retreating/avoiding in fear, a pattern that 
has been attributed to early neglect, physical or sexual abuse and abandonment (Fonagy, 
2011). And I was repeating a part of their early experience. I was eliciting and allowing the 
reliving of painful experience, and then abandoning them. And I was doing the same to their 
children, with whom I had formed relationships during the time I worked at the crèche, and 
then I left, once I had got what I came for. I dread standing accused of, as one social scientist 
commented to another about a keynote speaker at a conference, “She wears other people’s 
pain like jewellery” (Swartz, personal communication, August 6, 2012). 
There is a deeper, more pervasive structural issue at stake here. The services that the Saartjie 
Baartman Centre offer are in my view outstanding, but out of necessity, in terms of resources 
and the pressure of need, limited in terms of the length of time they can be offered. This is not 
unique to Saartjie Baartman, but a function of the difficulty of balancing needs with available 
resources that affects most organisations like it. For women who have experienced 
transgenerational trauma in particular, developing relationships of trust which are short-term 
and unsustainable can be highly re-traumatising. There are no easy answers to dilemmas such 
as these. But it is important to be conscious of them, and to work against re-traumatising 
survivors of trauma wherever possible. 
 
Limitations and Recommendations 
 
There is a far greater need for qualitative studies on shame than there is for quantitative 
studies. Although there is a vast quantitative literature on shame and psychopathology and a 
major theoretical literature on shame, there are virtually no qualitative studies on shame. 
Having said that, this study would have been stronger methodologically if I had triangulated 
methods; I would have been able to come up with firmer conclusions.  
Firstly, considering the relative emphasis on psychopathology in my study, it would have 
been desirable to administer clinical scales assessing for the presence of chronic trauma- 
and/or shame-related disorders. For example, PTSD is often accompanied by other, comorbid 
disorders such as panic disorder, simple phobia, social phobia, substance misuse, and in 
women in particular, dissociation, eating disorders (bulimia and anorexia nervosa) and 
personality disorders (Carey et al., 2003; Ford & Courtois, 2009; Sanftner & Crowther, 1998; 
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Seedat, Stein, & Forde, 2005). BPD in particular has been associated with shame and 
suicidality in a number of studies (Brown et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2005). Observation and 
interviews alone could not assess for the presence of any of these disorders. Future South 
African research on chronic trauma and shame should triangulate methods and clinically 
assess for the presence of these disorders and relate them to chronic trauma exposure. The 
associations between exposure to chronic trauma, psychosomatic complaints and 
psychopathology also need to be tested quantitatively, with reliable and validated instruments.  
Secondly, qualitative constructions of shame could have been complemented by quantitative 
measures of shame, particularly since shame was so often unspoken. Scales such as the Test 
of Self Conscious Affect (TOSCA) (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989), its predecessor, 
the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney, 1990), and the 
Dimensions of Consciousness Questionnaire (DCQ; Johnson et al., 1987), the Adapted Shame 
and Guilt Scale (ASGS; Hobitzelle, 1987), the Internalized Shame Scale (ISS; Cook, 1988; 
1996), and the Personal Feelings Questionnaire – 2 (PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma, 1990) are 
examples of quantitative measures of shame. The use of these measures would be valuable 
chiefly in studies triangulating qualitative and quantitative methods. Although counter-
intuitive, some research suggests that the repeated telling of one’s narrative leads to an 
increase in narrative length rather than a decrease in narrative length. Foa et al. (1995) found 
that narrative length increased from pre-exposure therapy to post-exposure therapy. 
Specifically, the percentage of thoughts and feelings increased, especially thoughts illustrative 
of attempts to organise the traumatic memory, while the percentage of action and dialogue 
(concrete details of the trauma) decreased. This was associated with an improvement in 
mental health outcomes (Foa et al., 1995). Similarly, in another study, level of simplicity or 
complexity of rape narratives was inversely associated to chronic PTSD, which is consistent 
with the idea that simpler, less developed trauma narratives impede recovery (Amir et al., 
1998). It would have been useful to do a quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
trauma narrative length and mental health outcomes in my participants, to see if this 
relationship is applicable in the South African setting.  
I believe my study could have been enriched by a more detailed and comprehensive study of 
the relationships between culture and shame. South Africa is characterised by a great deal of 
cultural diversity, but from observation of the women I interviewed, it appeared that they 
endorsed the values of a broadly individualistic culture, and that they reacted in shame against 
a culture of honour maintained by patriarchal, oppressive men in their communities. But these 
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are mere reflections. A more systematic and in-depth investigation of these associations 
would add to our understanding of why these women experienced shame in the way they did, 
as a thoroughly social (and stigmatising) emotion, which one would expect from more 
collectivistic cultures. But as noted in chapter 4, the distinction between individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures is not as simple as initially believed, which may account for this 
unexpected finding (Swartz, 1985, 1998). These women experienced shame on an individual 
level, but associated it with the authentic self being seen, exposed, by others, even others from 
the same social group as they came from themselves. And they saw all IPV survivors, as a 
group, as inherently shameful; stigmatised, but unlike one would expect in a collectivistic 
culture, they did not feel their own shame reflected badly on the social group they belonged 
to.   
There is an acute lack of prevalence studies of chronic trauma and its correlates in South 
Africa. In addition, there is a dearth of longitudinal studies on chronic trauma, shame and 
psychological outcomes, both internationally and locally. But qualitative studies are just as 
rare. And the advantages of conducting a qualitative study is that you gain access to a fuller, 
in-depth verbal and non-verbal understanding of the topic at hand – in this case, shame - with 
all its complexities, intricacies, contradictions, ambiguities and nuances. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this final section I draw together the most striking findings emerging from this study. Most 
of these findings have been mentioned elsewhere, in different contexts, but this final section 
provides the reader with a convenient summary of key findings. 
One of the most important findings involves (external) shame, often described or interpreted 
as humiliation (more so than embarrassment) in this study, which requires a hostile, mocking 
audience who sees the now exposed authentic self. This, as we have seen, is not a necessary 
precondition of (internal) shame. Unlike shame, humiliation does not involve the negative 
evaluation of the self by the self, instead it involves the self’s negative evaluation (and blame) 
of the other whom s/he believes has behaved unjustly towards him/her (Elison & Harter, 
2007; Gilbert, 1998). When experiencing humiliation, there is an audience who no longer 
respects the shamed self, the self who feels stigmatised and experiences status anxiety (the 
self, who in evolutionary terms, has lost SAHP). The self responds by feeling humiliated fury, 
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frequently turned inward, which leads to the fused construct I spoke of earlier – the 
experience of the global negative self-perceptions (including feelings of deservedness and 
“badness”) associated with a shame-prone emotional style. However socially defined, these 
emotional processes occur in an individualistic culture where individual shame does not 
reflect badly on the group as in collectivistic cultures, but in a culture that values certain types 
of status that these women do not have access to (for example, financial independence). It 
also manifests within a cultural/linguistic system where the word “shame” is poorly 
differentiated (e.g. the word “shame” includes embarrassment and shyness, for instance, in 
Oriya Brahmans [Shweder, 2003], in Bengkulu [Fessler, 2004] and in Japanese culture 
[Lebra, 1983]), and has negative connotations that emphasise blame, vulnerability and 
fallibility, and consequently do not facilitate its expression, and so, the possibility of freedom 
from its bondage.  
Women I interviewed were exposed to a great deal of diverse and overlapping traumas. 
Transgenerational trauma, emotional abuse, and having children witness abuse between 
parents were cited as the most traumatic experiences for women. Research has demonstrated 
that earlier onset trauma (before the age of 14 years) is associated with significantly more 
dissociative symptoms, difficulties in modulating anger and self-destructive and suicidal 
behaviours than for older survivors of interpersonal traumas or acute traumas/disasters (Van 
der Kolk et al., 1996). As will be described, these are all symptoms that were evident in my 
participants, suggesting high rates of child abuse. 
The most striking reported mental health outcomes (I did not formally assess levels of 
psychopathology) were persistent fear, depression and suicidality, dissociation and somatic 
complaints. Coping mechanisms included religion, support from family, counselling and 
substance misuse. Using smiling as a mask to conceal difficult feelings, and keeping occupied 
were cited as the most effective defenses.  
One of the most significant findings emerging from the categorical content analysis and the 
narrative analysis from a social constructivist point of view, is the presence of the split self 
amongst participating women – the authentic self who admitted to a great deal of shame when 
asked indirectly, and the false self who was described in surprisingly positive terms when 
asked directly. Eleven women demonstrated a significant split between the false, socially 
conforming self, and the shame-based authentic self. I firstly analysed this split on an 
individual level, drawing attention to its manifestation in chronic trauma syndromes such as 
Complex PTSD and DESNOS, and how it is amplified by complicity with the perpetrator – 
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by remaining silent, and keeping the abuse secret. Secondly, I analysed the split at 
organisational level, and drew attention to women’s counter-narratives, in which they 
constructed themselves as strong survivors, which was consistent with the ethos of the 
Saartjie Baartman Centre. I critically evaluated the authenticity of these counter-narratives, 
which are by definition meant to be resistance narratives, and came to the conclusion that they 
were not “true” counter narratives, because they were based on what had been micro-
culturally (organisationally) – however well-intentioned - imposed upon them. They were not 
new identities that women had constructed for themselves, which is why these claims of inner 
strength and survivorhood often felt thinly-veiled and forced. Finally, I
 
analysed the split at 
cultural level, and focused on cultures of shame and honour. I argued that cultures of honour 
develop where poverty is pervasive, and where, as a result, social status and patriarchy are 
held in high esteem (Cohen et al., 1998). Patriarchy in cultures of honour is maintained by the 
reactive shame that women feel, this being a shame-based response pattern which recurs 
cyclically at cultural level. This is why IPV was considered normative in these communities. 
However, paradoxically, considering its normative status, women also expressed a great deal 
of shame, humiliation and embarrassment about IPV. I argue that women are unconsciously 
complicit in preserving the gender-based status quo – they protect the dominance, strength 
and authority of men in cultures of honour, and the “right” of these men to own or possess 
them at the cost of valued parts of themselves, and that they blame themselves for their abuse, 
which is an undeniably painful process, however unconscious. 
I believe the numerous references to social status, respect, and seeking financial security 
(representing a preoccupation with stigma, stigma consciousness, and status anxiety) in both 
chapters 7 and 8 is a compensatory effort made by the individual false self for the culturally-
determined shame felt by the shame-based authentic self. 
In the final results and discussion chapter, I explore trauma and shame narratives for 
significant signs of related pathology: psychic fragmentation. I analysed five long, complex 
narratives using Gee’s (1991) method, and three short, compressed narratives, using a more 
informal method to demonstrate how the unspeakable manifests for some narrators in bodily 
form. The nature and length of trauma narratives have implications for narrators’ mental 
health; shorter narratives are associated with poorer outcomes (Amir et al., 1998; Foa et al., 
1995).  
The structure of the short narratives tended to be circular, erratic, disjointed, and interrupted 
(Scarry, 1985; Simon, 2008). The three short, compressed trauma narratives were 
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characterised by long pauses or silences, hesitations, avoiding eye contact, hunching over, 
covering the face with clothes, whispering, so making the narrative almost inaudible, crying, 
and defensive leaning in towards me, and laughing. These women were exceptions – most 
women expressed an urgency to talk about their experiences. Yet these women did want to 
talk; their bodies were talking for them. This is why traumatic memory is so often 
communicated through the body (Simon, 2008).  
Although the longer narratives are essentially fractured chaos narratives at linguistic level, 
they contain predominant trauma- and shame-related themes that are consistent throughout 
the narratives and that remain intact in spite of the signs of linguistic disruption and 
fragmentation. They are, in order of narratives, 1) shame/self-blame and deservedness; 2) 
truth/lies and bearing witness; 3) shame, humiliation and dissociation; 4) the concealed, 
shame-based self, including amnesiac-like disorientation of place and time; and 5) patterns of 
cyclical leave-return reflecting perpetrator-instilled abandonment terror, including 
disorientation of time. I have argued that although language, or narrative structure, continues 
to mimic and reflect narrative content (fractured narratives vs fractured selves) – there is also 
the fascinating possibility of a disconnection between form and content; and that thematic 
coherence or consistency and narrative fracturing can co-occur; co-exist.  
I would argue that from the five narratives I analyse, a linguistic and semantic pattern 
emerges. At linguistic or structural level, the narrators produce non-linear, disrupted, 
fragmented narratives through the use of linguistic devices such as repetition; the meaningless 
use of connecting words such as “and”, “then” and “because”; ellipses, followed by 
incomplete “sentences”; and incomprehensible phrases. These linguistic features do not occur 
randomly – they occur, without exception, at particularly significant, painful or shameful 
parts of the narrative. Both “macro-fracturing” (major structural breakdowns) and “micro-
fracturing” (minor structural ruptures) occur in some of the narratives. 
The theme of shame is ubiquitous in at least three of the narratives. Four aspects of chronic 
trauma also feature in the narratives: firstly, disorganised attachment patterns, and 
abandonment terror; secondly, the issue of credibility/being believed and bearing witness to 
the trauma; and thirdly, the emotional investment in the perpetrator-defined identity (the 
“bad”, blamed, shamed self). Fourthly, in at least one of the narratives, there is evidence of 
substantial disorientation: disturbances in space and time which take place when trauma 
memories are encoded without a spatio-temporal frame to organise them, creating memories 
which are disjoined and fractured, which lack spatial and temporal orientation and can induce 
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deficits in episodic memory (Payne et al., 2004). These features are either related to, or 
comprise diagnostic criteria for chronic trauma syndromes such as chronic PTSD and 
DESNOS, and intersect with shame themes in the narratives I analysed. Consequently, I 
would argue that there is a substantial intersection or co-occurrence between exposure to 
chronic trauma, and trauma-related clinical symptoms, including shame, which emerge from 
the narratives, which without exception, demonstrate noteworthy linguistic fracturing.  
To expand on this interpretation, firstly, I would argue that a global pattern of negative self-
evaluative responses is the process underlying a shame-prone emotional style borne out of 
repeated exposure to trauma. Following this argument, chronically traumatised individuals are 
likely to have shame-based self-esteems, which I would argue should be included as a 
diagnostic criterion for all chronic trauma-based syndromes. Secondly, the linguistic 
fracturing referred to at the end of the last paragraph is representative of the fragmentation of 
self, which is the basis of dissociative and complex traumatic syndromes. Thus, in my view, 
both shame and fragmentation/dissociation link and underlie complex trauma-based 
syndromes. Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele (2006) have worked on a theoretical approach 
which supports this argument. They argue that trauma-related dissociation unifies psychiatric 
disorders with a traumatic stress source, and provide an associated treatment model. In 
essence, existing research and the outcomes of my study show that shame is embedded in 
chronic trauma, yet literature linking the two is limited. Shame (and linguistic fragmentation, 
as representative of the fractured self) has been associated with a range of trauma-related 
psychopathological outcomes, yet it is not included as a diagnostic criterion in most chronic 
trauma-based syndromes. Van der Kolk argues in his 1994 article that there has been debate 
about diagnostic criteria in the DSM system for PTSD in particular for (now) over three 
decades. This lack of attention to shame as a central contributor to psychopathology, 
combined with the complex comorbidity associated with chronic trauma undermines clinical 
efficiency and the effectiveness of treatments. In fact, shame has been described as a key 
predictor of Complex PTSD independent of fear, helplessness, and horror, and contributes to 
psychological recovery among childhood abuse survivors who experience adult-onset trauma 
(Cloitre et al., 2009). It is viewed by these authors as the “core” emotion resulting from 
chronic trauma (Cloitre et al., 2009). 
In conclusion, women participating in this study were in what Wozniak and Allen (2012, p. 
85) define as a “liminal space”. Liminality is characterised by a separation from one’s old life, 
and transition towards a time of ambiguity, rolelessness and danger, where individuals are no 
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longer who they were, but they have not yet become something personally and socially 
different (Wozniak & Allan, 2012). Women who continue to identify themselves as either 
victims or survivors of intimate partner violence, as these participants did, in their (imposed) 
counter-narratives, remain in liminality (Wozniak & Allan, 2012). The danger is that crisis 
intervention often ends at this point, leaving women to perpetuate their psychological 
investment in an identity blemished by deficit, stigma and shame (Wozniak & Allan, 2012). It 
was during this important time of transition that I collected my data. Most women had already 
attempted to alter their identity from victim to survivor, at least at a superficial level, but few 
could see beyond an identity defined through abuse. It is my sincere hope that through 
continued mental health interventions, for as long as is sustainable, these women will begin to 
construct narratives that will free them of the bondage of a shame-filled, perpetrator-defined 
identity. That they will construct narratives that free them from their persistent fear, their 
wishes to die, their numbness, and their sense of unreality, or dissociation; their descriptions 
of seeing the world through a “bubble”, a pane of glass. It reminds me of a quote by author 
Martha Beck (2005), who in her recent autobiography refers to her identification with 
Virginia Woolf, who was never able to free herself from such bondage, particularly the 
paralysis, the numbness, of dissociation. I wish for these women what Beck (2005, p. 220) 
says:  
I am endlessly grateful for the fact that I was lucky enough to learn something 
Virginia Woolf never realized: glass can melt. It melted for me when I began allowing 
myself to know what I already knew, to feel consciously the pain I’d been ignoring 
almost all my life… Call it awakening, call it being born again, call it whatever you 
like; but the sensation of my disowned self moving back into my body was so strange 
and delicious that it occupied much of my attention for many months. In the words of 
another female writer, Emily Dickinson, ‘to live is so startling it leaves little time for 
anything else.’ 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Interview Schedule (English Version) 
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in my study. I know that some of the things 
that we will talk about will be very private and personal to you, and so I would like to remind 
you that everything you say here is confidential. I also wanted to remind you that although I 
will be recording our conversation, only I will have access to the recording.  
 
1. How long have you been at Saartjie Baartman? 
 
2. How does being a resident in a shelter make you feel? [tapping stigma and its relation to 
shame] 
 
3. Would you mind telling me about the experiences that brought you to Saartjie 
Baartman? [gender-based violence exposure] 
 
4. Tell me about your life before the abuse from your partner.  
 
- Prompt 1: Tell me about your mother and father. What was your childhood like?  
– Prompt 2: Have you experienced things like what brought you to the Centre earlier in your 
life? [chronic trauma exposure] 
- Prompt 3: How was your childhood similar to what happened to you recently, and in what 
ways was it different? [chronic trauma exposure] 
- Prompt 4: (if interviewee has experienced exposure to natural disasters). How was the 
experience of the earthquake/flood/fire different from the kind of difficult times you 
experienced with your partner (and/or in childhood) recently? [drawing distinctions between 
acts of nature and other traumas] 
 
5. How do you feel about yourself? [self-esteem] 
 
- Prompt 1: Is this different from how you used to think and feel about yourself?  
- Prompt 2: (if yes). What has changed?  
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- Prompt 3: (if yes). When do you think it changed? 
 
6. If I was to ask someone who knows you very well what kind of person you are, what 
would he or she say? [self-perception] 
 
- Prompt 1: What parts of what this person says to describe you, are the most important or 
most noticeable parts of you?  
- Prompt 2: Have the parts in you that are most important or noticeable changed because of 
the difficult things you have gone through?  
 
7. How have your difficult times changed the way you feel about people (not the 
person/people who hurt you)? [shift towards shame-proneness in social interactions] 
 
- Prompt 1: Some people feel like it is difficult to trust people after they have been hurt the 
way you have been. Is this how you feel? 
- Prompt 2: Some people feel very angry about what happened to them, and easily get angry. 
Is this something you feel? 
- Prompt 3: Some people wrongly feel that it is their fault that they were hurt in the way you 
were, and feel ashamed and shy and embarrassed with other people. Sometimes they just feel 
like hiding away. Is this something that happens to you?  
 
8. What kinds of thoughts and feelings about the hard times you have been through are 
the most difficult for you? [assessing how prominent shame features are and whether they 
relate to aspects of psychopathology] 
 
Prompt 1: Why is this thought/feeling so difficult for you?  
 
9. Focus on the experience which has been the hardest for you. How did you feel while it 
was happening? 
 
- Prompt 1: How did you feel in your body during the attack/abuse? 
- Prompt 2: What thoughts went through your mind? 
- Prompt 3: What feelings did you feel? [tapping potential shame responses] 
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10. What do you think causes the kind of violence you have been exposed to? 
 
11. Can you tell me how you feel in relation to the people who hurt you this way? 
[internalisation of blame, as well as anger and hostility] 
 
- Prompt 1: Some people feel very angry with the person or people who hurt them. Is this 
how you feel? 
- Prompt 2: Some people wrongly blame themselves rather than those who hurt them for 
what happened to them. Is this something you feel?  
 
12. Many people feel shame after they have been hurt by other people. Does what your 
partner did to you make you feel ashamed? 
 
 
13. What does the word “shame” mean to you?  
 
- Prompt 1: (if yes) Can you tell me how it felt for you?  
- Prompt 2: (if yes) How did it feel in your body? 
- Prompt 3: (if yes) What kinds of thoughts did you think when you felt ashamed?  
 
14. Some people feel bad about themselves, or don’t feel good enough or worthless after 
they have been hurt like you have. Have you ever felt like this? 
 
15. Do you experience psychological problems? 
 
- Prompt 1: (if yes) Can you tell me about these difficulties? 
 
16. Who or what supported you through your childhood and abusive relationship? 
 
17. What do you do to cope with your difficult feelings? [the presence of coping strategies 
for shame reactions] 
 
- Prompt 1: (if shame is one of the difficult feelings). How do you cope with your shame?  
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Thank you very much for talking to me. I have learnt a lot from what you have told me. I 
hope that what you and other women have talked to me about, will allow me to do research 
that helps to teach people about gender-based violence. I also hope that my research will teach 
counsellors and therapists how to work with women like you, to help them.  
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Interview Schedule (Afrikaans Version) 
Baie dankie dat jy ingestem het om deel te neem aan my navorsing. Ek besef dat sommige 
van die dinge waaroor ons sal praat, vir jou baie privaat en persoonlik is, daarom wil ek net 
bevestig dat alles wat jy hier sê, vertroulik is. Ek wil jou ook daaraan herinner dat, hoewel ek 
ons gesprek op band opneem, net ek toegang tot die band sal hê.  
 
1. Vertel vir my van jou ervaring van Saartjie Baartman.  
 
2. Hoe laat dit jou voel om in ‘n skuiling soos Saartjie Baartman te lewe?  
 
3. Gee jy om om my te vertel watter ondervindings jou na Saartjie Baartman gebring 
het? [blootstelling aan gender-geweld] 
 
4. Vertel my van jou lewe voordat jy deur jou man of kerel mishandel is.  
 
- Vraag 1: Het jy al vroeër in jou lewe dinge ervaar soos dit wat jou na die Sentrum gebring 
het? [kroniese blootstelling aan trauma] 
- Vraag 2: Op watter maniere was jou kinderjare dieselfde as dit wat onlangs met jou gebeur 
het, en op watter maniere was dit verskillend? [kroniese blootstelling aan trauma] 
- Vraag 2 (indien persoon aan natuurrampe blootgestel was). Hoe was die ervaring van die 
aardbewing/vloed/vuur anders as die moeilike tye wat jy onlangs met jou man of kerel (en/of 
in jou kinderjare) beleef het? [tref onderskeid tussen natuurrampe en ander traumas] 
 
5. Hoe voel jy oor jouself? [selfbeeld] 
  
- Vraag 1: Is dit anders as wat jy vroeër oor jouself gedink en gevoel het?  
- Vraag 2: (indien “ja”). Wat het verander?  
- Vraag 3: (if yes). Wanneer, dink jy, het dit verander? 
 
6. As ek iemand wat jou baie goed ken, sou vra watter soort persoon jy is, wat sou hy of 
sy sê? [self-persepsie] 
 
- Vraag 1: Watter aspekte van wat daardie persoon sê om jou te beskryf, is die belangrikste of 
opvallendste aspekte van jou persoonlikheid?  
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- Vraag 2: Het hierdie belangrikste en opvallendste aspekte van jou verander as gevolg van 
die moeilike tye wat jy deurgemaak het?  
 
7. Hoe het hierdie moeilike tye jou gevoelens teenoor ander mense verander (nie teenoor 
die persoon wat jou seergemaak het nie)? [oorgang na geneigdheid tot skaamte in sosiale 
interaksie] 
 
- Vraag 1: Sommige mense voel dit is moeilik om ander mense te vertrou nadat hulle soos jy 
seergemaak is. Is dit hoe jy voel? 
- Vraag 2: Sommige mense is baie kwaad oor wat met hulle gebeur het, en word maklik 
kwaad. Is dit iets wat jy voel? 
- Vraag 3: Sommige mense voel, verkeerdelik, dat dit hulle skuld is dat hulle seergemaak is 
soos jy, en voel skaam, teruggetrokke en verleë voor ander mense. Somtyds voel hulle net lus 
om weg te kruip. Gebeur dit ook met jou? 
 
8. Watter tipe gedagtes en gevoelens oor die moeilike tye wat jy deurgemaak het, is vir 
jou die swaarste? [nagaan hoe prominent skaamte-kenmerke is en of hulle verband hou met 
aspekte van psigopatologie] 
 
Vraag 1: Waarom is hierdie gedagtes/gevoelens so moeilik vir jou?  
 
9. Fokus op die ervaring wat vir jou die swaarste was. Hoe het jy gevoel terwyl dit aan 
die gebeur was? 
 
- Vraag 1: Hoe het jou liggaam tydens die aanval/mishandeling gevoel? 
- Vraag 2: Watter gedagtes het deur jou gegaan? 
- Vraag 3: Watter emosies het jy ervaar? [stimuleer potensiële skaamte-reaksies] 
 
10. Wat dink jy lei tot die tipe geweld wat jy ervaar het?   
 
11. Kan jy my vertel hoe jy voel teenoor die persoon of mense wat jou op hierdie manier 
seergemaak het? [internalisering van blaam, sowel as woede en vyandigheid] 
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- Vraag 1: Sommige mense voel baie kwaad vir die persoon of persone wat hulle seergemaak 
het. Voel jy ook so? 
- Vraag 2: Sommige mense blameer verkeerdelik hulleself, eerder as die mense wat hulle 
seergemaak het, vir wat met hulle gebeur het. Is dit iets wat jy voel?  
 
12. Baie mense voel verkeerdelik skaam nadat hulle deur ander mense seergemaak is. 
  
- Vraag 1: Het jy gevoelens van skaamte gehad oor dit wat met jou gebeur het? [subjektiewe 
interpretasies van skaamte] 
- Vraag 2: (indien “ja”) Kan jy my vertel hoe dit vir jou gevoel het?  
- Vraag 3: (indien “ja”) Hoe het dit in jou liggaam gevoel? 
- Vraag 4: (indien “ja”) Watter soort gedagtes het jy gehad toe jy skaam gevoel het?  
 
13. Wat beteken die woord “skaamte” vir jou? 
 
14. Sommige mense voel sleg oor hulle self, hulle voel hulle is nie goed genoeg nie, of het 
geen waarde nie nadat hulle soos jy seergemaak is. Het jy al ooit so gevoel? 
 
15. Ervaar jy sielkundige probleme?  
 
Vraag 1: Kan jy vir my vertel oor die sielkundige probleme? 
 
16. Wie of wat het jou ondersteun gedurende jou kinderjare en gedurende jou 
geweldadige verhouding? 
 
17. Wat doen jy om jou pynlike gevoelens te hanteer? [aanwesigheid van strategieë om 
skaamte-reaksies te hanteer] 
 
- Vraag 1: (indien skaamte een van die pynlike gevoelens is) Hoe hanteer jy jou skaamte?  
 
Baie dankie dat jy met my gesels het. Ek het baie van die gesprek met jou geleer. Ek hoop dat 
dit waaroor jy en die ander vroue met my gepraat het, my in staat sal stel om navorsing te 
doen wat mense oor gender-geweld kan leer. Ek hoop verder dat my navorsing vir raadgewers 
en terapeute sal leer hoe om met mense soos jy te werk, om hulle te help. 
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Appendix B 
Informed consent form (English version) 
 
Focus of the research project: 
Shame narratives in South African survivors of chronic trauma 
 
Institutional affiliation: Stellenbosch University, Cape Town, South Africa 
 
Principal investigator: Amelia van der Merwe 
 
Address: 129 Empire Avenue, Hout Bay, Cape Town, 7806, South Africa 
 
Contact number: 021 7907567 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project.  Please take some time to read the 
information presented here, which will explain the details of this project.  Please ask the study 
me any questions about any part of this project that you do not fully understand.  It is very 
important that you are fully satisfied that you clearly understand what this research entails and 
how you could be involved.  Also, your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
decline to participate.  If you say no, this will not affect you negatively in any way 
whatsoever.  You are also free to withdraw from the study at any point, even if you do agree 
to take part. 
 
The interviews will be audio-taped, with your permission, so that I can go back later and 
listen carefully to what you had to say. If you do not wish to be audio-taped, I will ask you to 
withdraw from the study.  
 
It is also important for you to know that everything we talk about during this study will be 
kept private and confidential, and only I will have access to the information you give me. 
Once I have collected all the information from you and other people who visit Saartjie 
Baartman Centre, I will put it together in a way that ensures that no-one can find out what you 
told me.  
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This study has been approved by the Health Research Ethics Committee at Stellenbosch 
University and will be conducted according to the ethical guidelines and principles of the 
international Declaration of Helsinki, South African Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 
and the Medical Research Council (MRC) Ethical Guidelines for Research. 
 
What is this research study all about? 
 The study will be conducted at the Saartjie Baartman Centre, and 20 individuals will 
take part in the study.   
 South Africa has very high levels of violence of all kinds, which makes exposure to 
trauma and experiencing associated psychological difficulties, more likely. In many 
South African communities, people are exposed to violence on an ongoing basis. 
Despite this, there is a serious lack of research on exposure to chronic (ongoing) 
trauma, and how people respond emotionally to this kind of trauma. I would like to 
use the information I collect to produce research in this area, and to advise 
counsellors who work with people like you how to address the emotional experiences 
and difficulties you may be feeling as a result of being exposed to chronic trauma.  
 I will conduct one interview of approximately 1 hour in duration with each of the 
participants.  
 
Why have you been invited to participate? 
 You have been selected because you are an adult (over 18 years of age) who has 
experienced chronic (ongoing) trauma. I have also asked you to participate because 
you indicated that you are willing to participate in research. 
 
What will your responsibilities be? 
 Your only responsibility is to participate in an interview focusing on your emotional 
responses to exposure to chronic trauma.  
 
Will you benefit from taking part in this research? 
 Your participation in this study will help me produce research which will enhance the 
kind of help that mental health professionals working with people who have been 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
419 
 
 
 
exposed to chronic trauma are able to provide. This will hopefully benefit all those 
exposed to chronic trauma who seek mental health services. 
 
Are there any risks involved in your taking part in this research? 
 There is a risk that you may feel upset when recalling traumas you have been exposed 
to, and how they made you feel. This is why we are arranging that you can speak to 
your counsellor at the Saartjie Baartman Centre at any time after the interview. This 
means you will be able to discuss what came up in the interview with your counsellor 
shortly after completing the interview. I will also, with your permission, talk to your 
counsellor about any issue that came up in the interview that you feel would be helpful 
for your counsellor to know about.  
 
Will you be paid to take part in this study and are there any costs involved? 
 
 You will be paid R50 in food vouchers for your participation.  There will be no costs 
involved for you, if you do take part. 
 
Is there anything else that you should know or do? 
 You can contact the Health Research Ethics Committee at 021-938 9207 if you have 
any concerns or complaints that have not been adequately addressed by the 
researcher. 
 You will receive a copy of this information and consent form for your own records. 
 
Declaration by participant 
 
By signing below, I …………………………………..…………. agree to take part in a 
research study focusing on shame narratives in South African survivors of chronic trauma.  
 
I declare that: 
 
 I have read or had read to me this information and consent form and it is written 
in a language with which I am fluent and comfortable. 
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 I have had a chance to ask questions and all my questions have been adequately 
answered. 
 I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and I have not been 
pressurised to take part. 
 I may choose to leave the study at any time and will not be penalised or 
prejudiced in any way. 
 I may be asked to leave the study before it has finished, if the researcher feels it is 
in my best interests, or if I do not follow the study plan, as agreed to. 
 
 
Signed at (place) ......................…........…………….. on (date) …………....……….. 2011. 
 
 
 
 ......................................................................   ...................................................................  
Signature of participant Signature of witness 
 
 
Declaration by investigator 
 
I (name) ……………………………………………..……… declare that: 
 
 I explained the information in this document to ………………………………….. 
 I encouraged him/her to ask questions and took adequate time to answer them. 
 I am satisfied that he/she adequately understands all aspects of the research, as 
discussed above. 
 
Signed at (place) ......................…........…………….. on (date) …………....……….. 2011. 
 
 
 
 ......................................................................   ...................................................................  
Signature of investigator Signature of witness 
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Toestemmingsvorm (Afrikaans version) 
 
Fokus van die navorsingsprojek: 
Verhale van skaamte deur Suid-Afrikaanse oorlewendes van chroniese trauma. 
 
Geaffilieerde instelling: Stellenbosch University, Kaapstad, South Africa 
 
Hoofnavorser: Amelia van der Merwe 
 
Adres: 129 Empire Avenue, Hout Bay, Cape Town, 7806, South Afrika 
 
Kontak nommer: 021 7907567 
 
Hiermee word u uitgenooi om aan ‘n navorsingsprojek deel te neem. Gebruik asseblief 
voldoende tyd om die inligting te lees wat hier gegee word. Vra asseblief enige vrae aan 
enigiemand van die studiepersoneel oor enigiets wat nie vir u volkome duidelik is nie. Dit is 
baie belangrik dat u heeltemal seker is wat hierdie studie presies behels en op watter manier u 
betrokke sou kon raak. Wees verseker dat u deelname volkome vrywillig is en dat dit u vry 
staan om deelname te weier. As u nie u toestemming verleen nie, sal dit geen negatiewe 
gevolge vir u inhou nie. U is ook vry om u in enige stadium aan die studie te onttrek, selfs as 
u aanvanklik toegestem het om deel te neem. 
 
Die onderhoude sal, met u toestemming, op oudioband opgeneem word, sodat ek later presies 
kan nagaan wat u gesê het. As u nie op oudioband opgeneem wil word nie, sal ek u versoek 
om u aan die studie te onttrek.  
 
Dit is ook belangrik vir u om te weet dat alles waaroor ons tydens hierdie studie praat, 
privaat en vertroulik gehou sal word, en net ek sal toegang hê tot die inligting wat u aan my 
verskaf. As ek eenmaal al die inligting van u en van ander persone wat die Saartjie 
Baartmansentrum besoek, versamel het, sal ek dit op so ‘n manier saamvoeg dat niemand sal 
kan weet wat u aan my vertel het nie. 
 
Hierdie studie is goedgekeur deur die Gesondheidsnavorsing Etiekkomitee aan die 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, en sal uitgevoer word volgens die etiese riglyne en beginsels 
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van die Internasionale Verklaring van Helsinki, die Suid-Afrikaanse Riglyne vir Goeie 
Kliniese Praktyk en die Mediese Navorsingsraad (MNR) se Etiese Riglyne vir Navorsing. 
 
Waaroor handel hierdie studie? 
 Die studie sal by die Saartjie Baartmansentrum onderneem word, en 20 indiwidue sal 
daaraan deelneem.   
 Suid-Afrika het baie hoë vlakke van geweld in verskeie vorme, wat die ervaring van 
trauma en die sielkundige probleme wat daarmee verband hou, vermeerder. In baie 
Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskappe word mense voortdurend aan geweld blootgestel. 
Nogtans is daar ‘n ernstige tekort aan navorsing oor chroniese (voortdurende) 
trauma en mense se emosionele reaksie daarop. Die inligting wat ek inwin, wil ek 
gebruik om navorsing op hierdie gebied te doen, en om raadgewers wat met mense 
soos u werk, te adviseer hoe om die emosionele ervaring en probleme van mense soos 
u, wat aan chroniese trauma blootgestel is, te hanteer.  
 Ek sal met elkeen van die deelnemers ‘n onderhoud van ongeveer ‘n uur voer.  
 
Waarom is u uitgenooi om deel te neem? 
 U is uitgenooi omdat u ‘n volwassene is (ouer as 18 jaar) wat chroniese 
(voortdurende) trauma ervaar het. Ek het u ook uitgenooi omdat u aangedui het dat u 
gewillig is om aan navorsing deel te neem.  
 
Wat sal u verantwoordelikhede wees? 
 U enigste verantwoordelikheid is om aan ‘n onderhoud deel te neem wat fokus op u 
emosionele reaksie op die blootstelling aan chroniese trauma.  
 
Wat sal dit u baat as u aan hierdie navorsing deelneem? 
 U deelname aan hierdie studie sal my help om navorsing te doen wat van waarde kan 
wees vir die professionele persone wat geestesgesondheidsdienste lewer en wat met 
mense soos u werk. Sodoende, hoop ek, sal almal wat aan chroniese trauma 
blootgestel is en wat die hulp van geestesgesondheidsdienste soek, direk of indirek 
daarby baat. 
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Is daar enige risiko’s verbonde aan u deelname aan hierdie navorsing? 
 Daar is die risiko dat u ontstel mag word as u praat oor die traumas waaraan u 
blootgestel was en hoe dit u laat voel het. Daarom sal ek organiseer dat u met u 
raadgewer (counsellor) oor die onderhoud kan gesels sodra dit moontlik is, en as dit 
vir u sal help, (en met u permissie) sal ek met u raadgeweer (counsellor) praat oor die 
dinge wat jou onstel het in die gesprek met my.  
 
Sal u betaal word vir u deelname aan hierdie studie, en is daar enige koste aan 
verbonde? 
 
 U sal voedsel-geskenkbewyse ter waarde van R50 ontvang. Dit sal u niks kos om deel 
te neem nie.  
 
Is daar enigiets anders wat u moet weet of doen? 
 U kan die Etiese Komitee van Gesondheidnavorsing by die Universiteit van 
Stellenbosch skakel by 021-938 9207 as u enige klagtes of bekommernisse het wat nie 
bevredigend deur die navorser opgelos is nie. 
 U sal ‘n kopie van hierdie inligting en toestemmingsvorm vir u eie rekords ontvang. 
 
Verklaring deur die deelnemer 
 
Hiermee word verklaar dat ek …………………………………..…………. toestem om deel te 
neem aan ‘n navorsingstudie wat fokus op verhale van skaamte deur Suid-Afrikaanse 
oorlewendes van chroniese trauma. 
 
Ek verklaar dat: 
 
 Ek hierdie inligting en die toesigvorm gelees het of dat iemand dit vir my gelees 
het. Dit is geskryf in ‘n taal wat ek ken en waarmee ek met gemak omgaan. 
 Ek die geleentheid gehad het om vrae te stel en dat al my vrae voldoende 
beantwoord is. 
 Ek begryp dat deelname aan hierdie studie vrywillig is en dat ek onder geen druk 
geplaas is om daaraan deel te neem nie. 
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 Ek enige tyd mag besluit om nie meer aan die studie deel te neem nie en dat ek nie 
op enige wyse daardeur gestraf of benadeel sal word nie. 
 Ek gevra mag word om deelname aan die studie te staak voordat dit voltooi is, 
indien die navorser van mening is dat dit in my beste belang is of indien ek nie die 
studieplan volg soos ooreengekom nie. 
 
Geteken te (plek) ......................…........…………….. op (datum) …………....……….. 2011. 
 
 
 
 ......................................................................   ...................................................................  
Handtekening van deelnemer Handtekening van getuie 
 
 
Verklaring deur die ondersoeker 
 
Ek (naam) ……………………………………………..……… verklaar dat: 
 
 Ek die inligting in hierdie dokument duidelik gemaak het aan 
………………………………….. 
 Ek hom/haar aangemoedig het om vrae te stel en voldoende tyd gebruik het om 
die vrae te beantwoord.  
 Ek tevrede is dat hy/sy alle aspekte van die navorsing, soos hierbo uiteengesit, 
voldoende begryp. 
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